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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the radical right movement in the Russian Empire between 
1900 and 1914. Eschewing an exclusively ‘high political’ focus, it considers the 
right-wing interaction with Russian society in what rightist activists widely 
considered to be an era of crisis. It examines the construction of social and political 
identities by rightists, and also their practical projects in what was part of a wider 
effort to renovate and transform Russia, and arrest what were perceived as negative 
developments in politics and society. In so doing, leaders and activists tested the 
effectiveness of a developing popular monarchist ideology in the age of mass 
politics, during and after the 1905 revolution.  
 
 Examining several major right-wing groups, the Russian Assembly, Russian 
Monarchist Party, Union of Russian Men, Union of Russian People, and Union of 
the Archangel Mikhail, this work presents an argument that rightists were becoming 
increasingly radical in the final years of the Russian Empire, as they enthusiastically 
engaged with the challenges presented in post-1905 Russia, yet were still drawing on 
conservative precepts. The creation of a populist appeal was part of a wider process 
of political mobilization on the part of rightists, yet the construction of both positive 
and negative images of the people was a complex process. This thesis considers 
right-wing engagement with diverse bases of social support; an attempt to create a 
broad based counter-revolutionary social movement. It contributes to an 
understanding of the right’s place in the wider context of social and political life in 
late imperial Russia, and examines the inter-action between ideology and practice. 
The ultimate implication of the rise of a spontaneous right-wing movement that 
developed away from the regime and even in conflict with it was to deepen the crisis 
of autocratic power in late imperial Russia.  
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 1 
Introduction  
 
In recent years, historical interest in Russia has shifted from how the revolutionaries 
gained power to why the regime, after centuries of rule, managed to lose it. The 
Russian autocracy collapsed swiftly in 1917, and all attempts to revive it afterwards 
met with failure.1 Throughout the civil war period and beyond, the autocracy’s 
supporters could not agree on the measures or indeed goals necessary for a potential 
revival of the Tsarist regime. Both before and after the revolutions of 1917, Russian 
conservatism was a broad, discordant and often unhappy church. Whilst 
conservatives agreed on the need to preserve the autocracy, they could not agree on 
the means by which to unite, and promote that goal. The future development of the 
autocracy haunted the policy-makers of the empire, in what were to be its final 
years. Whether Tsarist Russia was to become a state based on the rule of law and 
civil rights, or else a police state based on repression, was one question that 
especially vexed educated society.2 However, the autocracy did not altogether lack 
support; many groups rose up to defend it in the face of the revolutionary challenge. 
This thesis is about one particular set of these defenders: the radical right movement 
that emerged in the last years of the Russian Empire.  
 
 The final years of tsarism saw a wave of crises unlike any that had been 
encountered before. The revolution of 1905 was a direct challenge to leaders and 
activists from the right, which saw in society’s transformation the seeds of a new 
crisis. The right’s political leaders, statesmen and their adherents opposed Russian 
modernity; they were obsessed with decline and the emergence of a new ‘time of 
troubles’, caused by foreign and domestic enemies, such as revolutionaries, Jews and 
bureaucrats. The resulting images of people and society were mixed: positive, in the 
case of the peasantry; compromised, like workers; and negative, regarding Russia’s 
                                                
1 For general works on Tsarist Russia, see R. Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime (2nd edition, 
London, 1995); P. Waldron, Governing Tsarist Russia (Palgrave, 2007); D. C. B. Lieven, Empire: 
The Russian Empire and its Rivals (London, 2000). 
2 For an insightful discussion of this issue, see C. Read, ‘In Search of Liberal Tsarism: The 
Historiography of Autocratic Decline’, Historical Journal, 45, 1 (2001), pp. 195-210. Pipes saw the 
key years in the creation of a police state as 1880 and 1881. See Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime, 
pp. 281-318.  
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Jews and national minorities. To counter such developments, rightists organized and 
mobilized, engaging with problems of mass politics following the 1905 revolution. 
These activities raise many questions. What did the right appear to be like to 
contemporary observers? Was right-wing ideology populist? Why were rightists able 
to mobilize elements of the Russian population? What were their drawbacks? Were 
any of these successes or failures inherent in the ideas or political culture of the 
right, or were they the result of tactical, ideological or practical problems? And what 
did these issues mean for the fate of late imperial Russia? This thesis addresses the 
creation of these social visions, and the development of an illiberal populist 
monarchism.3 
 
 This work is part of a live argument, as interest in the Russian right, and 
conservatism more generally, has grown exponentially in recent years. Much of the 
earliest serious work on Russian conservatism and the Russian right was carried out 
in the West. Some of the pioneering studies include Hans Rogger’s exceptional 
studies on the Russian extreme right, including the Union of Russian People (URP),4 
and Robert Edelman’s work on the Nationalist Party.5 Heinz-Dietrich Löwe’s 
monograph on the ‘reactionary utopia’ was a particularly searching analysis of 
Russian anti-Semitism.6 More recently, a monograph by Don C. Rawson examined 
the activity of rightists during the revolution of 1905, and particularly in elections to 
                                                
3 Social history of the right has frequently been overlooked in favour of political and bureaucratic 
perspectives. For two assessments of the lacunae in the historiography, see S. K. Morrissey, ‘Review 
of D. C. Rawson, Russian Rightists and the Revolution of 1905’, Russian History, 24, 3 (1997), pp. 
350-351; I. V. Narskii, ‘The Right-Wing Parties: Historiographical Limitations and Perspectives’, 
Kritika, 5, 1 (2004), pp. 179-184. 
4 H. Rogger, ‘Was There a Russian Fascism? The Union of Russian People’, Journal of Modern 
History, 36, 4 (1964), pp. 398-415; ‘The Formation of the Russian Right, 1900-1906’, California 
Slavic Studies, 3 (1964), pp. 66-94; ‘Russia’, in E. J. Weber and H. Rogger (eds.), The European 
Right: A Historical Profile (Berkeley, 1966), pp. 443-500; the first two of which have been reprinted 
in Rogger’s Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia (London, 1986), pp. 118-211 
and pp. 212-232.  
5 R. Edelman, Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Revolution: The Nationalist Party, 1907-1917 (New 
Brunswick, 1980); ‘The Elections to the Third Duma: The Roots of the Nationalist Party’, in L. H. 
Haimson (ed.), The Politics of Rural Russia, 1905-1914 (Bloomington, 1979), pp. 94-122. 
6 H.-D. Löwe, Antisemitismus und reaktionäre Utopie: Russ. Konservatismus im Kampf gegen d. 
Wandel von Staat u. Gesellschaft, 1890-1917 (Hamburg, 1978); The Tsars and the Jews: Reform, 
Reaction and Anti-Semitism in Imperial Russia, 1772-1917 (Oxford, 1992); see also his ‘Political 
Symbols and Rituals of the Russian Radical Right, 1900-1914’, Slavonic and East European Review, 
76, 3 (1998), pp. 441-466. 
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the First and Second Dumas.7 An excellent recent work by Faith Hillis focusing on 
the issue of Russian nationalism and the highly important Ukrainian question does 
necessarily include analysis of several rightist groups, such as the Double-Headed 
Eagle in Kiev, and of course many nationalist groups, one of which was the Kiev 
Club of Russian Nationalists.8 One recent thesis has examined the issue of 
corruption amongst the extreme right – or ‘black hundred’ groups.9 
 
 But it is in Russia itself where there is now the most intense interest. Since 
1991 historians, freed from the ideological constraints of Soviet scholarship, have 
examined a wide range of right-leaning ideologies, from liberal conservatives 
through to the Russian extreme right. This has resulted in scores of monographs, 
many published document collections, the establishment of a journal called Russian 
Conservatism, creation of websites, and convening of a number of conferences for 
the study of the phenomena.10 There has even been the establishment of a research 
centre in Perm for the history of Russian conservatism.11 Different types of 
conservative ideologies as well as different periods have been recently engaged 
with.12 To highlight a few examples, some of the most notable contributions are the 
                                                
7 D. C. Rawson, Russian Rightists and the Revolution of 1905 (Cambridge, 1995). 
8 F. Hillis, Children of Rus’: Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation (Ithaca, NY, 
2013). 
9 J. Langer, ‘Corruption and the Counterrevolution: The Rise and Fall of the Black Hundred’ (Ph.D. 
diss., Duke University, 2007). 
10 Several of the proceeds from such conferences have been released as edited collections.  Two are 
Iu. I. Kir’ianov (ed.), Konservatizm v sovremennom mire: materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi 
konferentsii, Perm. 27-28 May 1993 (Perm, 1994); P. Iu. Rakhshmir (ed.), Konservatizm i 
tsivilizatsionnye vyzovy sovremennosti: materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchno-prakticheskoi 
konferentsii, Perm. 29 February-1 March 2000 (Perm, 2000). 
11 Recent republications of the works of conservatives and monarchists give an idea of the trend. The 
series, Paths of Russian Imperial Consciousness (Puti russkogo imperskogo soznaniia), edited by M. 
B. Smolin, includes works by Lev Tikhomirov, Petr Kazanskii, Mikhail Men’shikov and others. 
12 On the nineteenth century, see V. Ia. Grosul (ed.), Russkii konservatizm XIX stoletiia: ideologiia i 
praktika (Moscow, 2000). For comprehensive overviews of recent Russian scholarship, see A. Iu. 
Minakov, ‘Russian Conservatism in Contemporary Russian Historiography: New Approaches and 
Research Trends’, and A. V. Repnikov, ‘The Contemporary Historiography of Russian 
Conservatism’, Russian Studies in History, 48, 2 (2009), pp. 8-28 and pp. 29-55. A recent article 
translated into English is A. I. Bokhanov, ‘Hopeless Symbiosis: Power and Right-Wing Radicalism at 
the Beginning of the Twentieth Century’, in A. Geifman (ed.), Russia Under the Last Tsar: 
Opposition and Subversion, 1894-1917 (Oxford, 1999), pp. 199-213. 
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monographs by Iu. I. Kir’ianov that examine the right-wing parties.13 Kir’ianov was 
also active in publishing many collections of documents on the right that have 
appeared in several scholarly journals.14 The work of Mikhail Luk’ianov has 
assessed the approach of different types of conservatives to renewing Russia.15 
Similarly, Aleksandr Repnikov’s recent work considers conservative approaches to 
issues of religion, nationality and economics.16 The proliferation of such studies 
reflects a revival of public interest in Russia’s national heritage, and how a nation 
imagines (and re-imagines) its own history, especially those elements that were 
hidden from view for many years.17 Such questions also have a contemporary 
resonance by fitting in with the educational projects of the Putin regime.  
 
 This recent wave of scholarship, however, invites fresh challenges. Whilst 
Russian conservatism and rightist movements have now attracted much attention, 
several aspects remain poorly understood. One of the main problems, even 
concerning high quality contributions, is a tendency to equate more moderate 
conservatives with right-wing thinkers, statesmen and groups that held very different 
views.18 One example is a recent encyclopedia on Russian conservatism, which 
includes figures that were to many intents and purposes polar opposites. Entries on 
Russia’s first Prime Minister, Sergei Witte, and the leader of the URP, Aleksandr 
Dubrovin, are both included in this volume.19 Both men claimed to support the 
                                                
13 Iu. I. Kir’ianov, Pravye partii v Rossii, 1911-1917 (Moscow, 2001); Russkoe sobranie: 1900-1917 
(Moscow, 2003).  
14 The most significant of which is Pravye partii. Dokumenty i materialy, 2 Vols. (Moscow, 1998). 
Several other collections appear in the journals Voprosy istorii (Questions of History) and 
Istoricheskii arkhiv (Historical Archive).  
15 See in particular the work of Mikhail Luk’ianov (sometimes appearing as Loukianov in English-
language publications), which considers broader conceptual issues such as support for the monarchy 
and views of the national question. M. N. Luk’ianov, Rossiiskii konservatizm i reforma, 1907-1914 
(2nd edition, Stuttgart, 2006); ‘“Conservatives and “Renewed Russia,” 1907-1914’, Slavic Review, 61, 
4 (2002), pp. 762-786; ‘“Russian for Russians” or “Russia for Russian Subjects”? Conservatives and 
the Nationality Question on the Eve of World War One’, Russian Studies in History, 46, 4 (2008), pp. 
77-92. 
16 A. V. Repnikov, Konservativnye kontsepstii pereustroistva Rossii (Moscow, 2007). 
17 Reflecting this interest, during my own research for this thesis in Moscow, there were two stalls 
displaying titles from the ‘history of Russian conservatism’ in the Russian State Library.  
18 For an example of this debate, see M. Loukianov and M. Suslov, ‘Defenders of the Motherland or 
Defenders of the Autocracy?’ Kritika, 13, 1 (2012), pp. 217-231.  
19 V. V. Shelokhaev (ed.), Russkii konservatizm serediny XVIII-nachala XX veka. Entsiklopediia 
(hereafter RKE) (Moscow, 2010), pp. 158-164 and pp. 90-93. 
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autocracy, and yet the latter’s organization carried out an assassination attempt on 
the former, such was their hatred of Witte – seen by these extreme right-wingers as a 
liberal, not a conservative.20 Richard Pipes’ straightforward definition that Russian 
conservatives were those who supported the autocracy obscures as much as it 
clarifies, for a large number of different groups and statesmen did so; those loyal to 
the regime such as Witte, and some increasingly unlikely fellow travellers.21  
 
 Among these were the extreme right that also supported the autocracy. These 
have sometimes been described as ‘black hundreds’ in the scholarship, and some 
called themselves this at the time.22 Yet elsewhere during 1906, large numbers of the 
Kadets (Constitutional Democratic Party, formed in 1905) came to accept the 
principle of a constitutional monarchy, shedding their earlier radicalism. By Pipes’ 
definition, there were conservatives amongst the Kadets, but many on Russia’s 
extreme right totally opposed this group.23 An entirely separate issue with some, by 
no means all, recent scholarship is the level of political engagement. Certain 
contributions are openly polemical, whilst others are more tacit attempts at the 
rehabilitation of figures now re-imagined as heroes to some observers.24 These 
arguments show that one of the initial problems in the study of both Russian 
conservatism and the right is how to define such tendencies. 
 
                                                
20 For more on this attempted assassination, see I. Lauchlan, ‘The accidental terrorist: Okhrana 
connections to the extreme-right and the attempt to assassinate Sergei Witte in 1907’, Revolutionary 
Russia, 14, 2 (2001), pp. 1-32.  
21 R. Pipes, Russian Conservatism and its Critics: A Study in Political Culture (New Haven, CT, 
2005), p. 184.  
22 See S. A. Stepanov, Chernaia sotnia v Rossii. 1905-1914 gg. (Moscow, 1992); and revised edition 
(Moscow, 2005). In early Soviet-era scholarship, ‘black hundreds’ meant the combat arms of the far 
right, mostly the ‘fighting brotherhoods’ of the URP. However, it should be noted that this 
appellation is no longer used exclusively as a pejorative label, and recent work has used it to describe 
a much wider set of right-wing interests.  
23 For work on the Kadets see V. V. Shelokhaev, Kadety–glavnaia partiia liberal’noi burzhuazii v 
bor’be s revoliutsiei, 1905-1907 gg. (Moscow, 1988); S. Galai, The Liberation Movement in Russia, 
1900-1905 (Cambridge, 1973). 
24 I am not the first to note such trends. Gary Hamburg writes how ‘the cross-fertilization of 
scholarship and current politics has yielded predictably mixed results: politically salient scholarship 
of high calibre, dubious scholarship in the service of the latest political fad, self-serving political 
preening, and disreputable politics in search of academic legitimation’. G. M. Hamburg, ‘The Revival 
of Russian Conservatism’, Kritika, 6, 1 (2005), p. 121. 
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What was ‘the right’? What is ‘rightist?’ 
 
Russian rightists have been characterized as many things by a range of authors and 
observers with a wide variety of viewpoints, some of whom are openly politically 
engaged, others less so, in Russia, the West and elsewhere. What they represented 
has proved controversial. Authoritarians, nationalists, defenders of law and order, 
conservatives, monarchists, reactionaries, radicals, prophets, protectors, fascists, 
proto-fascists, revolutionaries, both for and against the status quo are just some of 
the labels applied to this diverse and dynamic tendency that emerged in the earliest 
years of the new century.25 Therefore, is it appropriate to use terms such as ‘rightist’ 
and ‘conservative’ as synonyms? Many agree, either implicitly or explicitly, that the 
Russian right in the late imperial era was somehow different to older conservative 
forces, but the precise nature of the difference between old and new right has often 
been imperfectly sketched, and usually absent from studies that examine fascism and 
conservatism in European or even global perspective.26 A contribution from Bertram 
D. Wolfe captures this complexity. During the revolution of 1905: 
 
…the reaction began to organize extra-legal armed forces as shock troops for 
the impending struggle, forces that were the precursors of the secret military 
groupings, the Blackshirts, Brownshirts, and Storm Troopers of Italy and 
Germany in the twenties. Under the banner of Holy Russia was gathered 
together a most unholy and variegated band…To the familiar compound of 
rabid nationalism and national antipathies and social demagogy was added 
the peculiar component of the Orthodox religious banners and the deep 
susceptibility to legendary rumour of an illiterate and credulous people…27   
  
Wolfe describes the similarity of the right to later fascism, though adding that the 
peculiar social conditions present in the Russian Empire were crucial to 
                                                
25 The URP is mentioned in one overview of fascism in world history, described as ‘authoritarian 
nationalists’ moving in the direction of later fascisms. S. G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 
(London, 1995), p. 69.   
26 See M. Blinkhorn (ed.), Fascists and Conservatives (London, 1990). Russia has often been 
excluded from a pan-European perspective on the relationship between the traditional and radical 
right, and, tellingly, this volume does not include an essay on Russia. 
27 B. D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution, Vol. 1 (2nd edition, New York, 1964), pp. 407-408.  
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understanding the movement. Historians have often described nineteenth-century 
Russia as the most backward major power. Did its right-wing movement reflect this; 
was it modern, was it reactionary, or did it contain elements of both?28 The unique 
estate structure of the Russian Empire makes comparisons with Western Europe 
problematic; consequently, the ‘Russian fascism’ appellation may be inaccurate. 
Moreover, to search for a one or two sentence working definition of the Russian 
right fulfilling a set number of factors, in much the same way that many scholars 
have looked for a ‘fascist minimum’ may eventually prove to be a futile exercise.29 
Yet to speak of a ‘right’ is far from meaningless, as in certain parties and groups 
there was a collective aggregate of features that represented ‘right-wing’ ideas and 
action, and were interpreted as such by observers.30  
 
 The main features of these associations were: an idea of the supremacy of 
Russian religion, the Russian people and the Russian nation, or ‘great Russian’ 
chauvinism; a desire for a mass basis, structured around a wide variety of social 
groups, including working-class and peasant support; spoken or direct opposition, to 
a greater or lesser extent, to parliament and politics, including that of the Tsarist 
regime’s attempts to create new legislative institutions, such as the State Duma 
(parliament); a pronounced sense of pessimism and dissatisfaction with the status 
quo; and appeals to and more infrequently use of violence. This is not to suggest that 
all of these essential features were active at the same time, or that all members of a 
particular group believed in them. Rather, it is to state that such features were part of 
the group’s rationale and action, and many members believed in them. Five of the 
most significant groups that showed these principles, in chronological order of 
establishment, were: the Russian Assembly (Russkoe sobranie); the Russian 
Monarchist Party (Russkaia monarkhicheskaia partiia); the Union of Russian Men 
(Soiuz russkikh liudei); the Union of Russian People (Soiuz russkogo naroda); and 
the Union of Archangel Mikhail (Russkii narodnyi soiuz imeni Mikhaila 
                                                
28 See J. Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third 
Reich (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 12-17.  
29 See for example R. O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (London, 2004), pp. 14, 120, 206.  
30 Rogger, ‘Was There a Russian Fascism?’ pp. 398-400; see also R. Griffin, The Nature of Fascism 
(New York, 1991), pp. 1-19. 
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Arkhangela). Many smaller groups appeared across the empire during and after 1905 
that copied such principles.31 
 
  But do such features distinguish a ‘right’ from other ‘conservatives’? 
Certainly all Russian conservatives supported the Uvarov triad of Orthodoxy, 
autocracy and nationality in different ways, and many felt pessimistic about Russia’s 
present and future, though generally less so about its past.32 But this set of features 
clarifies some key differences. Others who saw themselves as Tsarists, including a 
number of Kadets and the Octobrists, did not share the right’s pronounced 
opposition to politics, parliament and in particular the State Duma.33 Social 
differences distinguished the rightists from interest groups such as the United 
Nobility, which also proclaimed support for the Uvarov triad and had many 
ideological similarities with the extremist URP. However, this group was by its own 
self-definition not aiming to create a mass basis for support, and instead operated 
more narrowly as a pressure group, hoping to influence the Tsar by directly 
communicating with him.34  
 
 Less clear are the distinctions between rightists and the myriad of other 
nationalist groups, which sat on the boundary between more moderate conservatives 
and the far right. The Nationalist Party (or All-Russian National Union) created in 
the spring of 1909 was a socially elitist group, using populist ideas in a different way 
to existing right-wing associations such as the Union of Russian Men (URM) or 
URP. But it did include similar elements, such as an appeal to ‘true Russians’ and 
the supremacy of Russian Orthodoxy, and was also attracted to the problem of mass 
politics, being deeply involved in political activity, in Kiev and elsewhere. 
                                                
31 An extensive list of these smaller groups can be found in Iu. I. Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii. 
Dokumenty i materialy, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1998), pp. 6-7.  
32 An interesting work on pessimism is E. Newstad, ‘Components of Pessimism in Russian 
Conservative Thought, 1881-1905’, (Ph.D diss., University of Oklahoma, 1991).  
33 D. B. Pavlov, ‘The Union of October 17’, in Geifman (ed.), Russia Under the Last Tsar, pp. 179-
198.  
34 On the United Nobility, see G. A. Hosking and R. T. Manning, ‘What was the United Nobility?’ in 
L. H. Haimson (ed.), The Politics of Rural Russia, 1905-14 (Bloomington, 1979), pp. 142-183; much 
useful material can be found in A. P. Korelin (ed.), Ob”edinennoe dvorianstvo: s”ezdy 
upolnomochennykh gubernskikh dvorianskikh obshchestv. 3 Vols. (Moscow, 2001).  
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Additionally, members of the Nationalists and right-wing groups often worked and 
communicated with each other.35 The offshoots of the Nationalist Party, one of 
which was the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists, a group that also lacked the social 
demagoguery of the URP, developed ideas at least as extreme as any from the 
rightist fraction.36 The nationalists, like the radical right, anchored their appeal in an 
idea of an established order, and its values and aspirations. 
 
 However, the differences between the groups were based on more than just 
social demagoguery and populism. The Nationalist Party, like the Kiev Club of 
Russian Nationalists and the United Nobility, may have been conservatives or even 
reactionaries, but they were not counter-revolutionaries. They did not seek to exploit 
social tensions to the same extent as the URP and later versions of the Russian 
Assembly; they did not have the same level of attraction to social dynamism, or a 
vision of unity across horizontal class divides. This reflected the different social 
bases of the nationalists and the ‘new’ right. A central event distinguishing the two 
tendencies was the revolution of 1905: consider that the URP appeared late in this 
year, whereas the Nationalist Party only in 1909. The former was established 
primarily to fight revolution: counter-revolutionary struggle, not a vision of social 
conservatism, was at the heart of this association. The revolutionary experience was 
central not only to the URP, but to all other major right-wing parties.37 Therefore, in 
accordance with the parlance of contemporary observers, and taking into account the 
temporal and practical distinctions between the groups, this analysis will consider 
the rightists separately from the nationalists. However, given that there were strong 
similarities as well as contrasts between rightists and nationalists, the thesis will 
make reference to the Nationalist Party when appropriate.38   
                                                
35 For discussion of the Nationalist Party, see D. A. Kotsiubinskii, Russkii natsionalizm v nachale XX 
stoletiia. Rozhdenie i gibel’ ideologii vserossiiskogo natsional’nogo soiuza (Moscow, 2001). 
36 For an assessment of the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists, see Hillis, Children of Rus’, pp. 217-
230. 
37 On the distinction between conservatives, reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries, see E. Weber, 
‘Revolution, Counter-revolution, What Revolution?’ in W. Laqueur (ed.), Fascism: A Reader’s Guide 
(Harmondsworth, 1976), p. 499.  
38 The overlap is reflected by the sometime inclusion of the Nationalist Party and its offshoots in 
scholarship that explicitly addresses ‘right-wing’ parties. Susanne Hohler’s article on ‘radical right 
civil society’ includes the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists, unlike Kir’ianov’s work. See S. Hohler, 
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Approach of the project 
 
This thesis considers a primary problem in the study of the right to be one of society 
and social factors, rather than clear distinctions between ‘left’ and ‘right’ politics. 
The estate (soslovie) system was evolving towards recognizable class divides in the 
West European sense in late nineteenth-century Russia, but this process was 
uncertain and imprecise.39 An emerging theme for the right was class struggle; this 
work will add to the current understanding of the rightist phenomenon by 
highlighting the nature of its social radicalism in reaction to a series of emerging 
crises, rather than the problems of party formation or activity in the State Duma, 
both of which have already been covered in great detail.40 Assessing a social crisis 
as perceived by rightists has wider implications for the understanding of the 
movement; it fed into almost every aspect of their wider political and cultural 
activity. Examining the practical activity of rightists, their crafting of a popular 
appeal, and implications for the lived experience of everyday life can show elements 
of the rightist presence not previously considered. Though they agreed on the 
necessity of the Uvarov triad, like the autocracy, an intransigent rejection of Russian 
modernity developed. Themes such as anti-Semitism, hatred of the ‘other’, and class 
struggle mutually reinforced one another.41  
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
‘Radical Right Civil Society’, in F. Fischer von Weikersthal et al. (eds.), The Russian Revolution of 
1905 in Transcultural Perspective: Identities, Peripheries, and the Flow of Ideas (Bloomington, IN, 
2013), pp. 93-104; and Kir’ianov, Pravye partii v Rossii. 
39 An excellent analysis of why ‘class’ and ‘estate’ cannot be (quite) treated as synonyms is in G. 
Freeze, ‘The Soslovie (Estate) Paradigm and Russian Social History’, American Historical Review, 
91, 1 (1986), pp. 11-36. 
40 For overviews of the right’s activity in the State Duma, see Rawson, Russian Rightists, pp. 152-
224; and also A. Levin, The Third Duma, Election and Profile (London, 1973); A. Ia. Avrekh, 
Stolypin i tret’iia Duma (Moscow, 1968); Tsarizm v IV Duma, 1912-1914 gg. (Moscow, 1981); V. S. 
Diakin, Samoderzhavie, burzhuaziia i dvorianstvo v 1907-1911 gg. (Leningrad, 1978); Burzhuaziia, 
dvoriantsvo i tsarizm v 1911-1914 gg. (Leningrad, 1988); G. A. Hosking, The Russian Constitutional 
Experiment: Government and Duma, 1907-1914 (Cambridge, 1973); A. A. Ivanov, Poslednie 
zashchitniki monarkhii: fraktsiia pravykh IV gosudarstvennoi dumy v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny 
(1914-fevral’ 1917) (St. Petersburg, 2006); Z. Vydra, Život za Cara? Krajní pravice v 
předrevolučním Rusku (Prague, 2010), pp. 357-424.  
41 Rogger, ‘Was There a Russian Fascism?’ pp. 412-414.  
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 However, despite the unpleasantness and ideological banality of much right-
wing discourse, we need to consider that rightists were not just fantasists, but reacted 
to real social and political conditions in Russian society, politics and culture, 
although they twisted these developments to increasingly divisive, bizarre and often 
negative ends.42 Rightists were faced with a paradoxical challenge: to preserve the 
autocracy, and yet show that they were members of an independent movement, 
generating their own avenues of popular support in an era of mass politics.43 Could 
rightists agree on a shared goal? What means were acceptable to defend the 
autocracy? Should the right always be loyal to the monarchy or, in instances of 
disagreement, could it become an increasingly spontaneous movement? Could 
monarchism become a viable ideology in the late imperial period, supported by the 
use of political parties, newspapers, and backed by the masses?44 Such questions 
would vex the movement throughout its existence. 
 
 A key feature distinguishing extremists from moderates on all parts of the 
political spectrum was the question of violence and also terrorist activity.45 For 
instance, though all the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) wished for revolution, there 
were deep divisions within the group over the efficacy and indeed desirability of the 
use of terror. The Popular Socialist faction was opposed by the SR maximalists: 
activists from the latter group declared that politically motivated violence was an 
acceptable means to reach the same revolutionary ends.46 Disputes on whether 
violence could be used to achieve social and political change were also common on 
                                                
42 Much as in the same way that anti-Semites, in Russia and elsewhere, twisted existing social 
conditions to fit their own extreme and exaggerated views. See A. S. Lindemann, The Jew Accused: 
Three Anti-Semitic Affairs. Dreyfus, Beilis, Frank, 1894-1915 (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 8-9.  
43 Generally, it was agreed upon by right-wingers that Uvarov was an acceptable starting point. See a 
report in the Kadet newspaper Vestnik narodnoi svobody, 17 August 1906, 23-24, cols. 1379-1380. 
44 Congresses from the right frequently met to debate such issues, as seen in a report of a 1906 rightist 
congress in Moscow, Vestnik narodnoi svobody, 26 October 1906, 33-34, col. 1767. 
45 An enlightening recent discussion can be found in S. K. Morrissey, ‘The “Apparel of Innocence”: 
Toward a Moral Economy of Terrorism in Late Imperial Russia’, Journal of Modern History, 84, 3 
(2012), pp. 607-642.  
46 On the SRs, see A. Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917 
(Princeton, 1993), pp. 45-83; M. Hildermeier, Die Sozialrevolutionaere Partei Russlands: 
Agrarsozialismus und Modernisierung im Zarenreich (1900-1914) (Cologne, 1978), pp. 35-57. 
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the right.47 Though the aims were different, the basic question was the same; did the 
ends justify the means? Vladimir Gringmut, the leader of the Russian Monarchist 
Party (RMP) from 1905 to 1907, publicly disowned such tactics, but many URP 
activists openly committed violence. Yet both groups were united by profound 
dissatisfaction with the status quo and a desire to enact a counter-revolution. The 
problem of violence was more than an academic debate: it shows in a broader sense 
how central violence was to rightist ideas and action, and not only in the most 
extreme factions.48 Therefore, this study will emphasize the problem of violence in 
rightist political culture.49 
 
  Reflecting ideology and practice, this study will generally eschew the use of 
the term ‘conservative’ and instead describe the main subjects as rightist, right-wing, 
monarchist, the Russian term for right, pravye, or the ‘black hundreds’, whilst 
recognizing that the difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ right was not clear cut in 
many instances. Indeed, there were pronounced limits to the radicalism of the new 
right. Unlike later fascists, right-wingers did not desire to fundamentally change the 
long-established ethos and structure of Russian governance. Quite the reverse; they 
often yearned for its fortification. This is not to deny that there were profound and 
myriad differences between several right-wing associations; as will be seen, rightists 
often disagreed with each other as vehemently as they did with their left and liberal 
rivals, which in itself had no small effect on the successes and failures of the 
movement. To show this, the study will examine not only high politics and the 
pronouncements of leaders on the right, but what activists and those on the ground 
said and felt, and will consider the formation of individual and group identities 
within the right. 
                                                
47 In particular, the Russian Assembly was less prone to launch an appeal for violent struggle than the 
URP or URM. Whether a large proportion of the Assembly’s members committed acts of violence is 
not entirely clear. However, some of the most important members of the group, such as Pavel 
Krushevan, did appeal to violence, and struggle against the revolutionary foe was indeed part of the 
ideology of some, though by no means all, of the group’s members. Krushevan’s role in instigating 
the Kishinev pogrom of 1903 is recounted in S. D. Urusov, Memoirs of a Russian Governor (London, 
1908), pp. 45-49.  
48 Morrissey, ‘Review of D. C. Rawson’, pp. 350-351.  
49 Some recent work has played down the role of the right in actually committing violence. See I. V. 
Omel’ianchuk, Chernosotennoe dvizhenie v Rossiiskoi imperii, 1901-1914 (Kiev, 2007), pp. 570-621.  
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The significance of the Russian right 
 
The Russian right was no minor trend, and study of the right can shed light on 
central aspects of politics and society in the late imperial period.50 Firstly, there are 
numbers to consider; the right was at one stage a very sizeable presence. It grew 
from the small-scale cultural groups that initially comprised the movement around 
1900-1901, to several hundred groups with many thousands of members after 1905. 
Whilst the right eventually declined in influence, it did not die out quickly after the 
revolution of 1905, but survived as a substantial and increasingly independent force 
into a later period. This was long after its revolutionary opponents had been 
suppressed by the autocracy.  
 
 Study of the right also sheds light on the fragility of the autocracy. The right 
presented a challenge not just to the revolutionary left, but more crucially, to the 
regime that it claimed to support. The presence of a large, spontaneous right was an 
obvious problem for the policy makers who ruled Russia, as well as the 
revolutionary challenge. Could such a phenomenon be a reliable supporter for the 
autocracy that it claimed to defend? Rightists had the ability to impede the policy-
making process of the regime, as seen in 1911 by the arguments between 
conservatives and rightists over the Western borderlands crisis.51 More widely, a 
large and independent right divided the possible base of public support for the 
autocracy, far outside of the ruling elites. Could one be in favour of an organization 
like the URP, and yet still, in principle, of the Tsarist status quo?52 Whether the right 
could be relied upon to shore up the uncertain public support of the autocracy after 
1905 had important implications for the long-term sustainability of tsarism. 
 
 Additionally, study of the right not only highlights the frequent lack of clear 
distinctions between moderates and extremists within the movement, but, more 
                                                
50 Kir’ianov, Pravye partii v Rossii, pp. 388-424.   
51 For further analysis, see T. Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and 
Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914 (DeKalb, 1996), pp. 131-151. 
52 The relationship of the rightists and more moderate conservatives to the status quo is considered in 
Luk’ianov’s article, ‘Conservatives and “Renewed Russia”’, pp. 762-786. 
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surprisingly, the overlap between rightists and apparently unrelated social and 
political groups. Rightists were able to gain a degree of support precisely because 
they used appeals that had a degree of resonance elsewhere. For instance, right-wing 
civic groups appealed to Russian patriotism, as did many other civil society 
associations. Uniting elements of modernity such as science and technology with 
visions of civic pride shows how rightists were beginning to use ideas with wider 
social traction. Ideas of ‘civic patriotism’ were used by societies completely 
unrelated in practical terms; one example was the Russian Technical Society 
(founded in St. Petersburg in 1866) that praised the potential of science and 
technology to transform education. Study of the right can shed light on significant 
and powerful questions of identity, nationalism and state formation, and the 
challenge posed by a crisis of modernity to right-wing ideas and discourse is a 
central element to explaining their rise and fall.53 
 
Source material 
 
This thesis has drawn on a wide range of unpublished archival material. Most 
significant are the following collections (fondy) from the Russian State Archive 
(GARF): the secret police archive, including the special section (osobyi otdel), 
consisting of police reports and a variety of newspaper cuttings that have been 
annotated by the censors (fond number 102);54 the collections of the right-wing 
groups, the Union of Russian People (116), and the Union of the Archangel Mikhail 
(117); the United Nobility collection (434); the repositories of Nicholas II (601), Lev 
Tikhomirov (634), as well as Boris Nikol’skii (588); and finally, records from the 
protocols of the Provisional Government commission of enquiry into the unlawful 
activities of the old regime before 1917 (1467). The thesis will present a range of 
fresh findings from the archives, consisting of both the words of rightists 
themselves, and a wide variety of observers. 
                                                
53 J. Bradley, Voluntary Associations in Tsarist Russia: Science, Patriotism and Civil Society 
(Cambridge, MA, 2009); N. G. Filippov, Nauchno-tekhnicheskie obshchestva v Rossii, 1866-1917 
(Moscow, 1976).  
54 A thorough overview of the history of the special section is in Z. I. Peregudova, Politicheskii sysk 
Rossii (1880-1917) (2nd edition, Moscow, 2013), pp. 73-123.  
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 The second main source base is contemporary newspapers, journals, and 
serial publications. These include contemporary ‘thick’ journals, monthly 
publications that contained poetry and literature, as well as political commentary. 
Not only are right-wing and liberal publications an excellent resource on which to 
draw for commentary on the right, these documents complement archival records 
and can be used to corroborate controversial incidents. Police reports from the 
Russian State Archive contain accounts of disputed activity such as right-wing 
violence. Certainly, one should read these reports with a critical eye, as officials 
were, like all others, prone to human whims, sometimes playing up to their superiors 
by writing reports that would please them, and either exaggerating or dismissing the 
impact of the right in their district to show their effectiveness in controlling the 
movement. A technique of cross-referencing the same incidents by using both 
newspapers and police records can highlight inconsistencies in the sources, as well 
as showing the diversity of interpretations of the right.   
 
 This thesis has also engaged with a range of published primary material, 
including memoirs, diaries and correspondence from right-wingers and government 
and parliamentary figures. These sources include many recent document collections 
on the right, not least those compiled by Kir’ianov. Even many collections that have 
been published in the last twenty years reflect the fashions of Soviet 
historiographical tradition, focusing on questions of high politics; these include 
problems of party formation, and activities in the State Duma.55 However, rightists 
were not idle in their views of how to fight a social crisis: they posed practical 
answers to these problems. Questions of the right’s social obligations, such as 
charity work, temperance drives, education, and the formation and activity of civic 
groups, all central aims of this thesis, are less thoroughly addressed in these 
collections. To satisfactorily answer these issues, the personal insights of right-
wingers can be used in conjunction with archival material, which includes letters and 
records from activists. A view of the right ‘from below’ as well as ‘from above’ will 
                                                
55 Narskii, ‘The Right-Wing Parties: Historiographical Limitations and Perspectives’, pp. 183-184. 
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be constructed, in order to see these social projects from the original perspective that 
they were viewed, and to understand how these affected wider society.  
 
 Finally, a range of secondary material has been consulted. Much recent 
Russian scholarship has been assessed, in addition to the few studies on the Russian 
right that exist in English. As well as literature on the right in the Russian Empire, 
studies on rightist groups in contemporary Europe have been examined to illustrate 
how study of the right can highlight trends in the wider European experience.  
 
Framework 
 
This thesis will follow a mixed chronological and thematic approach, and consists of 
three parts with six chapters. The first considers the rise of the Russian right, 
including an examination of nineteenth century influences, and an analysis of one 
early right-wing group, the Russian Assembly (officially established in 1901). It 
discusses a series of crises including the Kishinev pogrom, Bloody Sunday, and the 
Russo-Japanese War, and how these laid the groundwork for a surge in a new 
radicalism arising during the revolutionary period of 1905-1907, inextricably linked 
to the increased scale of the right.  
 
 The challenge posed by right-wing radicalism to the Tsarist status quo will 
be assessed in the second part of the work, consisting of two chapters examining the 
right’s changing ideas and activities between 1905 and 1908. This was the phase in 
which the influence of the right-wing movements peaked. The second chapter will 
consider the rise of populist nationalism, an ideology that distinguished the right 
from other conservatives, shown by the creation of groups during the revolutionary 
period, including the URM and the URP. In particular, the violence and radicalism 
of these groups will be analyzed. The third chapter will examine examples of 
rightists extending their reach away from the capitals and across the empire, 
considering three case studies of Odessa, Kiev and Astrakhan’. This led to a new set 
of centre-periphery tensions between the right and the imperial regime.  
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 After the revolution of 1905, rightists were divided between waging an anti-
revolutionary war and developing concepts of renovating Russia. The third and final 
part will examine the activity of the right between 1907 and 1914, a period in which 
the right was in general decline. However, this decline was not straightforward, and 
the three chapters will consider examples of success, power and influence from the 
right as well as failures. The fourth chapter will examine the relationship of the right 
with Russia’s police, assessing how a collision with authority imposed limits on 
their power. The second section will reflect on the form and content of right-wing 
attempts at popular mobilization, considering rituals, symbols and identity 
commemoration; all central elements in right-wing desires to connect with a mass 
audience. The fifth chapter will discuss right-wing attempts to construct an 
independent civic society, including two themes that intrigued many activists: 
cultural campaigns and a growing interest in education. The sixth and final chapter 
will consider important reasons for right-wing decline, including extended 
assessments of corruption and factionalism, the thorny problem of coping with the 
national question, and the controversial Beilis affair and its fall-out.  
        
 The conclusion will place the right in a broader context. After a brief note on 
the fate of the right after 1914, the relationship of the right-wing parties to other 
contemporary movements in Europe and later fascism will be considered. The final 
part of the conclusion will assess what the right can tell us about developments in 
contemporary Russia. Though the people of the pre-1905 rightist movement have 
long since died out, elements of their ideas and appeals have proved remarkably 
durable.56 As well as in Russia, this can be seen from the renaissance of the right 
across Europe in the early twenty-first century. Overall, this thesis will contribute to 
a wider understanding of the Russian right, and provide a fresh perspective on a 
lively, provocative and often controversial debate. 
                                                
56 See W. Laqueur, Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia (New York, 1993). A 
recent analysis has described right-wing influences on later Nazism. M. Kellogg, The Russian Roots 
of Nazism: White Èmigrès and the Making of National Socialism, 1917-1945 (Cambridge, 2005). 
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Chapter One 
 
The Origins of the Russian Right 
 
This chapter will consider the nineteenth-century influences on the right, and 
subsequently the first stages of the movement’s development in the early twentieth 
century. Processes of modernization and change in Russia meant this was a crucial 
stage in the development of autonomous conservatism. Rightists adopted several 
principles of nineteenth-century Russian conservatism, including: distinctiveness 
from Europe; sanctity of the Tsar’s divinely ordained power; belief in the estate 
(soslovie) system as a basis for social hierarchy; the peasant commune as the unit 
around which to arrange economic development; and criticisms of liberalism, 
parliamentarianism, and socialism.1 Yet conservatives were not all the same. From 
the outset, there were different exponents of this unstable ideology. The challenges 
of modernity in the Russian Empire threatened the above precepts, and a series of 
crises at the outset of the twentieth century created a pessimistic mood, providing the 
background for a surge in right-wing group formation. The right’s obsession with 
moral ruin was closely connected to earlier changes in Russian society, culture and 
politics. Rightists in the twentieth century placed great emphasis on what they saw 
as Russian tradition, and their adoption of older conservative ideas is central to 
understanding their activity, as well as to understand what exactly were the negative 
changes in society that the rightists were reacting against.2  
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 On generic models of Russian conservatism, see for example ‘Russkii konservatizm: problemy, 
podkhody, mneniia. “Kruglyi stol”’, Otechestvennaia istoriia, 3 (2001), pp. 103-133; A. Iu. Minakov, 
A. V. Repnikov and M. Iu. Chernavskii, ‘Konservatizm’, in V. V. Shelokhaev et al. (eds.), 
Obshchestvennaia mysl’ Rossii XVIII-nachala XX veka. Entsiklopediia (Moscow, 2005), pp. 217-220.   
2 Some significant studies on nineteenth-century Russian conservative nationalism are Grosul (ed.), 
Russkii konservatizm; E. C. Thaden, Conservative Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Russia (Seattle, 
1964); and A. M. Martin, Romantics, Reformers, Reactionaries: Russian Conservative Thought and 
Politics in the Reign of Alexander I (DeKalb, 1997). 
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Nineteenth-Century Influences 
   
Conservatism in Russia developed in reaction to events at home and abroad. Loose 
elements of the ideology had existed in Russia long before the nineteenth century, 
but it was during this period that it became an organized body of doctrine under the 
banner that we would recognize today, with principal exponents in high society 
expounding a ‘conservative’ vision. It was in reaction to the materialism and 
rationalism of the enlightenment period that modern European conservatism first 
took shape; in particular, it was in response to the French Revolution that Russian 
conservatism became more organized. Russian conservatism emerged as a romantic 
nationalist movement, stimulated principally by the growth of state power, cultural 
change in the Russian Empire, and fear of foreign revolution. One of the leading 
figures in the literary and cultural world of nineteenth-century conservatism was 
Nikolai Karamzin (1766-1826). His seminal political work, the Memoir on Ancient 
and Modern Russia, first appeared in Russia in 1810, and was presented to 
Alexander I in 1811.3 In writing that ‘an old nation has no need of new laws’ 
Karamzin pre-empted later rightist criticisms of the Russian state and bureaucracy 
copying Western modes of development.4 Temperamentally, Karamzin was quite 
unlike any right-wingers that appeared later, but they had something in common – a 
view that a revolutionary crisis was threatening civilization; and both saw that the 
roots of this crisis lay in Europe. His criticisms of the main ideals of the French 
Revolution – liberalism and equality – were much the same as later rightists, who 
shared his anti-revolutionary consciousness.  
 
 Fears of revolution would further stimulate conservative ideology. This was 
driven by the rise of a Russian intelligentsia, pro-Western and anti-state, amongst 
educated society. The Decembrist Revolt of 1825 stimulated a desire to explicitly 
formulate an ideology that recognized rulers, state and subjects. However, 
                                                
3 Karamzin developed his conservative views elsewhere in his incomplete 12-volume History of the 
Russian State (Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo), published 1818-1829. See D. Saunders, ‘The 
Political Ideas of Russian Historians’, Historical Journal, 27, 3 (1984), pp. 757-771. 
4 N. M. Karamzin, Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia (translated and edited by R. Pipes) 
(Harvard, 1959), p. 187. 
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conservatives were beginning to respond to thinkers such as Petr Chaadaev, who 
criticized Russia’s social and intellectual heritage. One figure with a direct influence 
on later right-wingers was the Minister of Education under Nicholas I, Sergei 
Uvarov (1786-1855) who in 1831 promulgated the doctrine of ‘official nationality’, 
or the Uvarov triad. This became the guiding doctrine of the Russian state and 
conservative elite during the nineteenth century. It presented as ideals the centrality 
of Russian religion, the necessity of strong centralized autocratic government to 
maintain the power of the state, and the idea of Russian nationhood as exemplified 
by the strength of the people: in short, Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality.5 
Temperamentally and ideologically, Uvarov was a moderate, increasingly out of 
touch with the romanticism and mysticism that began to permeate the highest 
echelons of the imperial regime under Nicholas I. His greatest legacy to the right 
was his formulation of the triad; like all other conservative groups in the early 
twentieth century, Russian rightists would not deviate from these central principles. 
However, though they were never jettisoned entirely, conservatives in the early 
twentieth century were divided over how to interpret Uvarov’s principles. A great 
irony of not only the right’s adoption of the concept of nationality (narodnost’) in a 
later era but also the regime’s use of it under Alexander III was how different their 
interpretations were from the original conception. In the 1830s, narodnost’ was an 
attempt to provide an ideological formula uniting a diverse set of peoples in a 
country where autocracy was paramount; it did not yet have the more reactionary, 
negative connotations of later years.6 
 
 One of the most important features of the twentieth-century right was its 
spontaneity and independence from the ethos of tsarism. A crucial stage in the 
development of autonomous conservative groups was the appearance of the 
                                                
5 On Uvarov, see C. H. Whittaker, The Origins of Modern Russian Education: An Intellectual 
Biography of Count Sergei Uvarov, 1786-1855 (DeKalb, 1984); P. Waldron, ‘The Legacy of Count 
Sergei Uvarov’, in M. Branch (ed.), Defining Self: Essays on Emergent Identities in Russia, 17th to 
19th Centuries (Helsinki, 2009), pp. 211-23. 
6 See N. Knight, ‘Narodnost’ and Modernity in Imperial Russia’, in D. L. Hoffman and Y. Kotsonis 
(eds.), Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices (Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 54-60; D. 
Saunders, ‘Historians and Concepts of Nationality in Early Nineteenth-Century Russia’, Slavonic and 
East European Review, 60, 1 (1982), pp. 44-62. 
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Slavophiles in the 1830s and 1840s.7 They were quite different from later rightists, 
but paved the way for the development of conservative groups outside of the regime, 
and the language, symbolism and ideals of the Slavophiles would be adopted by later 
right-wingers. Thinkers such as Ivan Kireevskii (1806-1856) and Aleksei 
Khomiakov (1804-1860) followed the ideals of Karamzin and Uvarov, including the 
inapplicability of Western systems of rule to Russia. Religion was particularly 
important to the Slavophiles; these thinkers emphasized Russian Orthodoxy as the 
principle around which to organize the nation’s socio-economic development. This 
entailed increasing criticism of ‘the West’. Though Western Europe and Russia had 
Christianity in common, thinkers such as Kireevskii perceived a growing distinction 
between their own version and Western Christianity, described as superficial and 
nihilistic, and associated in a pejorative sense with Roman Catholicism. This can be 
clearly seen in Ivan Kireevskii’s Reply to A. S. Khomyakov [sic] (1839), describing 
the superiority of Russian Orthodoxy over Roman Catholicism. ‘What a rich culture 
we might assume among our lower orders...this culture might not be superficially 
brilliant, but it is profound...it is inner and spiritual’.8 The Russian people (narod) 
were given an elevated role in Kireevskii’s writings, pre-empting the populists of the 
1860s. We can see an idealistic, romantic view of the Russian land, people and state 
developing amongst these Slavophile groups in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. The idea that the ‘inner’ life, as Kireevskii wrote, should be celebrated over 
modern, Western political conceptions such as civil rights, the rule of law, and an 
enhanced administrative structure (developments in the external life) had clear 
echoes amongst rightists in a later era.  
 
                                                
7 For literature on the Slavophiles, see N. V. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West in the Teaching of the 
Slavophiles: A Study of Romantic Ideology (Harvard, 1952); A. Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy: 
History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought (Oxford, 1975); A History 
of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism (Oxford, 1980), pp. 92-114; A. Gleason, 
European and Muscovite: Ivan Kireevsky and the Origins of Slavophilism (Cambridge, MA, 1972); 
and the series of biographies by P. Christoff, An Introduction to Nineteenth Century Russian 
Slavophilism: A Study in Ideas, 4 Vols. (The Hague, 1961-1991).  
8 I. V. Kireevskii, ‘A Reply to A. S. Khomyakov’ [sic], in W. J. Leatherbarrow and D. C. Offord 
(eds.), A Documentary History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism (Ann Arbor, 
1987), pp. 79-88.  
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 The story of the Slavophiles cannot be understood without reference to the 
‘Westerners’: thinkers such as Aleksandr Herzen, Nikolai Chernshevskii and Nikolai 
Dobroliubov. Curiously, both groups desired change in Russia, albeit different sorts 
and at different rates.9 Prominent Slavophiles such as the historian Mikhail Pogodin 
(1800-1875) and the poet Fedor Tiutchev (1803-1873) were deeply attached to the 
romantic ideals of Karamzin. Nicholas I, despite his own conservatism, accurately 
perceived a difference between these autonomous groups and his own precepts. The 
most important parallel between such thinkers and later rightists – who, incidentally, 
rarely quoted the first wave of Slavophile thinkers – was increasing criticism of the 
practices of the Russian state. Pogodin wrote directly to the Tsar to criticize the 
institution of serfdom, and demanded the liberation of the Russian people to allow 
them to enact their spiritual mission of spreading the Orthodox Christian message 
around the world. Understandably, the regime of Nicholas I was deeply alarmed by 
such criticism, and ‘denied these groups the positive role that they sought in 
society’. In the Nicholavean era, views separate to those of the government were not 
readily tolerated. The Decembrist Rebellion had demonstrated the danger of 
autonomous activity, and criticism of the status quo emanating from conservative 
thinkers was also dangerous. The regime understood that autonomous groups 
wanting to change the structure of society were emerging on both the left and the 
right.10  
 
 Though the Slavophiles accepted the autocratic principle, these autonomous 
groups increasingly protested against the existing conditions of Russian society. 
Thinkers such as Kireevskii and Tiutchev were social critics who viewed Russian 
serfdom with great dismay. However, they were different from the later rightists in 
that they saw the possibility of preserving the autocracy whilst instituting 
widespread social reform. The publicist Konstantin Aksakov (1817-1860) wrote to 
Alexander II in 1855 that autocracy would lead to the strengthening of the Russian 
people. ‘For the Russian, absolute monarchical government is not an enemy, not 
                                                
9 For the rise of left in this era, see F. Venturi, Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and 
Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia (New York, 1963). 
10 W. B. Lincoln, Nicholas I: Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias (London, 1978), pp. 263-268. 
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something to be opposed, but a friend and a defender of freedom – of that true, 
spiritual freedom’.11 Aksakov’s focus on the ‘Russian people’ in his writings shows 
the populist potential in his thought. Like many right-wingers after 1900, he 
championed the idea of an assembly of the land (zemskii sobor), which could 
provide a bond between the Russian people, their native soil and the regime. In 
focusing on the people and a return to the land, he had much in common with the 
left-wing populists (narodniki), despite his conservative inclinations. In spite of his 
support for untrammeled autocracy, he also attributed a clear role for the people as a 
consultative voice.12 This tribute to the people would become deeply problematic for 
the regime in a later era. 
 
 There were therefore strong traditions of protest, criticism and dissent 
amongst Russian conservatives prior to the emergence of an organized right. 
However, the changing wider context would radicalize some of these demands. 
Russian failure in the Crimean War, the Emancipation Manifesto of 1861, peasant 
risings of 1861 and 1862 and the Great Reforms of the 1860s would challenge the 
conservative ethos established thirty years earlier. The emergence of thinkers such as 
Herzen and figures such as Mikhail Bakunin and Petr Lavrov who criticized serfdom 
and the autocracy showed how demands for change were becoming not just more 
radical, but revolutionary: and the next wave of Slavophiles would become more 
reactionary in response. A central figure was Mikhail Katkov (1818-1887) an 
influential journalist who became editor of the newspaper Moskovskie vedomosti 
(Moscow News) in 1863. Katkov was a more militant figure than the original 
Slavophiles, and the Polish Rebellion of 1863 set off fierce anti-Polish diatribes in 
his paper. Katkov believed that soft liberal treatment over the past decade regarding 
the ‘Polish question’ had allowed an uprising in the Western borderland regions of 
the empire. Katkov, despite his deep misgivings over the Russian state’s path of 
development, was deeply involved with the imperial establishment, and enjoyed a 
                                                
11 K. S. Aksakov, ‘Memorandum to Alexander II’, in Leatherbarrow and Offord (eds.), A 
Documentary History of Russian Thought, p. 100. 
12 Ibid., pp. 98-99; Venturi, Roots, pp. 336-330. 
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close relationship with Tsar Alexander III, who on occasion granted him special 
privileges and favours.  
 
 In his desired solutions to such problems, Katkov broke ranks with the 
original Slavophiles. He believed that firm central government action was needed to 
unite the subjects of the empire under a strong, centralized Russian state. Katkov had 
adopted earlier Slavophile precepts of cultural nationalism, whilst allying these to 
fulminations on the need for stronger state power. In particular, Katkov attacked the 
Polish citizens of the empire as political subversives who sought to weaken the 
Russian state. ‘Ten million pure Russians’ had become ‘alienated from their roots’ 
in the Western borderlands, the fault of the Russian regime. Harsh attacks on 
national minorities were becoming common amongst Russia’s conservative factions; 
in this, we can see direct parallels between Katkov and later rightists.13 Intriguingly, 
certain right-wingers in later years looked to Katkov for inspiration. These included 
the leader of the Russian Monarchist Party (RMP) from 1905, Vladimir Gringmut, 
who saw nineteenth-century Russian conservatives including Katkov as heroes.14 
 
 A complex matter should not of course be over-simplified. Many in the 
regime shared Katkov’s chauvinism, and criticisms of Poland were certainly not 
unique to the reactionary publicist. However, more problematic was that the 
eventual target of Katkov’s criticism was not Poland, but the contemporary Russian 
regime. Like many rightists in a later era, Katkov was deeply dissatisfied with the 
group whom he called the ‘Petersburg bureaucrats’, He claimed that ‘bureaucratic 
procedures dominate all of our doings, and dominate exclusively; all of our doings 
move through bureaucratic organizations, all of the practices and doings of our 
                                                
13 M. N. Katkov, Sobranie peredovykh statei: Moskovskikh vedomostei, 1864 god. (Moscow, 1897), 
p. 371. Originally published in Moskovskie vedomosti, 17 June 1864, no. 164. For secondary 
literature on Katkov, see M. Katz, Mikhail N. Katkov: A Political Biography, 1818-1887 (Michigan, 
1966); K. Durman, The Time of the Thunderer: Mikhail Katkov, Russian Nationalist Extremism and 
the failure of the Bismarckian System, 1871-1887 (New York, 1988); G. P. Izmest’eva, ‘Mikhail 
Nikiforovich Katkov’, Voprosy istorii, 4 (2004), pp. 71-92; Thaden, Conservative Nationalism, pp. 
38-56. 
14 V. A. Gringmut, Sobranie statei, 1896-1907, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1908), pp. 14-17, ‘M. N. Katkov i 
sovremennoe obshchestvo’. This essay first appeared in Moskovskie vedomosti in 1896. 
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government are bureaucratic properties’. Katkov, who considered a pre-Petrine, pre-
Westernized Russia favourably, looked upon ‘modernization’ of Russia’s 
institutions with dismay. In particular, he criticized the legal and political 
developments known as the Great Reforms.15 These included: the Emancipation 
Manifesto of 1861; the judicial reforms of 1864; the formation of a system of local 
government, establishing councils (zemstvo); a university statute, and further 
reforms throughout the 1860s and 1870s, all of which showed Katkov that the feared 
path of Westernism was becoming a reality. To Katkov, the imperial regime had 
lacked strength in combatting this general tendency. In particular, the bureaucracy 
was obscuring the link between Tsar and people.  
 
 As Slavophilism hardened into Pan-Slavism in the 1860s and 1870s, militant 
views amongst Russia’s conservative factions became more common, stimulated in 
part by the growing revolutionary movement and the impact of thinkers such as 
Nikolai Chernyshevskii, Petr Tkachev and Petr Lavrov.16 One whose views became 
more extreme towards the end of his life was Ivan Aksakov (1823-1886), who 
demonstrated the increasingly vehement chauvinism of Pan-Slavism. Aksakov’s 
mission was more radical than that of the regime; he had a messianic, utopian 
worldview, presenting a mission to unite all of world Orthodox Slavdom led by the 
Russian people. He perceived a fundamental and irresolvable duality between the 
West and Russia, believing the future world would belong to the Slavic peoples. In 
typical style, he wrote that ‘the jealousy, often instinctive, of the West towards the 
world of Slavic Orthodoxy derives from other, deeply hidden reasons; these reasons 
start from the antagonism of two opposing spirits of enlightenment, and the envy of 
the ancient world towards that to which the future belongs’.17  
 
                                                
15 M. N. Katkov, Sobranie peredovykh statei Moskovskikh vedomostei, 1864 god (Moscow, 1897), p. 
190. Originally published in Moskovskie vedomosti, 28 March 1864. 
16 For an overview, see H. Kohn, Pan Slavism: Its History and Ideology (New York, 1960). 
17 I. Aksakov, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1886), p. 5, originally published in 
Slavianskii obzor, 1 October 1861. For biography, see S. Lukashevich, Ivan Aksakov, 1823-1886: A 
Study in Russian Thought and Politics (Cambridge, MA, 1965).   
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 A disturbing inclination that Aksakov shared with later rightists was anti-
Semitism. Aksakov reflected the non-religious character of Russian anti-Semitism; 
in particular, the idea of a global Jewish political and financial conspiracy based 
around the exploitation of non-Jewish subjects of the empire. His denunciations of 
Jews joined religious and modern anti-Semitisms: ancient animosity towards Jewish 
religion, and criticisms of overwhelming Jewish power and ‘dominance’ due to the 
involvement of Jews in political movements. He linked Russian Jewry to the 
pernicious effects of a cosmopolitan, liberal, Western intelligentsia: a small group, 
but one with much power in society. In this he was influenced by the presence of 
Jews in revolutionary movements. His paper Rus’ (Russia) published an early 
version of the notorious Protocols of the Elders of Zion in 1864.18 In particular, 
Aksakov claimed that Jews dominated Russia’s educational institutions. At the 
outset of the pogrom wave that swept the empire from 1881 to 1882, he wrote 
‘already, one third of our students are Jews’.19 Whilst Aksakov conceded the 
pogroms were a horrific occurrence, he claimed the Russian people were the true 
victims. Instead, he described the Jews as the cause of the riots, emphasizing a 
growing gap between the ‘dark forces’ within Russian society at large and the views 
of the educated elite. Regarding the Jewish and Polish inhabitants of the empire, 
Aksakov wrote:  
 
The sympathy of the ‘liberals’ was on the side of these nationalities, and, as 
usual, wrath fell upon the barbarism, which comes from the lack of ‘culture’ 
and ‘correct order’ of the Russian people. So it was, for example, with the 
popular movements against the Jews – certainly, lawless movements that 
demanded restraint and taming by our authorities (moreover, our Russians 
suffered no less, even much more than the Jews)’.20 
 
                                                
18 H. Rogger, ‘Russia’, in Weber and Rogger (eds.), The European Right, p. 472; Lukashevich, Ivan 
Aksakov, pp. 95-110. 
19 I. Aksakov, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, Vol. 2: slavianofil’stvo i zapadnichestvo (Moscow, 1886), 
p. 502, originally published 14 February 1881. ‘Pogrom’ is here defined as ‘an outbreak of mass 
violence directed against a minority religious, social or ethnic group’. This was usually, though not 
always, targeted against Jews. J. D. Klier, ‘Pogroms. YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe’ 
(2010). <http://www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Pogroms> (accessed 24/4/2014). 
20 I. Aksakov, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, Vol. 2, p. 563, ‘The liberal programme’, originally 
published 20 February 1881. On the 1881 pogroms see J. D. Klier, Russians, Jews and the Pogroms 
of 1881-1882 (Cambridge, 2011).  
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The press fulminations of Aksakov led to these ideas gaining influence with a 
minority of the population, providing a model for later rightists.21 Significantly, 
some ministers shared his ideas, including the Minister of the Interior from 1881-
1882, N. P. Ignat’ev, who also claimed that Jews were the cause of the pogroms. 
Ignat’ev tabled a resolution to the Committee of Ministers in March 1882 on the 
‘Jewish question’, with harsh measures calling for further restrictions of the rights of 
Jews in the empire. His thinking was that the Russian people needed protection from 
Jewish economic domination. Influence, however, does not always result in trust. 
His proposals were defeated easily; all the other members of the Committee of 
Ministers objected, for a range of pragmatic and ideological reasons.22  
  
Though the proposals were defeated, the ideas lived on. Anti-Semitic ideas 
and policies had currency elsewhere in Russian society, including within the regime 
itself, albeit with the wilder designs of Ignat’ev curtailed by more fearful ministers 
due to the potential for popular disruption. As well as the notorious Pale of 
Settlement (created 1791-1835) as many as 1,400 different laws existed, 
representing a vast and unworkable bureaucracy of legalized discrimination.23 
Passports and registration acts were designed to make it difficult for Jewish citizens 
to move freely around the Russian Empire. In addition, after 1893 even baptized 
Jews were banned from changing their names to Christian ones.24 Therefore, when 
the right adopted anti-Semitism as such a central part of their message, it needs to be 
remembered that it was not only a principle of outsiders, but part of the structure of 
Russian autocracy; anti-Semitic ideas were also a centuries old feature of Russian 
life, and hardly unique to rightists. 
 
                                                
21 E. Haberer, ‘Cosmopolitanism, Antisemitism and Populism: A reappraisal of the Russian and 
Jewish Response to the pogroms of 1881-1882’, in J. D. Klier and S. Lambroza (eds.), Pogroms: 
Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 98-134.  
22 H. Rogger, ‘Russian ministers and the Jewish question’, in Jewish Policies and Right-Wing 
Politics, pp. 58-62; Klier, Russians, Jews and the Pogroms of 1881-1882, pp. 207-232. 
23 For more on this, see Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics, p. 106; A. L. 
Gol’denveizer, ‘Pravovoe polozhenie evreev v Rossii’, in Kniga o russkom evreistve: ot 1860-kh 
godov do revoliutsii 1917 g. (Moscow, 2002), pp. 115-158. 
24 M. I. Mysh’, Rukovodstvo k russkim zakonam o evreiakh (St. Petersburg, 1914), pp. 34-37; Polnoe 
sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, 2nd series, Vol. 40, Pt. 1, no. 41799 (1865), p. 191. 
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An especially dramatic event occurred in 1881: the assassination of the Tsar 
by a terrorist organization, the People’s Will. In no small irony, it was the ‘Tsar 
liberator’, Alexander II, who on the eve of the event was preparing to put into 
practice plans for a consultative assembly, or the Loris-Melikov constitution, which 
would have been the first such body in Russia’s history. His reign was interpreted by 
many conservative observers as one of liberalism, associated with the Great Reforms 
of the 1860s and 1870s. His murder saw the onset of the ‘counter-reform’ era, 
partially in reaction to the growing revolutionary movement, but also in response to 
the liberal reforms of the preceding twenty years, which had failed to work as 
 
Figure 1 Pale of Settlement in the Russian Empire circa 1900. G. D. Hundert (ed.), The YIVO 
Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe (New Haven, CT, 2008), p. 1312; also available 
online at <www.yivoencyclopedia.org> (accessed 2/6/2014). 
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desired. Within the regime, conservatives were becoming increasingly reactionary, 
opposing any change in Russia’s political system. In May 1882, inspired by a letter 
from Ivan Aksakov, Ignat’ev proposed summoning a zemskii sobor, based on the 
Slavophile principle, uniting thousands of peasants from across the empire. 
However, Igant’ev’s proposal, when put to the Committee of Ministers, was 
defeated, and he was subsequently replaced as the Minister of the Interior.25 
Ignat’ev’s successor, Dmitrii Tolstoi, opposed any such form of popular 
representation, however symbolic it may have been.26 Tolstoi claimed, ‘my ministry 
can be summed up in one word: order’.27 Another significant source of opposition to 
Ignat’ev’s proposal was Konstantin Pobedonostev, the Over-Procurator of the Holy 
Synod from 1881 until 1905, and a central figure in the counter-reform era.28  
 
 The regime’s desire to contain autonomous activity, fed by the suspicion of 
revolutionary politics, also had the effect of slowing the development of right-wing 
forces outside the regime during the following two decades. One example of this 
curtailment was the short-lived Holy Brotherhood (1881-1882), an organization 
founded on a pledge to defend the life of Alexander III after his father’s 
assassination. It called itself a fighting brotherhood, or druzhina, a word that 
rightists would adopt later. The political police (or third section) shut this group 
down soon after its formation. The illegality of political groups before 1905 meant 
that autonomous groups, even ones with a pro-Tsarist focus, attracted suspicion and 
faced closure by the Ministry of the Interior. Like leftists and liberals, this denied 
pro-autocracy groups the public space required to sharpen skills that would be later 
required for a different kind of debate. However right-wing cultural groups, unlike 
any association of the far left, did not desire to challenge the Tsarist system, so they 
                                                
25 This episode is recounted in Lukashevich, Ivan Aksakov, pp. 153-157; Rogger, ‘Russian Ministers 
and the Jewish Question’, in Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics, p. 62.  
26 V. L. Stepanov, ‘D. A. Tolstoi’, in A. I. Bokhanov (ed.), Rossiiskie konservatory (Moscow, 1997), 
pp. 234-286. 
27 D. A. Tolstoi cited in Rogger, ‘Russia’, in Weber and Rogger (eds.), The European Right, p. 474. 
28 On Pobedonostev, see A. Iu. Polunov, K. P. Pobedonostsev v obshchestvenno-politicheskoi i 
dukhovnoi zhizni Rossii (Moscow, 2010). A useful older work is R. F. Byrnes, Pobedonostsev: His 
Life and Thought (Bloomington, 1968).  
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were not driven underground or into exile, but could sustain a limited amount of 
marginal activity, under the auspices of the regime.29  
 
 The tensions between official and autonomous conservative forces towards 
the end of the nineteenth century were thrown into sharper relief by broader 
developments in Russian society. These included: Russia’s rapid industrialization 
under the Minister of Finance from 1892 until 1903, Sergei Witte, and the resulting 
appearance of an urban working class; land hunger in the countryside and the 
revitalization of the zemstvo movement after the famine of 1891-1892; the 
reappearance of the revolutionary movement, now inspired by the successes of a 
nascent Russian Marxism; and the use of ‘Russification’ policy starting under 
Alexander III towards the empire’s significant national minority populations. All of 
these policies and movements created an increasingly fissile empire. It was 
especially problematic that any right-wing movement might be made up of ‘the 
masses’ – crowds of peasants or townsfolk from the rapidly urbanizing empire. 
Ministers such as Tolstoi and Pobedonostev associated popular movements with a 
benighted peasant democracy threatening order in the Russian land, and wished to 
keep a firm check on their rise and spread; Nicholas II dismissed the ‘senseless 
dreams’ of zemstvo representatives at the outset of 1895. The new social basis, rather 
than the political ideology, of a populist right was what most concerned ultra-
conservative ministers, who greatly feared the destructive potential of the Russian 
people. 
 
 Though reactionary policy inside the Tsarist regime had the curious effect of 
stifling an autonomous right, figures that would have strong influence on right-wing 
movements in the early twentieth century were developing their arguments in this 
era, albeit being restricted to the use of the pen. One was the publicist Sergei 
Sharapov (1855-1911) who would become a member of the Russian Assembly and 
                                                
29 S. Lukashevich, ‘The Holy Brotherhood: 1881-1883’, American Slavic and East European Review, 
18, 4 (1959), pp. 491-509. The world of the right-wing salons in St. Petersburg has been recounted in 
D. I. Stogov, Pravomonarkhicheskie salony Peterburga-Petrograda (Konets XIX-nachalo XX veka) 
(St. Petersburg, 2007). 
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the Union of Russian Men (URM), active throughout the 1890s in sharpening and 
developing earlier Slavophile ideals. He was a prolific writer, publishing brochures 
with titles such as The Future of Peasant Ownership  (1882) and In The Garden and 
the City (1895) and the short-lived journal Russkii trud (Russian Work) from 1897 
until 1899.30 Sharapov’s work exhibited a central connection between the above 
conservatives and the right after 1900: strong dissatisfaction with the current path of 
Russia’s political, social and economic development. In Sharapov’s view, Russia 
since the time of Peter the Great had reneged on its authentic values, taking on 
Western forms of political development not suited to its own unique state structure.31  
 
 Sharapov’s objections were to wider social and economic processes. One of 
these was industrialization, undertaken since the time of Witte. Sharapov saw Russia 
as an agrarian society, mistakenly copying Western models of economic 
development with the goal of becoming an industrialized nation. This had led to the 
Russian people being exploited for the financial gains of foreign states. Sharapov 
opposed modern building projects, such as railroad construction in Russia. He 
opined, ‘railroads, and other developments of foreign capital, are actually strangers 
to Russian property, and cause the accumulation of real wealth abroad and give the 
Russian people only a subservient role to international capital’.32 Instead, Sharapov 
saw the future salvation of Russia in the peasantry, and claimed Russia’s future 
economic development should be based on the peasant commune (obshchina). 
Sharapov’s nostalgia for a lost rural world would have no small impact within the 
rightist movement, in particular, the stance adopted towards Russia’s peasants.33  
  
 Sharapov formed an intellectual link between Slavophilism from an earlier 
age and the organized right as it appeared during and after 1905. Like the 
Slavophiles during the 1830s and 1840s, Sharapov was a utopian in temperament, 
                                                
30 For background on Sharapov, see Chernaia sotnia. Istoricheskaia entsiklopediia (hereafter CSIE, 
Moscow, 2008), pp. 589-596; RKE; pp. 572-577. For a detailed analysis of his central ideas, see M. 
D. Suslov, ‘Neo-Slavophilism and the Revolution of 1905-07: A Study in the Ideology of S. F. 
Sharapov’, Revolutionary Russia, 24, 1 (2011), pp. 33-58. 
31 Russkii trud, 20 April 1897, 15-16, p. 2. 
32 Ibid., p. 3. 
33 Russkii trud, 3 January 1898, 1, p. 3.
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not a pragmatic political thinker. His ideas on Russia’s development were out of step 
with Witte’s industrialization plans. Like the earlier Slavophiles, Sharapov was a 
populist: his own ideas demanded, at least ostensibly, freedom for the Russian 
people whilst also desiring a strong autocratic state structure.34 This would form one 
of the most substantial challenges for the Russian right after the revolution of 1905 
had legalized political parties: how to preserve Russia’s autocratic governance, and 
yet promise liberation for the people?35 Sharapov was earlier grappling with the 
connected problem of how to present a populist style as genuine and on behalf of the 
Russian people.36 One answer was to turn against enemies. In his publications, 
Sharapov asserted unity of interests with Russia’s peasant majority, against 
capitalists, big business and, frequently, Russia’s Jews. Behind much of this anti-
capitalist propaganda were anti-Semitic ideas. In the case of Sharapov’s journal, 
opposing the supposed economic subjugation of Russians meant also opposing the 
‘enemy within’, meaning minority nationalities and Jews.37 Sharapov, like Katkov, 
took a harsh line towards the Russian government since the Great Reform era. 
Sharapov asserted that in making concessions to liberalism, Russia’s leaders had 
failed to preserve the individuality of the nation in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. The bureaucracy, he declared, was what had inhibited true understanding 
between Tsar and people. Legal reforms, the establishment of zemstvo and other 
‘western’ developments had stood between Tsar, people and the realization of 
Russia’s true greatness.38 Yet unlike earlier thinkers, Sharapov would have a 
practical impact, joining several rightist associations.  
 
                                                
34 Russkii trud, 7 August 1899, 32, p. 4. 
35 Sharapov was nothing if not consistent in his view of autocracy as the necessary form of state 
power in Russia. In his pamphlet ‘autocracy or a constitution?’ published a decade later, he described 
the autocracy as the ‘cement of the Russian state.’ S. F. Sharapov, Samoderzhavie ili konstitutsiia? 
(Moscow, 1908), p. 17. 
36 This would remain a theme in his journal Russkoe delo (Russian Cause, 1905-1907) with frequent 
references to the ‘eighty million ploughmen’ in Russia. Russkoe delo, 23 April 1905, 17, pp. 12-14; 7 
May 1905, 19, pp. 16-18; 21 May 1905, 21, pp. 6-7; 20 August 1905, 34, pp. 1-3. 
37 Russkii trud, 28 November 1898, 48, p. 17. For incisive commentary on Sharapov’s anti-
capitalism, see H.-D. Löwe, Antisemitismus, pp. 11-13, 26-29, 94-95. 
38 S. F. Sharapov, Rossiia budushchego (tret”e izdanie “opyta politicheskoi programmy”) (Moscow, 
1907), pp. 9-10. 
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 Right-wing interests, like liberally inclined educated elites, were beginning 
to coalesce in this period. The journal Russkoe obozrenie (Russian Review) was a 
short-lived attempt to present monarchist ideas to a wider audience. It contained 
essays from figures such as Vladimir Gringmut, and Lev Tikhomirov, a former 
member of the People’s Will, now reborn as an ultra-conservative, who also 
reflected pessimistically on Russia’s current path of development.39 The journal 
lasted only seven years (1890-1897) as, despite generous donations from friends, it 
had to close due to lack of funds. This sheds light on another factor: ‘the right’ in 
these years was not a large-scale presence in Russian life; public interest was 
confined to the educated elites of Russian society. Primarily, these were 
intelligentsia and gentry figures that felt the need for an independent right-wing 
politics. However, during much of the nineteenth century, the absence of open 
political opposition to tsarism meant that there was little need to formalize the 
potential of an independent right. But the educated elites were becoming 
increasingly fissile in this era. Liberals as well as conservatives were creating 
independent non-political associations, such as educational and technical societies. 
Organized group formation was beginning to assume a greater scale, though these 
associations would draw their support from elites. Unlike their rivals on the left, 
conservatives did not place themselves in explicit opposition to the regime: whilst 
socialists were also beginning to mobilize, they would have to do so away from the 
state’s auspices.40  
 
 Though political groups were banned before 1905, in creating civic groups, 
right-leaning thinkers had an important advantage over their rivals: conservatism 
was built into the ethos of the regime, which increased their chances of being 
                                                
39 Tikhomirov was a member of the People’s Will (Narodnaia volia) terrorist organization in the late 
1870s. In later years his political views shifted far to the right, though he lost none of his radicalism. 
Tikhomirov declared Russia to be in a state of chaos. He perceived the need for the monarchist 
movement to harness social support after 1905 in order to be successful, and foresaw the cataclysm of 
war in 1914 with some precision. An innovative thinker, Tikhomirov has unsurprisingly attracted no 
small interest in recent historiography. A comprehensive recent biography is A. V. Repnikov and O. 
A. Milevskii, Dve zhizni L’va Tikhomirova (Moscow, 2011).  
40 This discussion draws on Rogger, ‘Russia’, in Weber and Rogger (eds.), The European Right, p. 
475. For prominent liberal voices see A. A. Fedyashin, Liberals Under Autocracy: Modernization 
and Civil Society in Russia, 1866-1904 (London, 2012). 
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tolerated by it. The institutions of the state, such as the 215 members of the State 
Council under Nicholas II, were composed from landowning and official families, 
and the bureaucracy was understandably dominated by a sense of elitism, reflecting 
the social composition of those who ruled Russia.41 Also, the press before 1905 was 
a powerful voice for different conservative ideas, some staunchly pro-government, 
but others more independent. Moskovskie vedomosti and A. I. Suvorin’s newspaper 
Novoe vremia (New Time) had no small influence in the developing sphere of public 
opinion.42 
 
Yet a growing sense of dissatisfaction, embattlement and pessimism about 
the path of Russia’s development was stimulating reactionary tendencies. The 
revolutionary movement emphasized the fears of thinkers such as Nikolai 
Danilevskii (1822-1885) and Konstantin Leontiev (1831-1891), who criticized the 
Russian state for its ‘Europeanism’ and proclaimed the necessity of autocratic 
absolutism.43 Alongside Sharapov, they attacked the industrialization of Russia and 
liberal attitudes within the bureaucracy. The main ideas of twentieth-century 
rightists, such as anti-Semitism, nationalism and chauvinism were all being 
developed in this period. Moreover, by the end of the nineteenth century, all strands 
of the political spectrum were beginning to coalesce into formal groups. These 
included ones on the far left inspired by Marxism, such as the Russian Social 
Democratic Worker’s Party in 1898, and the Socialist Revolutionary Party in 1901; 
from the liberal position, prominent examples included the Union of Liberation, 
officially formed in 1904. Rightists responded by developing their own associations, 
including elite circles in the salons of St. Petersburg, and also combative tendencies 
on the ground, that took an anti-revolutionary message to the streets and fields of the 
empire.  
                                                
41 For the bureaucratic culture of the late imperial period, see D. C. B. Lieven, Russia’s Rulers under 
the Old Regime (London, 1989). 
42 On press regulation, see L. McReynolds, The News Under Russia’s Old Regime: The Development 
of a Mass-Circulation Press (Princeton, 1991); C. Ferenczi, ‘Freedom of the Press, 1905-1914’, in O. 
Crisp and L. Edmondson (eds.), Civil Rights in Imperial Russia (Oxford, 1989), p. 205. 
43 R. E. MacMaster, Danilevsky, a Russian Totalitarian Philosopher (Cambridge, MA, 1967). For 
discussions of Leontiev, see Thaden, Conservative Nationalism, pp. 164-182; and Walicki, A History 
of Russian Thought, pp. 290-308. 
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The Russian Assembly 
 
Cultural groups on the right began to proliferate in the final years of the nineteenth 
and the earliest years of the twentieth centuries. An important step on the road to the 
right becoming more of an organized force was the creation of a group called the 
Russian Assembly. This small group was in several respects a model for later right-
wing parties; post-1905 ‘national’ right-wing groups adopted the central ideology of 
this frontrunner, and followed many of its cultural practices. ‘Reaction’ was key to 
its formation. Circles of writers and thinkers from the gentry met in St. Petersburg 
between November and December 1900 with the aim of founding an organization 
celebrating the strength of Russia’s native artistic works, in opposition to what 
members perceived as the domination of Russia’s elites by West European ideas and 
practices.44 The contrast with the Holy Brotherhood in 1882 is instructive. V. K. 
Pleve, the Minister of the Interior, perceived the Assembly as a cultural rather than 
political organization, and decided to allow the group to form, somewhat 
sidestepping the long-standing tensions between autonomous right-wing forces and 
the regime.45 The organization was officially opened, and the rules and regulations 
promulgated, in January 1901.46  
 
 Like many later right-wing groups that claimed to be representing ‘the 
people’ the Assembly was a group drawn exclusively from elites of Russian society, 
and its council was a list with impeccable upper-class credentials. The group was the 
brainchild of D. P. Golitsyn (1860-1928), a minor novelist and a member of the 
State Council.47 As chair of the group’s council in St. Petersburg, Golitsyn had a 
large impact on the initial ideas and tactics of the group. Vice-chairs A. A. Suvorin, 
                                                
44 On the Russian Assembly, see Rogger, ‘The formation of the Russian Right’, pp. 191-193; 
Rawson, Russian Rightists, pp. 46-55; Vydra, Život ot Cara? pp. 59-71; Stepanov, Chernaia sotnia v 
Rossii, pp. 32-34; and V. Levitskii, ‘Pravye partii’, in L. Martov et al. (eds.), Obshchestvennoe 
dvizhenie v Rossii v nachale XX-go veka (St. Petersburg, 1910), pp. 357-360; the most comprehensive 
recent work is Kir’ianov, Russkoe sobranie. 
45 See E. H. Judge, Plehve: Repression and Reform in Imperial Russia, 1902-1904 (New York, 1983). 
46 Russkii vestnik, 3 (1906), p. 296. 
47 For a brief biography of Golitsyn, see RKE, pp. 121-123.  
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editor of the influential Novoe vremia newspaper, and the Slavophile writer S. N. 
Syromiatnikov shared his elite background and upbringing; all were members of 
prominent gentry families. The council of the group was composed of members 
from noble backgrounds; from the official records published early in 1902, it is 
apparent that bishops, academics, officers and writers together made up a large 
proportion of the total membership.48 The group was small at first, consisting of 
several circles totaling a few hundred people, and even in later years it never 
possessed more than several thousand members.49 One sympathetic estimate claimed 
the St. Petersburg branch had just over 1,000 members in April 1902.50 This elitist 
composition was typical of organized associations in late imperial Russia.51 
Significantly, several figures that would later be active on the radical right became 
members of this self-stated cultural and non-political group. Aleksandr Dubrovin, 
the leader of the Union of Russian People (URP) from October 1905, Vladimir 
Gringmut, and the publicists Pavel Krushevan and Pavel Bulatsel all joined the 
Russian Assembly before or during 1905.52 These central figures, and also other 
members, would later join right-wing political organizations established during the 
1905 revolution. 
 
 Other branches appeared in different parts of the empire following the 
establishment of the council in St. Petersburg. The first regional branch was 
established in Khar’kov, Ukraine, on 8 December 1902.53 The council in Khar’kov 
was comprised of six intellectuals: the chair, professor A. S. Viazigin; the vice-chair, 
professor Ia. A. Anfimov; the organizer of the group, Ia. I. Denisov; the treasurer, V. 
I. Al’bitskii; and two further members of the council, professors P. N. Butsinskii and 
                                                
48 Letopis’ russkogo sobraniia (St. Petersburg, 1902), pp. 6, 32-45; Izvestiia russkogo sobraniia, 3 
(1903), p. 5; Kir’ianov, Russkoe sobranie, pp. 84-85; Mirnyi trud, IV (1902), pp. 198-203. 
49 For a comparison between the social composition of the membership in 1902 and 1914, see 
Kir’ianov, Russkoe sobranie, pp. 84-85. An estimate from the Assembly itself in the first half of 1905 
gives a figure of 3,000 members for the Petersburg branch.  
50 Mirnyi trud, IV (1902), pp. 198-203; Mirnyi trud, V (1903), pp. 195-196. 
51 Bradley, Voluntary Associations in Tsarist Russia, pp. 10-11.  
52 Russkii vestnik, 11 (1906), pp. 307-308. 
53 Russkii vestnik, 10 (1903), p. 831; Mirnyi trud, 10 (1904), pp. 164-175. 
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N. K. Kul’chitskii.54 That the council of the Russian Assembly was composed only 
from intellectuals is a curious feature, given the suspicions of the Russian 
intelligentsia displayed by members of the group. The establishment of a branch in 
Khar’kov points towards another trend exemplified by later organizations, parties 
and groups on the right: the strong provincial dimension of right-wing activity.55 
During 1903, Assembly branches were established in Ekaterinoslav, Odessa, 
Orenburg, Kiev, Voronezh, Saratov, Warsaw and Tambov.56 To publicize the 
activities and ideas of the group, Viazigin would publish the journal Mirnyi trud 
(Peaceful Work) from 1902, and on a monthly basis from 1903.57 
 
Central ideas 
 
‘Official nationality’ was the ideological lodestone of the group.58 Like later 
rightists, a primary aim of the group was to oppose what members felt was growing 
‘cosmopolitanism’ in Russian cultural life, clear from even a brief survey of the 
Assembly’s literature published between 1900 and 1904.59 Their mission was to 
promote self-awareness (samosoznaniia) amongst Russians, by educating those who 
joined about native culture, language and society.60 Much of this involved a 
particular conception of Russia’s decline due to prevailing trends of cultural 
                                                
54 A 52-page appendix accompanied the January 1904 edition of the Assembly’s journal Mirnyi trud, 
describing at length the opening of a branch in Khar’kov. Mirnyi trud, 1 (1904), section 2, p. 4, P. 
Khorsov, ‘Prazdnik russkogo samosoznaniia’.  
55 A central rationale of the group in Khar’kov was opposing foreign strength in the region. GARF, F. 
588, op. 1, d. 1243, ll. 1–1 ob.: Zapis’ zasedeniia soveta Russkogo sobraniia’, 9 April 1902. 
56 Mirnyi trud, 10 (1904), p. 170. The Warsaw branch was sympathetically regarded by a local army 
commander, general-lieutenant Andrei Bogoliubov, who apparently trusted the ‘aims and activities’ 
of the group enough not to consider shutting it down. GARF, F. 588, op. 1, d. 1243, ll. 8-9 ob.: Iz 
zapisi zasedaniia soveta Russkogo sobraniia, 16 April 1903; ibid., l. 19: Iz zapisi zasedaniia soveta 
Russkogo sobraniia, 22 December 1903.  
57 A. Kaplin and A. Stepanov, A. S. Viazigin, ‘Tol’ko vera daet silu zhit’’, in A. A. Ivanov and A. D. 
Stepanov (eds.), Voinstvo Sviatogo Georgiia: zhizneopisaniia Russkikh monarkhistov nachala XX 
veka (St. Petersburg, 2006), pp. 339-367.  
58 See the extracts from a meeting of the Assembly attended by Boris Nikol’skii, who would later join 
the URP: GARF, F. 588, op. 1, d. 1243, l. 10: Iz zapisi zasedaniia soveta Russkogo sobraniia, 6 
September 1903.   
59 See the review of the Assembly’s activity in opening the Khar’kov branch in the conservative 
journal Russian Messenger. Russkii vestnik, 10 (1903), pp. 831-843. ‘Sovremennaia letopis’: otkrytie 
Khar’kovskogo otdela Russkogo sobraniia’. 
60 Mirnyi trud, 1 (1904), section 2, p. 3. 
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Westernization in art, literature and music.61 The group’s council held that Russians 
had not realized their artistic and cultural potential. Instead, decadent Western trends 
that represented egoism and rootlessness, rather than community and authenticity, 
had swept the Russian land.62 Instead of Western artistic trends, which centred on 
individual achievement, the Assembly emphasized collective achievements, freedom 
and personality.  
 
The greatness of the nineteenth-century Russian canon pointed towards the 
innate genius of the Russian people; examples of outstanding high culture from the 
nineteenth century were used to illustrate this idea. Lermontov, Tolstoy, Gogol and 
Pushkin were preferred points of discussion to the ideas of Slavophile and Pan-Slav 
thinkers such as Aksakov or Leontiev and were held up as examples of what the 
Russian cultural genius had achieved. The Assembly’s literature claimed a desire to 
emphasize group achievement over individual talent, whilst celebrating heroes in 
Russian art and literature.63 However, founders of the group claimed not to be 
focusing only on a series of ‘great men’ and their significance to the canon, but also 
exploring the contribution of the Russian people (narod). It was a celebration of 
Russian (and only Russian) national genius.64 Music was particularly important to 
the Assembly, as it was to later right-wing groups. Many of the association’s 
gatherings took the form of literary and musical evenings (literaturno-muzykal’nye 
vechera) held to promote and celebrate the greatness of Russian culture.65 Later 
right-wing associations such as the Union of Archangel Mikhail (UAM), and many 
smaller civic groups, would share the Assembly’s nostalgia for a supposedly 
vanishing culture.   
 
                                                
61 Russkii vestnik, 10 (1903), pp. 838-839. 
62 Mirnyi trud, 1 (1904), section 2, p. 41. In adopting ‘community principles’ (obshchinnoe nachalo) 
and not ‘society’, the Assembly was using older Slavophile precepts. Walicki, A History of Russian 
Thought, pp. 108-109. 
63 Mirnyi trud, 1 (1904), section 2, pp. 9-10. 
64 Russkii vestnik, 10 (1903), p. 838. 
65 This would be a tactic that the Assembly, and other rightist organizations, would use throughout 
their existence until the revolutions of 1917.  
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 Before 1905, the group described itself as a cultural rather than a political 
organization. This was not merely a pragmatic consideration to evade closure by the 
Ministry of the Interior (Russia’s police). It signified something deeper: many 
members of the group regarded any form of organized political activity with 
suspicion, a development that they connected with ‘the left’ and Western influences 
on Russian society and culture. Later right-wing groups would echo these principles. 
The writer and publicist S. N. Syromiatnikov, one of the group’s founders, wrote in 
1901 that Western developments were the antithesis of the autocratic tradition. The 
Western idea of constitutionalism threatened the existing system of government, 
which alone ‘understood the heart of every Russian’.66 S. N. Syromiatnikov drew a 
distinction between the long-established institution of the autocracy, and artificial 
developments in contemporary Russia and the West. He presented the Emancipation 
Manifesto of 1861 as proof that it was the autocracy, not the revolutionaries, that 
protected the true interests of the people. Syromiatnikov described Russia’s liberals 
as sustained by a series of falsehoods, and claimed in his work Experience of 
Russian Thought that real liberalism and freedom could only be provided by the 
autocracy. He claimed to be ‘above politics’, reflecting his view that ‘modern 
politics’ – a loaded term – represented negative ends.67  
 
 The ceremonial trappings of Russian religion were a central element of the 
symbolism of the Assembly. Student members of the Khar’kov branch chose an icon 
of the priest Serafim Sarovskii to display rather than one of a Tsar or even a leader 
of the group at the first ceremonial meeting held on 8 December 1902.68 The 
demonstrations of the Assembly, with icon processions, crosses, and images of 
saints, were richly redolent of Orthodox religious symbolism. The roots of the 
conflict between the greater Russia and minority nations were often considered by 
the leaders of the Assembly, such as Boris Nikol’skii, to be religious: Russian 
                                                
66 S. N. Syromiatnikov, Opyty russkoi mysli (St. Petersburg, 1901), p. 37. 
67 Ibid., p. 99. 
68 Russkii vestnik, 10 (1903), p. 843. 
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Orthodoxy against Roman Catholicism, in the case of Poland.69 From an early stage, 
religious figures played an important role in right-wing groups.70 Priests formed a 
small percentage of the group’s membership, but reflected a wider perception 
amongst members of the centrality of religion to Russia’s development. Tying into 
these convictions was an avowed nationalism. Members conceived of Russian 
statehood as centering on the achievements of the ‘great Russian’ state, and its 
control over the ‘little Russian’ nations, such as Ukraine. The Assembly drew on 
older Pan-Slavist ideals, as expressed by Aksakov above, of a worldwide mission to 
unite all of the Slavic peoples, based on an idea that the Russian nation was the 
greatest of all nations.71  
 
 The aim of the group as stated by prominent members such as A. S. Viazigin 
may have been the preservation of a particular type of ‘great Russian’ culture and its 
heroic, ascetic ideals, but there was also a negative focus to this. Certain lists of 
enemies – political, social, ethnic or national – were contrasted with the positive 
aspects of Russian culture and art, in order to accentuate threats to the state and 
people. A commentator from the Assembly, Nikolai Engelgardt, drew a link between 
the 1863 Polish rebellion and the subversive nature of Roman Catholicism, as 
opposed to Russian Orthodoxy.72 Additionally, the group continued to display the 
anti-Semitism associated with Pan-Slavist thinkers such as Aksakov as it attracted 
more reactionary members. Sharapov displayed his own anti-Semitic inclinations, 
stating in a meeting that the group had a mission to oppose ‘international Jewry’.73 
Members also opposed atheism, anarchism and nihilism.74 Overall, the central ideas 
of the Assembly were not innovative, but derived from nineteenth-century 
conservative ideals. The main ideas of the Assembly reflected the central principles 
of later organized right-wing parties, though with one important distinction. Before 
1905, it was a cultural rather than a political group, necessarily so given the blanket 
                                                
69 GARF, F. 588, op. 1, d. 1243, ll. 1–1 ob.: Zapis’ zasedaniia soveta Russkogo sobraniia, 9 April 
1902.  
70 Kir’ianov, Russkoe sobranie, p. 78. 
71 Mirnyi trud, 1 (1904), section 2, p. 28. 
72 Russkii vestnik, 1 (1905), pp. 420-421, Nikolai Engelgardt, ‘Sovremennaia letopis’’.   
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ban on political organizations. Only later would political activity become a more 
central feature.  
 
Radicalism and social transformation 
 
The Assembly placed great stress on the group’s relationship with the narod. Like 
the URP, the URM and the UAM, the Assembly was desperate to claim mass 
support, though it did not have many obvious advantages in this aim. It was an 
organization composed of the nobility, who had little in common with the majority 
of the subjects of the Russian Empire, including the narod that was frequently 
idolized. Members such as D. P. Golitsyn only had an abstract conception of the 
Russian people and their role throughout history. However, the populist-
demagogical tendency in the organized right was developing within the group, with 
appeals to ultra-nationalism as well as social and cultural ideas celebrating ‘the 
people’. 
  
 The right-wing student movement (or Academists) that would form a support 
base for later right-wing groups had its origins within the Assembly. Securing wider 
social bases was a challenge for the right, especially during and after the 
revolutionary period.75 This appeal to youth was an intriguing feature, discernible 
from the early propaganda of the founders and organizers of the group.76 Youth were 
held to be the future and salvation of Russia, and members of the Assembly wished 
to give them a role reflecting their importance to the organization, as well as to the 
Russian land and state. A speech given by D. P. Golitsyn at a meeting of the 
Khar’kov branch on 8 December 1902 included the following address to student 
                                                
75 Mirnyi trud, 1 (1904), section 2, p. 7. The Academist movement will be assessed in chapter five.  
76 Intriguingly, clear echoes of this right-wing appeal to youth can be seen in later Romanian 
nationalist student movements, which were also created in response to fear of a left-wing revolution, 
and a strong national minority presence on university campuses. The student movement of Corneliu 
Codreanu in the 1930s played on such fears, and saw that the incumbent regime had not done enough 
to prevent the revolutionary threat from within higher education. ‘In 1936, Codreanu claimed that he 
had been frightened by the revolutionary phenomena he observed after the war and that the 
authorities had not responded to the leftist and Jewish danger vigorously enough’. I. Livezeanu, 
Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930 
(Ithaca, NY, 1995), p. 256. 
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members, ‘Youth, tomorrow will be the day of our nation, youth – you will be the 
future of the life of our land, youth – this, which may be yours...when we depart, it 
will be your turn’.77 However, only very small numbers of students were initially 
attracted to the Assembly. The Khar’kov student branch had only around 50 
members at first, all of them drawn from the nearby university.78 Only 100 students 
appeared at a demonstration on 27 November 1903 in Khar’kov, held in defence of 
the Uvarov triad of Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality, in what was apparently a 
peaceful protest.79  
 
 A primary rationale of such groups was to oppose revolutionaries. A law 
student, S. Mandrukin, opined that there were only 82 student members of the 
Assembly in Khar’kov by December 1904, united in declaring ‘cultural war’ against 
revolutionary elements. The main council of the ‘Russian-students’ organization 
suggested compiling a list of the ‘student-revolutionaries’ and liberal professors who 
resided at Khar’kov University, which would then be passed on to the government. 
Given its political status, the Russian-students organization was technically illegal, 
but this did not appear to dissuade the organizers of the group from the possibility of 
communicating with the government. Its members wished to work with the regime, 
showing the shared desire of the regime and the autonomous right to combat 
revolution.80 
 
 It was desperately important to appeal to youth to win support for the nascent 
right. Incidents such as the 1899 student disturbances had highlighted the urgency of 
the crisis at the Russian university. According to the publicist Pavel Khorsov, 
writing in Mirnyi trud, the university was in a ‘state of decline’, as was Russian 
                                                
77 Mirnyi trud, 1 (1904), section 2, p. 51; Russkii vestnik, 10 (1903), p. 843. 
78 Mirnyi trud, 1 (1904), section 2, p. 2. At the turn of the twentieth century, the Russian Empire had 
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culture generally. The purity of ‘Russian science’ was threatened by political 
developments on the university campus, and Russia’s technological progress was 
potentially delayed.81 A wave of student strikes had disrupted the calm of Russia’s 
universities; Russia’s place as a centre of scientific and cultural development, a 
feature the group held with pride, was threatened by such unrest. A future Dmitrii 
Mendeleev, rather than working in the laboratory, could be out amongst the rioters: a 
detrimental development indeed in regard to Russia’s future. Though many 
conservatives looked on the power of Russian youth with dismay,82 at an early stage, 
influential figures on the right, including Lev Tikhomirov, and the leader of the 
Russian Assembly in Kiev, Boris Iuzefovich, placed great emphasis on the potential 
power of youth movements and attempted to entice them to the cause.83 This is not 
to deny rightist fears of youth radicalism. Tikhomirov himself claimed radicalism in 
the Russian university had grown immensely during 1905, posing a serious threat to 
the stability of the autocracy. He claimed between 3,000 and 4,000 students took 
part in strikes at Moscow University during September 1905.84 The relationship 
between Russia’s rightist factions and youth was not uniform, but complex: a 
delicate balance between optimism and pessimism, and in this, the Assembly set a 
template for later rightist organizations.  
  
 There was a great interest shown in using music to enhance public 
celebrations by members of the Assembly. There were conservative precedents for 
                                                
81 In their readiness to defend ‘Russian science’, the Assembly was adopting nineteenth-century 
precedents from a variety of civil society groups, in Europe as well as in Russia. The Society of 
Friends of Natural History (established in 1863 in Moscow) displayed a similarity with right-wing 
student groups in seeing a link between patriotism and ‘forms of useful knowledge’. The nineteenth-
century fascination with science including materialism, theories of evolution, Darwin and natural 
history also had clear echoes in a number of Academist groups. See Bradley, Voluntary Associations 
in Tsarist Russia, pp. 128-168.  
82 Prince Vladimir Meshcherskii’s very conservative newspaper Grazhdanin (Citizen) described 
increasing anarchy as the culmination of the 60-year influence of socialist ideologies within the 
Russian university, protected and promoted by liberal sympathizers. This had reached a peak in 1905-
1906, when he claimed that 12,000 students from St. Petersburg University had taken part in strikes. 
Given the total number of students enrolled in all nine Russian universities in 1908 was estimated to 
be around 35,000, this is an unlikely figure. Grazhdanin, 14 March 1910, 8-9, p. 20. 
83 One proponent was Lev Tikhomirov, who wrote of the need for a strong nationalist student wing to 
combat the powerful tendencies of the left-wing student movement in 1907. See L. Tikhomirov, 
Khristianskoe gosudarstvo i vneshniaia politika (Moscow, 2012), p. 650.  
84 ‘25 let nazad: iz dnevnika L. Tikhomirova’, Krasnyi arkhiv, 3(40) (1930), p. 60. 
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this, such as the Slavophile publicist Petr Kireevskii’s collaboration on a collection 
of popular folk songs in the 1830s; an attempt to preserve specific popular songs, 
and prevent the possible disappearance of Russian folklore. Members of the 
Assembly, like nationalist thinkers elsewhere, understood that music could be used 
for mobilization purposes, and its meetings were rarely silent affairs, frequently 
including performances of patriotic music. These musical evenings provided 
opportunities for members to listen to high-minded ‘great Russian’ music that was 
held by organizers to be of a superior style to more modern trends.85 The emphasis 
on music as a feature of the ‘cultural performance’ lasted throughout the course of 
the Assembly’s existence. Choices included the arias from the opera Eugene Onegin, 
and performances of the nationalist composer Mikhail Glinka’s 1836 opera A Life 
for the Tsar (Zhizn’ za tsaria). Such musical choices were carefully selected to 
emphasize the glory of holy Rus’, Orthodoxy and autocracy.86 The cultivation of this 
‘national’ style of music had the central aim of glorifying the Russian land and 
people. It is therefore curious that in these meetings there was no sustained attempt 
to cultivate folk conceptions of music or art that were instead held to be ‘decadent’ 
trends. Instead, the Assembly had in mind a certain type of high-minded, ascetic 
music as the accompaniment for their events. Hence, these musical choices were not 
genuinely ‘popular’ but reflected the tastes of the group’s organizers. Teasing out 
popular aspects would prove to be a challenge to the right in its quest to cultivate a 
style appealing to a wider public, rather than the narrow set of elites that made up 
the Assembly.87  
 
 A particular element that needs highlighting is the negative aspects of the 
group. The Assembly was established as an antidote to a series of threats to the 
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Russian land. The conservatively-inclined founders of the group, D. P. Golitsyn and 
A. S. Viazigin, saw chaotic, destructive Western chimeras unleashed within 
nineteenth-century Russia: revolution, cosmopolitanism and anarchism.88 Though 
later rightist groups such as the URP would take on huge notoriety throughout the 
empire for their violent and demagogical nature, the Assembly always renounced 
violence as part of its programme, though some of its members, such as Pavel 
Krushevan, did much to incite tensions and hatreds.89 However, given the size of the 
Assembly, its ability to plan and oversee large-scale violence across the empire was 
indeed limited.90  
 
 Notwithstanding such limitations, the group undeniably had a hostile 
element, based around an idea of ethnic, as well as religious, exclusiveness. At a 
meeting between members of the Odessa branch of the Russian Assembly on 26 
September 1902, it was declared that foreigners of all types were not to be admitted 
to the group. Only ‘true Christians, true Russian subjects’ were allowed to be 
members. National minorities and Jews were not to be admitted, in the case of the 
latter, even after conversion to Orthodoxy. The temperament of the group, as 
expressed by figures such as Golitsyn and Nikol’skii, was militantly anti-Semitic 
and nationalist.91 The Assembly after 1905 would refuse to compromise with what it 
saw as more moderate conservative tendencies, such as the Octobrists, who were 
seen, along with liberals such as the Kadets, as part of the problems facing Russian 
society.92 The Assembly’s rationale serves to demonstrate the ambiguity between 
traditional conservatism and newer ideas of right-wing radicalism. 
 
 Therefore, whilst the group had a limited size and social base, it signified an 
important turning point in the historical development of the right. Ideologically, it 
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focused on Russian supremacy and ethnic exclusivity. Its desire to use the power of 
culture to educate the masses was also adopted by later right-wing civic groups. The 
Assembly was a bridging point between later associations, affording many figures 
prominent in the monarchist movement later on the first chance to tackle the 
problems of the day in a group forum. However, as a wave of social and political 
crises hit Russian society, tensions existing within this group would develop 
elsewhere, causing a growing instability in the forces claiming to defend the old 
regime.  
 
Towards Crisis: A New Time of Troubles 
          
The early twentieth century saw the emergence of fresh right-wing radicalism, 
inspired by events in contemporary Russia.93 A conservative diagnosis of Russian 
politics and society at the outset of the twentieth century would not have been a 
healthy one. Historical crises from the latter half of the nineteenth century, including 
the 1863 Polish uprising, university unrest and the dawn of the worker’s movement 
were pointed to by members of the Assembly as evidence of the growing ferment in 
society. Many rightists were informed by a sense of history; these historical shocks 
pointed towards the future ruin of Russia.94 One of the founders of the Assembly, 
Boris Nikol’skii, perceived a variety of political, social and economic crises on the 
horizon at the outset of the twentieth century.95 This sense of pessimism was deeply 
felt across wider society; it was not limited to right-wing thinkers.96 It is important to 
remember that the autocracy was genuinely embattled; what can be seen as a series 
of right-wing myths were often exaggerations, but were constructed around real 
events and crises, albeit often loosely.  
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Pogroms, assassinations and failed wars 
 
The immediate catalyst for the rise of the right was a series of events between 1902 
and 1905. Not only were there agrarian riots in Poltava during 1902, continuing 
ferment in the cities was a negative development intimately tied to existing 
ideologies; we have already seen how the agrarian utopia of Sharapov was built on 
older Slavophile precepts of celebrating rural Russia.97 Rapid urbanization gave rise 
to new fears of an urban working class, as workers were seen to be losing their ties 
with the Russian countryside and acquainting themselves with the writings of Marx 
and Engels, leading to political radicalization. Tikhomirov was one thinker who 
perceived this, and the workers’ issue became a central priority for him during 1905, 
in response to urbanization in Russia.98  
 
 The Easter 1903 pogrom in Kishinev was the first large-scale anti-Jewish riot 
since those of 1881-1882.99 The reactionary publicist Pavel Krushevan, a member of 
the Russian Assembly and leader of the URP in Bessarabia from 1905 until 1909, 
published anti-Semitic tirades in the months leading up to the pogrom in his paper 
Bessarabets (Bessarabian), blaming Jews for a variety of ills in Russian life, as well 
as re-animating the ancient ritual murder myth.100 According to the governor of 
Bessarabia from 1903, Prince S. D. Urusov, Krushevan’s paper had exploited 
tensions in the area, which were pronounced given Kishinev’s 45 per cent Jewish 
population.101 The ‘opinion of radical right society’ perceived Russians as exploited 
by rich and powerful Jews. Though the Russian Assembly did not have the 
organizational wherewithal to organize a mass uprising, the appearance of a group 
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known as the Union of Truly Russian Men (Soiuz istinno-russkikh liudei) in 
Kishinev shows that provincial radical right movements were developing.102 
Members of the Assembly tended to be unsympathetic towards Jewish plight in 
Kishinev.103 Like Ivan Aksakov in the 1880s, rightists saw the poor Russian masses, 
not the Jews, as the true victims of the pogroms. A. M. Zolotarev, a vice-chair of the 
Russian Assembly, in one of its meetings countenanced establishing a fund to 
provide financial assistance for the ‘Russian victims’ of the pogrom in Kishinev.104 
 
 Consequently, rightists were beginning to worry establishment figures such 
as Urusov.105 Pleve, the Minister of the Interior, was no friend of the Jews, but 
realized the dangers posed by mass unrest. It was necessary to suppress any 
disorders that posed a threat to the calm of the empire. This was made difficult by 
the scant police presence in the provincial regions, as well as corrupt and lazy 
officials turning a blind eye to disorders, which helped to create a situation whereby 
mobs could create anarchy in Kishinev. Though there is no evidence that the 
government planned the Kishinev pogrom, inaction, foot dragging and general 
incompetence from the local authorities meant the violence took days to subside.106 
After Kishinev, fierce pogroms swept other regions, a major one being in Gomel 
during 1903. Unlike in Kishinev, fierce fighting broke out between pogromists and 
Jewish self-defence groups, much to the government’s alarm. In 1904, there were a 
further 43 pogroms across the empire.107 In Kishinev and Gomel, the pogroms were 
spontaneous events, with disorganized bands of townsfolk carrying out the violence. 
Smaller groups with interests akin to the right were certainly involved in these 
outbreaks of violence, suggesting that the pogroms were popular uprisings, though it 
is difficult to definitively assess the complicity of the central right-wing groups 
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during 1903 and 1904.108 This spell of anti-Jewish violence led to the word ‘pogrom’ 
taking on international as well as domestic recognition.109 
 
 It was in this period that the movement increased its provincial presence. In 
Nizhnii Novgorod province, the Words and Deeds (Slovo i delo) group was created 
as a small ‘monarchist’ party, pledging to defend the Uvarov triad of Orthodoxy, 
autocracy and nationality. The total membership of the group was estimated to be 
around two hundred. A proclamation from March 1903 appealed to ‘true Russian 
people’, and the committee pledged allegiance not to the Russian government, but to 
the ‘Tsar-father’ (Tsar’-batiushka) and the preservation of an autocracy that was not 
in any way compromised by contemporary political developments.110  Radicalism 
was becoming an increasing feature, not primarily expressed by ideological novelty, 
but rather pledges to commit violence. A police report from 1 May 1903 noted the 
proclamations of the Russian Union that promised ‘death to the yids!’111 Both 
documents show a desire to appeal to the masses, rather than only elites. The regime 
itself had previously tried to utilize a ‘conservative monarchism’ aimed at attracting 
the workers, under the auspices of the Zubatov Unions. But the Words and Deeds 
group and the Russian Union were different in that they were not organized by 
figures from within the regime, but were spontaneous associations; these were 
popular movements that rejected any accusation that they were created at the behest 
of the government.112  
 
 The key event was the onset of the revolutionary era, with the rise of 
spontaneous rightist groups stimulated by developments elsewhere, mobilizing in 
defence of an increasingly embattled autocracy. A series of attacks on significant 
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establishment figures by revolutionary movements alarmed many conservatives. The 
assassination of Pleve in 1904, the result of a bomb attack by the SRs, drew public 
attention to anti-state revolutionary violence.113 For other conservatives, as well as 
the radical right, there were fears that further concessions would be wrung out of the 
regime by these attacks on government officials. Vladimir Meshcherskii, influential 
member of the Tsarist court camarilla, confidant of Nicholas II and editor of the 
reactionary newspaper Grazhdanin was one who expressed such views.114 Pleve’s 
successor, Prince Sviatopolk-Mirskii, was perceived, not inaccurately, as a liberal 
sympathizer by Meshcherskii, who saw in his tendency to follow a more moderate 
course of action than his predecessor Pleve the encouragement of further demands 
for change from liberal elites.115 Sviatopolk-Mirskii’s predilection for moderate 
reform did indeed encourage liberal demands, with the banquet campaign of 
November to December 1904 and the subsequent formation of the Union of 
Liberation shortly prior to the revolution of 1905 being one outcome.116  
 
 The greatest cause of pessimism at this time was the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-1905. Yet in the initial phases of the war, the feeling amongst the right was 
optimistic. Lev Tikhomirov wrote in his diary that on 28 January 1904 ‘in Moscow, 
the mood was high and patriotic’.117 Nicholas II, openly dismissive of the Japanese 
and predicting an easy victory, was shocked by the humiliating nature of the military 
defeat, exemplified by events such as the rout of the Russian navy at Tsushima. As 
much as the defeat itself, it was the resulting political radicalization of Russian 
society that frightened onlookers. Tikhomirov noted how crowds of anti-war 
demonstrators in Moscow had grown in size during 1904, and wished for the fall of 
the autocracy, ‘war with the Russian government’ and ‘unity with the Japanese 
proletariat’.118 That it was an urban crowd who chanted ‘down with the autocracy 
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and the Tsar!’ in particular riled this ex-revolutionary, who saw in increasing worker 
radicalism ‘the ruin of the unhappy nation’.119 Mikhail O. Men’shikov, contributor 
to Aleksei Suvorin’s influential, widely-circulating St. Petersburg newspaper Novoe 
vremia, felt the war would reveal the weakness of Russia’s ruling classes; he 
predicted the resulting mood of anarchy would fundamentally change Russian 
society. Men’shikov wrote in late 1905, ‘revolution has come to Russia...but after 
every revolution there comes an uncertain period of anarchy, from which comes war 
– not with the old, but with the new regime’.120 A. V. Bogdanovich, the wife of the 
future URP member General E. V. Bogdanovich, expressed the following sentiment 
in her diary, after a meeting between members of her husband’s salon in St. 
Petersburg on 17 May 1905 where Russian failures in the war were discussed:  
 
So far, no terrible disturbances have followed this clash, but there have been 
many others – Port Arthur, Laioian, Mukden, etc. All of today’s guests had a 
deep fall in their spirits, and everyone expects domestic troubles, that from 
the catastrophes that have befallen the monarchy, the Tsar would issue not 
only a constitution, but a republic…121 
 
Such developments contributed towards an idea in rightist circles of a second time of 
troubles (smutnoe vremia), the first of which came after the period between Ivan 
IV’s death in 1598 and the installation of the Romanov dynasty in 1613.122 This 
underlying feeling of chaos and instability was integral to the message of the right 
before, during and after 1905, with current events representing nothing less than 
national humiliation. Tikhomirov wrote in his diary, ‘apart from nonsense and 
anarchy, what is the basis of the contemporary disorganization and demoralization of 
Russia? It is a horrible time’.123 Reaction also came from elsewhere. A letter from 12 
February 1904, signed by members of the Group of Russian Patriots, claimed that 
workers in the factories of Tiflis had taken it on themselves to organize branches of 
patriotic groups in defence of the ‘140 million Russian patriots’ let down by the 
liberal classes of greedy, money-hungry bureaucrats. The events of the Russo-
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Japanese War were cited as one example of the catastrophe that would follow if 
Russia continued to go down the path of liberalism. Though these groups may have 
wanted to keep the autocracy, they were far from happy with it in its present form. 
Indeed, there was widespread anger at present developments.124   
 
 Moskovskie vedomosti, edited by the future leader of the RMP Vladimir 
Gringmut since 1896, explicitly linked workers with political radicalism and the 
ensuing era of crisis. Gringmut wrote in one editorial that the workers’ movement 
lay behind much of the crisis, and the onset of the revolutionary period.125 The 
worrying events of Bloody Sunday, 9 January 1905, revealed Father Gapon to be a 
revolutionary, one who had ‘previously drawn a salary from the security section’. 
Gringmut added that Gapon was the tool of ‘the young red nihilists and the Jews’.126 
That the new period was conceived of as an era of social crisis would have an 
important effect on the rightist conception of the narod – never straightforward from 
its inception. Right-wingers such as Gringmut realized the importance of creating a 
wider appeal, but due to widespread strikes and riots saw large sections of the 
Russian people in a pessimistic light.   
 
Other monarchist groups displayed fear of an impending catastrophe at the 
outset of 1905. The assassination of the governor-general of Moscow, Grand Duke 
Sergei Aleksandrovich, by an SR bomb in February 1905 added to the general sense 
of unease.127 The most extreme branches of the right attempted to create a 
worldview where politically motivated (as opposed to anti-Semitic) violence was 
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exclusively the preserve of the left. Rightists would continually hark back to such 
events as proof of the murderous intentions of revolutionaries.128 A monarchist 
proclamation from April 1905 in Kiev, addressed ‘to the Russian workers’, 
mentioned the following assassinations: Alexander II (1881), A. S. Sipiagin (1902), 
V. Pleve (1904) and Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich (1905).129 Activists claimed 
that these assassinations, and the prevalence of revolutionary terror, would in future 
necessitate a more combative approach.130  
 
The Russian Monarchist Party  
 
A central paradox of the right was that in mobilizing 
politically, they clearly felt that the regime itself 
could no longer be relied upon to defend Russian 
interests. This built on existing trends within rightist 
circles, such as the Russian Assembly, in distrusting 
Russia’s bureaucratic classes.131 As well as the 
events of Bloody Sunday, the early months of 1905 
saw key events that would lead to the creation of 
new parties and groups on the right. January 1905 
saw the rise of a fresh wave of opposition to the 
government, in the wake of the Russo-Japanese 
War. The Union of Liberation became more vocal in 
its demands, provincial zemstvo assemblies became 
increasingly critical of government policy, and 
several thousand students joined strikes at St. Petersburg University. A further wave 
of political and economic strikes swept major cities such as St. Petersburg, Moscow, 
Baku, Warsaw, Vilna, Riga, Kiev and several others. In one month, 500,000 people 
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Figure 2 Badge of the Russian 
Monarchist Party, Vladimir 
Andreevich Gringmut: ocherk 
ego zhizni i deiatel’nosti 
(Moscow, 1913), p. 73.  
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went on strike. A series of declarations from the regime on 18 February, the imperial 
rescript, pleaded for loyalty from the empire’s people in a time of war and also 
outlined the concessionary measure of establishing a consultative (but not 
legislative) assembly.  
 
The imperial rescript triggered both further oppositional activity –  and also a 
nascent right. A particularly significant group that emerged was the RMP, created in 
Moscow under the leadership of Vladimir Gringmut on 24 April 1905. As the editor 
of Moskovskie vedomosti, Vladimir Gringmut also had a journalistic platform. The 
RMP’s banner was ornately decorated in Old Church Slavonic, with images of saints 
and the Virgin Mary. The official seal of the group included a quote from Nicholas 
II, ‘may my autocracy stay as of old’ which is indicative of the mood of the group 
and its attitude towards the idea of socio-political development in contemporary 
Russia. For Gringmut, the 18 February rescript was the result of the machinations of 
liberal ‘blabbers and charlatans’. Like the Russian Assembly, the RMP sought to 
turn the clock back to a time before such political changes. At first the RMP was 
small in scale. The initial meetings, often attended by less than 100 people, took 
place in Moscow, with small groups of neo-Slavophiles and rightist publicists 
present.132 
 
 The need to form this group (which, significantly, Gringmut called a party, 
with the accompanying political associations, rather than an assembly or union) 
suggested the monarchist movement thought the autocracy on its own was 
inadequate to save Russia. Indeed, Gringmut and others were critical of the 
contemporary situation. In the first months of 1905 more rightist groups formed in 
response to the 18 February acts.133 Gringmut saw that rightist party formation was 
needed to safeguard the autocracy, but other prominent conservatives, such as 
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Vladimir Meshcherskii, disagreed. Meshcherskii had accurately perceived the 
aforementioned paradox. He noted from examples of other autocratic states in 
Europe that there were no autonomous political groups mobilizing to defend them, 
so why should Russia be different?134 In contrast, Gringmut saw the need to 
establish a party in order to channel the ideas of existing cultural groups such as the 
Assembly. This party could place pressure on the Tsar and his advisors, influencing 
the politics of the official court. Gringmut, unlike Sharapov, jettisoned any allusions 
to Slavophilism, and claimed what Russia needed was a benign dictatorship, led by 
the Tsar, to oppose the current revolutionary developments. Unlike the later URP, 
Gringmut conceived of the RMP primarily as a pressure group to influence the Tsar 
and important advisors, who may be sympathetic to their aims.135 In this conception, 
Gringmut differed from Sharapov. In his paper, Russkoe delo (the Russian Cause) 
Sharapov called for a wider process of popular mobilization on the part of a potential 
right. He denounced the Russian Assembly as the ‘essence of Petersburg police 
patriotism’, and called for a more autonomous set of rightist groups. Gringmut in his 
turn defended the Assembly, suggesting that the right needed to work closely with 
the Tsar.136  
 
 One of the main attractions of the RMP was Gringmut himself, who used his 
oratorical talents to excite crowds of observers in Moscow. In later years, a number 
of monarchists would present a view of Gringmut as the dynamic leader (vozhd’) of 
the movement, with unassailable values of heroism and strength.137 His personality 
cult amongst followers was one aspect of his importance to the wider monarchist 
movement, but also vital was Gringmut’s conception of how to harness a social 
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135 Moskovskie vedomosti, 5 May 1905, 121, pp. 1-2.  
136 Russkoe delo, 5 March 1905, 8, p. 12. In this conception of the Tsar’s politics, Gringmut was 
largely correct: see S. Podbolotov, ‘And the Entire Mass of People Rose Up...the Attitude of Nicholas 
II Towards the Pogroms’, Cahiers du monde russe, 45, 1/2 (2004), pp. 193-208. During and after 
1905 rightists would attempt to communicate directly with the Tsar to declare unity with the Russian 
monarch. But this did not stop criticism of Nicholas II emerging in rightist circles, with his personal 
weakness perceived as his main failing. See S. Podbolotov, ‘Monarchists Against Their Monarch: 
The Rightists’ Criticism of Tsar Nicholas II’, Russian History, 1/2 (2004), pp. 105-120. 
137 See the hagiographic account of his life published by supporters in 1913, Vladimir Andreevich 
Gringmut: ocherk ego zhizni i deiatel’nosti (Moscow, 1913), pp. 5-72. 
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dynamic in Russia.  Yet Gringmut, despite what his followers may have believed, 
did not represent the entire right. His social and political views betrayed a conflict 
between rightist leaders at an early stage on key issues, including the relationship 
with authority, desirability of launching a mass appeal, and how to go about 
achieving the latter aim. He spoke of a potential autonomous right as possessing an 
authoritarian dynamic, with the masses of people loyal subjects of the Tsar himself 
and the right-wing movements. Sharapov, however, sharply criticized this 
conception of a future right, given its rejection of the zemskii sobor, the consultative 
element beloved of the Slavophiles. Sharapov wrote that the popular potential of a 
monarchist movement was lost by Gringmut’s stress on order and authority, and that 
this emerging right was not truly popular, or indeed autonomous.138 
 
Conclusion 
 
At the outset of 1905, many of the most significant thematic aspects of the rightist 
movement were set, and its influences in place. Ideologically, rightists were 
committed to the Uvarov triad of Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality. Many 
different monarchist groups had sprung up across the empire in support of these 
ideas, the most significant of which were the Russian Assembly and the RMP, as 
well as other provincial groups. However, the movement before the middle of 1905 
was small in scale, with discordant aims. Whilst members of the Russian Assembly 
and the RMP were in dialogue, they had different conceptions of the necessary 
tactics to take the movement forward, outside the studies of thinkers and small-scale 
cultural meetings.139 These groups had formed populist ideas, but were still 
composed exclusively of elites. The mobilization that the movement sought was 
only just beginning. However, the RMP took a different view from Slavophile 
groups of the role the narod should play. Gringmut imagined monarchist movements 
as acting on the people’s behalf via his strong leadership, whilst Sharapov in 
Russkoe delo made frequent reference to the potential of the Russian people 
                                                
138 Russkoe delo, 5 February 1905, 4, p. 3. 
139 Ibid., p. 3.  
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themselves, the ‘80 million ploughmen’ who were the truly loyal subjects of the 
Tsar.140 But even by the spring of 1905, the rightist reach outside minute cultural 
groups was very tenuous.141 
 
 Additionally, major conservative figures agreed that the movement was weak 
at this stage. Vladimir Gurko, Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs (1906-1907), 
wrote early in 1905, ‘at the time, those who represented conservative thought in 
Russia found it very difficult to freely express their thoughts and sentiments’.142 Lev 
Tikhomirov concurred with Gurko’s assessment. ‘In recent times...there appears to 
be taking shape a “conservative party”. But everywhere where its existence is 
manifest, there is ideological emptiness: apparently, it is composed of old or limited 
people. It will hardly be a great bulwark against the masses of liberals and the 
disgruntled.’143 However, the events of 1900-1905 created the potential for a much 
larger monarchist movement. The critical changes that the movement needed to react 
against in society were starting to occur: wartime humiliation, urban unrest, 
demographic shifts and political assassinations. Ironically, it was the failings of the 
autocracy that prompted the much wider formation of a popular monarchist 
movement during the 1905 period.   
 
 
                                                
140 Russkoe delo, 23 April 1905, 17, pp. 12-14. 
141 Rogger, Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics, pp. 200-202.  
142 V. I. Gurko, Features and Figures of the Past: Government and Opinion in the Reign of Nicholas 
II (Stanford, 1939), p. 381. 
143 ‘25 let nazad: iz dnevnika L. Tikhomirova’, Krasnyi arkhiv, 1(38) (1930), p. 26. 
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Chapter Two 
 
In Reaction to Revolution 
 
The development of the right was especially pronounced during the revolution of 
1905. The increasing vocalization of liberal criticism directed at the imperial regime, 
prompted by the 18 February imperial rescript and widespread rebellions and 
disorders across the empire shown how the challenges to the autocracy were multi-
faceted in nature and occurring across class and social divides. For rightist observers 
at the outset of 1905 the sources of this instability were both within and outside of 
the establishment.1 Later events of that year, such as the promulgation of the 
October Manifesto, exacerbated such views by showing that the autocracy could no 
longer be counted upon to effectively defend itself. These events acted as the 
catalyst for the emergence of two national groups, the Union of Russian Men (URM) 
and the Union of Russian People (URP), as well as a plethora of smaller 
associations. This chapter will assess how these new groups created a populist 
appeal, based on a desire to attract workers and peasants allied to a vision of national 
pride. It will consider the impact of the violence and radicalization of these groups 
and the controversy that these features engendered. The rise of a spontaneous, 
radical right that wished to develop a mass appeal was a challenge to the autocracy, 
as well as for the right’s ostensible opponents, and reflected a longer-term instability 
in Russian conservatism. 
 
The Development of Populist Nationalism 
 
The most obvious sign of this instability was the emergence of new parties and 
groups, which arose to defend the autocracy. Count Pavel Sheremetev officially 
launched the URM in the spring of 1905. Sheremetev had previously been involved 
                                                
1 There are many studies on a huge variety of different aspects of 1905. However, the outstanding 
general history of the 1905 revolution remains the two-volume work by A. Ascher, The Revolution of 
1905: Russia in Disarray (Stanford, 1988), and Authority Restored (Stanford, 1992).    
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in the Beseda circle, a group of zemstvo activists meeting since 1899.2 Sheremetev 
opposed a constitutionalist answer to Russia’s problems, and left to form his own, 
more conservative, group in 1904. Known as the ‘Sheremetev circle’, this 
association believed in a patriarchal version of the autocracy. Sheremetev and most 
of his colleagues believed that the zemskii sobor was the necessary consultative 
element that could unite Tsar and people.3 After this, Sheremetev formed the URM 
in the spring of 1905 and was appointed as its chairman. Like the Russian Assembly, 
the URM’s council was wholly composed of elites. Some of the most notable 
members of the group were Prince A. G. Shcherbatov, one of the most prominent 
landowners in the Russian Empire; Prince P. N. Trubetskoi, marshal of the nobility 
for Moscow province; Prince V. M. Urusov, marshal of the nobility for Smolensk 
province; Prince V. P. Meshcherskii, the editor of the Grazhdanin; and Princes V. 
A., V. D. and V. P. Golitsyn, all members of the noted noble family.4 Another 
notable member has already been encountered – S. F. Sharapov, the Slavophile 
publicist and editor of Russkoe delo.5 One must bear in mind that, in spite of its 
claims to represent the people, this was a group from the nobility, supported by 
socially well-connected, solvent backers. Unlike the Russian Monarchist Party 
(RMP), Sheremetev conceived of this group, not as a political party, but as a set of 
gentry interests united in their loyalty to the Tsar, even while representing the 
people; this was a group therefore not of, but rather for the people.6 
 
                                                
2 T. Emmons, ‘The Beseda Circle, 1899-1905’, Slavic Review, 32, 3 (1973), pp. 461-490.  
3 Russkoe delo, 19 March 1905, 10-11, pp. 15-18; Rawson, Russian Rightists, pp. 34-45.  
4 Shcherbatov’s works, like many of the Russian rightists from this era, have been re-published in 
contemporary times. One example is his Obnovlennaia Rossiia i drugie raboty (“Russia restored and 
other works”) (Moscow, 2002).  
5 Russkoe delo, 31 March 1905, pp. 2-3.  
6 Ibid., pp. 2-3; 23 April 1905, 17, pp. 12-14; 7 May 1905, 19, pp. 16-18; 21 May 1905, 21, pp. 6-7.  
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At the end of 1905 a quite different group 
was formed in St. Petersburg. Aleksandr 
Dubrovin formally founded the URP on 8 
November 1905 in response to widespread 
strikes and disorders, and, especially, the 
promulgation of the October Manifesto.7 By 
December 1905, the group had dozens of 
branches across the empire. Newspapers, 
flyers and banners distributed by the group 
were part of a mass propaganda drive to 
raise awareness of the revolutionary crisis 
facing the land.8 Whilst precise data for the 
number of branches of the organization is 
incomplete, from the newspapers and 
archival documents analyzed it can be 
estimated that by mid-1907 there were at 
least 800 branches across the empire, and 
perhaps as many as 1,000.9 Not only was the scale of the URP significant, many 
individuals of stature within the right-wing movement joined it – intriguingly, both 
men and women. Its founding members included figures that became prominent on 
the right after 1905, including the publicists A. N. and A. F. Maikov, Pavel Bulatsel, 
Elena Poluboiarinova, and V. M. Purishkevich, who would later found the Union of 
the Archangel Mikhail (UAM) in 1908 after a split in the right. This group would 
highlight the increasingly radical component to an independent right-wing 
movement. 
                                                
7 Overviews of the URP can be found in Rawson, Russian Rightists, pp. 56-72; Rogger, ‘Was There a 
Russian Fascism?’ pp. 398-415; Vydra, Život ot Cara? pp. 108-119.   
8 The circulation of Russkoe znamia, the URP’s main newspaper, has been estimated at between 
12,000-15,000 copies. 
9 Like Rawson’s study, the data used to reach this estimate are incomplete. Not all issues of Russkoe 
znamia for 1906-1907 were available; the total number of issues in the collections examined account 
for less than half of the total number of issues of those respective years. However, additional 
branches mentioned in the collections housed in GARF on the URP revealed yet more regional 
branches. The total comes to around some 800 branches, corroborated by Rawson, Russian Rightists, 
pp. 241-242.   
 
Figure 3 Badge of the Union of Russian 
People. V. A. Obraztsov, Torzhestvo 
russkogo ob”edineniia: osviashchenie 
“narodnogo doma” ekaterinoslavskogo 
otdela soiuza russkogo naroda, 5-go 
Oktiabria 1910 g. (Khar’kov, 1912), p. 79. 
   
 61 
 
Little is known for sure about the personality and character of Dubrovin. A 
shady figure with somewhat mysterious origins, it is difficult to pinpoint his political 
convictions reliably, beyond the most obvious facets of right-wing ideology: an 
opposition to a variety of internal enemies, most of all Russia’s Jews, and a loose 
belief in the Uvarov triad. He attracted a wide range of descriptions; to Sergei Witte, 
Russia’s first Prime Minister, Dubrovin represented the ‘hooligan element’ amongst 
the right, whereas to the Minister of the Interior, Petr Durnovo, Dubrovin was an 
‘honourable man’.10 Contrasting opinions were also to be found within the right. 
Boris V. Nikol’skii, from the Russian Assembly, who joined the URP during 1905, 
later fell out with Dubrovin. He decried the leadership of Dubrovin as ‘already 
pointless’ by late 1907, and described him as a ‘foul parasite’.11 Many of these 
personal squabbles and insults were prompted by widespread financial corruption 
within the URP.12 Yet such criticisms notwithstanding, Dubrovin apparently had 
some skill as an organizer and leader of the party. Under his leadership, the URP 
rose to become by some margin the most numerically significant of the myriad of 
right-wing groups that appeared during 1905.13  
 
The emergence of novel right-wing parties and groups would challenge the 
status quo ante in late imperial Russia. This included these groups led by 
                                                
10 Witte, Vospominaniia, Vol. 2, (Berlin, 1922), pp. 36, 80.  
11 ‘Dnevnik Borisa Nikol’skogo’, Krasnyi arkhiv, 2(63) (1934), p. 88.  
12 The issue of corruption will be returned to in chapter six.  
13 It is difficult to calculate the overall numerical strength of the right with certainty, due to 
incomplete data and poor record keeping amongst the right-wing organizations including the URP. 
Notwithstanding the claims of the right-wing groups (as seen from their newspapers, such as Russkoe 
znamia) that they had millions of members, one estimate can be arrived at from adding together a 
large number of police reports from various parts of the empire, housed in GARF, F. 102, 4-e d-vo, 
op. 1907, d. 164, ll. 179-398 ob. The figures from 1907 total around 358,758 for the URP and 47,794 
for all other right-wing groups. S. A.  Stepanov in his 1992 work Chernaia sotnia v Rossii has 
presumably used the same set of sources as the present author in arriving at his estimate: pp. 105, 
108-109; this is corroborated by data used in Kir’ianov, ‘Pravye i konstitutsionnye monarkhisty’, 
Voprosy istorii 6 (1997), pp. 108-124; and 8 (1997), pp. 92-117. These estimates seem dubious, given 
that the largest party elected to the First Duma, the Kadets, accounted for a total organizational 
strength of around 150,000 across the empire in 1906, and therefore this would mean that in total 
numbers, the organized right would outweigh all left and liberal groups combined for the same 
period, which appears highly unlikely. Then there are the inconsistencies in the same records: other 
police reports note how rightists were frequently outnumbered when present at left-wing anti-
government demonstrations.  
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Shcherbatov and Dubrovin, which were reacting to the political changes of 1905. 
But the right was not emerging as a coherent whole; the URM and the URP were not 
the same in how they appealed to populist, demagogical elements. There were close 
parallels between these newer right-wing groups and older conservative associations 
in content, but the style of these groups was different to what had gone before. 
Those on the newly emerging political right, activists such as Boris Iuzefovich, 
Aleksandr Shcherbatov and Pavel Sheremetev, as well as commentators such as 
Mikhail Men’shikov, were expressing increasingly extreme views, developing an 
intransigent and idealized view of the Russian land and people. The emerging right-
wing parties, including the URP and URM, as well as existing organizations such as 
the RMP, differed from their earlier rivals in that they sought to attract only 
Orthodox Russians to this mass cause; in one editorial from Moskovskie vedomosti, 
Russia was, quite simply, only for true Russian (istinno Russkii) men.14 
 
 Editorials in the conservative press that described associations including the 
URM and URP noted their resistance to many of the changes sweeping the Russian 
land. This included pronounced opposition to several features of Russian modernity, 
including parliament and politics in a general sense of the term, as well as specific 
political developments;15 the promulgation of the October Manifesto of 1905 and the 
laws of religious toleration and political representation from 17 April, the supposed 
‘betrayal of the Tsar’s powers’;16 the blocking of ‘true organic unity between Tsar 
and people’; and bureaucrats, national minorities and Jews, together creating an 
‘unhappy motherland (rodina).17 Such developments were considered to be 
concessions to liberalism, a mood reflected amongst conservative and reactionary 
pundits and commentators. Mikhail Men’shikov typified such tendencies when he 
wrote of the ‘abominable mood’ sweeping St. Petersburg, and the entire Russian 
nation, during 1905, with riots and disorders demonstrating widespread opposition 
                                                
14 Moskovskie vedomosti, 7 December 1905, 323, p. 1. 
15 Grazhdanin, 21 July 1905, 57, p. 2.  
16 See P. Waldron, ‘Religious Toleration in Late Imperial Russia’, in Crisp and Edmondson (eds.), 
Civil Rights, pp. 103-119; Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, 3rd series, 25, Pt. 1, no. 26126 
(1905), pp. 258-262. 
17 This can be seen from various editorials in Russkoe znamia throughout October and November 
1905.  
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to the autocracy,18 and similarly, Tikhomirov pointed to the revolution as the sign of 
the future ruin of the nation.19 For such observers, this new wave of deviant 
revolutionary behavior could only result in a mass wave of death and destruction.20 
 
 The founders of the URM and the URP thought that they had grander plans 
to renovate and transform Russia, more so than the RMP; this is reflected most 
obviously by their self-description as unions rather than the narrow designation of 
party that the RMP adopted. Dubrovin drew attention to the ‘higher and greater 
aims’ of the URP, which he saw as an association to foster unity between all classes 
of society and the Tsar. The aim was that these would be cross-class groups rather 
than only elitist organizations.21 Such populist appeals had long been part of Russian 
conservatism, but what was different here was the extent to which new parties and 
groups used such convictions as a basis for action. As part of this general shift of 
organized political development towards the right, commentators began to observe 
the potential for a right-wing popular front, in spite of the revolutionary situation, 
and began to notice the right’s potential to become a mass movement. One 
Grazhdanin editorial noted the cultish attraction of the ‘romance’ of revolution, but 
also that ‘130 million people’ could unite under the ideas of Sharapov or Gringmut, 
given the people’s separation from the ruling clique of aristocrats and bureaucrats.22  
 
 The rise of the right was inspired by the strikes and disorders that swept the 
nation during 1905. However when liberal publications such as Birzhevye vedomosti  
(Stock Exchange News) castigated groups including the URM as a ‘reactionary part 
of the gentry’ they were only partially correct.23 Whilst there were indeed many 
reactionary tendencies amongst the right, the appeal was wider than only to the 
                                                
18 M. O. Men’shikov, Natsonal’naia imperiia (Moscow, 2004), p. 39.  
19 ‘25 let nazad: iz dnevnika L. Tikhomirova’, Krasnyi arkhiv, 3(40) (1930), p. 59.  
20 A recent research trend in Russian history, the ‘emotive turn’ has focused on such themes from a 
variety of perspectives. One recent analysis of society and culture in St. Petersburg on the eve of the 
war that contains an extended assessment of the fascination with decadence as a moral and spiritual 
condition is Mark Steinberg’s Petersburg Fin-de-Siècle (London, 2011), pp. 157-197.  
21 For one example of this mentality, see an early publicity leaflet from the URP’s main council in 
1906, ‘Soiuz russkogo naroda’, K svedeniiu sluzhashchikh russkikh liudei (St. Petersburg, 1906), p. 1.  
22 Grazhdanin, 11 August 1905, 63, p. 30. 
23 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, t.1, l. 16: Birzhevye vedomosti, 22 June 1905.  
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gentry. Groups on the right actively created a wider popular message, like the Tsarist 
Society of the Russian People mobilizing in Kazan during 1905, a flyer for which 
declared of workers’ riots in the nearby Alafuzovskii factory, ‘…in view of this, the 
assembly recognizes the following as unnecessary: economic strikes and disorders, 
accompanied by attacks on people and property…by workers’.24 That the 
organization tried to recruit factory workers shows that groups on the right were 
attempting to broaden their support by recruiting new social bases.25  
 
Peasants and proletarians 
 
At the outset of 1905, peasant disturbances across the empire, riots on university 
campuses and worker unrest led many on the right to believe that their earlier 
apocalyptic visions, which had gathered pace during the Russo-Japanese War, were 
now being realized. Tikhomirov, describing strikes at the Putilov factory on 5 
January in his diary, wrote: 
 
…now in St. Petersburg there are 12,000 workers striking in the factory in 
Putilov (headed by Gapon), but they were joined today by [workers in] the 
French-Russian factory. There were disorders in Nizhnii, in Vilna, in 
Vitebsk. In Kiev, the criminal lawyers’ union declared that we need a 
constitution. With one word, all will be gone…26 
 
Another crisis occured on 9 January 1905 in St. Petersburg, when Tsarist soldiers 
fired upon peaceful crowds of demonstrators led by Father Gapon, a demonstration 
that had been banned by the regime. The events, known as ‘Bloody Sunday’, 
provoked yet further criticism of the regime. The following unrest in factories, and 
disorders and strikes across the empire, brought major industrial hubs to a 
standstill.27 Yet intriguingly, given the number of people taking up actions against 
                                                
24 Ibid., ll. 49–50 ob.: from the council of the ‘Tsarist Society of the Russian People’ in Kazan, 27 
December 1905. 
25 Ibid., ll. 55-55 ob.: from the council of the ‘Tsarist Society of the Russian People’ in Kazan, 4 
February 1906, addressed to the minister of internal affairs. 
26 ‘25 let nazad: iz dnevnika L. Tikhomirova’, Krasnyi arkhiv, 2(39) (1930), p. 55.  
27 On the urban revolution, see L. Engelstein, Moscow, 1905: Working-Class Organization and 
Political Conflict (Stanford, 1982), pp. 127, 139-148. 
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the state, certain right-wingers demanded closer interaction with the masses. Boris 
Nikol’skii, chair of the Russian Assembly, demanded at one meeting the 
‘betterment’ of the lot of the common man, and for their conditions to be improved 
in line with economic development.28 A popular revolution could come from below, 
with the greatness of the narod an antidote to the revolutionary threat. A URP 
message, re-printed in the pages of the Russian Assembly’s journal Mirnyi trud from 
September 1905, exemplified this central conviction:  
 
Unite, Russian people, under the banner of the ‘Union of Russian People’, 
for truth, Tsar, fatherland, for the royal heritage, for the indivisibility of 
Russia, for the good of the Russian people, for law, order, for a peaceful and 
secure population, and for a quiet and gentle life.29 
 
Conservatives had used the Uvarov triad of Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality 
since the nineteenth century, but addressing these principles to the wider public 
represented a tactical departure on the part of the right. The numerical growth of the 
right-wing groups in this period, reflected by the proliferation of archival materials 
on the right during 1905-1907, suggests that these claims of popular support need to 
be taken seriously. Whilst rightists may have exaggerated the numerical strength of 
the movements, evidence suggests the movement was growing rapidly.30 Existing 
groups, which had a largely cultural focus before 1905, such as the Russian 
Assembly, were starting to focus in detail on issues such as the worker’s question, 
developing an approach to popular politics in an illiberal and autocratic regime.31  
 
URP propaganda for elections to the Second Duma showed Dubrovin’s 
attempts to attract popular support. The election manifesto of the URP expressed an 
                                                
28 GARF, F. 588, op. 1, d. 1265, l. 157. 
29 Mirnyi trud, 9 (1905), pp. 233-244, ‘Vozzvanie soiuza russkogo naroda’. 
30 This increase in numbers could only have derived from an increased social reach on the part of the 
right. See for example, Iu. I. Kir’ianov, ‘Chislennost’ i sostav krainikh pravykh partii v Rossii (1905-
1917 gg.): tendentsii i prichiny izmenenii’, Otechestvennaia istoriia, 5 (1999), pp. 29-43. 
31 One series of the laws of the Russian Assembly appears in the URP collection, in GARF, F. 116, 
op. 2, d. 66: file no. 3, ‘Russkoe sobranie. Programma russkogo sobraniia'. St. Petersburg, 1906, 
which contains an extended series of points on the ‘workers’ question’ and the need to secure their 
rights; see also GARF, F. 588, op. 1, d. 1265, ll. 88-92: copy of the rules and regulations of the 
Russian Assembly.  
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interest in the wellbeing of the people, and the necessity of improving efforts for 
‘popular education’ if Russia were to be saved from a continuum of crisis.32 The 
URP’s populism was an important part of the public activities of the post-1905 party 
programme, moving towards a vision that declared the people needed to be protected 
from capitalist interests (often, equated with Jews in the propaganda), and claimed to 
protect the rights of workers and peasants. In using such slogans the URP declared 
itself to be a protector of the Russian people, Tsar and fatherland.33 The leadership 
of these new groups tried to create an idea of the sanctity of the Russian people, and 
promote it to a wider audience. In the same manifesto, the group also defined itself 
to be against many things: national minorities, Jews and modern political 
institutions. Some of these were features of the Russian autocracy, as well as 
minorities, highlighting the dissatisfaction with tsarism on the right.34 
 
This did not mean that rightists lacked a positive programme. To build mass 
support, it would be necessary to entice the peasantry, which comprised well over 80 
per cent of the empire’s population. Yet given the riots and disorders that had broken 
out amongst large sections of the peasantry during 1905, it was not immediately 
apparent whether such an appeal rang true.35 Sections of the peasantry had shown 
themselves to be receptive to revolutionary ideas during 1905, in contrast to the 
frosty reception that greeted many of the revolutionary agitators involved in the 
populist movement during the 1860s and 1870s.36 This was met with disbelief by 
several monarchist groups, which continued to believe in the idea of peasant loyalty, 
and devotion to autocracy and Orthodoxy. Publicly, several important right-wingers, 
such as Gringmut, professed their continued ‘faith’ in the peasantry, and the 
                                                
32 ‘Soiuz russkogo naroda’, in V. V. Shelokhaev (ed.), Programmy politicheskikh partii Rossii. 
Konets XIX–nachalo XX veka (Moscow, 1995), p. 453.  
33 Ibid., p. 453.  
34 Ibid., pp. 440-441. 
35 Recent analyses of this issue examine this mostly through the programmes of the main right-wing 
parties and groups. See I. V. Omel’ianchuk, ‘Krest’ianskii vopros v programmakh konservativno-
monarkhicheskikh partii Rossii (1905-1914 gg.)’, Voprosy istorii, 7 (2006), pp. 83-97; for an example 
of rural unrest, see R. S. Edelman, ‘Rural Proletarians and Peasant Disturbances: The Right Bank 
Ukraine in the Revolution of 1905’, Journal of Modern History, 57, 2 (1985), pp. 248-277. 
36 See for instance, M. Perrie, ‘The Russian Peasant Movement of 1905-1907: Its Social Composition 
and Revolutionary Significance’, in B. Eklof and S. Frank (eds.), The World of the Russian Peasant: 
Post-Emancipation Culture and Society (London, 1990), pp. 193-218; Venturi, Roots, pp. 316-330. 
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practices of right-wing associations also reflected this view.37 Russkoe znamia 
(Russian Flag) described how a delegation of URP activists met with the Tsar in 
Tsarskoe Selo on 23 December 1905. The 23-man delegation, among them 
Dubrovin, Bulatsel and Maikov, equated the narod with anti-revolutionary feelings, 
and declared that the majority of the Russian people supported tsarism, but had been 
turned by a minority revolutionary ‘intelligentsia’ of leftists and socialists. The 
following address to the Tsar demonstrated an ostensibly pro-peasant message:  
 
Your truly loyal subjects slave as peasants…the stronghold and essence of 
your reign is the peasant village and peasant trade, rather than industrial 
development, still less the craftsmen in the towns, mainly in St. Petersburg, 
in these days of widespread strikes…remember the unhappy peasantry, 
following agrarian and other disorders…truly, Tsar, the Russian people 
believe in the destiny of their Tsar-father, as his power does not oppress 
them. The central truth and understanding is that the Tsar’s power – is power 
from God. The truth of the Tsar – is the truth from God.38 
 
This presented an ideal of the ‘Russian peasantry’ and their innate goodness, which 
built on convictions, held by figures such as Gringmut, that the peasantry idolized 
the Tsar as a ‘father’ (Tsar’-batiushka), and that popular monarchism was 
widespread.39 As in the address from the above delegation, Christian myths of 
divinely ordained power, the Tsar’s devotion to the people, and observance of the 
rituals and symbols of the autocracy, the Tsar and Orthodox religiosity were 
portrayed as key parts of the peasant consciousness.40 These elements were retained 
in the construction of a mythology amongst rightists, which aimed to celebrate the 
virtues of the people, such as their decency, work ethic and Orthodox religious 
values. This represented a continuation of the ideology of Slavophilism that would 
be demonstrated in public via the political practices of the organized right, and the 
creation of a nostalgic vision of Russia’s lost rural world. Though the right-wing 
leaders who presented this manifesto to the Tsar described themselves as both 
                                                
37 V. A. Gringmut, Sobranie statei: 1896-1907, Vol. 4 (Moscow, 1910), p. 164. 
38 Russkoe znamia, 9 January 1906, in Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol. 1, p. 99. 
39 Gringmut, Sobranie statei, Vol. 4, p. 164. 
40 D. Field, Rebels in the Name of the Tsar (Boston, MA, 1976), pp. 1-29; M. Cherniavsky, Tsar and 
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conservatives and loyal subjects of the Tsar, the wider political and social events of 
1905 were starting to transform aspects of rightist ideology, and show the emerging 
rightists as radical actors. 
 
One idea held by rightists that led to conflicting interests was the defence of 
property. In a manifesto for elections to the Second Duma, the URP declared that 
there needed to be radical revisions to the current system of land ownership. A 
greater percentage of Russian land needed to be placed in the hands of the peasantry, 
essentially asking for fundamental reform of the ‘land question’. One manifesto 
stated how ‘…the restriction in the total size of the land of all peasant allotments – 
as established by the law of 19 February 1861 and the law of 1865 – is entirely 
symptomatic of how the peasantry was completely forbidden to own any land’. The 
manifesto continued that a greater amount of surplus land needed to be placed in the 
hands of the peasantry, and the URP ‘sought betterment’ for their lot. Criticisms of 
the state were widespread on the right: before Stolypin’s land reforms in 1906, the 
URP pointed towards the inadequacy of the 1861 legislation, as it did not give the 
people enough freedom or indeed, land.41 In celebrating the greatness of the people, 
then, the URP expanded on the Slavophile vision of populism, though with the 
crucial difference that this was set against developments in constitutional Russia and 
the dawn of mass politics. There was an idea of rights for the masses developing on 
the right, though the exact conceptions of what these ‘rights’ would entail were often 
weakly developed. 
 
Other right-wing groups, such as the Russian Assembly, pursued the same 
ideas with a different emphasis. The main council declared that the structure of 
Russian society should not be radically altered; once the basic claims of wishing to 
enrich the Russian peasant had been made, this group stopped short of truly extreme 
ideas of reforming Russia’s rural world. Crucial to this was the retention of the 
obshchina around which to construct Russian society, in much the same manner that 
                                                
41 ‘Soiuz russkogo naroda’, in Shelokhaev (ed.), Programmy, p. 451; see also V. V. Vodovozov (ed.), 
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Russia’s nineteenth-century conservatives had believed.42 This was in contrast with 
the economic orthodoxy of the age, as displayed by Witte and the Ministry of 
Finance. The main aim of the Assembly in regard to their economic plans for the 
peasantry was the development of self-sufficiency: cultivating protectionist policies, 
avoiding reliance on any foreign imports, and opposing economic modernization and 
industrialization.43 Its manifesto for elections to the Second Duma described the 
need for self-sufficiency:   
 
The main aim of our economic politics must be the visible development of 
Russia, most of all in the sphere of the peasantry and landowners, with the 
aim of progressing down the path of self-sufficiency for the peasantry and 
their cultures, the development of cottage industries, and increasing peasant 
land plots.44 
 
Furthermore, even at an early stage of its development, there were contradictions in 
the populist message, including within the more extreme groups. One URP 
manifesto, in devoting a large section to discussion of the peasant question (in terms 
of written text, more than was devoted to the worker’s issue, education or even the 
‘Jewish question’) showed how the URP’s ideology was a mixture of supposedly 
radical reform whilst simultaneously engaging with more conservative ideas. It 
declared, ‘on the peasant question: the Union will be arguing with full force in 
favour of increasing the amount of land owned by peasants, whilst however 
remembering the words of Tsar Alexander III, and agreed upon by Tsar Nicholas II; 
all property, in terms of size and land, must be inviolable’. The URP, like the 
Russian Assembly, followed a policy of protectionism, and, most crucially, desired 
the preservation of the obshchina. The policies of the URP presented a convoluted 
message: private property was to be preserved, yet the mass of the Russian peasantry 
needed to be enriched and strengthened. The group sought to appeal to peasantry and 
                                                
42 It is worth reflecting how conservative groups in the twentieth century were moving away from 
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Rendle, ‘Conservatism and Revolution: The All-Russian Union of Landowners, 1916-18’, Slavonic 
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gentry alike, rather than entirely to either.45 In an ideological sense, the URP’s ideas 
about the peasantry were a halfway house between radical change, and established 
conservative views of Russia’s rural world. The development of such views shown 
that the right was unlikely to form a pliant buffer from the autocracy; such visions 
sharply diverged from the convictions of figures such as Witte.   
 
Class divides could supersede ‘left’ or ‘right’ political leanings. In their 
consideration of ‘the workers’ question’, monarchist newspapers such as Moskovskie 
vedomosti began to publish addresses and appeals directed specifically at the 
working classes, as in the case of one editorial from December 1905.46 One URP 
flyer circulated within Odessa in the same month, which was addressed to ‘simple 
working people’.47 Another detailed manifesto from a right-wing group, possibly the 
URM, published and disseminated in December 1905 was specifically addressed to 
‘factory and textile workers’, evidence that the right was changing its use of 
language, gearing appeals towards workers by addressing specifically ‘working-
class’ concerns.48 Right-wingers, particularly the URP, jettisoned some of the ideas 
of traditional conservatives in presenting a programme of cross-class unity, if not 
quite collectivism, socialism or egalitarianism. 
 
As well as the delivery of the message, there were also changes in content. 
One point of policy of the URP was to lobby for the shortening of the working day 
to no longer than eight hours.49 The economic objectives of a manifesto for elections 
to the Second Duma called for the nationalization of major industries, and the 
establishment of a Russian industrial bank, which would, it was hoped, lead to an 
increase in the ‘educated level’ of the workers, via the formation of industrial arteli, 
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and, in so doing, inculcate a mentality that would oppose strikes and disorders.50 In 
these respects, the manifestos of groups such as the URM and the URP did little to 
reflect conservative concerns such as, for example, safeguarding the primacy of 
Russian autocracy.  
 
This manifesto at first glance appears almost reminiscent of leftist ideas 
rather than of conservatism. However, the overriding priority of this message was 
not to defend workers’ rights, but to create an idea of the exceptional nature of 
Russia and the Russian people, distinguishing the future development of Russia 
from contemporary ‘Western’ trends. Though there appears a superficial element of 
similarity with the policies of the populists of the 1860s and 1870s, the underlying 
ideas driving these policy directions were very different. One strand of anti-Western 
ideology was stressed in the discussion of the worker’s question.51 Plans for a 
shorter working day were contrasted with the supposed ten or eleven-hour days 
workers had to endure in England, France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and 
America. The workers in these countries were, it was claimed (and not without some 
justification) being exploited and forced to work in terrible conditions, though this 
was presented as conclusive evidence of the negative effects of living in a socially 
democratic and capitalist political system.52 The anti-capitalism of right-wing groups 
including the URM and URP was also present in the policies for total nationalization 
of several fascist groups in twentieth-century Europe, based around the creation of 
an economic hierarchy, rather than ideals of common ownership.53 
 
The right launched a propaganda drive, openly agitating for mass support, 
across the Russian Empire during and after 1905 in an attempt to recruit more people 
to the monarchist cause. The Khar’kov branch of the URP claimed to publish a total 
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of 344,000 brochures from 1905-1906. Of the twenty titles listed in one issue of the 
Russian Assembly’s journal, nine of these were explicitly addressed either to 
workers (k rabochim) or to the Russian people (k russkomu narodu).54 Use of the 
press was an important tactic, ‘the main means of fighting the exploitation of this 
service and…administrative arbitrariness’, according to a flyer distributed by the 
URM in early 1906.55 The right-wing press, including Moskovskie vedomosti and 
Russkoe znamia, called for the bridging of the divide between elites and masses. 
Gringmut wrote of the need to unite different parts of society together in a spiritual 
union against new political and social forces in Russia. Channeling anger against the 
‘liberal’ establishment was part of this. Of the ‘constitutional’ classes, he exclaimed, 
‘…these traitors…destroy all of your land, all of your estates – gentry and workers, 
toilers and workers, and destroy the ancient autocratic power’. What was needed was 
a concerted effort, on the part of all classes, including the workers, to defend 
Russia’s ‘ancient traditions’.56 An editorial in Russkoe znamia similarly desired a 
very broad popular mandate, aiming for unity between ‘Russian conservative, 
patriotic and monarchical circles’, and saw that ‘all organizations’, including these 
unions, needed to be based around the theme of patriotism.57 The result was a stance 
of total intransigence towards political changes in Russia, seeing the Duma as the 
preserve of bureaucrats and foreigners, obscuring the ‘indivisible’ link between Tsar 
and people.58 Society was still constructed around a system of rank and 
differentiation: the right did not want elites to lose their social status, and did not 
promote equality between classes. But they did promote unity across these divides, 
and right-wing groups increasingly desired to transfer these views to a wider 
audience during 1905-1906.59  
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Such patriotic slogans, in addition to promoting the Uvarov message, were 
also mission statements for the groups’ plans to inculcate patriotic ideas in the 
subjects of the empire. Away from the central leadership of the URP or URM, police 
records show how the Tsarist Society of the Russian People in Kazan distributed 
patriotic literature to railway road workers in and around the Alafuzovskii factory 
during 1906, in an effort to encourage workers to engage with patriotic ideals. The 
activists of this society acted as strike breakers, foiling the attempts of rioting 
workers in the factory to disrupt trade and industry in the region. The perception 
from activists that 1905 caused a decline in Russian manufacturing capability was 
key to this effort. Right-wing activists were aware that in order to win the battle for 
the Russian nation, they would need to recruit greater numbers of people, attracting 
them to popular monarchism.60 A circular from the chair of this organization, 
Professor V. Zaisenii, intercepted by the department of police in February 1906, 
warned that ‘strikes and disorders, generally not tolerated in a civilized state, in the 
present time of troubles must be stopped, or there will be further consequences’. The 
council added that they would be writing to the Minister of Trade and Industry with 
a request to keep the Alafuzovskii factory open, even in the midst of the widespread 
strikes.61 
 
Yet the right’s activities actually created more of the disorder that the regime 
was so keen to contain. Following these proclamations confrontations took place 
between right-wing activists attracted to the monarchist cause and over a thousand 
striking workers in the Alafuzovskii factory, who chanted ‘down with the Tsar’ and 
fiercely resisted the overtures of the pro-monarchist forces in the factory. In spite of 
the clamour to protect law and order and restore normality to the daily life of the 
factory, which the council of this group had insisted was paralyzed by strikes, a 
wave of further disturbances and fights broke out. The group continued to claim that 
the true links between Tsar and people were obscured by the new Duma settlement, 
and that liberal groups, including the Kadets, were deliberately trying to subvert the 
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Tsarist state.62 This group demonstrates how rightists could use these ideas to power 
violent, ground-level ‘resistance’ against left-wing forces operating in the regions. 
However, the Tsarist Society of the Russian People, once we look beyond the rather 
nebulous ideals of ‘patriotism’ and ‘tradition’, appeared to have little in the way of 
concrete ideas to improve the future state of the nation. The organization’s raison 
d’être appeared to be diagnosing and confronting a situation of crisis, rather than 
finding political solutions by which to restore Russia.63  
 
In a telegram to the Tsar from 28 June 1906, the URP leader in Odessa, 
Count Aleksei I. Konovnitsyn, described the bravery and passion of the Russian 
army in the Russo-Japanese War. Explaining the defeat, he claimed they were let 
down by weak leadership, rather than their own values.64 Rightists relied on emotion 
and sentiment, rather than consistent intellectual slogans, to appeal to the masses. On 
2 December 1905, following on from a peasant delegation, a group of leaders of the 
extreme right faction, among them Gringmut, went to Tsarskoe Selo attempting to 
establish common ground between themselves and Nicholas II. They declared that 
courage, tenacity and fight were all considered to be characteristics of the narod, in 
contrast to the hated, supine enemies of the Russian land and people.65 Though such 
slogans praised the courageous and tenacious spirit of the Russian people, 
developments elsewhere challenged these visions. In this period, rightists were 
attempting to craft a popular appeal directed towards a wider social basis than 
previous conservative groups had desired. 
 
Compromised populism 
 
Like many political and social groups, rightists had both public and private faces. 
Less idealized views of the Russian people were also being developed. Lev 
Tikhomirov, who joined the URP in 1905, in a 1906 essay entitled Citizens or 
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Proletarians depicted a socialist ‘proletariat’ to contrast with his ideal of the 
‘citizen’, developing a particular view of civic society. Citizens, Tikhomirov 
claimed, ‘…stand against exploitation, and for lasting order in society, and peaceful 
interests’. The main negative factor associated with ‘proletarianism’ was that it was 
led, not by the conscience of the workers themselves, but the desires of their teachers 
– the revolutionary left.66 His fears of the involvement of workers in the 
revolutionary struggle were reflected in Gringmut’s Moskovskie vedomosti, which in 
early 1906 drew a direct link between workers and revolution, and continued to do 
so throughout the revolutionary period.67 
 
Tikhomirov saw that the link between the disorders sweeping the empire and 
the people could not be overlooked. Whilst Tikhomirov echoed populist messages 
outlined elsewhere, he drew images of the ‘masses’ with both positive and negative 
aspects. In his positive vision, Russians were described as naturally peaceful and 
good-natured, such as in his work Russia and Democracy. However, they were also 
easily exploited and vulnerable to the subversive intentions of revolutionaries.68 
Tikhomirov was less circumspect with his views of the people in private, which give 
an altogether more pessimistic view of the workers’ movement than that of the 
above example, describing widespread unrest in vivid detail. Behind this lay the 
effects of the revolution of 1905. Whilst perceptively realizing the need for rightists 
to appeal to working-class support in order to achieve success, Tikomirov’s diary 
betrayed no small degree of fear of the people. One entry, penned on 6 May 1905, 
ran as follows: 
 
All tremble between one another, and all wait for slaughter…and this 
slaughter is yet to come…and now beneath us, under us, our workers are 
loudly singing the Marseillaise – “awake, arise, working people”…every day 
there are fights, and shootings – with the example of the postal-telegraph 
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strikes. There are innumerable murders and robberies every day and night. 
Fights occur between the masses.       
 
Tikhomirov’s entry continued, ‘half of Russia is in strikes and revolution. The 
military is concerned by manifestations of revolutionary unrest’. A shrewd analyst of 
the fast-changing social and political situation in 1905, Tikhomirov realized popular 
attraction to any ideology could rapidly shift.69 The ‘masses’ had been turned against 
each other by the skillful manipulations of revolutionary leaders, and they were 
particularly susceptible due to their own lack of intellectual development. 
Tikhomirov drew a further contrast between the promise and reality of socialist 
ideals, which did not deliver ‘true freedom’ to the worker:  
 
The lack of working-class consciousness will lead to ten more mistakes 
being committed. The same weak consciousness allowed the intelligentsia to 
position themselves in close alliance with the ‘proletarian’ movement, which 
has a completely different purpose. As a result of this, our worker question, 
like our liberating political reforms, will come up against the wall of 
anarchy.70  
 
Tikhomirov claimed that the working classes had not yet reached the stage of 
consciousness needed to throw off revolutionary ideals. He claimed they had not yet 
reached the civilized state required to truly understand ideals of patriotism, 
education and religion. Like Gringmut, he saw that the masses needed to be firmly 
guided by an autocracy.  
 
 Russian autocracy was not totally rejected. Mikhail Men’shikov, writing in 
Novoe vremia, saw it as necessary to guide the worker. Another central foundation 
for him was Orthodox Christianity. Men’shikov perceived that negative ideologies 
of atheism and nihilism largely emanated from Western Europe.71 Men’shikov, in 
his Letters to Neighbours displayed a similarly pessimistic view of the Russian 
people to Tikhomirov, believing they were easily corrupted by foreign vices. 
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Men’shikov feared the degeneration of the masses, not yet ready for the conditioning 
required for becoming a mass force for patriotism. Men’shikov wrote that anarchists 
were the cause of the ‘days of insurrection’ in St. Petersburg during the general 
strike of December 1905, ‘…the majority of whom were damaged people, 
psychological degenerates’.72 Unlike Tikhomirov, his critiques took a more pseudo-
scientific turn towards ideas of decay and decline amongst the rioters. Men’shikov 
saw a link between the decline in the physical health of the nation, revolution and 
unrest, with alcoholism a particular concern. In 1902, he described his fears of 
‘crowds…bottles in hand’, and the widespread nature of drunkenness in Russian 
life.73 Like many from the autocracy, these two thinkers displayed unhappiness with 
Russia’s present. 
 
 Such views were reflected elsewhere. Rightist groups including the Russian 
Assembly and the RMP were also caught between fearful and idolatrous images of 
the people. These organizations absorbed tendencies from younger, populist 
organizations on the right that used an idea of the sanctity of ‘the people’ – by which 
was meant only Russian, Orthodox people. Such appeals were displayed by the RMP 
in the newspaper Moskovskie vedomosti. Nevertheless, not all of this propaganda 
glorified the Russian people. One editorial accused the naturally good-natured narod 
of turning over to the dark forces of revolution and anarchy: 
 
To Moscow workers: is it true that you, Russian people, baptized in the truth 
of Orthodoxy, have now renounced it, and replaced it with irreligious and 
different criticisms of God and the Church of Christ? Is it true; is it possible 
that you, allies of the Tsar’s truth, as pledged to his fathers and forefathers, 
and true servants of the Tsarevich, now stand alongside rebels and enemies 
of our fatherland, against his power?74 
 
The thoughts of prominent right-wing ideologues and newspapers concerning the 
‘workers’ question’ show that the construction of these images of the people in 
right-wing circles was a contested practice. Although there was a shift towards 
                                                
72 M. O. Men’shikov, Natsional’naia imperiia (Moscow, 2004), p. 47.  
73 M. O. Men’shikov, Pis’ma k blizhnim, February 1902, pp. 66-67. 
74 Moskovskie vedomosti, 19 December 1905, 326, p. 1. 
   
 78 
populism in the propaganda of the right from 1905, images of the people were 
presented differently depending on where they appeared. In the diaries of 
Tikhomirov and Men’shikov, more open criticism of the working classes can be 
seen, though neither denied the group’s positive aspects. In public, criticism was 
either more restrained or absent. Unsurprisingly, enemies of Russia and the Russian 
state take the ‘blame’ for Russia’s decline far more than the ‘Orthodox’ people of 
Russia. However, examples of both the good and bad visions of the people appear 
frequently, pointing towards compromise and fracture in the populist message. The 
URP’s leadership, like the RMP at certain moments, called for a dictatorship, with a 
benevolent autocracy for, but not composed of the people.75 This populist 
nationalism, whilst not egalitarian in a true sense, diverged sharply from previous 
conservative ideas and the views of many within the regime, highlighting 
dissatisfaction with the autocracy.  
 
Violence and Radicalization 
 
However, it was the actions of the right that thrown their divergence from the regime 
into sharper relief. The leadership of the URP and URM turned to more radical ends 
during 1905, a notable aspect of which was the tendency towards militarization, both 
in words and deeds. Russia could only be the preserve of ‘true Russian people’ 
(istinno russkie liudi), according to a sentiment displayed in a meeting in Warsaw 
between ‘conservatively inclined’ professors and members of the Russian Assembly. 
Time and again orators and statesmen on the right spoke out against ‘subversives’ in 
society, including Poles, Jews and socialists, urging retribution for the negative 
changes that Russia had undergone since 1905.76 It was similar sentiments that led to 
liberal observers quickly realizing the difference between the emerging right and 
established conservative groups.77 One factor that ultimately distinguished the right 
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from other conservative factions was the right’s intransigent mood, with the 
harshness of their ‘solutions’ to the crises plaguing the Russian Empire. This was 
readily displayed in right-wing literature. According to the official protocols of the 
Third All-Russian Union of Russian Men in Kiev from 1906, the URP was ‘an army 
without officers’.78   
 
 Whilst newspapers such as Russkoe znamia did not often directly call for 
pogroms and violence, and declared themselves to be in pursuit of fundamentally 
peaceful aims, they also promulgated a wider, by no means hidden, message of ‘us 
and them’ with the ‘true Russian’ subjects of the empire placed in opposition to the 
remainder of society.79 However activists could show more autonomy, and openly 
promoted violent ends. URM flyers addressed to supporters promised to bring ‘death 
to the revolutionaries…weapons in hand!’80 Many smaller right-wing groups shared 
such convictions. The Tsarist Russian People’s Society, led by a sympathetic 
professor from Kazan University, Vladislav Zalesskii, caused ‘chaos, strikes and 
disorders’ according to a police report. This refers to a case of recent clashes 
amongst the peasantry in the region, with a crowd of rightist supporters made up of 
workers, townsfolk and peasants.81  
 
 Many police telegrams from provincial branches of right-wing organizations 
such as the URP accentuated the violent nature of such groups. Considering the 
widespread peasant uprisings, disorders, strikes and riots during 1905, and the 
shadows cast by the pogroms, the upturn in police monitoring of right-wing groups 
is unsurprising.82 On interrogation by the Provisional Government in 1917, one of 
the main organizers of the St. Petersburg branch, A. V. Polovnev, described the 
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formation of combat organizations (boevye druzhiny) as one of the central aims of 
the URP. In St. Petersburg, the URP under the guidance of N. M. Iuskevich-
Kraskovskii, one of the leaders of the druzhiny in the region, had organized combat 
units shortly after the branch’s formation, and this group planned violent activities 
such as the murder of Duma deputies Mikhail Herzenstein and I. V. Iollos.83 
 
 Soiuzniki (unionists, as the rightist activists are often described in police 
reports) went into factories in the manufacturing centre of Iaroslavl, attempting to 
drum up support through the dissemination of leaflets, heckling of strikers and in 
many instances threats of physical violence towards leftists and revolutionaries. 
Sometimes this carried through into fierce pitched battles, with clashes occurring in 
the Iaroslavl factory.84 The numerical strength of the Iaroslavl URM was estimated 
from one police report, dated 17 October 1906, as over 2,000 when taking into 
account all sectors of the industrialized parts of the economy.85 According to 
participants from the right on later recollection, the central councils of the right-wing 
groups encouraged these activities. On interrogation by the Provisional Government 
in June 1917, a URP activist claimed that the central council of the group, headed by 
A. I. Dubrovin, organized the 1905 pogrom in Kherson province. He claimed that 
members of the branch had agreed on the necessity of violence to oppose the 
revolutionary threat.86  
  
 However, the use of violence caused controversy within the rightist 
movement. Certain leaders questioned whether it was acceptable, even in the face of 
the revolutionary crisis. Gringmut declared in his newspaper that ‘violence is not 
part of our social or political position’.87 In an address to the Russian Monarchist 
Assembly on 15 March 1907, Gringmut, in addition to L. Bobrov, chair of the 
Society of Russian Patriots, declared that ‘patriotic organizations, in contrast with 
                                                
83 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 55. 
84 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, t. 1, ll. 161-162 ob., 170-171 ob., 176, 224-
224 ob., 280-280 ob.: various police reports from Iaroslavl between September and November 1906. 
85 Ibid., ll. 224-224 ob.: report from the Iaroslavl department of police, 17 October 1906. 
86 GARF, F. 1467, op. 1, d. 497, ll. 75 ob.-76: v protokoly chrezvychainoi sledstvennoi komissii dlia 
proizvodstva sledstvennykh deistvii, 23 June 1917, N. S. Ivanov.  
87 Moskovskie vedomosti, 17 December 1906, 304, p. 1.  
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the Kadets and socialists, do not recognize political murder as an aim’. Gringmut 
showed a consistent attitude towards the question of political violence, believing it 
an inimical method that the right should not pursue, and was only for 
revolutionaries. However, in the same speech, he also declared that ‘militant war 
with internal enemies must be with the permission of the imperial government’, 
claiming that violence might have a role to play provided it was sanctioned by the 
regime.88 The distinction lies, not so much in the use of violence per se, but in its 
association with any political ends, politics being an activity that Gringmut, due to 
its connections with the 1905 settlement, found distinctly unappealing.  
 
 The central council of the Russian Assembly went further to disown the use 
of violence as a tactic. Though the group was harshly anti-Semitic and chauvinistic, 
it called for an end to violent reprisals against Jews, including pogroms, due to the 
‘damage done to the spirit and properties of the Russian population’. It continued 
‘violent actions against Jews inevitably lead to other conditions’. Instead, anti-
Semitic measures should be channelled towards legislation, and the Assembly 
proposed passing laws banning Jews from participation in Russian state service, 
including administrative posts, teaching and the army. These were all repressive 
methods, but in view of the council in St. Petersburg, preferable to violent actions, 
which took the right closer to becoming ‘revolutionaries’ themselves.89 However, 
central council declarations to refrain from violence did not always appear to 
resonate with the rank and file. Activists from central and local right-wing groups 
undertook their own violent activities, often unhindered by the leadership. The most 
notorious example were pogroms that occurred in many parts of the Russian Empire 
during 1905.90 Some of the worst violence occurred in Odessa, but outbreaks of 
violence occurred in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Volsk (Saratov province), 
Zolotonoshka (Poltava province) and Kiev. Many of these took place on 18-20 
                                                
88 GARF, F. 634, op. 1, d. 17, l. 53: rezoliutsiia v russkom monarkhicheskom sobranii. 15 March 
1907.  For more on Witte’s attempted assassination see Lauchlan, ‘The Accidental Terrorist’, 1-32.  
89 GARF, F. 588, op. 1, d. 1265, ll. 51-52: notes from the central council of the Russian Assembly. 
90 On the 1905 pogroms, see Lambroza, ‘The Pogroms of 1903-1906’ in Klier and Lambroza (eds.), 
Pogroms, pp. 195-247; A. Ascher, ‘Anti-Jewish Pogroms in the First Russian Revolution, 1905-
1907’, in Y. Ro’i (ed.), Jews and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union (Ilford, 1995), pp. 127-
145. 
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October, after the promulgation of the Manifesto, as those sympathetic to the 
autocracy sought out targets of retribution for the supposed ‘weakening’ of the 
Tsarist state. Activists targeted Jews, students, ‘leftists’ or those suspected of 
involvement in such collusions.91 Pogroms were part of a culture of violence and 
militarization amongst right-wing groups. Assorted bands of workers, small 
shopkeepers and others sympathetic to the convictions of right-wing groups across 
the empire threatened to ‘beat’ their enemies, including the Jews (one of the most 
common refrains from right-wing militants being ‘beat the Jews!’), and bring 
destruction to the revolutionary elements of society, and in so doing, secure the 
autocratic heritage of the Russian state. Though incidences were often small in scale, 
and apparently without a clear pattern, violence occurred throughout the empire 
during 1905-1906, with rightist groups mobilizing in response to the October 
settlement.92  
 
 In feeding the antagonistic passions of sympathizers rightists were, 
seemingly unwittingly, engineering a conflict between state and society. The 
autocracy that the right claimed to defend was not always comfortable with the 
presence of these ‘patriots’. Authorities were apprehensive about counterreprisals 
from revolutionary forces prompted by the activities of the URP and its 
sympathizers. The Bund’s retaliations against the URP were particularly feared. One 
report from the assistant governor of police in Gomel, Rogachev and Bykhov 
provinces from 17 June 1906 emphasized the increase in numbers of ‘armed Jews’ 
‘Bundists’ and ‘weapon-bearing Jewish self-defence forces’ in response to URP 
violence.93 The dynamic between rightist activists bearing pro-Tsarist slogans and 
their organization of mass street parades and possible recriminations created a 
tension between rightist groups and the autocracy, which they at least ostensibly 
sought to serve. 
                                                
91 Ascher, Revolution of 1905, Vol. 1, pp. 253-262. 
92 The liberal journal Pravo (Law) throughout the winter of 1905 and the spring of 1906 carried 
extensive reports of these outbreaks of violence across the empire. See for instance Pravo, 14 August 
1905, 32, cols. 2600-2603, ‘Sobytiia v Kerchi’, which chronicles the outbreaks of violence occurring 
in this port city. 
93 GARF, F. 102. OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, t. 1, ll. 89-90: report from the assistant police 
chief in Gomel, Rogachev and Bykhov provinces, 17 June 1906.  
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The search for enemies  
 
A central feature of all the major right-wing groups was their constant search for 
enemies, a list that included Jews, socialists, students, minority nationalities, 
freemasons, capitalists, merchants, the Russian government, liberals and other 
rightists. Particularly common on the right were anti-Semitic and nationalist ideas. 
In regard to the ‘national question’, as Theodore Weeks has explained, ‘for an easy, 
quite consistent ‘solution’ to the nationality question, one must consult the Russian 
right. Here, the answer was quite clear and uncomplicated: Russia existed for the 
Russians’.94 Additionally, the URP, RMP, the Russian Assembly and other similar 
organizations argued that the Jewish question held a distinct position from other 
problems.95 Whilst such groups may have claimed that their appeals were addressed 
to ‘workers’ or ‘the people’, the other side of this ideology was the exclusion of non-
ethnic Russians from the body politic.96 The use of populist ideas was closely tied 
with this constant, unending search to find enemies within and hence identify threats 
to the Russian people.97  
 
One principal reason for this was the legacy of the revolution of 1905, which 
aided the use of stereotypes and pejoratives. Anti-Semitism was especially common; 
we can see how the crisis of autocratic power caused by the revolutionary climate 
                                                
94 Weeks, Nation and State, p. 30.  
95 In particular, the most extreme of right-wing groups considered the Jewish question to be separate, 
given the ‘distinct’ characteristics of the Jewish people and Jewish culture. The URP claimed that the 
Jewish people were hostile towards all non-Jewish nationalities, as well as the ‘true Russians’. ‘Soiuz 
russkogo naroda’, Shelokhaev (ed.), Programmy, p. 444; see also GARF, F. 588, op. 1, d. 1265, ll. 
16-17 ob: Russian Assembly manifesto for elections to the First State Duma, 3 December 1905.  
96 It is important to note that the ‘masses’ did include Ukrainians, whom Russian nationalists called 
‘little Russians’, in contrast to the Polish or Jewish subjects of the empire. See A. L. Kotenko, O. V. 
Martiniuk and A. I. Miller, ‘Maloruss’, in A. I. Miller, D. A. Sdvizhkov and I. Shirle (eds.), Poniatiia 
o Rossii: k istoricheskoi semantike imperskogo perioda, Vol. 2 (Moscow, 2012), pp. 392-443. For a 
thorough analysis of the Ukrainian question, which includes assessment of Russian nationalists in the 
southwest, see Hillis, Children of Rus’. 
97 For theoretical assessments, see S. Goldin, ‘Evrei kak poniatie v istorii imperskoi Rossii’, in Miller, 
Sdvizhkov and Shirle (eds.), Poniatiia o Rossii, pp. 340-391; E. Weinerman, ‘Racism, Racial 
Prejudice and Jews in Late Imperial Russia’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 17, 3 (1994), pp. 442-495; E. 
Avrutin, ‘Racial Categories and the Politics of (Jewish) Difference’, Kritika, 8, 1 (2007), pp. 13-40; 
S. Podbolotov, ‘True Russians Against the Jews: Right-Wing Anti-Semitism in the Last Years of the 
Russian Empire’, Ab Imperio, 3 (2001), pp. 191-220.  
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was central to the use of such images.98 The promulgation of the October Manifesto, 
and the seismic changes that it brought to Russian politics, encouraged a view 
associating Jews with parliament, modernity and bureaucracy. The radical right’s 
reactionary politics were closely tied to the use of anti-Jewish stereotypes.99 Jews 
were associated with both ‘parliamentary Russia’ and revolutionary Russia; the 1905 
revolution itself, according to a quotation cited by the publicist A. P. Liprandi, 
‘…may as well have been called a ‘Jewish’ one’.100 Political changes were 
associated with radical left-wing politics and Jews, and rightist election materials to 
the First State Duma utilized the theme of anti-Semitism in many of the declarations 
circulated.101 Aleksandr Dubrovin declared in a 1905 manifesto that no more than 
three Jews should be elected to the State Duma at any one time, due to their 
association with revolutionary movements.102 In discussions held amongst URP 
members, even more extreme views were expressed. At a meeting in 1906 one 
member suggested that Jews should not have any electoral rights at all, due to their 
‘lineage’.103 The right-wing parties unanimously claimed that groups of enemies, 
including Jews and socialists, were harming the Russian people and denying them 
rights, though these were ‘indivisible’ links between Tsar, people and land, rather 
than civil rights as decreed by a constitution. 
 
In manifestos for elections to the First Duma compiled by rightists, few 
themes generated more discussion than the ‘Jewish question’. Manifestos presented 
a theme that Jews, in addition to bureaucrats, minority nationalities, non-Orthodox 
                                                
98 Anti-Semitism is a highly complex and multivalent term that has attracted competing definitions. 
By ‘anti-Semitism’ what is meant here is deep-seated hatred of the Jews. This may include various 
‘psychological’ interpretations, such as the well-known ‘exterminationist’ view, which treats the Jews 
as a race out to destroy Western civilization, which has become especially notorious as a result of the 
Holocaust. A not dissimilar interpretation existed amongst the most vehement rightist factions. 
However, the use adopted here is not limited to this most extreme of all visions, but includes cultural 
and political stereotypes.  
99 These trends were clear in visual depictions of Jews. See R. Weinberg, ‘The Russian Right 
Responds to 1905: Visual Depictions of Jews in Postrevolutionary Russia’, in S. Hoffman and E. 
Mendelsohn (eds.), The Revolution of 1905 and Russia’s Jews (Philadelphia, 2008), pp. 55-69.  
100 A. P. Liprandi, Ravnopravie i evreiskie voprosy (Khar’kov, 1911), p. 2; Mirnyi trud, 9 (1905), pp. 
177-190, ‘Russkaia revoliutsiia i evreiskaia sotsial-demokratiia’, A. P. Liprandi.  
101 One example was a proclamation from the Russian Assembly, ‘K obrashchenie russkogo 
sobraniia’, in Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol. 1, p. 73. 
102 Ibid., p. 81. 
103 Vestnik narodnoi svobody, 28 October 1906, 33-34, col. 1769. 
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religions and socialists, were standing in the way of ‘true organic unity’ between 
Tsar and people.104 Central to this idea was the theme of Jewish power and desire for 
world domination.105 In one manifesto, the URP declared the ‘Jewish question’ 
distinct from other national questions, due to the power of the Jewish citizens of the 
Russian Empire. ‘Not only were Jews the enemies of Christians, but to all the non-
Jewish populations in view of their desire to place all the world under Jewish 
ownership’.106 The Russian Assembly declared in its own manifesto, ‘the Jewish 
question must be decided with the laws and measures of the government as separate 
from other tribal questions, in view of the continuing enmity of the Jews towards 
Christians and non-Jewish nationalities and the desire of the Jews for international 
supremacy’. The Jews were thus distinguished not only from the Orthodox Russian 
people, but also from all other national groups within the empire.107 The laws of 
religious toleration, convocation of the Duma, and electoral reforms were opposed 
by members of the URP across the empire, and associated with Jewish power.108 
One result was that many of these anti-Semitic ideas took rightists closer to 
criticizing the actions of the regime, as well as Jews themselves. 
 
The right-wing groups that appeared after 1905 were deliberately 
exclusionary in practice. The most vehement associations such as the URP would 
not admit ethnically Jewish members, even after conversion to Orthodoxy. In an 
audience with Nicholas II, one member of the URP proudly exclaimed they would 
never be allowed to enter the group. This highlights a shift in attitudes, from 
religious towards racial anti-Semitism, taking place in certain circles of the far 
right.109 A. S. Shmakov, a commentator who joined the URP in 1905, in his work 
                                                
104 ‘Russkoe sobranie’, in Shelokhaev, (ed.), Programmy, p. 422. Further proclamations from the 
URP on the ‘Jewish question’ can be found in ibid., pp. 449, 451.  
105 Ibid.; and S. Goldin, ‘Evrei kak poniatie’, in Miller, Sdvizhkov and Shirle (eds.), Poniatiia o 
Rossii, pp. 372-374.   
106 ‘Soiuz russkogo naroda’, in Shelokhaev, (ed.), Programmy, p. 444. 
107 ‘Russkoe sobranie’, in ibid., p. 422. 
108 GARF, F. 116, op. 1, d. 37, l. 18 ob.: telegram from the Yalta branch of the Union of Russian 
People to A. I. Dubrovin (St. Petersburg), 22 June 1907. 
109 Cited in Podbolotov, ‘True Russians Against the Jews’, p. 198; see also Vestnik narodnoi svobody, 
24 May 1907, 20, cols. 1223-1238. One activist, N. S. Ivanov, claimed that the leadership of the URP 
would not admit Jews under any circumstances (including after conversion from Judaism): GARF, F. 
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Freedom and the Jews (Svoboda i evrei) presented a view that inter-marriage would 
lead to weakening of the Russian land and people.110 This was occurring in other 
nationalist circles. Men’shikov, a leading ideologue of the Nationalist Party, 
increasingly developed such racist attitudes after 1905-1906, stating breeding 
between the Russian and Jewish ‘races’ would eliminate the Jewish ‘type’. 
Obviously, the eventual significance of this argument was racial, as well as religious 
and cultural.111  
 
However, racialist ideas, though present, were not the primary focus of right-
wing propaganda at this stage.112 More prominent in public anti-Semitic discourse 
throughout 1905 were themes of power and control. In one URM circular, the war 
with Japan was described as powered by ‘Japanese and Jewish money’, supporting 
intrigues against the Tsar.113 In a speech from 31 December 1905, Boris Nikol’skii 
declared to the Tsar the need to unite against the ‘Jewish Masonic conspiracy’, 
‘international enemies of law and order’ who sought to ‘fight our fatherland, 
education and culture’.114 The idea of ‘ownership’ of the land, linked to the theme of 
dominance and capitalism, shows the use of the ‘merchant’ stereotype in the rightist 
press. A mythical view of Jews as the masters of international finance capitalism 
circulated, which rightists desired would increase their own popularity by showing 
how they were on the side of the ‘exploited’ Russian people. The threat from the 
Jews, according to the URP, meant they needed to be limited in number within the 
First Duma, or even banned outright. This theme of the political, subversive Jew had 
a wider currency in the conservative press. Grazhdanin depicted Jews as clever, 
                                                                                                                                    
1467, op. 1, d. 497, ll. 75 ob.-76: v chrezvychainuiu sledstvennuiu komissiiu dlia proizvodstva 
sledstvennykh deistvii, 23 June 1917.  
110 A. S. Shmakov, Svoboda i evrei (Moscow, 1906), pp. lvii-lix. His later works explored the view 
that Jews were behind revolutionary movements and the assassination of Tsar Alexander II. 
Shmakov, Evreiskie voprosy, na stene vsemirnoi istorii (Moscow, 1912), pp. 76-77, 80-81. 
111 Löwe, The Tsars and the Jews, pp. 282-284.  
112 This is argument is explored in Weinerman, ‘Racism, Racial Prejudice and Jews’, pp. 442-495. 
See also Avrutin, ‘Racial Categories’, pp. 16-19, for a wider exploration of the ‘absence of race’ in 
the discourse of Russian culture and politics in the late imperial period.  
113 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, t.1, l. 1: address to the Union of Russian 
Men (circa June 1905).  
114 ‘Vsepoddanneishaia rech’ B. V. Nikol’skogo proiznesennaia im v vysochaishem prisutstvii pri 
prieme deputatsii “Russkogo sobraniia”, 31 December 1905, in Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol. 1, 
p. 101. 
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mendacious and intimately tied in to revolutionary movements, especially in the 
troublesome Western areas of the Russian Empire. In the rightist mindset, the 
involvement of Jews in government and the legal system, itself a mendacious 
‘Westernized’ development initiated by the Great Reforms of the 1860s and 1870s, 
had led to Jewish power and influence within the Russian state.115  
 
As well as Jews, the Poles, the Finns and other minority nationalities were 
widely denounced as subversives in right-wing circles. The ideological component 
of many of these ideas was often meagre; right-wing activists instead aimed to 
exploit emotions and resentments, hoping that in poor, rural areas of the empire the 
theme of powerful and wealthy subversives oppressing poor, Orthodox Russians 
would have a degree of popular resonance. However, an important implication of 
many of these constructions was how anti-Jewish emblems and feelings came to 
represent a wider rejection of Russian realities, often being associated with the 
Duma, liberalism or parliamentary Russia. Therefore, the far right’s anti-Jewish 
views took a more subversive turn for the regime, as well as the right’s enemies. 
 
Monarchical policies and mass attitudes 
 
Assessing whether these ideas correlated with those held by the much-eulogized 
‘masses’, rather than the central councils and pundits of the rightist groups, is an 
important end. The leadership of the right-wing parties believed the peasantry was 
particularly receptive to monarchist ideas, even in the face of revolutionary unrest. 
Violent disorders had challenged such notions; instances of peasant unrest since the 
Emancipation Manifesto of 1861, such as in Poltava during 1902, had shown rural 
instability. Furthermore, rapid population growth in the late nineteenth century had 
placed further strain on the peasantry’s ability to support itself.116 The right clearly 
desired to appeal across social classes, and there are many instances showing the 
attraction of rightist ideas and activities to peasants and workers.    
                                                
115 For example, see Grazhdanin, 3 September 1906, 65, pp. 2-3; A. P. Liprandi, Ravnopravie i 
evreiskie voprosy, pp. 1-5. 
116 Field, Rebels in the Name of the Tsar, pp. 1-27. 
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One right-wing organization in the village of Aleksandrevskii, in a telegram 
addressed to Nicholas II himself (the ‘dear Tsar father’), warned that ‘Jewish strikes 
in future elections’ to the State Duma would lead to the paralysis of the Russian 
state. This group pledged to defend the fatherland (otechestvo) against enemies ‘with 
the last drop of our blood’. However, the group is not named, and the number of 
signatories is uncertain.117 Other documents are more forthcoming with details. One 
telegram from 22 June 1907 from the Yalta branch of the URP, addressed to 
Dubrovin, described the work of this provincial branch as primarily to ‘save Russia 
from the Jews’ (adopting the neutral term evrei rather than the pejorative zhid’) and 
working to organize a ‘Union of Russian working men’ in the region, and thus 
develop working-class support for monarchism.118 Provincial activists adopted 
attitudes from the central leadership, mirroring the discourse of anti-revolution. It is 
notable how the URP projected their views onto wider society. For instance, in one 
telegram from the Russian Assembly to A. I. Dubrovin, a meeting held in memory 
of Alexander III near Znamenskii Square in St. Petersburg was said to reflect a 
moment of historical importance for all the Russian people.119 
 
 It is easier to chart attitudes amongst urban workers recruited to the URP 
from available sources, among which are the surviving records of the Provisional 
Government committee of enquiry into the unlawful activities of the former regime. 
These provide insights into the ideas of the activists themselves, as well as the 
leaders of the right-wing movements. One St. Petersburg worker who joined the 
URP in 1905, V. V. Shelkovnikov, recalled his experiences on his interrogation by 
the committee during June 1917. He recalled how URP activists went into the 
Nevskii factory in order to raise support for the autocracy, and in so doing 
deliberately targeted urban workers in order to sway the masses towards tsarism, 
amid the heat of revolutionary tensions. Strikes and the presence of ‘socialist 
revolutionaries’ had made activists question whether the masses were truly on the 
                                                
117 GARF, F. 601, op. 1, d. 1061, l. 49: telegram to Nicholas II from Aleksandrevskii, 16 June 1906. 
118 GARF, F. 116, op. 1, d. 37, l. 18 ob.: URP central council (Yalta), to A. I. Dubrovin (St. 
Petersburg), 22 June 1907.  
119 GARF, F. 116, op. 1, d. 37, ll. 8-8 ob.: main council of the Russian Assembly (St. Petersburg), to 
A. I. Dubrovin (St. Petersburg), 27 September 1907. 
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side of the autocracy. Shelkovnikov perceived that the 1905 revolution had spread 
unrest in the factories, and the urban proletariat was becoming increasingly radical. 
A druzhina was subsequently organized; Shelkovnikov claimed that 500 workers in 
the Nevskii factory joined this group during 1905.120 
  
I. A. Lavrov, a URP activist and factory worker operating in the 
Semiannikovskii plant in St. Petersburg during 1905, explained on his interrogation 
that recruitment for this group had started in the factories. Like Shelkovnikov’s 
testimony, he claimed the druzhiny in this region were especially active; they had 
received a cache of weapons from one of the chief organizers of the URP in St. 
Petersburg, Iuskevich-Kraskovskii. Lavrov claimed that hundreds of workers 
flocked to the autocratic cause in the Putilovskaia, Moskovskaia and Narvskaia 
factories during 1905. Lavrov said that the police were well informed about the 
druzhiny’s receipt of weapons, but did little to stop them due to their own 
sympathies. These weapons, amongst other nefarious goals, were distributed with 
the intention of fighting strikers in these factories, and also for the planned 
assassinations of liberal politicians, Shelkovnikov citing the murder of Herzenstein 
as one example of this activity.121 Fear of revolutionary criminality was one of the 
reasons that the URP needed to be formed; activists saw 1905 as a ‘crime’ against 
the Russian state, and that urgent methods needed to be taken to rectify this. 
 
Victor Pavlovich Sokolov was the product of a gentry family, and son of 
general P. V. Sokolov. An engineer by trade, he would later organize a student 
movement amongst the right, and co-organized a druzhina in the Aleksandrovskii 
factory in St. Petersburg, along with the URP leaders there, A. V. Polovnev and 
Iuskevich-Kraskovskii. Sokolov’s testimony gives an excellent insight into how 
violence could become an emotive experience. He discussed his recruitment into the 
druzhina after prompting from Polovnev: 
 
                                                
120 This account in drawn from Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, pp. 
67-69.  
121 Ibid., pp. 62-63.  
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I clearly remember 6 January 1906. Polovnev said to me that the URP has a 
squad there, the only purpose of which was the maintenance of order, and it 
would be a real help to the government against the revolution in the streets, 
and also the self-defence of workers in the factory. Subsequently I convinced 
myself of such a calling, and joined the squad. Then Polovnev said to me, in 
relation to serious disorders amongst the workers, that the squad took on the 
serious work of protecting the lives of a few government figures, and that he, 
Polovnev, would be heading a combat unit of ten men for this security…’122 
 
Polovnev’s attempt was persuasive, and showed the attraction of joining one of the 
most militant tendencies on the right. It provided an opportunity for those with 
autocratic sympathies to face off against a clear enemy in defence of the autocracy.  
 
It is harder to measure attitudes amongst the peasantry, given inconsistencies 
in the source base and widespread illiteracy. Clearly, sections of the peasantry 
shared some of the major prejudices held by rightist leaders. A resolution by 
peasants in Nogutsk (Stavropol province) from 29 June 1906 shows anti-Semitic 
attitudes. The resolution, signed by 41 literate peasants and with the names of a 
further 599 illiterate peasants attached, contains a list of political demands. Among 
these were, ‘under no circumstances give equal rights to the Jews, since these people 
seek to gain power over us; they wish to destroy the existing state system in Russia 
and to arrange things so that Jews will govern Russia in the place of God’s 
anointed’. By early June 1906, the politicized right had built up a political presence 
in Saratov province. The petition does not mention this, but shares certain themes in 
common with the ideas and aims of the publicity materials of several right-wing 
groups. Among these are demands to abolish the sale of alcohol, and opposition to 
amnesties for political criminals.123  
 
Peasant petitions examined by Oleg Bukhovets demonstrate some thematic 
overlap with the extreme right. In a sample of 69 petitions gathered from Ukraine, 
                                                
122 GARF, F. 1467, op. 1, d. 498, ll. 35 ob.-36.: gospodinu predsedateliu glavnogo soveta soiuza 
russkogo naroda (circa June 1917).  
123 ‘Resolution by Peasants in Nogutsk (Stavropol province), 29 June 1906’, in G. Freeze (ed.), From 
Supplication to Revolution: A Documentary Social History of Imperial Russia (Oxford, 1988), pp. 
278-280. 
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extreme negative perceptions of Jews, including a view that they were ‘parasites’ on 
the Russian land and needed to be ‘cleansed’ from the empire, occurred in only four 
of the petitions assessed (six per cent). However, the overall prevalence of anti-
Semitic cultural stereotypes is much higher, appearing in 23 of the 69 petitions (33 
per cent). Most common is the theme of the Jew as a ‘merchant’ or ‘bourgeois’. 
Whilst the demand for violent measures against Jews is only apparent from a small 
minority of the petitions, widespread cultural attitudes show the existence of deeply 
ingrained stereotypes. There was therefore a reservoir of attitudes for the right to 
play upon. Intriguingly the themes in the petitions correlate with trends in right-wing 
propaganda; specifically, the claims of Jewish power reflected in the idea of the 
merchant or speculator. Racial differences were less prevalent than ideas of Jewish 
wealth and economic domination.124  
 
 Yet other rightist themes were less prevalent. In terms of peasant attitudes 
towards the autocracy, Bukhovets has shown from a sample of 200 peasant petitions 
and documents drawn from across the empire between 1905 and 1907 that 
monarchist or pro-autocratic sentiments were in a distinct minority. Monarchist or 
reformist ‘mood’ (nastroenie) occurred in 33 documents sampled (16.5 per cent). 
This is in stark contrast to the ‘revolutionary’ mood present in 181 of the petitions 
(91.5 per cent). Bukhovets acknowledges the problems of finding representative 
samples, but his exhaustive research points towards a tentative conclusion that 
revolutionary ideas were popular amongst large sections of the peasantry during 
1905; doubtless, a view informed by Soviet historiographical traditions. However, 
given the unrest amongst the peasantry during the revolution, his conclusion that 
peasants were not only passive supporters of the autocracy is credible.125  
 
                                                
124 O. G. Bukhovets, ‘Natsii i etnokonfessionalnye gruppy Rossiiskoi imperii v massovom soznanii 
(po petitsiiam i nakazam 1905-1907 gg.)’, Sotsial’naia istoriia: ezhegodnik (1998), pp. 249-262; ‘The 
Political Consciousness of the Russian Peasantry in the Revolution of 1905-1907: Sources, Methods, 
and Some Results’, Russian Review, 47, 4 (1988), pp. 357-374; A. Verner, ‘Discursive Strategies in 
the 1905 Revolution: Peasant Petitions from Vladimir Province’, Russian Review, 54, 1 (1995), pp. 
65-90. 
125 O. G. Bukhovets, Sotsial’nye konflikty i krest’ianskaia mental’nost v Rossiiskoi imperii nachala 
XX veka: novye materialy, metody, rezul’taty (Moscow, 1993), pp. 219-220.  
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Conclusion 
 
The councils of the groups that emerged during 1905, such as the URM and URP, 
displayed a clear proclivity for harnessing a mass dynamic in society, and they had 
some support in this aim. Their ideas had currency within wider society, though it 
was distressing for some observers that the ‘masses’ were also turning to 
revolutionary forces in the same period.  Therefore the image of popular power that 
emerged on the right was a contested one. To many right-wing commentators, mass 
politics was perceived as both an opportunity and a threat. Even amongst 
propagandists who were enthusiastic about creating a mass basis for the right-wing 
movement, ideals were not clearly defined, and the resulting attitudes towards ‘the 
people’ were sometimes confused. However, a mass right-wing popular movement 
was starting to arise, as a number of activists flocked to the cause, excited by 
autocratic slogans and promises to be given a role in the war against revolutionary 
terror.  
 
 Rightists were reacting to real conditions during and shortly after 1905: a 
broad-based and destructive revolutionary movement, social and demographic shifts, 
and large-scale urbanization. Their rise can only be understood in conjunction with 
the wider social and political effects of the revolutionary crisis. This prompted the 
formation of larger parties and groups, quite different from the smaller groups such 
as the Russian Assembly that had existed prior to 1905. The violence of many 
activists emerged as a central issue, for rightist leaders, their followers and also 
observers from within the autocracy. This would place a question mark over their 
self-proclaimed status as the defenders of the old regime. Whether rightists could be 
reliable allies for the regime whilst using such tactics was initially unclear. During 
this phase of the movement, right-wing parties and groups spread across the Russian 
Empire, taking their approach to peripheral areas, far from the imperial centre, that 
in turn led to increased tensions with the imperial establishment.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Across the Empire 
 
Right-wing groups were particularly active in non-Russian areas of the empire, 
demonstrated by their growth in the southwest during the revolution of 1905.1 This 
chapter examines the provincial activity of several different right-wing groups, 
looking at cases from Odessa, Kiev and Astrakhan’, which provide insights into 
rightist radicalism by considering their militant, populist and anti-political mood. 
Rightists scored several successes following the revolutionary period; there were 
areas where the populist and nationalist ideas previously explored were effectively 
shaped to local concerns and situations. This ideology was generally inflexible; 
success followed where local factors facilitating the rise of the movement already 
existed. Rightists were not, however, equally successful in all areas, and the first two 
cases represented greater successes for rightist forces in the respective region than 
the final example. As rightists spread across the empire, tensions emerged between 
the independent right and the autocratic politics of the establishment.   
 
Odessa: Violence and Militancy on the Imperial Periphery 
 
An exceptional area of right-wing activity during and after 1905 was the bustling 
port city of Odessa, located in the southwest of the Russian Empire. Founded in 
1794, by the late nineteenth century Odessa was the largest city in Ukraine, and the 
fourth largest in the empire.2 Several factors underscored the rise of the right. Like 
other areas of prominent right-wing activity, such as Bessarabia and Kiev, Odessa 
                                                
1 This is reflected by department of police figures in GARF, F. 102, 4-e d-vo, op. 1907, d. 164, ll. 
179-398 ob. Rawson notes the success of the rightists in the southwest of the empire in campaigning 
to elect deputies to the First and Second Dumas, a result of ‘the significant role that regional concerns 
and local leadership played in Russian politics’. See Russian Rightists, pp. 91-106. A contemporary 
liberal analysis is Russkaia mysl’, 2 (1908), pp. 20-29, ‘Chernaia sotnia v provintsii’.  
2 General analyses of the history of Odessa include P. Herlihy, Odessa: A History, 1794-1914 
(Cambridge, MA, 1986); F. Skinner, ‘City Planning in Russia: The Development of Odessa, 1789-
1892’, (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1973); ‘Odessa and the Problem of Modernization’, in M. 
Hamm (ed.), The City in Late Imperial Russia (Bloomington, 1986), pp. 209-248.  
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was a diverse city in terms of its ethnic composition, home to many immigrant 
communities, including Jews; and like Kiev, it was located within the Pale of 
Settlement. According to the 1897 census, 30.8 per cent of the population of 403,768 
had either Hebrew or Yiddish as their first language.3 In 1904, 31.31 per cent of 
Odessa’s population of 511,000 was Jewish, one of the highest percentages in any 
region of the Russian Empire. Many Jews played an important role in the mercantile, 
financial, pharmaceutical and textile industries; 56 per cent of small businesses in 
Odessa were Jewish-owned, in a city that has been described as ‘a centre of Jewish 
culture and society in Russia’.4 Many prosperous Jewish residents played a vibrant 
role in the economic and social life of the city, yet there was also widespread 
poverty amongst Odessa’s Jews. Furthermore, anti-Semitism had been present in 
ugly and destructive episodes in its history. Odessa was the scene of the first Russian 
pogroms in 1821, with further episodes in 1859, 1871 and 1900. Exploiting long-
standing tensions, an idea of Jewish power, and economic subjugation of non-Jews, 
would play an important role in right-wing propaganda after 1905.5 The city was 
home not only to Jews, but also to substantial Polish, German, Italian and Greek 
communities, some of which contained within them pockets of their own anti-Jewish 
animus.6   
 
 The Union of Russian People (URP) was one of several right-wing groups 
present in this city, chaired by Count Aleksei Ivanovich Konovnitsyn (1855-1919) 
from 1906–1911. Konovnitsyn was a direct descendent of Petr Konovnitsyn, general 
at the battle of Vitebsk (1812) in the ‘Great Patriotic War’ against Napoleon, a 
family tie that Konovnitsyn was no doubt keen to allude to in his self-presentation as 
a patriot. Konovnitsyn was an unscrupulous figure, a rabble-rousing orator in public, 
and in private, accusations of his corruption led to splits in the right-wing fraction in 
                                                
3 Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis’, Vol. 47, p. vi.   
4 Evreiskaia entsiklopediia: svod znanii o evreistve i ego kul’ture v proshlom i nastoiashchem, Vol. 
12 (St. Petersburg, 1908-1913), pp. 60-61.  
5 Herlihy, Odessa, p. 251; a contemporary report on the 1900 pogrom is in Russkoe bogatstvo, 8 
(1900), pp. 159-162. For an overview of other pogroms in Odessa, see J. D. Klier, ‘The Pogrom 
Paradigm in Russian History’ in Klier and Lambroza (eds.), Pogroms, pp. 13-38; Lambroza, ‘The 
Pogroms of 1903-1906’, in ibid., pp. 232-237; Evreiskaia entsiklopediia, Vol. 12, pp. 67-68. 
6 Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis’, Vol. 47, p. vi.  
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Odessa, which would lead to the formation of the Union of the Archangel Mikhail 
(UAM) in 1908, led by Vladimir Purishkevich.7  Beforehand, Konovnitsyn had met 
with Aleksandr Dubrovin in St. Petersburg in 1905, and it was at the former’s behest 
that a URP branch was formed in Odessa. The other two founding members of the 
group were the teacher N. N. Rodzevich, who would also lead the closely linked 
Union of Russian Men (URM) in Odessa, and the barrister B. A. Pelikan. The 
branch was officially opened on 4 February 1906, with Konovnitsyn sworn in as the 
chair of the organization, and Pelikan the vice-chair. The newspapers of the Odessa 
URP, Russkaia rech’ (Russian Speech) and Za tsaria i rodinu (For Tsar and 
Fatherland) had been circulating since November 1905, shortly before the official 
establishment of the organization. A central aim of the URP in Odessa, as later 
recalled by Konovnitsyn, was the creation of a series of druzhiny in the region, for 
armed struggle against revolutionaries.8 The purpose of the following assessment is 
not to chart the entire history of the rise and decline of right-wing activity in Odessa, 
or re-tell the narrative of the pogrom of 1905.9 It is rather to consider the dynamics 
of the right-wing movement in the city between 1905 and 1908, and to discuss why 
right-wing ideas and actions were able to gain a disproportionate degree of traction 
in Odessa, as opposed to the central metropolitan areas of Moscow or St. Petersburg, 
or even in many other provinces. The analysis will consider how rightists mobilized, 
and then the outcomes of the centrality of violence and class struggle to the scenario 
of the Odessa right, and also what this meant for the autocracy. 
 
 
 
                                                
7 For a biographical sketch of Konovnitsyn, see CSIE, pp. 258-261. A recent thesis includes a chapter 
on the financial irregularities of the URP in Odessa. See Langer, ‘Corruption and the 
Counterrevolution’, Ch. 6. This is a theme I shall return to in chapter six.  
8 This is drawn from Konovnitsyn’s own account during interrogation by the Provisional Government 
in June 1917: Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, pp. 274-275.  
9 On the pogrom, see R. Weinberg, The Revolution of 1905 in Odessa: Blood on the Steps 
(Bloomington, 1992); and Herlihy, Odessa, pp. 301-304; G. Surh, ‘The Role of Civil and Military 
Commanders During the 1905 Pogroms in Odessa and Kiev’, Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, 
Society, 15, 3 (2009), pp. 39-55.   
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Revolutionary Odessa 
 
Like branches in Moscow and St. Petersburg, the Odessa URP saw itself as an 
organization created in reaction to the revolution of 1905. The two crucial events 
which prompted the formation of the Odessa branch of the URP were the 17 October 
Manifesto, and the general strike of that same month; both events influenced how 
the authorities would respond to these groups. Under the guidance of Konovnitsyn, 
and Rodzevich from the related URM, the group declared the need to launch a total 
defence of ‘Russian values’ (meaning Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality) to fight 
against what its supporters saw as the growing strength of the non-Russian 
population.10 The October 1905 pogrom sent shockwaves around the empire,11 and 
the right-wing mobs that became involved blamed the Jews for an erosion of the 
                                                
10 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, t. 1, ll. 92 ob.–93: police circular from 
Odessa to P. A. Stolypin, 2 December 1906.  
11 See R. Weinberg, ‘The Pogroms of 1905 in Odessa: A Case Study’, in Klier and Lambroza (eds.), 
Pogroms, pp. 248-289.   
 
Figure 4 Map of central Odessa circa 1895, P. Herlihy, Odessa: A History, 1794-1914 
(Cambridge, MA, 1986), p. 275. 
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Tsar’s autocratic powers.12 As in St. Petersburg and Moscow, rejection of the 17 
October Manifesto appeared as a key element in this presentation of a ‘defence’. The 
Odessa URP’s self-description as the defenders of Orthodox Russians, and the 
violent methods that many of its members were prepared to go to in order to achieve 
this defence, were central features of this branch in the years immediately following 
the revolution of 1905.13 The pogrom that followed the promulgation of the October 
Manifesto was one of the largest in the empire. On 18 October, hundreds gathered at 
Dal’nitskii Street, leading to a heightening of tensions, whipped up by pro-Tsarist 
orators. Following this demonstration, fierce violence broke out, with ‘patriotic 
demonstrators’ ransacking Jewish houses, shops and small businesses. Over 400 
Jews were killed in two days of carnage, and scores more injured.14  
 
 The pogrom of 1905 can prompt us to ask wider questions about government 
initiative, pro-Tsarist agency, and toleration of what have been described by 
sympathizers as ‘patriotic manifestations’. Much attention has focused on the role of 
government complicity in the pogrom.15 This points towards the importance of the 
relationship between the URP and the establishment. At least until 1908, the URP 
benefitted from the leniency of the commander of the Odessa military district, Baron 
Aleksandr Kaul’bars. As chief of the army in the region, he was one figure who 
could use force to oppose the rise of spontaneous right-wing organizations.16 
However, the liberal journal Pravo (Law) claimed on the morning of 18 October 
1905, at the outset of the infamous pogrom, that Kaul’bars was welcoming crowds 
of pro-autocracy demonstrators into the city centre, giving a speech that concluded 
‘long live Russia, and the free Russian people!’17 Kaul’bars, in a report circulated 
within the Odessa police, described the URP as a potentially useful counterweight to 
revolutionary forces in Odessa, adding that 40 per cent of the city’s population was 
                                                
12 Ibid., pp. 259-262.  
13 For one example, see GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, t. 1, ll. 123 ob.-
124: B. V. Kaul’bars to P. A. Stolypin, 31 December 1906. 
14 Evreiskaia entsiklopediia, Vol. 12, pp. 67-68.  
15 Surh, ‘The Role of Civil and Military Commanders’, pp. 39-55.  
16 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 215.  
17 Pravo, 4 December 1905, 48-49, appendices, col. 137. 
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Jewish; this was an exaggeration of around seven per cent, based on figures from the 
1897 census.18  
 
 Yet Kaul’bars was not alone in considering his overriding prerogative to be 
the control of revolutionary violence; indeed, this was where the main focus lay for 
most of the police at the time. The revolutionary climate in Odessa throughout the 
first half of 1905, with sporadic strikes in the first several months followed by a 
general strike in June, deeply affected the actions taken by the authorities during the 
rest of the year.19 Though the authorities did not, as has been claimed, plan and 
direct the pogrom of their own accord, they did not effectively keep public order.20 
In an investigation by Senator Aleksandr Kuzminskii into the origins and 
consequences of the Odessa pogrom, it emerged that the Odessa city prefect 
(gradonachal’nik) Dmitri Neidgardt ordered the removal of police from stationary 
posts on the night of 18 October, which allowed for outbreaks of ‘patriotic’ violence 
to spread more easily over the next few days, as they were unopposed by the 
presence of police on the streets.21 Though the pogrom pre-dates the ‘official’ 
formation of the URP by several months, Neidgardt describes ‘patriotic 
manifestations’ as one of the main sources of violence in clashes between pro-
                                                
18 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, t. 1, ll. 92 ob.–93 police circular from 
Odessa to P. A. Stolypin, 2 December 1906. 
19 For a more detailed assessment, see Weinberg, The Revolution of 1905 in Odessa, Chs. 4 and 5. 
These existing tensions included pogroms, which had swept Odessa from October 1905 before the 
URP was officially established here. It should be noted that the Odessa pogroms, whilst involving 
right-wing groups, were a wider phenomenon that did not only include these factions. They also drew 
in townsfolk uninvolved in the movements, including the unemployed, and day labourers out of work. 
20 This argument was originally expounded by Simon Dubnov, a co-editor of the Russian-Jewish 
journal Voskhod (Dawn), in The History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, Vol. 3 (Katv, 1975). 
Odessa is mentioned on p. 129. See also his Materialy dlia istorii antievreiskikh pogromov v Rossii. 2 
Vols. (St. Petersburg, 1919-1923). A similar view can be found in M. Vishniak, ‘Antisemitism in 
Tsarist Russia, A Study in Government Fostered Antisemitism’, in K. S. Pinson (ed.), Essays on 
Antisemitism (New York, 1964), pp. 122-144. One contemporary interpretation stressing government 
complicity is ‘Iz istorii vosmidesiatykh godov’, Evreiskaia starina, 8 (1915). Many works cited 
above, including by Weinberg, Klier and Surh, cast doubt on the notion that the pogroms were 
centrally planned, though it is not so easy to dismiss claims of culpability at a local level, where 
examples show police officials praising ‘patriotic manifestations’ as signs of a welcomed popular 
mobilization against revolutionary forces. 
21 Materialy k istorii russkoi kontr-revoliutsii. Vol. 1: pogromy po offitsial’nym dokumentam. (St. 
Petersburg, 1908), pp. 14-15.  
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autocracy and revolutionary forces from 18-20 October.22 However, in the wake of 
the general strike from October 1905, the emphasis and attention of the police and 
army was on anti-authority violence, rather than on crowds that pleaded loyalty to 
the Tsar. Hence, a period of toleration of these forces on the part of the city 
authorities, during and immediately after the pogrom, ensued.23 But far from 
showing government support for the far right, this approach was down to other 
factors. Neidgardt and his associates considered attacks on stationary police over 
previous days a more than adequate reason to withdraw a substantial armed police 
presence, and avoid further inflaming tensions. Neidgardt scaled down the police 
presence in order to try and avert further violence; this was not in itself an invitation 
for anti-Jewish crowds to run riot.24 
 
Inadequate policing was one factor facilitating the rise of the right, but 
another was the appeal of the groups themselves. Class conflict was central to the 
URP message. Appeals to workers took on an anti-intelligentsia focus, attempting to 
turn supporters against the ‘30,000 bourgeois in the city of Odessa’ and adding that 
Odessa University, where riots and disorders had broken out during 1905, was full 
of ‘half-educated strikers’ and needed to be ‘burned’. In public, these pro-autocracy 
groups attempted to stoke the flames of class, as well as ethnic, conflict by utilizing 
the language of revolution. One group of right-wing activists, documented in the 
legal journal Pravo, declared that ‘proletarian’ elements of society needed to ‘unite 
around the Tsar’. The group was composed of town-dwellers (meshchane) and the 
focal point of their violent activities was properties and shops considered ‘Jewish’, 
and educational establishments: much of the worst violence occurred either at or 
near Odessa University.25 Many of these spontaneous disorders targeted Jews and 
students, in attacks against what were perceived to be the educated and well-to-do 
                                                
22 Ibid., pp. 23-25.  
23 Ibid., p. 24. 
24 Ibid., p. 14. This version of events was interpreted in the liberal and juridical press as a sign that 
Neidgardt’s sympathies lay with pro-autocracy demonstrators: see Pravo, 4 December 1905, 48-49, 
appendices, cols. 136-145; Surh, ‘The Role of Civil and Military Commanders’, pp. 46-47.  
25 Pravo, 4 December 1905, 48-49, appendices, cols. 137-138. 
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elements of Odessa’s population.26 Konovnitsyn and his associates claimed ‘Jewish 
money’ was bankrolling the enemies of the autocracy.27 Class-conflict and anti-
Semitism mutually reinforced each other in this scenario. 
 
Workers, populism and anti-Semitism: public demonstrations  
 
Rightists in Odessa were keen to recruit from new bases of social support. Local 
instability caused by recent processes of urbanization meant that many workers from 
the dock areas of the city faced long periods of unemployment, with thousands often 
being out of work at any one time.28 In such a climate, the normal propaganda of the 
URP – that economic devastation had been wrought on the narod by controlling 
foreign and Jewish influences – became more effective, with the portrayal of the 
‘enemies’ of the Russian people as powerful subversives who exploited Russians 
having more traction in this context. In Odessa, the rightist press depicted Jews as 
merchants and speculators, and created a narrative of a powerful and wealthy Jewish 
community. Jews were described as the cause of many employment worries, 
portrayed as the dominant group seeking to exploit poor, Orthodox Russians.29 
Consequently Konovnitsyn aimed to recruit workers from the dock areas, and 
presented his movement as one dedicated to the people. When describing the 
rationale behind the creation of the URP in Odessa towards the end of 1905, he 
spoke of his desire to create a group that would ‘unite the Russian people’.30 As well 
as economic factors, Odessa’s politics was an additional stimulus for the rise of the 
radical right, linked tightly to its anti-Semitic ideology. The presence of a 
revolutionary movement, including the Bund and also branches of the Russian 
Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDWP) was an additional factor aiding the 
URP’s rise in the area.31 This is shown by the numerous examples of the far right 
                                                
26 Ibid., cols. 139-140. 
27 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 231.  
28 Herlihy, Odessa, pp. 304-305. 
29 Various issues of Russkoe znamia, January-March 1906. 
30 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 274.  
31 The Jewish Labour Bund of Poland, Russia and Lithuania, or Bund for short (1897-1920) played a 
prominent role in the propaganda of the URP and other right-wing radicals. Right-wing extremists 
developed a scenario where the typical Jew was also a professional revolutionary, partly based on the 
   
 101 
portraying a scenario in newspapers such as Russkoe znamia that being in a 
revolutionary group such as the Bund was typical of Odessa’s Jews.32 These 
economic and political factors mutually reinforced one another. Whilst these claims 
for mass support were not new to the right, Konovnitsyn’s branch clearly scored 
some successes in this aim. By 1907, Odessa had become a particular hotbed of URP 
activity, in stark contrast to the small-scale, elitist groups that had existed before 
1905, such as the Russian Assembly. 
 
The Odessa right took practical steps to advance its cause. One was to hold 
public meetings or rallies to recruit people to the movement. In one open-air meeting 
of URP activists held on 12 December 1906, a scenario was created which pitted the 
‘simple people’ against the revolutionary intelligentsia. Baron Kaul’bars noted that 
this assembly appealed to the ‘simple Russian people’ or as he termed it, the ‘99 per 
cent’ who would be ‘praying for their Tsar’. The activities at the meeting, including 
the singing of patriotic hymns and arias from Mikhail Glinka’s 1836 opera A Life for 
the Tsar, were according to a police report not ‘political’ but designed to unite 
‘forces of law and order’ specifically against ‘revolutionary’ forces and Jewish self-
defence groups. Like the Russian Assembly a few years earlier, music played a 
central role in such events. This report was sympathetic to the right-wing cause, 
noting the ‘non-political’ nature of the demonstration, and suggested that similar 
outbursts of public feeling should be allowed to continue.33  
 
 In Odessa and in other villages and towns in Ukraine, one strategy for 
popular mobilization was holding public funerals for previous members of the right-
wing groups, many of whom were workers who had joined the groups due to the 
                                                                                                                                    
number of Jewish leaders of revolutionary movements. See the relevant chapters in J. Frankel, 
Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism and the Russian Jews (Cambridge, 1981); and H. J. 
Tobias, The Jewish Bund in Russia: From Its Origins to 1905 (Stanford, 1972). For more on right-
wing depictions of Jews in visual culture, see Weinberg, ‘The Russian Right Responds to 1905’, pp. 
55-69. 
32 See for example, GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, t. 1, l. 316: Russkoe 
Znamia, 19 Feb 1907. The list of examples of similar statements from right-wing organizations could 
be multiplied hundreds of times.  
33 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, t. 1, ll. 123 ob.-124: B. V. Kaul’bars to 
P. A. Stolypin, 31 December 1906.  
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recruitment efforts of Konovnitsyn. These public processions were initially 
presented by supporters of these groups and the right-wing press as detached, 
sacrosanct events, separate from the planes of everyday political activity. Much of 
the symbolism of these events utilized the triad of ‘Russian’ values: Orthodoxy, 
autocracy and nationality that needed to be defended in a time of crisis. An addition 
to the URP’s message in Odessa was how it presented itself as a movement in 
defence of the masses. The populist element in the right-wing message created an 
additional element of tension, with funerals held for rightist workers allowing far-
right groups to portray themselves as defenders of ‘the people’.34 Russian rightists 
frequently presented themselves as under attack from external threats, and funerals 
and processions held for workers and the demonstrations and chants accompanying 
them were designed not to promote leaders or statesmen, but instead everyday ‘true 
Russian’ people.35 Funerals for members of right-wing workers acted as a trigger for 
waves of violence in defence of ‘the masses’ or common people, against an ‘enemy 
within’ threatening to destroy Russia.36 
 
 This ‘enemy within’ was often considered to be a Jewish one. Anti-
Semitism, as used by these far-right groups, was changing from a purely religious 
conception (for instance, depicting Jews as Christ-killers) to a ‘modern’ anti-
Semitism based on power and political oppression, which was fed by its association 
with the economic conditions of Odessa. Prominent themes of protection and 
retribution emerge in the scenarios of funerals held for members of the URP, or ‘for 
the people’, and can further show how the group conceived of itself as a defender of 
the narod. A funeral in Kherson province, Ukraine, was held for the URP activist 
                                                
34 The report from Senator Kuzminskii, sent to Odessa to conduct an investigation into the reasons for 
the pogroms in the city in late 1905, mentioned funeral processions in his report several times: 
Materialy k istorii Russkoi kontr-revolutsii, pp. CXXXIII-CXXXIV; Kievskii i Odesskii pogromy v 
otchetakh senatorov Turau i Kuzminskogo (St. Petersburg, 1907), pp. 14-16. URP bands appeared 
with red flags (representing the blood of Christ) and adorned with Georgii Pobedonosets (the sign of 
the URP) at student and revolutionary funerals. This led to counter violence from student militants, 
with the ensuing disorders often taking days to die out.  
35 Moskovskie vedomosti first used the nationalist slogan ‘Russia for the Russians’ in the mid-
nineteenth century, one of the earliest newspapers to do so. This phrase has been revived amongst 
Russian nationalist groups in our time. See Gringmut, Sobranie statei, Vol. 3, p. 212.  
36 One example of this mentality can be found in GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 
39, l. A, l. 214 c: Russkaia rech’, 14 May 1907. 
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Aleksandr Prokhorov on 28 February 1907. A dockworker, he was killed in a clash 
between URP and revolutionary forces, and his funeral was held in the nearby 
cemetery. Supervised by leaders of the local branch, A. A. Bankovskii and M. I. 
Ivanov, a police report noted how after the memorial service a crowd of several 
hundred URP activists were invited to ‘unite for the fight with enemies’, crying 
‘Russia is on the march! (Rus’ idet) and ‘hurray!’ whilst promising to wage war, 
most of all against Odessa’s Jews. Led by Bankovskii, the crowd carried flags, 
including the Russian imperial standard, filing down Petrovskii and Alekseevskii 
streets. A pogrom was started, and shops considered ‘Jewish’-looking had their 
windows smashed with bottles and stones and were set on fire. Scores of onlookers 
were injured in the chaos that engulfed the town centre. The violence had subsided 
by the following day, but the sudden nature of these acts of violence had caused 
panic in the town centre and created an air of tension amongst residents.37 
 
A funeral held for Polivanov, a former member of a group called the Russian 
Society of Steamship Workers, attracted bands of URP supporters, who urged 
retributive violence against revolutionary oppressors, namely, Jews and socialists. 
Polivanov’s death was supposedly at the hands of the powerful, subversive 
revolutionary movements operating within the city.38 Russian rightists frequently 
presented themselves, and the Russian people, as under attack from a variety of 
internal threats. These funerals, as well as the processions adopted for workers, and 
the demonstrations and chants that accompanied them, were not designed to promote 
leaders or statesmen, but, instead, everyday ‘true Russians’. The image of the 
sanctity of the worker was added to long-standing values of Orthodoxy and 
nationalism, creating a new synthesis on the far right between populism and the 
Uvarov triad, resulting in a populist nationalism that took on shades of certain fascist 
movements.39  
 
                                                
37 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, pp. 395-396.  
38 Ibid., p. 218. 
39 See Rogger, ‘Was there a Russian fascism?’ pp. 398-415.  
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The presentation of the images of the people had changed in the case of these 
worker-funerals. The people were no longer passive receptors of the ideas of leaders, 
as they had been in previous right-wing scenarios, but were the central focus of the 
right-wing myth. This distinguished the URP’s events from the contemporary 
scenarios of the regime that involved audiences of peasants, but did not present the 
peasantry as the primary focus of their activity.40 Such demonstrations had a large 
potential to incite unrest. These funerals for workers could act as a trigger for further 
waves of violence in defence of ‘the masses’ against an ‘enemy within’ threatening 
to destroy Russia. The results could be pogroms, or isolated outbreaks of violence 
with a random pattern.41  
 
In the period following the October Manifesto and the pogrom, the right 
became a more visible public presence.42 The demonstrations and rallies of right-
wing forces in the region give a strong insight into the nature of these groups, re-
imagined by activists and supporters as groups in support of the people, opposing 
contemporary political and social changes sweeping the empire. Instead of being 
conceived of as pro-government strikebreakers, rightist groups in Odessa should be 
considered to be protestors and demonstrators. This conceptualization takes us closer 
to the mood of the organizations that arose from 1905-1906, with the resulting 
mobilization of opinion driven by protest against contemporary Russia and the status 
quo, which presented themselves as groups in support of ‘the people’.43 Hence, the 
populist tradition started in St. Petersburg and Moscow by those respective branches 
of the URP was continued in Odessa, guided by Konovnitsyn and Rodzevich, yet 
with local factors creating a more extreme presence.  
 
                                                
40 See, for instance, R. Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in the Russian Monarchy, 
Vol. 2 (Princeton, 2000).  
41 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, pp. 217-218. 
42 Existing records, including the police reports cited, are not always forthcoming on specific figures. 
When they do cite numbers they vary wildly, from describing only a few dozen supporters to groups 
of several thousands. One should treat such estimates with a degree of caution, but one can generalize 
that a sudden proliferation of reports from the end of 1905 showed an enhanced right-wing presence 
in Odessa. 
43 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, t. 1, ll. 332-334 : undated and unsigned 
police report, referring to demonstrations from the end of 1906 and beginning of 1907. 
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Mass violence, militancy and independence  
 
The slogans of right-wing groups frequently declared themselves to be acting 
peacefully, and did not usually call directly for the incitement of further pogroms 
and violence. However, the published works of the central councils of groups such 
as the URP, Society of Russian Patriots and the Russian Society of Steamship 
Workers, as well as the editorials of papers such as Za tsaria i rodinu and Russkoe 
znamia, often appeared to have little connection to the activities of activists at 
ground level.44 As supporters of such groups were not averse to using violence to 
achieve a ‘united and indivisible’ Russia, the imperial regime closely monitored 
their actions, which casts doubt on the notion that right-wing groups were organized 
at the behest of the Tsarist state. However, toleration of these groups by the regime 
was always a risky premise, as the activity of the right in Odessa could cause 
significant disruption to patterns of everyday life in the city; most notably, trading 
through the busy port area was threatened by crowds of armed rightist activists.45 
Consequently, the role of violence in the Odessa movement arises as a central issue. 
This distinguished militants in Odessa, with their demagogic and vehement message, 
from other pro-authority groups, which in turn shaped the responses of other social 
and political groups towards the URM and URP in Odessa. 
 
 Throughout 1906, small groups of URP activists continued to commit 
intermittent violent acts, proclaiming armed combat as the solution to restore Russia. 
Activists claimed this was directed against Jews and students, the enemies most 
commonly presented as revolutionary oppressors.46 Konovnitsyn and his followers 
made it clear that they conceived of the Odessa URP primarily as a series of combat 
organizations (boevye druzhiny) designed to wage war against the enemies of 
Russia. An ongoing dynamic of counter-revolutionary violence was the result.47 As 
                                                
44 URP banner, K russkomu pravoslavnomu narodu, vozzvanie, Odessa, 19 December 1905.  
45 The police response to right-wing violence in Odessa will be assessed in the following chapter.  
46 Reports of similar attacks can be found in various police circulars housed in GARF, F, 102.OO, op. 
316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A., t. 1, ll. 1, 1 ob., 2, 3-4, 15-15 ob., 20, 57, 60-60 ob., 61, 62 ob., 
72, 89-93, 103, 107-108 ob., 121-124 ob.   
47 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 274.  
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time elapsed, it became clear that the URP was taken more seriously as a threat in its 
own right. The Odessa city mayor, A. G. Grigor’ev, fully cognizant of the possible 
disruption that this, as his colleagues more euphemistically put it, ‘disorder’ could 
cause sent a telegram to Prime Minister Petr Stolypin in September 1906 recording 
his concerns that the URP in Odessa was disrupting the hard-won calm achieved in 
the region after the pogrom.48 His feeling was in the wake of the revolutionary crisis 
of 1905 the city had returned to its previous calm, but this was threatened by fresh 
outbreaks of right-wing violence.49 Another message from Grigor’ev to Stolypin 
displayed concerns that ‘the simple working people, the bulk of whom in the present 
time are unemployed, are roused by the religious message of Russkaia rech’, and its 
appeal to mob law’.50 
 
 Grigor’ev’s fear needs to be considered with the revolutionary disorders that 
occurred before, during and after 1905. Riots, strikes and demonstrations had 
sharpened the authorities’ suspicions towards independent political and social 
movements, and a powerful revolutionary force had made all of Odessa’s 
administrators especially wary. However, the demagogic message of rightist groups 
was unique, in that they claimed to be pro-autocracy, and on the side of both Tsar 
and people. But their use of violence and intransigent mood towards the present 
realities of Russia highlighted the distinctiveness of populist ultra-nationalism from 
official state conservatism. That the title of one of the URP’s 1906 publications was 
The Plot Against Russia gives some idea of the mood held amongst the highest 
echelons of this group. The URP, Russian Society of Steamship Workers, Russian 
Brotherhood and other smaller groups in Odessa responded to leftist ‘disorders’ by 
targeting Jews and students in violent reprisals. URP activists, headed by 
Konovnitsyn, denounced the October Manifesto, and similar groups loudly 
proclaimed the necessity to take action against any ‘foreigners’ weakening the 
                                                
48 It should be noted that city mayor of Odessa and the governor of Novorossiia region, which 
incorporated Odessa, were two distinct offices, though often held by the same person. Grigor’ev 
served as city mayor until August 1907, when he was replaced by V. D. Novitskii. 
49 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, ll. 1, 1 ob., 2, 3-4: A. Grigor’ev to P. 
Stolypin, 4 and 7 September 1906.  
50 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, t. 1, l. 1 ob.: A. Grigor’ev to P. Stolypin, 
4 September 1906. 
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Russian state. However in criticizing the manifesto so vehemently the URP was 
showing a growing schism between establishment forces, whose political wrangling 
had resulted in the document, and the autonomous right.  
 
One of the centres of right-wing violence in Odessa was the university 
campus, where pro-URP youth groups were allied with activists from the central 
organization. At Odessa University, URP bands brandished weapons and intimidated 
many of the students on the campus. Though it should be noted that not all of these 
acts ended in violence, there was widespread disruption at the university, as lectures 
were stopped by groups of URP activists, and many fled from the campus in terror at 
the right’s activities.51 It is crucial to note that through the spontaneous nature of this 
activity, URP activists were envisaging more than sporadic armed conflicts. They 
desired a total war against modern Russian society in its entirety, rejecting what 
were perceived, either in reality or in the imagination, as parliamentary institutions, 
modern political conceptions, Western-based ideologies and other chimerical ideas 
that were seen as having no place in the soil of the rodina. The intransigence of 
these conceptions illustrates a rejection of the political realities as delivered by the 
autocracy, as well as the more obvious enemies of Jews and students.52 
 
 The perception of a Russia in crisis and violent responses to it formed a 
powerful statement of intent; but the use of violence attracted controversy within the 
right-wing movements. The Odessa branch of the Russian Assembly, under the 
leadership of Iosef Passat, created what it described as ‘patriotic workers’ circles’ 
from 29 May 1905, pre-dating the October pogrom and the formation of the URP.53 
                                                
51 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, t. 1, ll. 103, 126, 126 ob., 127, 128: this 
series of police reports chronicles one outbreak of violence on the Odessa campus in November 1906, 
headed by Konovnitsyn, accompanied by an audience of pro-rightist demonstrators. Though we can 
say for sure that the URP possessed considerable power to disrupt the life of the university and direct 
police efforts toward increased surveillance of their own activities, and had a level of attraction for 
students that sympathized with their actions, the human cost of this particular outbreak of violence is 
unclear, at least from this set of reports.  
52 The press had as much to say on such matters as the above police reports. See the following in 
ibid., l. 5: Tovarishch, 2 September 1906; l. 10: Russkie vedomosti, 12 September 1906; l. 24: Russkie 
vedomosti, 16 September 1906; and Russkie vedomosti, 19 September 1906. 
53 Mirnyi trud, 7 (1905), p. 191, ‘Odesskii otdel Russkogo Sobraniia’ 
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The Assembly had created groups in response to revolution, primarily with the aim 
of opposing ‘radicalism’, in practice meaning ‘social democratic’ parties and Jewish 
self-defence movements. It associated these groups with other enemies, often 
described as cosmopolitans, national minority groups and masons in the editorials of 
its journal, Mirnyi trud. Though they shared the URP’s view towards Russia’s 
‘enemies’, Passat and the Assembly rejected the use of violence, noting a 
contradiction between this and a desire to be seen as for ‘law and order’. He claimed 
of the pogroms, ‘we well understand…that all [these] disorders, which were not in 
our character, cause grief to his imperial highness, and benefit the enemies of the 
motherland and the Russian people’. According to Passat, other rightists could not 
have been involved in earlier pogroms for such reasons. On the subject of the 
Kishinev pogrom, he declared the newspaper Bessarabskaia zhizn’ (Bessarabia Life) 
was the source of many of these claims, a ‘Jewish paper’ labelling the right-wing 
groups as ‘black hundreds’ and ‘patriotic hooligans’. This was a smear campaign 
from Russia’s enemies to discredit the right and bring about the total ruin of Russia. 
Passat declared that the true aims of the Assembly in Odessa were the dissemination 
of ‘patriotic literature’ and holding educational evenings, often with a musical 
theme. The Russian Assembly leader thereby dismissed claims that the group’s 
members were involved in any pogroms.54 
 
The controversy over violence within the monarchist factions illustrated that 
there was no consensus on the use of it, and the extent to which right-wing activists 
could pursue radical measures. Notably, though pogroms in Odessa and Kiev were 
discussed in sections of the monarchist press, this was in a vague and even 
euphemistic fashion. Moskovskie vedomosti ran numerous articles covering the 
pogroms from June 1905, and placed the blame for these events, unsurprisingly, on 
Jewish radicalism and revolutionary politics.55 These articles described the events in 
Odessa not as ‘pogroms’ but as ‘disorders’ (bezporiadki) and suggested left-wing 
students and workers were the primary instigators behind them, as they joyously 
                                                
54 Ibid., p. 191.  
55 Moskovskie vedomosti, 15 July 1905, 191, pp. 2-3.  
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reacted to the October Manifesto, and then partook in orgies of revolutionary 
violence and destruction.56 In this sense, the primary agency for the violence of these 
events was placed on revolutionary culture, and ‘blame’ shifted towards those from 
the left who sought to do harm to the rodina by continuing their existing culture of 
violence. The RMP wished to distance itself from violence in its public 
pronouncements,57 and even the URP’s Russkoe znamia, like Moskovskie vedomosti, 
declared that it was Jewish and socialist radicals instigating violence.58  
 
Some later rightist groups would shift their tactics towards non-violent 
activities. One was the UAM under the leadership of V. M. Purishkevich, which 
generally followed political practices, such as attempting to elect deputies to the 
State Duma, rather than enticing violent disturbances.59 Purishkevich saw that the 
violence of Dubrovin’s URP limited its potential as a mass movement. Instead there 
should be a degree of compromise with the political settlement of October 1905 – 
which all right-wingers including Purishkevich still fundamentally opposed – and 
that rightists should therefore at least attempt to work with the Duma system. 
However this did not mean that the UAM only pursued peaceful measures; 
correspondence in 1908 between the department of police and city mayor I. N. 
Tolmachev shown that the combat organizations, boevye druzhiny, associated with 
the URP were something that the UAM also used.60 The later split in the right was 
the result of factionalism, corruption and also such tactical disagreements. 
 
The Russian-Jewish paper Voskhod (Dawn) reported on crowds of right-
wingers laying the blame for the revolutionary situation at the feet of Odessa’s 
Jewish population.61 One of the Jewish responses to pogroms and right-wing 
                                                
56 Moskovskie vedomosti, 22 October 1905, 280, p. 2; 25 October 1905, 283, p. 1. Long before this 
stage the term ‘pogrom’ had been used to describe an anti-Jewish riot, including in the foreign press. 
See an extensive report on the Kishinev pogrom in The Times, 7 December 1903, 37257, p. 10. 
57 Moskovskie vedomosti, 25 October 1905, 283, p. 1.  
58 Russkoe znamia, 19 February 1907, p. 1. 
59 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 238.  
60 Ibid., pp. 239-240.  
61 Voskhod’, 13 May 1906, 19, pp. 21-26. The theme of Jewish self-defence has attracted much 
interest in the historiography. See the work of G. Surh, ‘Jewish Self-Defense, Revolution, and 
Pogrom Violence in 1905’, in F. Fischer von Weikersthal et al. (eds.), The Russian Revolution of 
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violence, though not without controversy for many of Odessa’s Jews, was for them 
to take up arms against right-wing activists. The revolutionary left was well 
organized in Odessa, and in particular, the Bund took a stand on this issue, claiming 
that the Jewish community could no longer stand back and become the passive 
victims of right-wing brutality. In the wake of pogroms in Belostok and Kishinev, 
the Bund issued this call to arms in May 1905: 
 
…it must become a general rule that each worker who considers himself part 
of the struggle should carry a revolver in his pocket…and as tens of 
thousands of workers will go into the streets and each feel he is prepared for 
the struggle then the uprising will take on a different appearance. Arm 
yourselves. Learn how to handle a weapon.62  
 
In wake of this, Jewish self-defence forces (evreiskie samooborony) mobilized in 
towns and villages across the Pale of Settlement, the scene of the most brutal 
pogroms in Russian history. This call to arms was directed against both the Tsarist 
government and the right-wing movements. Throughout 1906-1907, there was a 
series of clashes in Odessa, as crowds of right-wing activists were countered with 
armed revolutionary movements. In particular, rightists were often outnumbered and 
outgunned by well-organized Jewish self-defence forces.63    
 
 The right encountered opposition and dissatisfaction with its activities from 
the civil and cultural establishment in Odessa. Though the Russian Orthodox Church 
                                                                                                                                    
1905 in Transcultural Perspective: Identities, Peripheries, and the Flow of Ideas (Bloomington, IN, 
2013), pp. 55-74; ‘Russia’s 1905 Era Pogroms Reexamined’, Canadian-American Slavic Studies, 44 
(2010), pp. 253-295; ‘Ekaterinoslav City in 1905: Workers, Jews, and Violence’, International Labor 
and Working-Class History, 64 (2003), pp. 139-166; and S. Lambroza, ‘Jewish Self-Defense during 
the Russian Pogroms of 1903-06’, Jewish Journal of Sociology, 23 (1981), pp. 123-34; ‘Jewish 
Responses to Pogroms in Late Imperial Russia’, in J. Reinharz (ed.), Living with Antisemitism: 
Modern Jewish Responses (London, 1987), pp. 253-274; S. Weise, ‘Jewish Self-Defense and Black 
Hundreds in Zhitomir. A Case Study on the Pogroms of 1905 in Tsarist Russia’, Quest. Issues in 
Contemporary Jewish History. Journal of Fondazione CDEC, 3 (2012), <www.quest-
cdecjournal.it/focus.php?id=304> (accessed 15/5/2014); I. Shtakser, ‘Self-Defence as an Emotional 
Experience: The Anti-Jewish Pogroms of 1905-07 and Working-Class Jewish Militants’, 
Revolutionary Russia, 22, 2 (2009), pp. 153-179.  
62 Der Bund 2, 7 (May 1905), pp. 3-4, cited in Lambroza, ‘Jewish Responses to Pogroms’, p. 272.  
63 One clash in Odessa is referred to in newspaper reports and police circulars in GARF, F. 102.OO, 
op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, t. 3, ll. 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 30. Jewish self-defence particularly 
troubled the authorities. I shall return to this theme in the following chapter.  
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has been seen as a buttress of nationalism and autocratic support, it is important to 
note how elements of the Orthodox Church in Odessa as elsewhere rejected URP 
violence. Many of these relations between the Church and the URP show ambiguity; 
though the Church officially endorsed the URP in 1908, this was on the condition 
that the organization conformed to the rules of the Church. When it did not do this, 
and activists did not uphold preferred values on occasion, the URP met with 
criticism.64 One example was a communiqué sent from the head of the Church 
(Over-Procurator of the Holy Synod), Petr Izvolskii, to the police in Odessa: 
 
The Archbishop of Kherson, in a letter dated from 25 April this year [1908] 
reported on the extremely unpleasant actions of members of the ‘Union of 
Russian People’…who accompanied pilgrims from the city of Odessa to the 
village of Kasperovko Kasperovskii to the miraculous icon of the Holy 
Mother (this has been repeated annually for over 50 years), the behaviour of 
the union’s orchestra and choir, singing Easter hymns along with a variety 
of other church chants and verses from operettas, very much appalled the 
majority of the pilgrims and offended their good feelings.65  
 
This is not to claim that the URP was universally opposed within the hierarchy of 
the Orthodox Church, more to suggest that members’ attitudes towards the right, 
including those of its most significant figure, were contested and inconsistent, with 
the URP and its followers dividing many within the episcopate.66 Though the URP 
drew a substantial segment of its support from figures within the Church, the group 
also engendered controversy. Several Church leaders, including Izvolskii, preferred 
to turn their attentions to pro-Tsarist peasants and pilgrims, more meek observers of 
                                                
64 See J. Curtiss, Church and State in Russia, 1900-1917 (New York, 1965), pp. 271-272. An 
insightful analysis of the subversive nature of the Church is G. Freeze, ‘Subversive Piety: Religion 
and the Political Crisis in Late Imperial Russia’, Journal of Modern History, 68, 2 (1996), pp. 308-
350. 
65 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, t. 3, l. 128: vedomostvo pravoslavnogo 
ispovedaniia. Kantseliariia ober-prokurora Sviateishogo sinoda. Otdelenie 2. Stol’ 3. S. Peterburg. 
Ober prokuror Sviateishogo sinoda: Petr Petrovich Izvolskii-MVD, 22 May 1908.  
66 Analyses of the right’s relationship with the Church are M. Agursky, ‘Caught in the Cross-Fire: 
The Russian Church between Holy Sinod and Radical Right (1905-1908)’, Orientalia Christiana 
Periodica, 59, 1 (1984), pp. 163-196; A. K. Pisiotis, ‘The Orthodox Clergy and the Radical Right at 
the Beginning of the Twentieth Century: Ideological Mentor or Strange Bedfellow?’ in A. Iu. 
Minakov (ed.), Konservatizm v Rossii i mire, nastoiashchee i proshloe: sbornik nauchnykh trudov, 
Vol. 2 (Voronezh, 2005) <http://podelise.ru/docs/index-26683442.html> (accessed 15/5/2014). 
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traditional institutions, rather than the activities of a vehement, organized right.67 
Violence could be at the core of this rejection, and for others, betrayal of the people 
whom the groups ostensibly supported. A priest from Klepachev in Poltava (another 
area where the far right had built regional support) on 12 January 1907 condemned 
the URP as a tool of the landowners and gentry, which would not provide the much-
needed peace for the majority of the narod during the revolutionary era.68  
 
Odessa was an exceptional area for right-wing activity due to several 
contextual factors: its substantial Jewish population, patterns of seasonal 
employment, the presence of revolutionary and militant forces, both Jewish and 
gentile and the leadership of Konovnitsyn. These all provided forces for the radical 
right to react against. The rightist appeal in Odessa was united to existing tensions 
and concerns amongst many Odessans, and from 1905 onwards, the right was 
disproportionately active in the area due to a combination of all of the above factors.   
 
Kiev: Right-Wing Interests and Criticism of the Status Quo 
 
Kiev was another area to the southwest of the empire where right-wingers were 
exceptionally active. As in Odessa, several contextual factors underscored the rise of 
the right in Kiev. Significantly, the city was home to a large Jewish population. 
According to the 1897 census, 49,813 of the 450,904 residents of the city were 
Jewish, around 11 per cent.69 Not only this, but the Jewish community was 
disproportionately involved in the civic and economic life of the city; 44 per cent of 
all merchants in the city, and over one-third of all of its craftsmen, were Jewish.70 So 
active was the city’s Jewish population that one scholar has commented how ‘Jews 
influenced – indeed shaped – this city to a remarkable extent’.71 However, at the 
outset of the twentieth century there was the rise of fresh anti-Jewish animus, most 
notable in the 1905 pogrom, which followed the promulgation of the October 
                                                
67 Wortman, Scenarios of Power, Vol. 2, p. 460.  
68 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 390.  
69 Evreiskaia entsiklopediia, Vol. 9, p. 526.  
70 Ibid., p. 528.  
71 N. M. Meir, Kiev: Jewish Metropolis. A History, 1859-1914 (Bloomington, IN, 2010), p. 9. 
   
 113 
Manifesto, occurring from 18-20 October. This anti-Jewish riot had shown the 
fragility of peace in the city.72 It was also a sign of anti-Semitic moods; Kiev had 
long been a citadel for nationalist feeling, decades before any rightist groups had 
even formed. The newspaper Kievlianin (Kievan), in circulation since 1864, outlined 
a strongly conservative and nationalist agenda, carrying many anti-Semitic ideas.73 
As in Odessa, long-standing religious and ethnic tensions were a backdrop for the 
right-wing groups that were emerging during 1905. Additionally the Kiev city 
council had reacted slowly and hesitantly to the pogroms in October, and the 
governor-general of Kiev, Nikolai Kleigels, was removed from his post on the night 
before the pogroms started for his decision to transfer the power for dealing with 
them directly from the police to the army, which was declared illegal.74 
 
 Such factors made Kiev a potential stronghold for right-wing activity. One 
particular aspect of this activity that needs stressing is that rightists in Kiev did not 
operate independently from each other, but met to discuss their plans on a cross-
party basis shortly after their formation. Assembly figures, such as Boris M. 
Iuzefovich, met with URP leaders, including Dubrovin, and also more ‘moderate’ 
nationalists, such as the commentator and later member of the Nationalist Party, A. 
I. Savenko, to discuss their plans and ideas.75 The United Rightist Parties of Kiev, 
the coalition formed between several right-wing groups that campaigned for election 
to the Duma in 1906, proved to be a powerful and politically successful force for 
right-wing interests in the region. In elections for the Second Duma, the rightist 
coalition secured 51 per cent of the vote in Kiev, against only 48 per cent for the 
Kadets, ranking as the strongest electoral performance of rightists anywhere in the 
                                                
72 On the 1905 pogrom, see V. Khiterer, ‘The October 1905 Pogrom in Kiev’, East European Jewish 
Affairs, 22, 2 (1992), pp. 21-37; M. Hamm, Kiev: A Portrait, 1800-1917 (Princeton, 1993), pp. 189-
207; Meir, Kiev, pp. 122-130; Evreiskaia entsiklopediia, Vol. 9, pp. 524-525; Suhr, ‘The Role of 
Civil and Military Commanders’, pp. 39-55. One of the fullest contemporary accounts is that of 
Senator Turau, ‘Vsepoddaneishii otchet o proizvedennom senatorom Turau izsledovanii prichin 
bezporiadkov, byvshikh v gor. Kieve’, in Materialy k istorii russkoi kontr-revoliutsii, pp. 224-230; 
see also Kievskii i Odesskii pogromy, pp. 47-48.  
73 J. D. Klier, ‘Kievlianin and the Jews: A Decade of Disillusionment, 1864-1874’, Harvard 
Ukrainian Studies, 5, 1 (1981), pp. 83-101.  
74 Materialy k istorii russkoi kontr-revoliutsii, p. 263.  
75 Kievlianin, 15 January 1907, 15, p. 3. 
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Russian Empire.76 The United Congresses of the Union of Russian Men from 1905-
1907 held their meetings in Kiev. Dubrovin, Gringmut, Viazigin, Purishkevich, 
Pavel Bulatsel and hundreds of other delegates from a score of different right-wing 
groups converged on the city to discuss their plans and compile manifestos for 
elections for the First Duma, outlining a vision of how Russia was to be ruled.77   
 
Criticisms of the contemporary situation in Russia were also emerging in 
Kiev. Vladimir Gringmut, in a speech to the United Council of Monarchist groups 
on 2 October 1906, agreed to carry out the ‘indivisible will of the Tsar’, but rejected 
the entire ethos of constitutionalism. Many delegates agreed with his stance; others 
oscillated between an uneasy toleration of the system, and outright rejection of it. 
Relatively few embraced the possibilities this could provide for the right, such as, 
most obviously, the election of delegates to the Duma who shared their own 
convictions (one important exception was Vladimir Purishkevich). All betrayed a 
feeling of deep dissatisfaction with the fact that this series of developments had even 
come about.78 One URP delegate, D. V. Tushkevich, described the possible 
incompetence of the Duma as due to Russia’s liberals, ‘they come to Witte, and to 
see again when they can start troubles and disorders’.79 The meetings of the right-
wing coalitions in Kiev demonstrated the distinction between support for the 
establishment, which created the new political culture after 1905, and the 
pronounced rejection of such ideas by the autonomous right.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                
76 Meir, Kiev, pp. 204-208; Rawson, Russian Rightists, pp. 98-103.  
77 The full list of 166 delegates from the 1906 meeting is re-printed in Tretii vserorossiiskii s”ezd 
russkikh liudei v Kieve (Kiev, 1906), pp. 219-230.  
78 ‘Protokoly delovykh zasedanii s”ezda’, in Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol. 1, p. 210.  
79 Ibid., p. 211.   
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The right in Kiev was very diverse. More militant associations included the 
White Guard, a group that patrolled the streets near Kiev University during the end 
of 1906 looking for students to antagonize.80 Other rightists in Kiev attempted to 
create a civic culture; this was part of the general rightward shift in civil society 
during 1905.81 Activities included holding patriotic meetings, religious assemblies, 
musical evenings, and conducting charity works, all to help create an alternate public 
                                                
80 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 378.  
81 As recounted in H. Balzer, ‘The Problem of Professions in Imperial Russia’, in E. W. Clowes, S. D. 
Kassow and J. L. West (eds.), Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public 
Identity in Late Imperial Russia (Princeton, 1991), pp. 184-198. 
 
Figure 5 Southwest region in the Russian Empire circa 1900, N. Meir, Kiev: Jewish 
Metropolis: A History, 1859-1914 (Bloomington, IN, 2012). 
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space for the dissemination of patriotic and religious ideas.82 Groups such as the 
Russian Assembly and the All-Russian Union of Russian Workers took an active 
part in such projects. Yet even in these civic groups, there were pronounced 
exclusionary practices. The Kiev Russian Sports Society provided a forum for 
rightists with an interest in sport, but was established for ‘Orthodox Russians’ and 
closed to all others.83 Like the URP and URM on a national level, rightists in Kiev 
were interested in workers’ rights, one of which was to make demands for the eight-
hour day. But in comparison with the forces of the revolutionary left and liberals in 
Kiev, particularly the Kiev branch of the Kadet Party, active from 1906, these ideas 
were weakly developed. They involved mostly negative visions: opposition to 
developments such as the freedom of conscience edict; the October Manifesto; the 
17 April 1905 laws of religious toleration; promises of increased rights for minority 
groups; and the general strike from October 1905.84 Given the widespread 
dissatisfaction with these developments, the same rightists portrayed this era as the 
new ‘time of troubles’ (smutnoe vremia).85  
 
Another strength of the right in Kiev was its ability to attract different social 
groups. Contemporaries sympathetic to right-wing interests later recounted this 
potential. One was I. G. Shcheglovitov, the Minister of Justice from 1906-1915, who 
on his interrogation by the Provisional Government in 1917 described the 
proliferation of monarchist parties in Kiev after 1905 as resting on crude populism, 
which attracted peasants, townsfolk, disaffected members of the working class and 
small landowners.86 The militant character of certain Kiev rightists played a role in 
this attraction. The strongly anti-Semitic, anti-revolutionary message of the rightist 
coalition during 1905-1907 was more effective at exploiting tensions in a city with a 
large Jewish population and a mixed ethnic base, with a strong history of worker-
radicalism. Messages of the rightist hatred of the ‘bourgeoisie’, and promulgation of 
                                                
82 Omel’ianchuk, Chernosotennoe dvizhenie, pp. 622-642. 
83 Meir, Kiev, pp. 205-206. 
84 B. M. Iuzefovich, Politicheskie pis’ma: Materialy dlia istorii russkogo politicheskogo 
umopomracheniia na rubezhe dvukh stoletii (1898-1908 gg.), Vol. 12 (Kiev, 1908), p. 228.   
85 Ibid., p. 228. Like the first ‘troubles’, this appellation had anti-Polish allusions.  
86 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 381; this was revealed on his 
interrogation by the Provisional Government in June 1917. 
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an anti-intellectual message, attempted to incite feelings of exploitation in working-
class supporters, the so-called ‘true Russians’ who were suffering in the current 
revolutionary period. Shcheglovitov considered these held appeal for many who 
poorly understood the jarring effects of 1905, developments including the 
appearance of a parliament, civic society and equal rights. The resulting attempts to 
recruit Kievans to the monarchist cause, or even to join a druzhina, had more 
attraction as a result.87  
 
Other rightists took criticism of the status quo further in their development of 
a populist appeal. On the pogroms, Iuzefovich, a prominent member of the United 
Rightist Parties of Kiev,88 expressed the following sentiments in Moskovskie 
vedomosti during November 1905:  
 
We all recognize that this popular protest, apparent from the pogroms of 
Jews and intellectuals, appears very ugly, but, in this case, it was not caused 
by the evil will of the Russian peasant, who is normally unusually mild and 
tolerant, but of all these savage insults, of all that is dear and holy to him, 
vile shootings on the streets, and our criminally inactive government, its 
cowardice before revolutionaries and intellectuals, and false views on 
humanity and Christian forgiveness.89 
 
Some features here are unsurprising; like many other right-wingers, Iuzefovich 
claimed the causes for the pogroms lay not with ‘truly Russian’ people but with 
revolutionaries and Jews.90 Given Iuzefovich’s anti-Semitism, his gross 
underplaying of Jewish suffering is no surprise, and the idea that pogroms were 
‘popular protest’ bears little basis in reality.91 But as the ‘spirituality’ of the masses 
                                                
87 Ibid., pp. 380-387.  
88 Iuzefovich held important roles in several right-wing groups, including: chair of the Kiev branch of 
the Russian Assembly; member of the Kiev URP after 1905; and leader of the Party of Legal Order 
(pravovogo poriadka), which published a newspaper Zakon i poriadok (Law and Order) from 1906-
1908. A biographical sketch can be found in CSIE, pp. 628-631.  
89 Moskovskie vedomosti, 28 November 1905, 314, p. 2.  
90 See also editorials on the Kiev ‘disorders’ in Moskovskie vedomosti, 16 November 1905, 302, p. 2; 
26 November 1905, 312, p. 2; 28 November 1905, 314, p. 2.  
91 For an idea of his anti-Semitism, which was cultural and religious rather than racially-based, in one 
essay Iuzefovich described Jews not as ‘true subjects of the Tsar’, but as subversives, representing 
‘falsifying political doctrines’ ‘equal political rights’ and ‘violence against Russia’; Politicheskie 
pis’ma, Vol. 12 (Kiev, 1908), p. 210. But the Kiev pogrom was not the popular uprising that he 
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was the key for the restoration of Russia, they could not be indicted.92 Instead, 
Iuzefovich described the ‘poorest classes’ as the ones suffering in these days of 
terror, who were the victims of a conspiracy from powerful Jewish and foreign 
forces operating within Russia.93  
 
 This critique of Russia’s government divided a potential base of support 
from the regime.94 Iuzefovich particularly blamed bureaucrats and ‘liberal’ 
politicians such as Sergei Witte, whom he held culpable for the revolutionary crises 
unfolding in Russia. In terms of right-wing political ideas, there was little new 
material here; more significant was the implication that the events of 1905 were the 
result of a clash of values between state and society that had been occurring since 
the October Manifesto. In particular, Iuzefovich blamed the Church, with the 
leadership of the Holy Synod allowing an increasing schism to occur between 
Church and state after 1905. The Holy Synod had ignored the powerful and virtuous 
ideals of Russian Orthodoxy in favour of focusing on pogroms.95 Iuzefovich thought 
much valuable time had been wasted on what he saw as such minor problems; the 
main objective was to train priests to fight the revolution and revolutionaries. The 
Church was abdicating its responsibilities in such matters, and wayward priests and 
bishops provided weak leadership for the masses, allowing the bacilli of revolution 
to further spread through Russian society:  
 
The Holy Synod, in its declarations from 20 December 1905, said that, 
“There were cases where the parish priests, in interviews with parishioners, 
without understanding, or even completely knowingly gave a false 
interpretation of the orders and actions of the government, stirring people to 
disobedience to the legitimate authorities”. Therefore, the pastors’ 
instructions affected the spirit of peace, love and obedience of the flock.96  
 
                                                                                                                                    
described. In Kiev: A Portrait, Hamm notes that the participants (pogromshchiki) did not form 
enormous crowds, but were isolated groups of provocateurs and opportunists. Relatively few Kievans 
actively participated in the October pogrom: p. 195.   
92 Iuzefovich, Politicheskie pis’ma, Vol. 16, p. 340.  
93 Ibid., Vol. 10, p. 156.  
94 Ibid., Vol. 9, pp. 330-332.  
95 Ibid., p. 341; Curtiss, Church and State, pp. 236-283.  
96 Iuzefovich, Politicheskie pis’ma, Vol. 16, p. 341.    
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It is important to note that this was no private utterance, but part of an address 
delivered on 24 April 1907 to the United Assembly of Councils and Committees of 
the Kiev Monarchist Parties and Unions. The public-private divide was less 
pronounced here, as in private too, Iuzefovich’s populist views entailed nothing less 
than the transformation of the nation. This was a prerequisite to arrest contemporary 
decline, which took on both spiritual and physical manifestations. The inspiration for 
action, curiously enough, came from the West.97 Iuzefovich specifically engaged 
with ideas of physical decline, declaring that for Russia’s youth, ‘a healthy spirit is 
paralleled by a healthy body’. Previous decades of educational failings had resulted 
in the physical degeneration of Russian youth, caused by the corrupting effects of 
political revolution. Iuzefovich described how there was an epidemic of nervous 
illnesses amongst Russia’s students, particularly, anaemia.98 As a corrective, 
Iuzefovich wanted the Russian educational system to adopt techniques of the 
English public schools, and universities such as Oxford and Cambridge, and increase 
the amount of physical education taught in schools. In the moral sphere, Iuzefovich 
demanded focusing teaching on the greatness of the Russian literary canon; it was no 
coincidence that he was the leader of the culturally focused Russian Assembly in 
Kiev.99 The final criticism was aimed at the establishment, as since Alexander II’s 
government had passed the University Statute of 1863, the Ministry of Education 
had assumed virtually complete control over Russian education, taking control of 
scholarships, disbursements, appointments and course content. This left little room 
for autonomy; the resulting failings could only be the fault of the state’s educators.  
 
                                                
97 Ibid., Vol. 8, p. 106. 
98 Ibid., pp. 106-107 (the letter cited is from 14 May 1899). The fin-de-siècle era in Europe and 
America, as well as Russia, was a ‘nervous age’. Not only rightists, many different groups in late 
imperial Russia were very concerned that modern life, particularly the strains and stresses of 
industrialization, was having a detrimental effect on the psychological health of many people. See for 
further analysis S. K. Morrissey, ‘The Economy of Nerves: Health, Commericial Culture and the Self 
in Late Imperial Russia’, Slavic Review, 69, 3 (2010), pp. 645-675. This was a pan-European 
phenomenon, with educated classes in Germany and France also fearful of nervous illness. An 
overview of nervousness in Europe can be found in R. Porter, ‘Nervousness, Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Century Style: From Luxury to Labour’, in M. Gijswijt-Hofstra and R. Porter (eds.), 
Cultures of Neurasthenia: From Beard to the First World War (Amsterdam, 2001), pp. 31-49. 
99 Iuzefovich, Politicheskie pis’ma, Vol. 8, pp. 106-107 
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 These problems were deep seated in other ways. Since the onset of 
revolutionary terror, exemplified by the shooting at Tsar Alexander II by Dmitrii 
Karakozov in 1866, Russian society had gradually been disintegrating.100 Iuzefovich 
reflected pessimistically on such developments. Yet in public, Iuzefovich distanced 
himself from acts of violence and terror, including the notorious pogroms. He 
described violence as a leftist phenomenon. In an address to the Kiev branch of the 
Russian Assembly on 29 October 1907, he described how Russia’s youth had 
suffered at the hands of revolutionaries, these ‘fanatics’ and ‘instruments of 
terror’.101 He pointed to the revolution of 1905, the ‘sorrowful events of the last few 
years’, as the primary event clouding the self-awareness of the Russian people 
(samosoznaniia).102 Iuzefovich added that the over-representation of Jews in the 
press, and in the legal institutions of Russia, was a result of the 1864 legal reforms, 
with Russia’s liberal leaders willing participants in this progressive decline.103  
 
The ultimate implication of these multi-faceted criticisms of modern Russia 
was that the enemies of the Russian state were considered to be not just autonomous 
leftists, terrorists and minority nationalities, but also dark forces operating within the 
state itself. Iuzefovich’s rejection of the Duma settlement was also a rejection of the 
Tsarist status quo. Iuzefovich displayed how in creating such a populist appeal, 
elements on the right were positioning themselves away from the state, and even 
beginning to grow increasingly critical of it. The defenders of the autocracy were 
increasingly looking less like supporters, and more like a source of opposition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
100 Ibid., Vol. 12, p. 232.  
101 Ibid., Vol.  17, p. 364.  
102 Ibid., p. 365.  
103 Ibid., Vol. 12, pp. 208-209; Vol. 17, p. 367. 
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Astrakhan’: The People’s Monarchists and Right-Wing Populism 
 
Another region where the right 
established a presence during 1905 was 
Astrakhan’. Far to the east of either 
Odessa or Kiev, it was located on the 
two banks of the Volga River, 
northwest of the Caspian Sea. Though 
in a different part of the Russian 
Empire, similar factors underscored the 
rise of the right here. One of these was a 
significant non-Russian population; the 
city was home to Jewish and Armenian 
communities that played a lively role in 
the civic life of the city.104 Furthermore, 
the revolutionary left was active in the 
city during 1905. One group was the 
RSDWP, active until 1906; and a 
related revolutionary worker’s 
movement had arisen during the 
revolution of 1905.105 The differences, as well as the similarities, with the above 
cases are worth noting. Firstly, though there was a prominent Jewish community in 
Astrakhan’, it was not as large as that in Odessa or Kiev. According to the 1897 
imperial census, 2,164 of 113,000 residents were Jewish, or less than 2 per cent, 
though the proportion of Jews involved in the mercantile industries was much 
higher.106 Furthermore, the entire Astrakhan’ province had been removed from the 
Pale of Settlement in 1816, as part of the increasingly ad hoc legislation on the 
                                                
104 Evreiskaia entsiklopediia, Vol. 3, pp. 405-406. 
105 Several proclamations from the Astrakhan’ branch of the RSDWP can be found in A. L. Sidorov 
et al. (eds.), Vtoroi period revoliutsii: 1906-1907 gg., Pt. 1, Bk. 1 (Moscow, 1957), pp. 647-654.  
106 Evreiskaia entsiklopediia, Vol. 3, pp. 405-406. 
 
Figure 6 Astrakhan in 1914, ‘The 1900 
collection: Maps and Plans of Yesteryear’, 
<http://www.discusmedia.com/album.php?albu
m=40&id=24430> (accessed 2/6/2014). 
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Jewish question in the nineteenth century.107 Therefore, the different political and 
social structure in Astrakhan’ would necessarily affect the popular reception of the 
discourse of the extreme right, which followed similar ideological contours to 
Odessa and Kiev.  
 
The most significant monarchist organization in the region was ‘the 
Astrakhan’ People’s Monarchist Party’ (APMP), the leader of which was Nestor 
Tikhanovich-Savitskii (1866-after 1917), the owner of Lira, a large music shop in 
Astrakhan’. He saw the potential for a popular monarchist movement, uniting 
millions of Orthodox believers across the Russian Empire, in support of his ideas. 
Like other rightists, his beliefs were constructed around the Uvarov triad. During 
1904-1905, following the disastrous war with Japan and the upsurge in revolutionary 
activity, Tikhanovich-Savitskii was emboldened to step onto the political scene, 
responding to what he called the ‘time of troubles’ (smutnoe vremia).108 
Tikhanovich-Savitskii and his supporters saw that the October Manifesto and other 
similar developments represented concessions to liberalism on behalf of the Tsarist 
state, which had gone too far in attempting to satisfy revolutionary feelings that did 
not represent the ‘true will’ of the people.109 His response was to form the APMP in 
the early months of 1907.110  Though this group encountered a degree of success in 
Astrakhan’ during 1907-1908, perhaps at one stage numbering around several 
thousand followers,111 the APMP was never as large in scale as the URP in 
Odessa.112 That the appearance of the organization was delayed until early 1907 – 
                                                
107 Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, 2nd series, Vol. 40, nos. 30,402 and 30,404 (18 June 
1825); J. D. Klier, Russia Gathers Her Jews: The Origins of the “Jewish Question” in Russia, 1772-
1825 (DeKalb, 1986), p. 168.  
108 Biographical information is in S. D. Stepanov, ‘Vozhd’ Astrakhan’skikh Monarkhistov. Nestor 
Nikolaevich Tikhanovich-Savitskii’, in Ivanov and Stepanov (eds.), Voinstvo Sviatogo Georgiia, pp. 
548-585; and CSIE, pp. 536-542.  
109 Ibid.  
110 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 311.  
111 Membership figures are difficult to state accurately, given conflicting sources and figures. A 
police report from January 1908 claimed the group had 1,300 members, but an issue of Vestnik 
Souiza russkogo naroda (more optimistically) gave a figure in excess of 4,000 from December 1905. 
Kir’ianov (ed.), Voprosy istorii, 8 (1997), p. 109.   
112 By the outbreak of the First World War, membership of the right had sharply declined. One police 
report claimed, perhaps improbably, that at the start of 1914 the Astrakhan’ monarchist groups 
   
 123 
months after the most intense period of the revolutionary crisis had passed – was one 
likely explanation for this.  
 
 The techniques used by the APMP were not especially novel by the standards 
of contemporary rightists. These included holding meetings attended by monks 
sympathetic to the right, such as the so-called ‘mad monk’, Iliodor, Archbishop 
Germogen, and authority figures who shared their autocratic and Orthodox 
convictions, such as the governor of Khar’kov. Attendees gave speeches where they 
spoke of the necessity to wage a ‘defence of the state’ against Russia’s enemies, 
mainly the Armenians and Jewish communities of Astrakhan’. The group’s 
newspaper Russkaia pravda (Russian Truth) was established in 1907, disseminating 
the messages of Tikhanovich-Savitskii and his associates, primarily designed to 
accentuate the threat posed by the non-Russian communities in the city. Another 
practice used by Tikhanovich-Savitskii was sending telegrams to notable figures, 
including Prime Minister Petr Stolypin, but most notably, Nicholas II, in a bid to 
establish favour with those that he deemed sympathetic to the monarchist cause 
within the imperial regime.113  
 
 As in Odessa and Kiev, the Astrakhan’ right took practical steps to cultivate 
a populist appeal. One editorial in Russkaia pravda from 28 October 1908 titled On 
the Workers’ Question (k rabochemu voprosu) claimed that the APMP was 
defending the interests of the ‘true subjects of the fatherland’ and had a degree of 
mass support. It denounced ideals of liberalism, cosmopolitanism, socialism and 
related doctrines as infections; these were alien developments coming out of Europe 
after the French Revolution.114 Telegrams from Tikhanovich-Savitskii to the Tsar 
made similar claims. They were sent directly to Nicholas to bypass bureaucrats and 
many of the ‘liberal’ ministers, whom Tikhanovich-Savitskii and like-minded right-
                                                                                                                                    
consisted of no more than 10 active members. GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. 
B, l. 80: doklad nachal’nika Astrakhan'skogo zhandarmskogo upravleniia, v DP 6 October 1915.  
113 Ibid., l. 85: N. Tikhanovich-Savitskii (Astrakhan’), to P. A. Stolypin (St. Petersburg), 2 May 1908.  
114 Ibid., l. 95: Russkaia pravda, 28 October 1908. 
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wing figures distrusted. He claimed that he was on the side of the Tsar in opposing 
the current epoch of revolution and constitutionalism.115 
 
 The similarities between the APMP in Astrakhan’ and the URP in Odessa are 
striking. Both harshly denounced the October Manifesto and claimed they were 
upholding ‘traditional’ values of Orthodox religion, Russian nationhood and 
autocracy. Both also criticized the authorities. Tikhanovich-Savitskii wrote to the 
governor of Astrakhan’, I. N. Sokolovskii, explaining that the APMP was based 
around a total defence of ‘Russian values’ (by which was meant the Uvarov triad), 
which the authorities had not done enough to safeguard.116 A telegram from 
Tikhanovich-Savitskii to Petr Stolypin from 31 March 1908 gives a good insight 
into the former’s plans to restore Russia, as well as his critique of the contemporary 
situation:  
 
In the present time of troubles those in the highest administrative positions 
in the provinces should appoint persons of sensitive and skilful direction, 
and certainly patriotic, not only in words, but in deeds. For in this province 
of Astrakhan’, like other provinces composed from a diverse population, of 
which Armenians and Jews chip away at other foreigners, the appointment 
of administrative officials possessing the above qualities to the highest 
positions of government is absolutely necessary.117  
 
However the APMP, far from having the sympathy of many local officials, gradually 
attracted the suspicions of law and order. F. P. Nikitin, one of the most prominent 
police officials in Astrakhan’, displayed a recurring suspicion of the aims and 
intentions of the APMP in his reports. Crucial to this was the perception that 
‘pogromist violence’ was a destabilizing force in the area.118 A police report from 21 
January 1907 specifically mentions the ‘militant character’ of the organization as 
increasing tensions in the area, and damaging the public peace. Furthermore, the 
                                                
115 Ibid., l. 97: N. Tikhanovich-Savitskii (Astrakhan’), to Nicholas II (St. Petersburg), 29 October 
1908.  
116 Ibid., l. 29: N. Tikhanovich-Savitskii (Astrakhan’), to I. N. Sosnovskii (date unknown).  
117 Ibid., ll. 57-58: N. Tikhanovich-Savitskii (Astrakhan’), to P. A. Stolypin (St. Petersburg), 31 
March 1908.  
118 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 303.  
   
 125 
report suggested that members of the group were engaged in suspected ‘criminal 
activity’ (although it is unclear what exactly was meant by this).119 Another circular 
from 7 February 1907 reported on the social composition of the group. It was 
composed, not from elites or the intelligentsia, but instead ‘only from small shop 
owners, and townsfolk’ which waged a series of ‘pogroms against the intelligentsia, 
Armenians and Jews’. Of Tikhanovich-Savitskii himself, he was said to be ‘a man of 
nervous illness, almost completely crazy’. Yet judging from the report, his 
incitement of violence against Armenians and Jews in Astrakhan’ was affecting 
certain sections of the population. The mood in Astrakhan’ was taking a darker turn 
due to the speeches of right-wing orators, and the report noted that one of the earliest 
actions of the APMP was the formation of a druzhina in the region. Though the 
police may have found the group unpalatable, it was, at least initially, managing to 
attract supporters to its cause of armed action against revolutionaries.120 
  
 Like the URP in Odessa, the APMP displayed intransigence in both its views 
and actions that meant it attracted suspicions. Police reports from the area were 
critical of the group’s activities. Though Tikhanovich-Savitskii stressed that the 
group’s true rationale was the ‘defence of Russian values…and the Russian flag’ 
even those who shared his central convictions had their suspicions over the activities 
of the group.121 These were prompted by the use and reception of orators, including 
Iliodor, who drew fearful images of a Russia ‘fettered in Jewish chains’.122 
Authorities then decided to act. A telegram from Tikhanovich-Savitskii to Petr 
Stolypin claimed that a number of issues of Russkaia pravda had been confiscated 
on 20 March 1908 by the authorities, a claim repeated in another telegram from 27 
March of the same year. Tikhanovich-Savitskii complained that the governor of 
Astrakhan’, I. N. Sokolovskii, had fined him due to such publishing activities. 
According to Tikhanovich-Savitskii, Sokolovskii had taken this action primarily due 
                                                
119 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. B, ll. 7, 9, 11: various police reports from 
Astrakhan' to the chair of the MVD, through January 1907. 
120 Ibid., l. 14: MVD Astrakhan' gubernator. Po kantseliariia, g. Astrakhan'. v DP 7 February 1907.  
121 Ibid., l. 29: k otvetu g-na gubernatoru, N. Tikhanovich-Savitskii (date unknown).  
122 A recent study of this radical is S. Dixon, ‘The “Mad Monk” Iliodor in Tsaritsyn’, Slavonic and 
East European Review 88, 1/2 (2010), pp. 377-415. 
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to his fear of the APMP inciting further pogroms in the region, and his wish to 
defend the region’s Jews (Tikhanovich-Savitskii used the pejorative zhid’ rather than 
the neutral evrei in this telegram). The obsession with Jewish power was a constant 
theme amongst radical rightists in Astrakhan’; but previous pogroms had raised 
suspicions. Furthermore, the relatively small Jewish population of Astrakhan’ 
somewhat detracted from Tikhanovich-Savitskii’s claims of Jewish power and 
control.123  
 
 Tikhanovich-Savitskii appeared undeterred by this lukewarm reception from 
the authorities. He insisted that the masses were still patriotic, and only a tiny 
minority, led by Jews and radical students, were behind the revolutionary crises. The 
confiscation of newspapers, conflicts with authority and suspicions from the 
authorities were the result of nefarious attitudes of liberal sympathizers, plotting 
against patriots from within the autocracy itself. Tikhanovich-Savitskii refused to 
face the realities of the new constitutional system. It was not that the rulers of Russia 
opposed (or were unresponsive) to his ideas; instead, blame was sought on the 
‘enemy within’, trying to bring down the state.124 At a later date, Tikhanovich-
Savitskii would write to Nicholas II suggesting that it was the ‘spies in the army’ 
that were responsible for the military’s calamitous performances during the first year 
of the First World War. The disastrous defeats of the Russian army, such as that at 
Tannenberg in 1914, were not even partially the fault of the Russian military, but 
instead evidence of the destruction wrought by subversive revolutionaries and Jews 
on the institutions of the imperial state.125  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
123 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. B, l. 85; Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov 
(ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 306; for further analysis see J. D. Klier, ‘Zhid’: Biography of a 
Russian Epithet’, Slavonic and East European Review, 60, 1 (1982), pp. 1-15.  
124 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. B, ll. 16-17.  
125 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 321.  
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Conclusion 
 
The most obvious parallel between the three cases discussed in this chapter was the 
potential for right-wing mass mobilization during and after 1905, and the 
spontaneous nature this took. The Odessa URP was particularly committed to 
violent, ground level struggle against revolutionary enemies. The APMP in 
Astrakhan’ also promoted the use of terror against its enemies, though made less 
headway in terms of popular support. In all instances, rightists were counter-
revolutionary rather than conservative actors, highlighted by the presence of 
religious and ethnic minority populations, especially Jews, and a tradition of 
organized revolutionary movements as prerequisites for their rise.126 It was no 
coincidence that each region had experienced pogroms of different severity between 
1905-1906; rightists appeared where tensions already existed. Without opposing 
forces to oppose, rightist movements were bereft of their rationale. One example was 
in Saratov, where the regime had largely suppressed the revolutionary movement by 
1908. There was thereafter no perception that an independent right was needed to 
fight such a movement, and one newspaper reported how this led to right-wing 
support disappearing. Only 12 members appeared at a URP branch gathering in 
February 1908: here, radical rightists were not reflecting common fears and tensions 
held by the local population.127 
 
The activities and ideas of three militants in the provinces, Konovnitsyn, 
Iuzefovich and Tikhanovich-Savitskii, illustrate that a significant theme in rightist 
activity and ideas was pronounced dissatisfaction with Russia’s post-1905 settlement 
and rejection of the Tsarist status quo. The Kiev Monarchist Coalition harshly 
castigated ‘Jewish revolutionaries’ and ‘Bundist terrorists’ who were ‘anti-Church, 
anti-nationalist and anti-government’, but another main inspiration for criticism was 
                                                
126 This was not only the case in the southwest. On the Finnish border too, right-wing groups were 
also active, driven by a desire to combat increasing national consciousness amongst minority groups. 
See M. Vitukhnovskaya, ‘Cultural and Political Reaction in Russian Karelia in 1906-1907. State 
Power, the Orthodox Church, and the ‘Black Hundreds’ against Karelian Nationalism’, Jahrbücher 
für Geschichte Osteuropas, 48, 1 (2001), pp. 24-44. 
127 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 101, l. 25: Saratovskii vestnik, 7 February 1908.   
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the Duma settlement.128 The legacy of 1905 was central to right-wing culture and 
politics; the rise of right-wing movements was intimately linked to the revolutionary 
experience in the Russian Empire, which gave the right stimulus for action. The 
provincial dimension to the right’s growth was linked to increased tensions between 
the imperial centre and the periphery, which impacted on the crisis of autocratic 
power suffered during the 1905 revolution. Autonomous right-wingers who 
ostensibly backed the autocracy were in fact increasingly divided from the regime, 
and many observers from within the regime did not consider such ‘defenders’ to be a 
reliable source of support.  
 
  
 
                                                
128 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 386.  
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Chapter Four  
 
The Responses of the Authorities and Popular Mobilization 
 
The strategies and techniques that right-wing leaders and activists wished to utilize, 
and the authority response to these, can shed light on the popular impact of the right-
wing groups.1 This chapter will consider two closely related aspects of the right’s 
public resonance. First will be the right-wing relationship with the authorities, 
considering examples of toleration, support, and, finally, opposition to autonomous 
right-wing activities from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerstvo vnutrennykh 
del, Russia’s political police). It will then consider one particularly important 
element of right-wing presentation sui generis: the use of rituals and symbols in 
pursuit of mass-scale popular mobilization. These two aims were not separate, but 
related aspects of the same question. The outcome of the right’s pursuit of public, 
mobilization activities was strongly influenced by the perceptions of the authorities. 
One important element of this, pogroms and violence, has already been considered; 
this will consider another feature of the right’s ability to mobilize.  
 
 Rightists played an active role in state and civic life after 1905. Leaders of 
the right were on friendly terms with Nicholas II, who like the Tsarina regarded 
them as loyal subjects, and their support for national, religious and autocratic values 
as expressing the popular will.2 He received delegations of rightists throughout his 
reign, and gifts from civic groups and political parties, including the URP.3 But 
important political figures were divided in their views of the right. Unsurprisingly, 
                                                
1 The police did not, of course, represent the entire establishment. Rightists made inroads into other 
areas, one of which was the institutions of official religion. For the right’s relationship with the 
Church, see the recent essay by A. K. Pisiotis, ‘The Russian Orthodox Clergy and Populism in the 
Twilight of the Romanovs’, in V. Tsurikov (ed.), Metropolitan Antonii (Khrapovitskii): Archpastor of 
the Russian Diaspora (Jordanville, NY, 2014), p. 191.   
2 ‘Introduction’, in M. D. Steinberg and V. M. Khrustalev (eds.), The Fall of the Romanovs: Political 
Dreams and Personal Struggles in a Time of Revolution (Yale, 1995), pp. 35-36. 
3 See for instance Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol. 1, p. 99; a later example is a delegation of 
Academists meeting with Nicholas at Tsarskoe Selo. The date at which the picture was taken is 
unknown. V. A. Obraztsov, Torzhestvo russkogo ob”edineniia: osviashchenie “narodnogo doma” 
Ekaterinoslavskogo otdela soiuza russkogo naroda 5-go oktiabria 1910 goda, (Khar’kov, 1912), p. 
191.  
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given their attempted assassination of him, Witte considered the URP to be little 
more than terrorists, but others harboured more favourable views, including Petr 
Durnovo, and Petr Stolypin, who initially thought that groups such as the URP might 
have a role to play as a buttress for the autocracy. In the world of imperial politics 
and parliament, one of the most notable achievements of the right was their 
enhanced presence in the later Dumas.4 From 1905-1907, the right-wing presence 
was little more than negligible, and the Kadets dominated the parliament. However, 
after the 1907 re-structuring of the Duma, it became a very conservative body, with 
strong moderate conservative, nationalist and rightist elements.5 The rightist fraction 
was particularly pronounced in the Third and Fourth Dumas.6 An enhanced right-
wing presence in the Duma was a problem for the autocracy, given the vocal 
opposition of right-wing radicals to politics and the procedures of parliament. Away 
from the legislative chamber, the rightist presence on the ground also represented a 
divergence between the status quo ante and newer, more radical forces.  
 
Rightists and the Authorities  
 
Though many right-wing activists claimed to be defending the fatherland and the 
Russian people, several factors made the support of the authorities for an 
independent right less likely. One was the revolution of 1905. Political and 
economic strikes, pogroms, riots and military mutinies had shown the fragility of 
public order. A long-term precedent was the Tsarist regime’s suspicion of all 
autonomous social and cultural groups; political parties became legal only in 1905. 
Furthermore, there were the structural and adiministrative deficiencies of the police 
                                                
4 It needs to be stated at the outset that this chapter will consider public activities largely overlooked 
by existing scholarship; therefore, demonstrations and the public use of rituals, as well as the 
regime’s reception of these. It will not focus on right-wing activity in the State Duma, though this 
was undoubtedly an important aspect of right-wing strategies and achievements. For overviews of the 
right-wing relationship with the State Duma, see the works by Avrekh, Diakin and Ivanov listed in 
the introduction.  
5 Not only the ultra-right, but conservatives in the Third and Fourth State Dumas expressed a wide 
variety of viewpoints, including those from the Nationalist Party. See Edelman, Gentry Politics, pp. 
65-100, 166-201. 
6 For thorough overviews of the statistical breakdown of rightist election results to the First and 
Second Dumas, see Rawson, Russian Rightists, pp. 152-224; a particularly strong analysis of the 
Third and Fourth Dumas is Vydra, Život za Cara? pp. 357-424. 
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force.7 The police were the day-to-day face of the Tsarist power pyramid, headed by 
the Tsar and supported by the Duma,8 and were given a host of responsibilities for 
keeping public order. Yet the police were spread very thinly; one estimate gives a 
ratio of one policeman for every 700 people in urban areas, which could fall to as 
few as one for every 50,000 in rural areas.9  
 
However there is also evidence to suggest that the authorities funded and 
supported the far right on numerous occasions. Whether to support these 
independent organizations that claimed they were pro-autocracy posed a difficult 
question. There did not appear to be a coherent strategy for dealing with the right, 
and a variety of responses emerged. The likely reason for this conflicted approach 
was the day-to-day realities of governing Tsarist Russia, a difficult task that did not 
readily lend itself to supporting sustained, ideologically based directives from 
superiors. Instead, local and personal objectives within different sections of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs were often in conflict. Asking the difficult though 
rewarding question of how close the right was to the autocracy, and examining the 
responsiveness of the conservative regime towards these groups, can show some of 
the similarities, as well as tensions, between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ right in late 
imperial Russia. It can also show how far rightists were enable to enact their desired 
role of ‘protection’, and to what extent right-wing activities actually created further 
tensions for an increasingly embattled autocracy.  
 
 
                                                
7 Rawson also examined the government approach towards the major right-wing groups in Russian 
Rightists, pp. 142-151. This section will build on these conclusions by looking at temporal and 
contextual changes behind the reduced authority toleration of the right-wing groups after 1906-1907.  
8 The distinctions between the two were not always clear-cut in the Russian Empire, where the Tsar 
and the administrative system were conceived of as one; the separation of powers between executive, 
legislative and judiciary was seen as a largely alien concept. See J. Daly, ‘Political Crime in Late 
Imperial Russia’, Journal of Modern History, 74, 1 (2002), pp. 62-100. 
9 N. Weissman, ‘Regular Police in Tsarist Russia, 1900-1914’, Russian Review, 44, 1 (1985), pp. 45-
68; D. C. B. Lieven, ‘The Security Police, Civil Rights, and the Fate of the Russian Empire, 1855-
1917’, in Crisp and Edmondson (eds.), Civil Rights, pp. 235-262.    
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Support 
 
A number of right-wing groups looked primarily to generous internal donations for 
financial backing. Vladimir Purishkevich, the leader of the Union of the Archangel 
Mikhail (UAM) from March 1908, dipped into his own pocket on several occasions 
to fund groups affiliated to his organization.10 Additionally, right-wing groups 
looked to a variety of sources of external funding in order to build and strengthen. 
These could be wealthy landowners, small traders, merchants or shopkeepers who 
looked favourably on monarchist ideas, often making private donations. Right-wing 
groups also wrote to the government requesting financial support, a tactic adopted 
soon after their formation and apparently pursued throughout their years of 
                                                
10 See for instance GARF, F. 117, op. 2, d. 8, ll. 36, 37, 40, 51: these are letters from members of the 
student right (Academists) at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic University thanking Purishkevich for his 
financial support.  
 
Figure 7 Academists meet with Nicholas II. V. A. Obraztsov, Torzhestvo russkogo ob”edineniia: 
osviashchenie “narodnogo doma” Ekaterinoslavskogo otdela soiuza russkogo naroda, 5-go 
Oktiabria 1910 g. (Khar’kov, 1912), p. 191.  
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existence.11 But who to write to, and what to expect? The Tsar himself looked upon 
the right favourably, but trying to ascertain the motives of local officials, police or 
even government ministers is a trickier task. Many rightists were silent on the issue 
of government funding, and their own newspapers rarely reveal any specific 
insights. However, sometimes, figures from within the regime are more forthcoming 
on this controversial issue. Indeed V. A. Dediulin, the St. Petersburg palace 
commandant even went so far as to claim that he had practically created the Union 
of Russian People (URP) during 1905.12  
 
 S. E. Kryzhanovskii, the Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs in 1906, 
claimed in his memoirs that several prominent rightists received funding from the 
government, including A. I. Dubrovin, V. M. Purishkevich and Father Ioann 
Vostorgov. These funds were distributed primarily for the purpose of supporting the 
publication of a variety of rightist brochures and newspapers, including Russkoe 
znamia, but a score of others too.13 On his interrogation by a Provisional 
Government official in June 1917, Kryzhanovskii recalled government support 
during 1906 for rightist groups. This was mostly to boost their publication activities; 
he claimed Purishkevich’s Kniga russkoi skorbi (Book of Russian Sorrows) and his 
journal Priamoi put’ (Straight Path) both received financial support.14 V. N. 
Kokovtsov, the Minister of Finance from 1904 to 1914 and Prime Minister from 
1911 to 1914 gave more specific details than Kryzhanovskii. He claimed that the 
government’s level of support for the right’s publishing activities from 1905 until 
the eve of the First World War was very high, estimating that as many as three 
                                                
11 GARF, F. 116, op. 1, d. 16, ll. 5, 6: protokol obshchogo sobraniia (plenarnogo) vserossiiskogo 
s”ezda soiuza russkogo naroda i primykaiushchikh k nemu monarkhicheskikh organizatsii v g. 
Moskve, 24 November 1911. The financial affairs of the URP are discussed in this case, which makes 
reference to both press and public support.  
12 [V. A. Dediulin] ‘Vlast’ i krainye pravye partii. Zapis’ besedy dvortsovogo komendanta V. A. 
Dediulina (1908 g.) i zapiski chlena soveta ministra vnutrennykh del N. Ch. Zaionchkovskogo (1913 
g.)’, Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1 (2000), pp. 88-89. 
13 S. E. Kryzhanovskii, Vospominaniia (Berlin, 1938), pp. 100-101.  
14 ‘Dopros S. E. Kryzhanovskogo’, in P. E. Shchegolev (ed.), Padenie tsarskogo rezhima, Vol. 5 
(Moscow-Leningrad, 1926), p. 410.  
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million rubles had been distributed to right-wing groups between 1910 and 1912.15 
Kokovtsov claimed that the newspaper Zemshchina (Realm), which the Tsar himself 
read, was subsidized to the tune of 180,000 rubles a year.16 Aleksandr Protopopov, 
the Minister of the Interior from September 1916 to February 1917, claimed that the 
rightist deputy to the Third and Fourth State Dumas, Nikolai Markov, received a 
total of around 40,000 rubles, most of which went towards newspapers, including his 
own Kurskaia byl’ (Kursk’s Past).17   
 
Such accusations are often difficult to corroborate, and many of these claims 
came well after the event. Many contemporary sources tend to conceal and obfuscate 
more than they clarify. The exact amount of money rightists received was a 
particular source of contention. Whilst Kokovtsov claimed both Kurskaia byl’ and 
Zemshchina were supported by 200,000 rubles annually, rightists themselves did not 
always second such accusations.18 However, on interrogation in 1917, Markov 
claimed that he received 12,000 rubles every year from Stolypin’s premiership until 
1916. This was for the purposes of supporting the newspapers and other publication 
activities of the URP. It is not always clear how exactly this money received was 
distributed. When right-wing deputies to the State Duma received money personally, 
they could then spend it on their own newspapers, organizations, or even embezzle 
the funds.19 Claim and counter claim are rife in these sources, but tellingly, some 
right-wing leaders and activists did not deny accusations of governmental support. 
E. A. Poluboiarinova, the secretary of the URP from the end of 1907, claimed the 
URP had received government subsidies throughout her time as secretary of the 
organization.20 One report into the activities of the URP in Odessa stated that the 
group received a monthly subsidy of 1,000 rubles throughout 1908 for the support of 
                                                
15 V. N. Kokovtsov, Iz moego proshlogo. Vospominaniia, 1903-1919 gg., Vol. 2 (Paris, 1933), pp. 9-
10.  
16 V. N. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past: The Memoirs of Count Kokovtsov (Stanford, 1935), pp. 338-339.  
17 ‘Dopros Protopopova’, in Shchegolev (ed.), Padenie tsarskogo rezhima, Vol. 1, pp. 122-125. 
18 Kokovtsov, Out of My Past, p. 285.  
19 ‘Dopros N. E. Markova’, in Shchegolev (ed.), Padenie tsarskogo rezhima, Vol. 5, pp. 184-185.  
20 GARF, F. 116, op. 1, d. 16, l. 7: Protokol obshchogo sobraniia (plenarnogo) vserossiiskogo s”ezda 
russkogo naroda i primykaiushchikh k nemu monarkhicheskikh organizatsii v g. Moskve. 24 
November 1911.  
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the newspaper Za tsaria i rodinu, dispensed through the agents of the city mayor, I. 
N. Tolmachev. The distribution of such large sums of money had the effect of 
encouraging widespread corruption within the URP. During this year, the in-fighting 
that occurred over missing disbursements contributed to a split in the group, when 
supporters of V. M. Purishkevich’s URP faction broke off from the main council, 
then led by A. I. Dubrovin, to form a rival right-wing group, the UAM.21  
 
 The other main funding was for the distribution of arms. This shows a more 
committed level of support than newspapers, as this entailed not only tacit 
agreement with right-wing ideas, but the material support of rightist groups that 
intended to carry out their imagined role as ‘patriotic’ and violent defenders of the 
motherland. In Odessa, several caches of weapons during 1906 were seized, with the 
apparent intention of being distributed to URP activists. The leader of the military in 
Odessa district during 1907, Baron Kaul’bars, took receipt of a stock of weapons 
with the intention of distributing them to the URP, and similar actions took place in 
Elizavetgrad. Konovnitsyn later claimed that Kaul’bars gave the combat groups of 
the URP in Odessa weapons after 1905.22  
 
 Overall, it appears the regime was prepared to support the right on occasion, 
though there are more examples of support for newspapers, rather than the supply of 
weapons. Sympathizers in the regime were more frequently prepared to use soft 
rather than hard power to support the right. The regime and right’s shared desire to 
safeguard the autocracy could lead sympathetic officials to offer financial support 
where they saw fit. However, plans to distribute revolvers, rifles and bombs were 
understandably controversial, and the authorities often seem to have been willing to 
draw the line before this stage was reached. Even for sympathizers, supporting the 
right was no easy matter. I. G. Shcheglovitov, the Minister of Justice and a notorious 
reactionary, later involved in the Beilis affair (1911-1913), pointed out the difficulty 
                                                
21 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 276.  
22 Ibid., p. 275.  
   
 136 
of providing financial support for the right, due to the disorganization of many of 
their groups.23 
 
 It is ironic that the government was at all a source of funding for far-right 
groups that considered themselves to be ‘anti politics’. The government’s policy 
throughout the late imperial period of funding newspapers was an attempt to curtail 
opposition to its policies, including from the extreme right, and in a crude way 
attempt to mobilize public support for the regime by funding ‘friendly’ journals and 
newspapers. Stolypin in particular desired this; he imagined support from a loyal 
press could help him achieve his aim of neutralizing conservative opposition during 
the Western zemstvo crisis of 1911. These attempts to control right-wing support 
were unsophisticated, inconsistent, and also highlighted the growing ideological 
divisions between different right-leaning groups after 1905. For whilst Stolypin was 
proclaimed to be the hero of several nationalist associations, including the 
Nationalist Party and the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists, right-wing parties such 
as the URP and UAM did not temper their criticism of current policies, even given 
support from government sources. This shows that, in the long term, the funding of 
the right by the regime was not only a risky tactic, but also one that did not always 
bring them into line with the regime’s policies.24  
 
Toleration 
 
Many significant individuals as well as local police forces, whilst not openly 
supporting rightists, displayed a tolerant attitude towards them. In one sense, this 
was natural given the shared motto of ‘Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality’, and 
the desire to protect the rodina. Consequently, many Soviet works expounded at 
length on the deep entanglement of the Tsarist regime with the right-wing parties.25 
                                                
23 ‘Dopros I. G. Shcheglovitova’, in Shchegolev (ed.), Padenie tsarskogo rezhima, Vol. 2, p. 353.  
24 Waldron, Between Two Revolutions, pp. 161-165.  
25 See the introductory essay by Viktorov in Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo 
naroda, pp. 3-18; and Avrekh, Stolypin i tret’ia Duma, pp. 22-30; Tsarizm i IV Duma, 1912-1914 gg., 
pp. 224-239; Diakin, Samoderzhavie, burzhuaziia i dvoriantsvo v 1907-1911 gg., pp. 91-107; and N. 
G. Koroleva, ‘Pomeshchich’e-monarkhicheskie organizatsii v 1905-1907 gg.: obrazovanie, struktura, 
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The reality was more complex than several analyses made out, but certainly, many 
with conservative inclinations initially welcomed the appearance of these groups. 
Vladimir Gurko, the Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs from 1906 to 1907, 
remarked: 
 
…I have never sympathized with organizations like the Union of Russian 
People. I have always thought that certain sentiments such as love of 
country should be inculcated and strengthened at school and by courses and 
lectures organized by educational societies, and not by organizing useless 
tea shops, which decent educated people could not be tempted to enter. In 
normal times no government should use methods employed by 
revolutionists…but during times of revolutionary unrest, when people are in 
the grip of mass psychosis, the government must support individual 
organizations that spring up to support it.26   
 
Whilst Gurko was suspicious of the methods of the URP, he was not in principle 
opposed to independent right-wing forces.27 In Odessa, there were other important 
examples where local officials and administrators viewed an autonomous right 
positively. The commander of the military in the district, Baron Kaul’bars, stated 
that a ‘patriotic defence’ was needed to ‘actively fight’ revolutionary and foreign-
backed forces in the city.28 Others of a lower rank echoed such sentiments. One 
police report from Odessa, addressed to Stolypin from 2 December 1906, whilst 
mentioning Kaul’bars’ laxity towards right-wing forces, also pleaded that a strong, 
independent right was needed, to oppose revolutionary forces in the city.29 In 
Molchanov, Ukraine, an army official, Captain Budagovskii, reported to his 
superiors that he saw Union of Russian Men (URM) demonstrations of over 2,000 
participants as ‘deeply felt’ and of a ‘patriotic, and not a party political character’, 
and should therefore be allowed to proceed unhindered.30 Central to this toleration 
was the idea of a popular patriotism that was beneficial, but equally pertinently, 
                                                                                                                                    
taktika’, in K. V. Gusev (ed.), Neproletarskie partii Rossii v trekh revoliutsiiakh. Sbornik statei. 
(Moscow, 1989), pp. 101-105.   
26 Gurko, Features and Figures of the Past, p. 437.  
27 Ibid., p. 437.  
28 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, t. 1, l. 91. 
29 Ibid., l. 89. 
30 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, t. 2, ll. 50-50 ob.: telegramma ot direktora 
departamenta politsii, January 1907. 
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manageable; such feelings were not to be opposed, even if apparently developing 
separately from the autocracy. 
 
 Lying behind this apparent support was the conception that rightist activists 
and the regime had shared aims and ideas. To some extent, this was of course the 
case.  Right-wing groups, even in their most extreme and virulent form championed 
the autocracy, the supremacy of Russian religion and Russian nationalism as the 
glue with which to hold state and society together during an era of revolutionary 
crisis. These were ideas that the regime and various Tsars had been developing in 
both theory and practice for many decades.31 Even perceptive and intelligent 
ministers who had suspicions about the right-wing groups, such as the Minister of 
the Interior and later Prime Minister, Petr Stolypin, saw that in principle autonomous 
organizations in defence of the autocracy could be tolerated. Unlike Witte, Stolypin 
did not see the URP and similar organizations as an innate nuisance, though he did 
recognize that their violent actions could disrupt previously tranquil areas. His initial 
reaction to the groups was that they offered a potential service to the empire. 
Chiefly, this was in helping to combat the revolutionary threat, though with the need 
for them to be closely monitored and policed. Given his own desire to mobilize 
conservative opinion, tacit support for right-wing ideas and groups continued under 
Stolypin’s premiership until his assassination in 1911.32  
 
 Left-wing and liberal voices critical of the regime and the right believed that 
the two were enjoying a mutually beneficial relationship. The newspaper Russkie 
vedomosti (Russian News) expounded the view that the weapons which URP 
activists brandished in their fights with striking workers and Jewish self-defence 
groups in Odessa had been distributed by the authorities; more specifically, the large 
number of agents in the secret police sympathetic to the URP. One right-wing group, 
                                                
31 For the official view, see E. C. Thaden and M. H. Haltzel (eds.), Russification in the Baltic 
Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914 (Princeton, 1981); Weeks, Nation and State, pp. 44-69.  
32 ‘Mobilizatsiia reaktsii v 1906 g. Podg. N. I. Sidorov’, Krasnyi arkhiv, 1(32) (1929), p. 180.  
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the White Guard, was accused of being given weapons by sympathetic officials.33 In 
the police force too, concerns were raised at this. One official accused 
Kryzhanovskii and his associates of dispensing 1,000 rubles a month towards the 
paper Za tsaria i rodinu in Odessa from the end of 1907 onwards.34 Away from 
clandestine financial support, a further criticism was that the government was not 
doing enough to stop the violence of the pogroms. The left-leaning newspaper 
Tovarishch (Comrade) ran a leading article on 2 September 1906 criticizing the 
apparent unwillingness of the government to stop outbreaks of right-wing violence, 
as ‘the governor-general [of Odessa, A. G. Grigor’ev] did not see any danger to 
societal order’, and criticized the level of respect in the conservative, pro-state press 
given to right-wing groups. In a later editorial, Tovarishch accused the police of 
taking an indifferent stance towards right-wing disorders in Odessa, as officers idly 
observed a meeting amongst the URP convened in the city on 29 September 1906, 
with attendees openly discussing violent measures to be taken against revolutionary 
agitators, in particular, Odessa’s Jewish population.35  
 
Opposition 
 
On other occasions, the presence of militant, armed activists worried many 
significant figures in authority. In contrast to liberal press claims, the city mayor of 
Odessa and governor-general of Novorossiia, A. G. Grigor’ev, showed a marked 
fear of a potential right-wing movement that cultivated a populist appeal, evident 
from several reports circulated within the MVD.36 Lower-ranking police officials in 
Odessa reflected his concerns. For example, crowds assembling in Odessa’s port 
during December 1906 in support of the right-wing group the Russian Society of 
Steamship Workers, led by A. I. Konovnitsyn, were noted as having a particularly 
aggressive character. Though the group supported autocratic values, what was also 
                                                
33 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, t. 1, l. 10: Russkie vedomosti, 12 
September 1906.  
34 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 277.  
35 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, t. 1, l. 5: Tovarishch, 2 September 1906; 
l. 33: Tovarishch, 29 September 1906.  
36 Ibid., l. 1 ob, 2, 2 ob., 3-4; Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 279.  
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recorded was the promotion of ground-level struggle against revolutionary workers, 
and the violence that accompanied this group.37 Between 11 and 23 February 1907, 
approximately 28 separate incidents of violence involving URP activists were 
recorded in the region.38 Were such events to reach uncontrollable proportions, those 
in the positions of the greatest responsibility had the most to lose. Grigor’ev stated in 
1906 that he opposed any financial support for the rightist paper Russkaia rech’, 
given that the militant tone of the newspaper was inciting the public mood, and 
threatening the fragile calm of the city. The main fear of these authority figures was 
not the message of the right in itself, but the potential for a popular, spontaneous and 
uncontrollable movement from the right. That the right could rouse ‘religious 
passions’ in the people betrayed the regime’s fear of the same masses that rightists 
claimed to represent.39 
 
 More worrying still were occasional attacks by rightists on the authorities. 
One report from September 1906 referred to the arrest of two prominent members of 
the URP, Averuchev and Voznok, for the attempted murder of a police chief. This 
assassination attempt was apparently in retribution for the official’s attempts to 
crack down on groups such as the URP whom he held responsible for the 1905 
pogrom. Under this individual, Odessa’s police force had taken forceful measures to 
disperse groups of far-right activists, including breaking up rightist ceremonials and 
parades.40 The mayor of Odessa from 1907 until 1911, I. N. Tolmachev, displayed 
more tolerance toward the actions of right-wing bands than his predecessor, V. D. 
Novitskii, but less than the chief of the army in the district, Baron Kaul’bars.41 
Tolmachev did however accurately perceive a greater potential for disorders with 
armed bands of rightists rampaging around the city. During his period in office, 
violent actions by the URP against other townsfolk helped to gradually erode 
government trust in rightist forces. Police officials might even describe their 
                                                
37 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, t. 1, l. 332 ob.  
38 Ibid., ll. 333, 333 ob.-334.  
39 Ibid., l. 2: A. Grigor’ev (Odessa), to P. A. Stolypin (St. Petersburg), 4 September 1906. 
40 Ibid., l. 90 ob.: unsigned police report (Odessa), to P. A. Stolypin (St. Petersburg), 2 December 
1906.  
41 V. D. Novitskii was the city mayor between 22 August and 14 November 1907, when he died of a 
heart attack. He was replaced by I. N. Tolmachev. 
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suppression of threats from the right in order to progress up the local chain of 
command. One unsigned police communiqué from August 1907, addressed to 
Tolmachev, described the exclusion of the far right from a parade:   
 
Today, I am in good spirits due to my categorical refusal to admit the flags 
of the Union of Russian People and [Union of] Russian Men to participate in 
this spiritual procession…neither I nor the governor-general [of Odessa] 
would think of allowing their participation, given that the procession was a 
purely spiritual ceremonial, as his excellency approved…why introduce 
political elements into this religious procession…especially taking into 
account the overall mood of anxiety in the city.42 
 
After the peak of the revolutionary crisis had passed by mid-1907, the government 
appeared to be more circumspect about giving firm support to the right. Attitudes 
and sympathies notwithstanding, there was simply not as much practical incentive to 
give weapons and support to armed and dangerous bands of right-wing activists, as 
the violence of the revolutionary left had been suppressed. The regime had taken 
matters into its own hands; repression was part of the government campaign against 
the opposition. Stolypin’s notorious Article 87, introduced on 19 August 1907, was a 
central element in the drive to repress revolutionary unrest.43  
 
 Additionally, rightists incited violent reprisals from other ethnic and social 
groups. Local officials were not always concerned primarily about right-wing 
violence in itself, but about the ferocious responses it could initiate. In Odessa, 
authorities feared the Jewish self-defence groups formed in response to the pogroms 
of October 1905.44 Right-wing activists provoked a sizeable response from these 
well-organized and powerful groups that often fought back fiercely against right-
wing violence. V. D. Novitskii, the mayor of Odessa after A. G. Grigor’ev, and one 
who appeared to be unreceptive to the overtures of Konovnitsyn and his supporters, 
described how rightists attempted to infiltrate a funeral procession for a murdered 
police officer, Kharchenko, and in so doing present themselves as on the side of the 
                                                
42 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, ll. 346 ob.–347: unsigned police report 
circulated during August 1907, addressed to I. N. Tolmachev.  
43 Ascher, The Revolution of 1905, Vol. 2, pp. 245-252.  
44 See the list of works in Chapter three, footnote 61, pp. 109-110. 
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authorities. This led to a furious response from Jewish self-defence groups. Whilst 
this telegram noted that the main cause of outbreaks of violence in Odessa was the 
Jewish self-defence groups which had ‘fired the first shots’, the actions of the two 
leaders of this group, Moshko Nastashkin and Mendel Barnovskii, were incited by 
URP attempts to start a pogrom. Novitskii appeared to be highly suspicious of the 
URP’s intentions, and held a view that all spontaneous activities needed to be 
controlled, including those of an independent, autonomous right.45 
 
 The URP attempted to exploit a public mood in the wake of Kharchenko’s 
death, and activists converged on the surrounding streets and at a nearby hospital, 
urging retribution against the ‘Jews’ who had ‘murdered’ Kharchenko. On 3-4 
September 1907, the already tense atmosphere in the neighbourhood following the 
interment of Kharchenko had deteriorated to such an extent that it was feared by 
local officials that another pogrom, like the one of October 1905, could break out in 
Odessa. Faced with this possibility, officials from the police and army quickly 
colluded with Novitskii in an attempt to stop any new outbreaks of violence, 
increasing the police presence and arresting any wandering bands of URP activists. 
This crackdown was pursued partly due to the fear of the violent nature of socially 
lower-class elements, the ‘riff-raff’ in the URP bands, but also the appearance of 
Jewish self-defence groups in response to rightist promises of violence to be carried 
out against Odessa’s Jews. One Jewish self-defence force, the Young Will, appeared 
on 3 September 1907 after a band of URP supporters had assembled outside a 
Jewish hospital. Several of the followers of the group brandished revolvers and fired 
shots into nearby crowds of rightist activists. Though it is unclear how many died in 
this clash, it appears to have caused a widespread panic, and was reported in all the 
newspapers in the following days. Groups of black-shirted URP activists, who were 
themselves armed, had apparently fled at the appearance of this well-organized and 
apparently destructive group that had adopted a fight fire with fire approach, and 
                                                
45 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, t. 3, l. 28: Razbor shifrovannoi 
telegrammy iz Odessy, V. D. Novitskii-g. direktora departamenta politsii, 13 September 1907. It is 
telling that the words ‘Jewish self-defence’ and ‘the first shots were fired by Jews’ (pervymi otkryli 
strel’bi evrei) are the words underlined by the censor in this police report, showing that the primary 
threat was considered to be the Jewish self-defence force, rather than the URP’s supporters.  
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was prepared to meet right-wing destructiveness with their own, decisive, 
measures.46 
 
Such conflicts placed URP funding under threat. In Odessa, a student section 
of the URP was formed in 1909 under the guidance of N. N. Rodzevich, the regional 
chair of the URM. Led by a student, Korniichuk, the URP student branch received a 
donation towards the building of a classroom during 1909.47 However, in later years, 
the organization appears to have struggled to find sufficient funding to expand its 
pedagogical activities, which were curtailed by a lack of financial support from both 
members and the authorities. A police report shows how by 1911, previous 
disbursements received through supporters of the URP in the police force had 
slowed to a trickle, and by 1912 to 1913, such financial aid was not forthcoming at 
all. Additionally the authorities in Odessa closely monitored the group, with 
undercover police agents sitting in on its meetings to observe its actions.48 However 
this decline in support was an incremental and gradual, rather than continuous, 
process. 
 
Ambiguity and inconsistency 
 
The responses of the authorities towards the right were ambiguous and inconsistent, 
with no consistent over-arching strategy emerging for how to deal with new parties 
and groups.49 Between 1906 and 1908, there were perceptible changes in attitude 
from the authorities towards the right; these were partially down to changes in 
personnel. Novitskii was particularly intolerant of the presence of the URP in 
Odessa, more so than Grigor’ev, and later, Tolmachev. Certainly, the bickering, 
                                                
46 The sources corroborate each other closely in this controversial set of incidents, discussed in the 
following newspaper and police reports found in ibid., l. 17: Birzhevye vedomosti, 3 September 1907; 
l. 18: Novoe vremia, 4 September 1907; l. 19: Birzhevye vedomosti, 4 September 1907; l. 21: Russkoe 
slovo, 4 September 1907; l. 22: Russkoe slovo, 4 September 1907; l. 27: police report from V. D. 
Novitskii; l. 28: Razor shifrovannoi telegrammy iz Odessy, V. D. Novitskii-g. direktora departamenta 
politsii, 13 September 1907.  
47 Ibid., p. 289.  
48 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, pp. 290-292.  
49 As noted in Rawson, Russian Rightists, p. 151.  
   
 144 
corruption and factionalism of the right put off many potential supporters.50 
However, a point that united many significant individuals in the establishment was 
the trepidation with which they approached the militant and extreme right, no matter 
their own personal convictions towards particular individuals or groups. The main 
reason for this fear is that revolutionary violence, which had been largely quelled by 
late 1907, would become a threat again in reaction to a more organized and powerful 
militant right. Furthermore, a wider point was the revolutionary crisis itself. During 
1905, strikes, revolution and agrarian unrest had stretched Russia’s police force 
(described by Weissman as ‘peasants in uniform’) to breaking point, presenting them 
with a task to keep public order, for which they were often ill equipped.51 Once the 
most intense period of revolutionary violence had subsided by the end of 1906, the 
support of the authorities for arming the right-wing factions became notably less 
fervent. Curiously, the far right was increasingly monitored in the absence of a 
revolutionary left, with undercover agents placed in the tearooms and meeting 
houses of the URP at an increasing rate from the end of 1906.52  
 
 A central point from reading the voluminous reports that have survived is the 
inconsistent approach of the police towards right-wing radicals. Overall, there did 
not appear to be a coherent plan from the regime in terms of dealing with the right. 
Instead, much was left up to local initiative. Previous studies have claimed that the 
regime backed the radical right, particularly in Odessa.53 Whilst this is undoubtedly 
true in some areas, in other parts of the empire a spontaneous, mobilized rightist 
presence was feared. As well as the practical considerations, such as the violence 
and unrest seen in 1905, there was a growing distinction between official practices 
                                                
50 In a letter, Tolmachev claimed that ‘you will be more and more disappointed with the activities of 
all the rightists’, and though he voiced no opposition to the existence of an independent right in itself, 
he did accurately claim that the right was disunited and riven with corruption by this stage, both in the 
Duma and elsewhere. GARF, F. 102, op. 265, d. 562, l. 643: I. N. Tolmachev (Moshonk, 
Kaluzhskoi), to an unknown recipient, 25 February 1912.  
51 Weissman, ‘Regular Police’; for an overview of peasant uprisings during 1905-1906 from the view 
of the landowners, see ‘Iz istorii bor’by s agrarnym dvizheniem 1905-1908 gg.’, Krasnyi arkhiv, 
2(39) (1930), pp. 76-107; 3(40) (1930), pp. 41-58.  
52 See for one example a report in GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, t. 1, l. 
61: MVD circular in Odessa, 15 November 1906.  
53 See Langer, ‘Corruption and the Counterrevolution’, Ch. 3.  
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of conservatism and a separate right-wing politics in late imperial Russia. Certainly, 
the difference between the two was far from clear to many observers. Yet the 
regime’s more perceptive observers, particularly those of conservative convictions 
such as Gurko and Stolypin, recognized that the new right was in one sense a tribute 
to the autocracy, but at the same time, posed a threat to it. Protest and dissent from 
the right aiming to build popular support intruded into the regime’s own space for 
publicly proclaiming the virtues of the autocracy. Rural and urban unrest caused by 
rightists undermined their own claims to be saving Russia, and shown to the 
autocracy the unreliability of one potential set of defenders. 
 
Rituals, Symbols and Popular Mobilization 
 
A wave of ‘jubileemania’, celebrating past military victories, imperial unity and 
national pride hit the Russian Empire in its final years. Public use of rituals and 
symbols was immensely important for a large number of rightists. Studies of right-
wing rituals, symbols and related demonstrations are thin on the ground, often 
playing a lesser role in existing analyses of the right, or are entirely absent.54 This 
section redresses this balance by considering several representative case studies 
examining how right-wing groups used rituals and symbols, and the wider 
conclusions about the far right that can be deduced from these activities. An example 
of a leadership cult will be examined, and then three cases of right-wing 
involvement in the cults of commemoration that swept the empire between 1909 and 
1913: the Poltava celebrations, the Bessarabia centennial and, finally, the Romanov 
tercentenary.55 The right relied on mobilizing moods, sentiments and emotions more 
than it did the construction of carefully articulated programmes and manifestos; this 
analysis will give the public phenomena of demonstrations the due weight it 
deserves by examining how these symbols were manifested and applied, and where 
                                                
54 Two important exceptions are Löwe, ‘Political Symbols and Rituals’, pp. 441-466; and Vydra, 
Život za Cara? pp. 333-356. 
55 The term comes from Konstantin Tsimbaev: K. Tsimbaev, ‘Fenomen iubileimanii v rossiiskoi 
obshchestvennoi zhizni kontsa XIX-nachala XX veka’, Voprosy istorii, 11 (2005), pp. 98-108. The 
outstanding study of official monarchist ideology and one that examines the Poltava and Romanov 
tercentenary celebrations from a variety of perspectives is Wortman, Scenarios of Power, Vol. 2; see 
for these two ceremonials pp. 421-428 and pp. 439-480. 
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they fitted into the wider context of contemporary Russian society. The goal is to 
show how right-wing identities were created and transformed between 1907 and 
1914.  
 
Reasons for rituals 
 
The overriding goal of rituals was to imbue the rightist social order with legitimacy.  
The creation of ‘sacred space’ in public was an important part of this legitimization 
process, involving the establishment of an area where the sanctity of what is taking 
place in front of observers cannot be questioned and takes on a detached, mythic and 
timeless quality independent from normal human activity.56 However, these simple 
statements make the process appear to be smoother and more unilateral than 
examples actually demonstrate; it was not fixed, but constantly evolving. Whilst in 
theory, right-wing groups were committed to the ideology of ‘official nationality’ 
the construction of rituals was in reality a dynamic practice that involved subversive 
processes and outcomes. The narod themselves were involved in the creation of this 
national myth. As in nineteenth-century Germany, national ideas were widely used 
in order to create a public grand narrative, in that case creating ‘heroes’ of the 
Second Reich.57 Public involvement in the legitimization process was crucial in 
order to build support, and to convince the masses of the inherent worth of right-
wing ideas and feelings. Visual symbols as a focal point for public demonstrations 
could take the notice of the wider community quickly, much faster than alternative 
techniques such as sending the Tsar telegrams, or even distributing newspapers.58 
 
We can see that primitive forms of group identity and even civic society 
were evolving amongst the right-wing factions immediately prior to the First World 
War. If they are skillfully constructed and given the correct thematic weighting for 
                                                
56 This concept of ‘sacred space’ has been explored in the context of state funerals in France of the 
Third Republic: A. Ben-Amos, ‘The Sacred Center of Power: Paris and Republican State Funerals’, 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 22, 1 (1991), pp. 27-48. 
57 See Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses.   
58 For instance, see G. Elenius, ‘The Politics of Recognition: Symbols, Nation Building and Rival 
Nationalisms’, Nations and Nationalism, 17, 2 (2011), pp. 396-418. 
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their intended audience, public rituals can successfully demonstrate a consecrated 
symbolic system, functioning as what Glifford Geertz describes as a ‘cultural 
performance’ which imposes order on life’s apparently chaotic and arbitrary 
events.59 The religious symbols used in funerals and crafted onto memorials were 
two techniques widely used amongst rightists, which served to function as 
visualizations of ‘ancestor worship’, signifying respect for generations past and ties 
to the wider community.60 Themes of death, remembrance and commemoration 
provided a potential common ground between rightists and their intended audience, 
and were directly linked with existing right-wing activities, which were already 
heavily reliant on themes including community, tradition, observation and, in 
particular, religious symbolism. Examples of such phenomena included ‘union 
banners, peasant choirs, church services, requiems and other purely religious rites 
that usually occupied no less a place than patriotic manifestations, and the sending of 
telegrams’.61 The focus of rightist rituals could change from emphasis on the 
grandeur of the autocracy or Russia’s ‘great men’ when in pursuit of new avenues of 
popular support. Though in private, rightists commonly feted ‘tough’ heroes such as 
the reactionary Tsar Alexander III, in public, rightists chose subjects that they 
believed would have a greater popular resonance.62 
 
One instance of this was at the presentation of a bust in honour of Alexander 
II, the ‘Tsar liberator’, in September 1912 in Vladimir province by a crowd of pro-
monarchist peasants, including representatives from the Vorshin branch of the URP. 
Rightists here tried to prove that tsarism still had popular support, whilst attempting 
to establish their own credentials as members of a movement for the people. The 
choice of Alexander II, often considered a ‘liberal’, might appear to be an odd one 
                                                
59 Theoretical underpinnings are C. Geertz, ‘Religion as a Cultural System’, in The Interpretation of 
Cultures (London, 1973), especially pp. 91, 112-113; C. Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (Oxford, 
1992); D. I. Kertzer, ‘The Role of Ritual in Political Change’, in M. J. Aronoff (ed.), Political 
Anthropology: Culture and Political change, Vol. 2 (New Brunswick, NJ, 1983), pp. 53-73.  
60 Geertz, ‘Religion as a Cultural System’, p. 88. 
61 Levitskii, ‘Pravye partii’, in Martov et al. (eds.), Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie, Vol. 3, p. 351.  
62 Examples of rituals held in celebration of Alexander III can be found in the Messenger of the 
Russian Assembly during 1909, Vestnik Russkogo sobraniia, 19 February 1909, 8, p. 3; 9 April 1909, 
15, p. 6; and GARF, F. 116, op. 1, d. 38, ll. 8-8 ob.: main council of the Russian Assembly to A. I. 
Dubrovin, 27 September 1907.   
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from a group of right-wingers, but in choosing the ‘liberator’ monarchists were 
attempting to reach out to peasant observers by showing them how they too 
venerated the Tsar who had emancipated the peasantry from serfdom in 1861. After 
local peasants had sung pro-autocracy hymns, V. M. Koriakin, a URP activist, gave 
a speech about ‘the important events from the life of the Tsar-martyr, since the 
peasants asked why the Tsar submitted to the feelings of his loyal subjects’.63 The 
powerful image of the Tsar’s martyrdom, dying for his subjects, was one example of 
how right-wing ritual demonstrations attempted to arouse emotion and feeling in 
observers, though with the important caveat that this applied only to ethnic, 
Orthodox Russian observers.64 
 
The adoption of ‘the people’ as part of a national myth had been pursued 
previously by the imperial regime, most clearly seen in the projected ideal of the 
‘good Tsar’, an idea that had been used for centuries.65 The right, like the regime, 
desired that rituals would be ‘cross class’ and demonstrate unity between people, 
Tsar and monarchist movements.66 However, differences between the regime and the 
right were emerging. A more novel development of certain right-wing rituals was 
that, unlike in the scenarios of the autocracy, the role of the narod changed from 
being an essentially abstract focus, shared with the Tsars, to an explicit 
personification of rightist favourites. Ideas of protecting the sanctity of the people, as 
well as the deep entanglement of the 1905 revolution with the rise of the right, can 
be seen in the construction of a church in memory of the ‘victims of revolution’. 
This was the ‘Church in Memory of Russia’s Sorrows’ (Khram-pamiatnik russkoi 
skorbi) in 1909 by the Ekaterinoslav branch of the URP, headed by leaders Ivan 
Andreevich and Kseniia Fedorovna Kolesnikova. This was dedicated to ‘2,000 
                                                
63 Priamoi put’, December 1912, p. 227. It should be noted that the description of this Tsar as a 
‘liberator’ was a key feature of the editorial covering the event.  
64 Moskovskie vedomosti, 3 June 1906, 141, p. 1. Alexander II’s martyrdom was also a central theme 
of several rightist memorial services carried out in his honour. For further examples see Kir’ianov 
(ed.), Pravye partii, Vol. 2, pp. 13-17.  
65 Cherniavsky, Tsar and People, p. 187.  
66 There are surprisingly few historical (as opposed to sociological) investigations on death, and those 
that do exist tend to be episodic works rather than prolonged analyses. One exception is J. Whaley 
(ed.), Mirrors of Mortality: Studies in the Social History of Death (London, 1981). See especially his 
‘Introduction’, pp. 1-14.  
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victims of revolution’ one of whom was Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich, killed 
by revolutionaries in Moscow in 1905, with the remaining 1,999 all ‘ordinary’ 
people, ‘true Tsarist subjects’ killed by subversive forces in the new ‘years of 
troubles’ (smutnye gody).67 These ‘subversive forces’ were taken to mean Jews and 
national minorities by right-wing activists; the tense interplay between positive and 
negative ideals was a distinctive feature of the new right.  
 
 
 
Vladimir Andreevich Gringmut: his leadership and cult 
 
A measure of the right’s independence from tsarism was the right-wing parties 
celebrating their own heroes of the movement that had arisen after 1905. 
‘Heroization’ has played a powerful role in Russian culture, managing to affect the 
                                                
67 Many reports on this church can be found in the right-wing press, for example Priamoi put’, 
December 1912, pp. 220-221; Obraztsov, Torzhestvo russkogo ob”edineniia, pp. 12-14; see also 
CSIE, pp. 562-564. The reference to the present era as a ‘time of troubles’ (smutnoe vremia) was 
common in right-wing circles: see for example Moskovskie vedomosti, 23 October 1905, 281, p. 1.  
 
Figure 8 An interior view of the Church in Memory of Russia’s Sorrows, V. A. Obraztsov, 
Torzhestvo russkogo ob”edineniia: osviashchenie “narodnogo doma” Ekaterinoslavskogo 
otdela soiuza russkogo naroda, 5-go Oktiabria 1910 g. (Khar’kov, 1912), p. 14.  
   
 150 
wider public consciousness as well as those more intimately involved, and the right 
was certainly not unique in its uses and abuses of selected deifications.68 The funeral 
and subsequent celebration of the life of Vladimir Gringmut by followers was one 
such instance; a peaceful event, but with several features inviting implicit – 
sometimes explicit – rejection of the regime.69 Gringmut, a former headmaster and a 
Russian ultra-nationalist of Baltic German descent, was the leader of the Russian 
Monarchist Party (RMP) from 24 April 1905, and the editor of the monarchist 
newspaper Moskovskie vedomosti from 1896 (positions he held until his death on 28 
September 1907), and one of the most notorious leaders of the right.70 His death at 
the age of 51 led to the construction of a cult amongst his most erstwhile followers, 
and is a good indicator of many of the values that the right wished to follow. 
 
 Large crowds gathering to mark Gringmut’s passing on 1 October showed 
that an independent right had emerged that could mobilize a significant number of 
followers. The symbolism of the funeral drew on Orthodox religiosity, and the 
power of Russian autocracy. Unlike Socialist Revolutionary funerals such as that 
held for Nikolai Bauman, this was not a subversive event from the regime’s 
perspective. The emblems used were powerful visual demonstrations of the 
Orthodox religiosity that the regime had been using for decades past. The icons and 
flags carried by supporters, including many RMP members, depicted various saints, 
the Virgin Mary, and Gringmut himself; importantly, both Gringmut and the Tsars 
were venerated here. On the day of the funeral, crowds of several thousand 
followers, led by the priest and orator Father Ioann Vostorgov, a close confidant of 
Gringmut and one of the leaders of the RMP, gathered at Red Square to chant 
slogans and sing Orthodox hymns. Many of these musical renditions, such as ‘God 
is with us’ (bog s nami) and verses from Mikhail Glinka’s 1836 opera A Life for the 
Tsar were typical of monarchist ritual. The procession formed at his funeral and 
                                                
68 A famous example is, of course, the first leader of the Soviet Union. See N. Tumarkin, Lenin Lives! 
The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia (Harvard, 1997).  
69 The creation of cults was not, of course, limited to Gringmut, though he was a prominent case. 
Another example was the religious celebrations of the memory of Father Ioann of Kronstadt. See for 
example Vestnik Russkogo sobraniia, 5 February 1909, 6, p. 5.  
70 For background on Gringmut’s life and work, see the list of works under ‘Russian Monarchist 
Party’, Chapter one, footnote 132, p. 54. 
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wound its way from Red Square, where several thousand followers and leaders of 
the movement had gathered, along Malaia-Dmitrovka and Dolgorovka streets to 
Skorbiashchenskii monastery. Supporters sang ‘save God!’ and carried Orthodox 
crosses along the procession route. The interment of Gringmut occurred in the 
monastery that evening. Reportage from the event declared that ‘the meaning of this 
will be fixed in popular memory’,71 and emphasized the peaceful nature of the 
crowds.72 
 
Gringmut’s funeral was described by monarchist followers, not without some 
justification, as a mass event that attracted a broad cross-section of society.73 One 
sympathetic source estimated that over thirty thousand people were present: if this is 
accurate, then it suggests that the funeral was on a mass scale.74 This assessment 
seems high, though an important piece of surviving evidence is a series of 
                                                
71 Bogatyr’ mysli i dela: pamiati Vladimira Andreevicha Gringmuta (Moscow, 1913), pp. 287-295. 
Father Ioann Vostorgov repeatedly praised Gringmut in his own public appearances and played a 
prominent role in the development of the Gringmut cult.  
72 Ibid., p. 287.  
73 Vladimir Andreevich Gringmut: ocherk ego zhizni i deiatel’nosti, p. 119. 
74 Bogatyr’ mysli i dela, p. 294.  
 
Figure 9 Crowds gather in Moscow for Gringmut’s funeral, 1 October 1907, Vladimir 
Andreevich Gringmut: ocherk ego zhizni i deiatel’nosti (Moscow, 1913), p. 118.  
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photographs from the event, which show crowds of at least several thousand. The 
crowd attending the event appeared to be socially mixed. Smartly attired men, some 
in uniform, peasant women in headscarves, as well as the drably dressed and not 
clearly identifiable were all present amongst the throng of supporters carrying flags, 
many depicting the Russian standard and images of Gringmut. Leaders from dozens 
of provincial branches of the RMP were present, along with various delegates of 
other monarchist groups from across the empire. Also present were the governor-
general of Moscow, V. F. Dzhunkovskii, and Metropolitan Vladimir of Moscow and 
Kolomenskoe. The mixed social base of the demonstration was important, as the 
right were generally keen to portray a degree of mass support. This event was ‘cross 
estate’ (soslovie), aimed at both elites and the masses, appealing for unity via the use 
of transcendent symbols of Orthodoxy and nationality rather than political or social 
emblems.75  
 
 
 
                                                
75 Ibid., p. 290.  
 
Figure 10 Gringmut’s funeral procession, 1 October 1907, Vladimir Andreevich Gringmut: 
ocherk ego zhizni i deiatel’nosti (Moscow, 1913), p. 119.  
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The centrality of religion to the right’s rituals and symbols was also apparent 
in the tributes presented in memory of Gringmut at the funeral. Unlike Alexander II, 
Gringmut had died of natural causes, so it was not possible to present him as a 
martyr. Instead, he was described as a steadfast defender of ‘Russian’ values. 
Supporters, such as father Ioann Vostorgov, depicted him as a man of the people, 
representing the popular mood. In a speech delivered by Vostorgov at the funeral, he 
stressed that at this event:  
 
…in the crowds there were no idlers and senseless gatherings, there was, in 
place of this, a popular mood united in profound veneration and 
prayer...between us we have seen that the death of Vladimir Andreevich was 
felt by thousands of people, many circling his coffin, as the death was dear to 
native men, who have rarely shed so many pure and just tears’.76  
 
The targeting of enemies, a common feature among the Russian right, was present in 
these tributes. This included recourse to anti-Semitism, a frequent feature of more 
extreme factions. Vostorgov referred to the ‘despicable words of one Jew’ in the 
press, who had reportedly commented on the surprisingly low turnout at the funeral, 
a claim that Vostorgov vociferously denied in his own speech. Though the event 
appears to have passed off peacefully, the idea of a conflict between the ‘true 
Russians’ and their enemies was apparent in the presentation of this funeral.77 
 
 It is the legacy of Gringmut, rather than the funeral itself, which shows the 
growing distinction between regime and right with greater clarity. Whilst the 
development of a Gringmut cult was not in obvious conflict with the regime, 
followers widely criticized the status quo, and perceived an alarming decline in 
contemporary Russia, with Gringmut’s ‘mission’ to restore the nation one that had 
been cruelly curtailed. According to the chair of the Russian Monarchist Society, 
                                                
76 I. Vostorgov, Piat’ rechei v pamiat’ V. A. Gringmuta (Moscow, 1907), pp. 33-34.  
77 Ibid., pp. 33-34; I. Vostorgov, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, Vol. 3 (Moscow, 1915), pp. 347-349, 
for one of five speeches he made in 1907 commemorating the life and work of Gringmut; Vestnik 
Russkogo sobraniia, 8 October 1909, 25, pp. 1-2.  
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Boris Nazarevskii, writing in the newspaper Staraia Moskva (Old Moscow) his 
mission was to re-energize the Russian people in spirit and religion, as well as to 
create a party machine.78 At a requiem (panikhida) for Gringmut held at the 
Skorbiashchenskii monastery on 30 March 1908, a crowd of bishops, priests and 
members of the RMP sang monarchist hymns, including arias from the Glinka opera. 
They also listened to a speech given by URP member and right-wing commentator 
A. S. Shmakov, which opined on threats to Russia in the new era. Shmakov’s speech 
was more aggressive than Nazarevskii’s tribute: essentially, a lengthy criticism of 
the recently elected second Duma. This was only interested in ‘passing Jewish laws’ 
and stood as the foremost bridge between the self-realization of the Russian people 
and the spiritual degeneration of the nation. This echoed the ideas of Gringmut, who 
had been a virulent anti-Semite and opponent of the Duma system.79 As Gringmut 
had declared in an editorial in June 1906, the leadership of the monarchist movement 
would ‘carry out the will of the Tsar’ and would co-operate with the Duma only 
grudgingly. Gringmut’s legacy attracted diatribes against politics, and demonstrates 
the negative core of the cult, as his supporters widely decried the situation in 
contemporary Russia.80 
  
 The content of much of the Gringmut cult was not novel. However, in 
contrast to other conservative heroes such as Alexander III, frequently praised by 
right-wing groups such as the Russian Assembly, eulogizing Gringmut was a chance 
to deify a figure not merely of conservative conviction, but one who was specifically 
from the right.81 The secular aspects of the Gringmut cult emphasized his personal 
values as a dynamic and independent leader of the movement. He was presented not 
only as an outstanding figure, but the focus of all convictions and a warrior 
(bogatyr’).82 His supporters saw him as the ‘outstanding individual talent’ in the 
earliest years of the formation of a nationwide, mass scale monarchist movement, 
                                                
78 Bogatyr’ mysli i dela, p. 207.  
79 Moskovskie vedomosti, 1 April 1908, 76, p. 3.  
80 Moskovskie vedomosti, 4 June 1906, 141, p. 1; Gringmut, Sobranie statei, Vol. 3, pp. 173-178. 
81 Vestnik Russkogo sobraniia, 12 March 1909, 11, p. 8; 28 May 1909, 22/23, pp. 8-9. 
82 Ibid. 
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and wished to demonstrate this through his cult.83 Indeed, it was perhaps the closest 
the organized right in late imperial Russia came to demonstrating one of the core 
tenets associated with the rise of fascist and totalitarian regimes to power, that of a 
‘leadership cult’.84 This is not to deny that older symbolism was frequently apparent, 
as many of the symbols used by the RMP at Gringmut’s funeral and after were 
Russian Orthodox, but rather to suggest that emphasis was shifting towards a secular 
emphasis on ‘heroic’ individuals as well. However, Gringmut could not usurp the 
role of the Tsar himself, so this heroic role was necessary limited.85 
 
A series of book publications between 1910 and 1913 were an additional 
tribute dedicated to his memory. Gringmut’s collected works, consisting of essays, 
newspaper columns from Moskovskie vedomosti and letters from all over the 
Russian Empire addressed to him were re-published in collected form.86 Members of 
a variety of monarchist organizations, from not only the RMP, but many other 
provincial groups, wrote in to major monarchist newspapers and journals, including 
Russkoe znamia, Grazhdanin, Vestnik Russkogo sobraniia, as well as Gringmut’s 
own newspaper Moskovskie vedomosti. These made extravagant claims that 
Gringmut was the best monarchist and supreme leader of the movement – some even 
claimed he was a spiritual leader of the Russian nation.87 
 
 From the regime’s perspective, the Gringmut cult may have appeared 
harmless enough. Indeed the official badge of Gringmut’s RMP was dedicated to 
Nicholas II, bearing a quote attributed to him, ‘may my autocracy stay as of old’. 
However, many of the eventual targets of the criticism generated by the Gringmut 
cult, such as the State Duma, were products of the regime.88 Gringmut, along with 
right-wing leaders G. V. Butmi, A. I. Dubrovin and the commentator K. N. 
                                                
83 Rawson, Russian Rightists, pp. 32-33. 
84 Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, pp. 42, 197. 
85 Vladimir Andreevich Gringmut: ocherk ego zhizni i deiatel’nosti, pp. 78-79.  
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Gringmut, Sobranie statei, 1896-1907, 4 Vols.  
87 Bogatyr’ mysli i dela, p. 224; Mirnyi trud (10) 1907, pp. 185-192.  
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Paskhalov, was a monarchist who did not wish for any sort of representational 
system in Russia.89 He instead desired direct and ‘indivisible’ links between leaders, 
organizations and people, dispensing with any parliamentary system.90 He saw, 
above all, the RMP as an all-class movement, beyond mere political aims, and for 
ethnic Russians only. This relates to a wider point; much of the energy created by 
Gringmut’s deification had a negative focus, and was directed against the enemies of 
the Russian state, rather than in pursuit of creating a positive ideal. His followers did 
not view the status quo in Russia with optimism. Many requiems and assemblies 
held for Gringmut stressed the need to renovate Russia. According to one recent 
analyst, ‘he declared that the black hundred movement had a higher and greater aim: 
the desire for a national and religious revival of the Russian people’.91 
 
 Gringmut was headmaster at the Tsarevich Nikolai Lyceum in Moscow 
between 1870 and 1895. Playing on his previous role in life, the theme of Gringmut 
as teacher was prominent in a report from 30 September 1908, two days after his 
death. RMP member I. A. Kolesnikov had arrived in Moscow to open a school 
established in Gringmut’s name, aiming to carry on his brand of teachings. This 
reveals the importance of youth to the monarchist movements. Followers such as 
Kolesnikov attempted to suggest that Gringmut was more than a political leader; he 
was also a spiritual teacher of Russia’s youth. Continuing the appeal to the masses 
rather than elites from the funeral itself, the school was free, and ostensibly aimed at 
poor students. In these publications, supporters attempted to present Gringmut as a 
spiritual as well as a political figure. One quote described him as ‘the dear leader and 
unifier of the Russian people, father-warrior (bogatyr’) Gringmut’.92 In a similar 
example from July 1909, B. V. Nazarevskii reported to delegates at a conference in 
Moscow that a church school in Siberia had opened, primarily aimed at peasants, 
which gave special instruction on Gringmut’s life and teaching. Selected spiritual 
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88, p. 15.   
   
 157 
texts, Gringmut’s own works and pamphlets from the movement would be 
distributed amongst the students, as in the case of the Moscow school.93 
 
The final piece in the development of the 
cult was a large monument that was 
unveiled in the cemetery of the 
Skorbiashchenskii monastery in Moscow 
on 25 April 1910. Supporters claimed 
this part of the cult was operating on a 
purely religious basis, and reportage of 
the event presented a series of Orthodox 
rituals. Unlike at Gringmut’s funeral, the 
party organization of the RMP, which 
had declined by this stage, did not figure 
as a prominent presence at the 
unveiling.94 The monument was 
designed by the architect and artist (and 
himself a member of the right-wing 
movements) Viktor P. Vasnetsov, and created by stonemason M. P. Ovchinnikov 
working in his shop. The body of the monument was constructed from only two 
pieces of granite. The top section of the edifice was made out of one massive granite 
block hewn by stonemason V. I. Orlov into the shape of an Orthodox cross. Another 
large piece of granite formed the base, and was inscribed with words dedicated to V. 
A. Gringmut, ‘Orthodox Russian people: assemble, unite, pray’. The cross, which 
depicted icons of the Virgin Mary and the priest Ioann Bogoslov, was sculpted from 
solid bronze and raised separately from the granite fascia. It reportedly cost over 
6,000 rubles to produce.95 
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Figure 11 Gringmut’s monument unveiled in 
Mogilev, 25 April 1910, in Priamoi put’, 30 
April 1910, p. 31. 
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The unveiling of the memorial was a major event for a variety of monarchist 
groups. Though the RMP did not have a large presence, Grazhdanin reported how 
Vostorgov had given a speech to a delegation composed from a range of major 
monarchist groups, including the Mogilev branch of the URP, with over 2,000 
supporters present in all.96 Crowds had gathered to praise Gringmut’s life and works, 
chanting ‘Christ has risen! Christ has risen!’ and ‘God is with us’. Vostorgov 
declared at the unveiling of the monument, ‘It is wonderful to hear that today we 
speak of you: look on the cross in silence, hear us cry for “true resurrection”, hear 
us, and our words!’’97 Gringmut’s values, including his supposed veneration of 
Russia and the Russian people, commitment to Orthodoxy and nationalist ideology 
                                                
96 Grazhdanin, 2 May 1910, 15, pp. 11-12; Vostorgov, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, Vol. 3, pp. 340-
346.  
97 Priamoi put’, April 1910, pp. 30-31. 
 
Figure 12 The Gringmut monument unveiled to crowds of monarchists, Priamoi put’, 30 April 
1910, p. 30. 
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would live on, as supporters sought to ‘resurrect’ his ideas for the contemporary 
age.98  
 
 Not all monarchists were completely satisfied with the effusive praise that 
the cult provided. Whilst Mikhail Men’shikov recognized the personal qualities of 
‘will’ and ‘unwavering service’ that Gringmut had given to the monarchist 
movement, he saw him primarily as a man betrayed by dark forces from the era. 
Men’shikov, a regular contributor to Novoe vremia, considered that Gringmut had 
been ignored by Russia’s rulers, ‘not because he did not have anything to teach 
them, but because the state idea was largely calibrated around a great many 
bureaucratic goals. And therefore Gringmut, like the majority of our publicists, 
wrote mainly for the bureaucracy’. Gringmut’s death was interpreted by some on the 
right not as a sorrowful passing, but as a prelude to catastrophe, with Men’shikov 
claiming his life had demonstrated the weakness of the autonomous right.99 Other 
monarchist commentators did not miss the opportunity to criticize the status quo that 
the creation of the Gringmut cult afforded. One obituary by N. Chernikov, as well as 
mentioning Gringmut’s own ceaseless war with ‘enemies of Russian unity’, 
mentioned the widespread mistrust of the ‘Petersburg bureaucrats’ and the enemies 
of the Russian state operating within the regime.100 Though the cult appears to have 
been peaceful, there was some mixed criticism of the regime emerging when 
presenting Gringmut’s qualities after his death. 
 
Poltava, 1909: military victory and populist nationalism 
 
The Poltava bi-centennial celebrations, held in the spring of 1909 in celebration of 
the military victory over Charles XII’s Sweden, were an attempt by the imperial 
regime to disseminate the bond between Nicholas II and the people. Like the other 
great celebrations held between 1909 and 1913 to celebrate the Russian autocracy, 
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Poltava was organized on a large scale.101 The celebrations were a spectacular 
evocation of the power and appeal of the Romanov monarchy and monarchist 
values, taking place across the empire, and used modern methods of technology, 
including the cinema and the press, to distribute this message. In the related 
Borodino centennial of 1912, Aleksandr Khanzhonkov’s spectacular historical epic 
1812 opened in cinemas across the empire on the eve of the celebrations taking 
place. Poltava was accompanied by the mass publication of laudatory works under 
both public and private auspices. From the regime’s perspective, these celebrations 
were the perfect demonstrations of successful leadership and imperial unity under a 
monarchy, in celebration of a military victory that subsequently enhanced the 
prestige of the nascent Russian Empire. The related values of military might and 
heroism had resulted in a series of ceremonies celebrating the triumph and grandeur 
of the Romanov monarchy. They also had a social function, designed to demonstrate 
the closeness between Tsar and people, though in an idealized light.102 
 
Like many areas where rightists were particularly active, Poltava was a 
largely non-Russian area of the empire, in what is now Ukraine. Its ‘great Russian’ 
population accounted for around 2.6 per cent of the inhabitants of the region, with 
Ukrainians, known as ‘little Russians’ in the imperial nomenclature, accounting for 
around 93 per cent. The remainder of the population was composed of Jews (around 
4 per cent), and very small groups of Tatars, Poles, Germans and Belorussians.103 
Therefore, as elsewhere, these attempts to hold an anniversary based on ‘great 
Russian’ precepts drew a sharp distinction between the imperial regime and the 
increasingly political nation. Nevertheless, the right, like the regime, were greatly 
enthused by the Poltava project, not least as it demonstrated great pride in Russian 
military capability. A crucial feature was the triumphalism of many of the rituals. 
One ceremonial, held at the Saint Sampson church on 27 June 1909, celebrated pride 
                                                
101 K. N. Tsimbaev, ‘Pravoslavnaia tserkov’ i gosudarstvennye iubilei imperatorskoi Rossii’, 
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in Russia’s victory through a series of processions. At a liturgy in the cemetery of 
the church, a delegation including 97 members from the Poltava branch of the URP 
bore flags with images of Georgii Pobedonosets (the saint depicted on the URP 
badge, whose surname means the ‘bringer of victory’), and took part in a ritual in 
remembrance of the great victory. Delegates included N. E. Markov, one of the 
leaders of the UAM and delegate to the Third State Duma, who recalled the glorious 
military victory won by Peter the Great, and praised the greatness of the Russian 
people in winning this victory over a great power rival. Peasant choirs assembled 
and sang hymns to the Tsar; largely, these were refrains from Glinka’s opera, giving 
thanks to the Tsar and to God.104   
 
It was not only right-wing radicals, but also more moderate nationalist 
groups who were present at the ceremonials, such as the Nationalist Party, as well as 
the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists. The appearance of Nicholas II at the 
battlefield in Poltava, the site of the victory two hundred years earlier, at the end of 
June 1909 gave him an opportunity to show himself as a leader in the style of Peter 
the Great, the military icon who had defeated Charles XII of Sweden in the great 
battle. His meeting with leading officials of the Preobrazhenskii regiment on June 25 
meant that Nicholas II could show himself as Peter’s heir by establishing his 
credentials as a military figurehead. The following day in June, a meeting between 
Nicholas, the Prime Minister Petr Stolypin and a large crowd of peasants drawn 
from the surrounding region (numbering around 4,200 according to some reports) 
gave the Tsar the chance to show his stature as a man of the people.105 In the fields 
of Poltava, peasants could approach Nicholas and, according to the pro-regime 
propaganda, feel at one with the autocracy itself. Monarchist commentators also 
linked the victory with the unity of the Russian Empire in the contemporary age. L. 
Volkov described how Poltava demonstrated the glory of ‘great Russia’ over ‘little 
Russian’ nations, including Ukraine (though quite how this was linked to a military 
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victory won against Sweden, Volkov declined to explain).106 The veneration of the 
‘most holy Tsar’ Nicholas II and the imperial family, the promotion of Orthodox 
religiosity and the celebration of Russian nationhood were all features derivative of 
those used by the autocracy.107 In this sense, the right-wing message was not a 
challenge to the socio-political structure of Russia, but rather a reiteration of it. Icon 
processions, choirs, chants, and demonstrations married ancient themes of 
Orthodoxy with the presentation of a national-religious myth; this was a central 
element of both the imperial and the rightist scenario.  
 
 Looking beyond superficial thematic similarities, how close was this 
confluence between the radical right and the regime? An important distinction arises 
when considering the particular focus of the celebrations. The populist instincts of 
the right can be seen from the ceremonials, demonstrations and rituals surrounding 
Poltava, which celebrated the triumph as one of the Russian narod. In one ritual, 
Count A. I. Konovnitsyn, the leader of the Odessa branch of the URP, led a 
delegation of around 50 URP activists to Main Square in the city of Poltava, and 
then to the grounds of the Podvor’ia monastery on 28 June. Delegates including A. 
S. Shmakov, Bishop Makarii and N. E. Markov unfurled flags in front of a group of 
URP members, and took Swedish banners to tombs in the grounds of the monastery. 
The victory was held to be a moment of great national – and popular – historical 
awakening.108 Private political functions, such as a meeting between members of the 
Kiev branch of the Russian Assembly in April 1909, also celebrated the Russian 
victory over Sweden as a moment of great ‘national and historical awakening’, and a 
‘victory also for the great Russian spirit’.109 Religious figures on the right, such as 
Ioann Vostorgov, wrote how the ‘destiny’ of Russia had led to a ‘love of truth, of 
church and observance’ amongst the Russian people. It was the unique national 
characteristics of the Russian people that had, in Vostorgov’s view, secured a great 
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military victory. Patriotic and religious feeling amongst Russia’s people had made it 
exceptional, and marked it out for greatness.110 
 
 A special commission organized by the Iaroslavl branch of the URP wished 
to mobilize all members of the group in support of the celebrations. A declaration 
from the group gives an insight into the plans. A procession, to be held in Iaroslavl 
in late June, would involve a delegation from this group carrying 500 flags, 
displaying slogans promoting the significance of Poltava as a ‘national-historical 
event’. Flags would depict Georgii Pobedonosets, who appeared on the official seal 
of the URP, as well as Russian and Swedish national ensigns, all in memory of a 
victory held by these groups to be a moment of Russia’s historical awakening. The 
‘wisdom’ of the Westernizing leader, Peter the Great, was particularly singled out 
for praise. One tribute from a rightist commentator went, ‘memory of the feats of our 
warrior (Peter) must be used for unity, and conveniently refreshed for popular 
memory’. Peter’s legacy as a winner and warrior from 1709 was celebrated above 
any disputations that his legacy as a Westernizer Tsar had compromised Russian 
conservative tradition.111 Such a practice shows that right-wing ritual practices could 
be subversive. The opportunity to venerate the institution of the autocracy trumped 
any possible dispute over whether the legacy of the Westernizing Tsar had betrayed 
Russia’s conservative heritage.112    
 
 The Iaroslavl wing of the URP enthusiastically took part in the choral singing 
and parades organized by the regime at Poltava. The branch went to great lengths to 
show that the group was carrying out ritual practices in support of tsarism. The 
permission of the authorities and spiritual leaders, including the Poltava governor, 
military detachments and bishops was sought in order to make sure that the URP 
would comply with the projects of the Poltava district administration, with which it 
declared a complete unity of aims. The wish was to hold celebrations that would be 
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‘coordinated with the government programme’ in celebrating the role of the Russian 
people in this great military victory.113 Presenting a confluence with the regime was 
easier in this case, as the ‘enemy’ in this scenario was an external threat to national 
unity, rather than a political or religious enemy destroying the Russian state from 
within. Hence, the criticism of the Russian land and state in the present day that 
rightists displayed on occasion was necessarily less pronounced in the Poltava 
celebrations114 
 
 Yet in spite of this, rightists were not always welcome at many of the 
regime’s official ceremonies. Whilst Nicholas II praised the rightists present as his 
‘true Russian subjects’, many viewed the forces of the autonomous right with some 
suspicion. A report in the newspaper Rossiia (Russia) on 26 June 1909, the paper of 
the Ministry of the Interior, played down the presence of URP activists at the St. 
Petersburg celebrations, instead drawing attention to crowds of peasants. The 
peasantry was the preferred subject of this ‘national awakening’. Why might this 
have been the case? The peasantry was portrayed as obedient, compliant and devout; 
they were easier targets to shape national feeling around, rather than autonomous 
political groups mobilizing, even if apparently on behalf of the autocracy. Therefore 
differences between regime and right were often more, rather than less, pronounced 
in nationalist celebrations.115 
 
Bessarabia centenary, 1912: nationalism and identity on the imperial periphery 
 
Bessarabia was another area in the empire where Russians were in a distinct 
minority. Kishinev, scene of the destructive pogrom in 1903, had a 45 per cent 
Jewish population, and large Romanian and Moldovan communities.116 The UAM 
took a special interest in the celebrations marking one hundred years since 
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Bessarabia became part of the 
Russian Empire, held between May 
and June 1912. Bessarabia was a 
territory annexed after the war of 
1806-1812 against Turkey, and 
incorporated many Orthodox 
believers into the Russian Empire, a 
point of fundamental importance in 
the right’s construction of the 
centennial rituals. Bessarabia, like the 
more famous Poltava and Romanov 
celebrations, was designed to 
demonstrate the greatness of the 
Russian Empire, and the Russian 
people.117 How to organize the 
celebrations set off fierce arguments 
from two different groups behind the 
centennial. Central to this was a 
conception of Russian identity, integral to the right-wing view of how the 
commemoration was to be presented. What emerged were two concepts of 
nationalism, one associated with the council originally organizing the centennial, 
and another associated with independent right-wing tendencies in the region.  
 
Arguments over Bessarabia’s identity, and its place in the Russian Empire, 
showed the controversy that the nationality question could engender. A. N. 
Krupenskii, a marshal of the nobility in Bessarabia province from 1908 to 1912, was 
the leader of the official council for the organization of the centenary, which first 
met on 10 May 1911. His view, like others on the council, was that the centenary 
should celebrate Bessarabia’s position within the Russian Empire as part of a ‘family 
of peoples’ (sem’ia narodov). Krupenskii perceived Bessarabia’s role as one of the 
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Figure 13 Bessarabia in 1883. 
<http://www.berdichev.org/index.html> (accessed 
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many members of the imperial family. In contrast was an autonomous right-wing 
vision.118  This was, most of all, associated with the right-wing delegate to the Third 
and Fourth State Dumas from Bessarabia and the leader of the UAM, Vladimir 
Purishkevich, with one of his most notable associates in the region being the monk 
Serafim (Chichagov), Bishop of Kishinev and a leader of the Bessarabia branch of 
the URP.119 Echoing the official position, right-wingers in Bessarabia supported the 
‘nationalization’ of Bessarabia, in essence a variation of the regime’s Russification 
policy. However, in contrast to the official organizational council, the radical right, 
led by the UAM leadership in the region, and supported by Serafim’s propaganda 
activities, believed that it was religion, rather than nation, that was the key to the 
successful promotion of the centenary of Bessarabia’s unity with the Russian 
Empire. This was particularly due to Bessarabia’s mixed demographics. Serafim 
perceived Bessarabia was not only separate from Moldova, but had a culture closer 
to that of the Russian people, due to the Orthodox religiosity of many of its 
inhabitants (for Serafim, as with many rightists, Russian meant also Orthodox).120  
 
 The importance of whether the accent of the ceremonials lay on religion or 
nation can be seen from the activities of the right in the run-up to the official 
celebrations. Serafim’s hosting of meetings amongst Bessarabia’s population that 
inspired the need for political and social revolution were of no small concern to 
Krupenskii and several of his associates on the official council. Serafim had been 
actively spreading a message amongst the population in Kishinev that Russia was 
undergoing a process of ‘spiritual re-birth’.121 The targets of Serafim’s speeches 
were mainly peasants, whom he considered to be good subjects of the Tsar. This 
concerned the committee, as there was a great potential for spontaneous and popular 
demonstration should Serafim be successful in arousing vitriol in the peasants of 
Kishinev. Serafim held that the ‘truly Orthodox’ subjects of Nicholas needed to be 
united, and to achieve this he believed that the rituals of the centenary should be 
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constructed around a religious framework. Activists from the UAM and the URP 
lobbied the organizational council to change the potential presentation of the 
ceremonials during the first half of 1912. Midway through the year, Krupenskii 
resigned from his position as the chair of the committee, probably due to pressure 
from the right. After this, the right had more leeway to take a greater role in the 
planning of the ceremonials.122 Unlike other celebrations from around the same time, 
such as the Poltava bicentennial or the Romanov tercentenary, the right was not 
merely present at the Bessarabia centennial, but took a more direct role in shaping 
how the ceremonials would be conducted in the region. Purishkevich and Serafim’s 
pressure had told in producing a re-shuffled committee, one more receptive to right-
wing ideas. 
 
 The ceremonials in Kishinev that followed demonstrate the rightist 
conviction that religion was the central lodestone around which to construct the 
identity of Bessarabia, given the strong presence of Orthodox believers. Orthodoxy 
was portrayed as the bridge between Bessarabia and the rest of the empire, as it was 
in Kholm, where rightists placed pressure on the government to take action against 
the Roman Catholic population on the part of ‘true Russian men’ (istinno russkie 
liudi).123 Furthermore, religion played a major role in the Tsar’s own view of the 
events. An official bulletin celebrating Bessarabia’s incorporation into the Russian 
Empire, dated 5 May 1912 and signed by Nicholas II himself, noted ‘the memorable 
event that saw hundreds of thousands of Orthodox Christians of the same faith take 
on total Russian citizenship’.124 Rightist leaders such as Serafim were confident in 
the success of the celebrations, especially given that the Tsar agreed with their 
interpretation of events. On 16 May 1912 a right-wing demonstration, a jubilee 
parade, was held in Kishinev. By eight in the morning, a crowd had gathered outside 
the cathedral, led by Serafim, though accompanied by many other priests and 
bishops. After the liturgy, prayers were sung to the Tsar and to Russia. The 
                                                
122 Löwe, ‘Political Symbols and Rituals’, pp. 455-456; Kushko, ‘Ritualy imperii i natsii’, pp. 301-
302.  
123 For a detailed analysis of the Kholm case, see Weeks, Nation and State, pp. 172-192. 
124 GARF, F. 102, 4-e d-vo, op. 121, 1912 g., d. 179, l. 11: biuro russkoi pechati, SpB, signed 
‘Nikolai’ (Tsar), 5 May 1912. 
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procession then took to the town square, where members of the Kishinev branch of 
the URP, students from the nearby school, peasant choirs and various townsfolk had 
gathered. A central element in this ceremonial was the rightist desire to claim mass 
support, and to function purely as a voice for ‘the people’, ostensibly in opposition 
to the intelligentsia. An editorial in Purishkevich’s journal Priamoi put’ noted with 
some pleasure that ‘the intelligentsia and the middle classes (sredniaia publika) were 
excluded from the service’.125 One of the key distinctions between the right and the 
establishment was the use of such populist messages.126 
 
 Rightist ritual activity continued in Bessarabia once the centenary had 
passed. In December 1912, Priamoi put’ reported on the work of the Patriotic 
League in Bessarabia, a group related to the UAM. After the panikhida, dedicated to 
‘victims of the years of troubles’ (smutnye gody), prayers were offered to the health 
of the Tsar. Like the Gringmut funeral, the panikhida here demonstrated the 
centrality of the revolution of 1905 to the monarchist mindset. In the services held, 
the present era was referred to as the new smutnoe vremia, a second ‘time of 
troubles’, after the first between the death of Fedor Ivanovich in 1598 and the 
establishment of the Romanov dynasty in 1613. I. V. Malinovskii, the chair of the 
Kishinev branch of the UAM, welcomed the forthcoming collections of patriotic 
holidays, and dedicated his speech to the victims of the revolution of 1905. The 
UAM re-iterated its aim to ‘unite the Christian population of Bessarabia’. The focus 
was on both Tsar and people. As in the example of Sergei Aleksandrovich cited 
above, the idea of ‘victimhood’ is important. The suffering ‘good’ people had died at 
the hands of villainous revolutionaries, much like Sergei himself.127 This was an 
excellent opportunity for the UAM to portray a vision of cross-class unity, a theme 
rightists widely used. When the imperial family was welcomed by a delegation of 
                                                
125 Priamoi put’, May 1912, p. 750. For a typical example of this anti-intelligentsia ideology, see B. 
V. Nazarevskii writing in Moskovskie vedomosti, 20 July 1906, 181, p. 2.  
126 Priamoi put’, May 1912, p. 750.  
127 Priamoi put’, December 1912, pp. 220-221.  
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right-wing groups in Kishinev in June 1914, love for Russian religion as well as love 
for the Russian Tsar was proclaimed.128 
 
 However, these visions were much contested and inflamed rival 
nationalisms, as can be seen from counterdemonstrations which occurred throughout 
1912. The UAM view that a religious and chauvinistic campaign would unite the 
Russian elements in Bessarabia also had the effect of bringing out into the open 
Romanian nationalist groups. The transformation of the town centre in Loov (Ismail 
district) included the public display of Russian symbols, such as flags and Orthodox 
crosses, and the illumination of the town square in the colours of the imperial 
standard at night. On 6 May at two o’clock in the afternoon, cries and shouts were 
heard from the Romanian section of the town, together with ‘the sound of a funeral 
march’. A large crowd of passers-by had gathered around the wharf area. This 
included a sizeable group in Romanian national dress, with a full brass band playing 
the Romanian anthem. A counterdemonstration by members of the crowd playing 
the Russian national anthem seems to have raised the temperature of the events, 
whereupon the police were called. They asked the pro-Romanian demonstrators to 
leave, orders with which they peacefully complied.129 Police reports monitoring the 
mood of the people in Bessarabia made frequent reference throughout May and June 
1912 to the upturn in Romanian nationalism and anti-Russian demonstrations. 
Rather than showing a united pro-Russian front amongst the townsfolk as was 
hoped, the officially organized celebrations helped to exacerbate divisions amongst 
many residents, though there was notably little in the way of actual violence.130 
 
 A council receptive to right-wing ideas had arisen as a result of rightist 
pressure placed on the centennial’s organizers. But in fact, the Bessarabia example 
can also point towards several limitations of rightist rituals. Rightists mainly utilized 
pre-Petrine forms of worship: Russian Orthodox hymns and ceremonials, slogans in 
Old Church Slavonic, liturgies and hymns. These rituals in Bessarabia were 
                                                
128 Vestnik Soiuza russkogo naroda, June 1914, 186, p. 17. 
129 GARF, F. 102, 4-e d-vo, op. 121, 1912 g., d. 179, l. 16: Russkie vedomosti, 28 May 1912. 
130 This demonstration is referenced again in police reports in ibid., ll. 2-2 ob., 6-6 ob., 18-18 ob.   
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structured around the Church. Modern ideologies of nation building were largely 
absent from right-wing discourse. Instead they stuck to a strictly prescribed high 
culture; rituals and symbols emphasizing heroism and asceticism that appeared 
authentic to their own members, but were of limited appeal in a multi-confessional, 
poly-ethnic empire. In Bessarabia, where citizens whom the UAM and other right-
wing groups would have considered ‘true Russians’ were in the minority, this was 
especially limiting. Indeed, rival nationalist groups were if anything provoked by the 
right’s activities. The rightist-organized celebrations led to a more divisive set of 
ceremonials than may have been the case had the regime’s original plans been 
followed. This highlighted a disjuncture between right-wing ideas of popular 
observance and realities in the periphery of the Russian Empire. 
 
The Romanov tercentenary, 1913: apotheosis of imperialism  
 
We turn finally to the grandest example of ‘jubileemania’, that of the Romanov 
tercentenary, the celebrations of which took place between February and June 1913. 
This event assumed an even greater scale than previous celebrations, and was 
accompanied by a rush of books, leaflets and other promotional materials, 
celebrating the importance of the event and its relevance to Russian history.131 
Rightists, like a variety of other social and political groups, were present at many of 
the festivals. The tercentenary celebrations demonstrate the close thematic 
relationship between the right and the autocracy, but also reveal other telling aspects 
of the relationship between official and populist monarchism.  
 
 The tercentenary plans excited monarchist groups, who, on hearing the 
announcements from the regime, immediately created their own projects to celebrate 
the tercentenary.132 What followed was the convening of a council, the Committee of 
United Monarchist Organizations, which met on 5 February to discuss their plans. 
                                                
131 An extended analysis of the tercentenary from a more general perspective can be found in 
Wortman, Scenarios of Power, Vol. 2, pp. 439-480.  
132 ‘Okruzhnoe poslanie komiteta monarkhicheskikh organizatsii po ustroistvu prazdnovaniia 300-
letiia doma romanovykh’, in Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol. 2, p. 301. 
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This would bring together delegates from the URP, UAM, Russian Monarchist 
Union, Russian Assembly and a variety of other provincial monarchist groups. The 
symbolism that would be used, and variety of rituals planned, closely followed the 
autocracy’s own projects. The flags to be carried at a procession in St. Petersburg on 
22 February would feature portraits of past Tsars, as well as Nicholas II, and display 
the official standard of the Russian Empire. The parades following on 23 and 24 
February would include ‘traditional’ features of monarchist demonstrations, such as 
peasant choirs, which represented popular support for the autocracy. Also featuring 
were more modern methods of mass communication, including the distribution of 
pamphlets, use of primitive cinemas and the performing of plays. However, in spite 
of claims to present popular support for the autocracy, the meeting of the assembly 
of monarchist groups, convening on the 24th, would feature a strict ticketing policy. 
Therefore, one must critically regard the UAM central committee’s concomitant 
claims of openness, as in reality a degree of selection was enforced in terms of who 
attended this ‘popular’ event.133 
 
 The widespread participation of monarchist groups in ceremonials held 
across the empire meant that the movement had momentarily to put aside the 
factionalism that had plagued it for years, and show a united front. Not only in St. 
Petersburg, but in cities across the empire, including Iaroslavl, Kostroma and 
Nizhnii Novgorod, the right mobilized in celebration of the autocracy, during both 
the February and May celebrations.134 The main council organizing right-wing 
involvement, the Sixth All-Russian Union of Russian Men, followed a five-day 
period of celebrations in St. Petersburg from 19-23 February 1913. The key rightists 
present in this five-day series of events were N. E. Markov, V. M. Purishkevich and 
N. F. Geiden, a leader of the Russian Assembly. However, not all monarchist leaders 
attended these celebrations. A. I. Dubrovin, the leader of the URP from 1905-1912 
                                                
133 Ibid., pp. 302-303.  
134 ‘Okruzhnoe poslanie soiuza russkogo naroda otdelam soiuza russkogo naroda i monarkhicheskim 
organizatsiiam, vkhodiashchim v ego sostav’, in Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol 2, p. 325; Vestnik 
Soiuza russkogo naroda, 27 May 1913, 143, pp. 1-12; 5 June 1913, 144, pp. 1-4; Moskovskie 
vedomosti, 22 May 1913, 117, p. 2; 25 May 1913, 119, p. 2; 26 May 1913, 120, pp. 1-3; 28 May 
1913, 121, p. 2.  
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and chair of the All-Russian Dubrovinist Union of Russian People from 1912-1917, 
was not present amongst the monarchist delegation. According to UAM propaganda, 
he had declined an invitation to be part of the ceremonials, and was not deliberately 
omitted.135 However, the resulting congress was united only in name, rather than 
spirit, given that significant figures were absent.136 Afterwards, on 24 February, a 
reception of URM leaders met in Kazan Square, with significant figures of Church 
and state, such as Grigorii (Bakhnin) and the Metropolitan of Moscow, Vladimir 
(Bogoiavlenskii), present amongst crowds of UAM activists. The festivals gave the 
opportunity to praise the autocracy, and the string of Russian military successes that 
had occurred under the Romanov dynasty. Most notably, these included the victories 
against Napoleon at Borodino and the triumph at Poltava.  
 
 Newspaper reports on a number of processions held from February to May 
make it apparent that the symbolism and rituals used encompassed primarily 
traditional practices, such as the peasant choir, Orthodox liturgies and processions to 
cathedrals. That the celebrations emphasized such religious symbolism exemplified 
how emblems of Russian Orthodox religiosity were central to the right’s 
demonstrations. Propaganda drew special attention to the religious elements of the 
assembled right-wing groups, including the appearance of various holy men, use of 
liturgies, and the mobilization of the Russian narod under God.137 Figures from the 
episcopate sympathetic to the right participated in the ceremonials; one was 
Germogen (Dolganev), Bishop of Saratov and Tsaritsyn from 1903 until 1912. In a 
procession to Moscow, Germogen spread news amongst the region’s peasants of the 
‘spiritual enlightenment and missionary organizations’ that the URP aimed to 
promote.138 The banners of the URP and UAM were decorated with Old Church 
Slavonic lettering – representing the glory of ancient Rus’ rather than the current 
time of troubles – and emblems of both God and the Tsar. In the absence of new 
                                                
135 Priamoi put’, March 1913, p. 153; ‘VI vserossiiskii s”ezd russkikh liudei 19-23 fevralia 1913 
goda’, in Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol 2, p. 305.  
136 Ibid., pp. 306-309, 312.  
137 Novoe vremia, 20 May 1913, 13357, p. 1; Vestnik Soiuza russkogo naroda, 18 May 1913, 142, p. 
9; ‘VI vserossiiskii s”ezd russkikh liudei’, in Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol 2, p. 307. 
138 Novoe vremia, 24 April 1913, 13331, p. 3. 
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ideas, the UAM had appropriated the existing visual signatures of the Russian 
Orthodox Church.139  
 
 At a banquet held for the upper ranks of state, church and marshals of the 
nobility in St. Petersburg on 22 February, both the URP and UAM were present, and 
accorded the special privilege of witnessing the procession of the imperial family 
through the halls of the Winter Palace. Whilst other political groups were omitted, 
Nicholas II’s favourable view of the monarchists accorded them a prime place in the 
celebrations. In contrast to the Bessarabia celebrations outlined above, it was the 
Romanov regime itself that had provided the right with a stage upon which to 
demonstrate their close thematic congruence with the autocracy. V. F. 
Dzhunkovskii, the governor-general of Moscow, noted Nicholas II’s granting of a 
request from Purishkevich to lead a delegation of 1,320 UAM activists to the Winter 
Palace, where they would meet with the Tsar himself, on 24 February.140 This went 
ahead, and shown the Tsar’s preference for right-wing groups to take the central role 
of all political associations, given their agreement with his own convictions.141 It 
should be noted, however, that though the UAM were accorded this special favour, 
they were not allowed to present bread and salt to the Tsar, a preferred element of 
the ritual they had planned.142 This was a partial rather than total toleration of the 
right-wing groups. 
 
 Elsewhere, ceremonials held across the empire afforded the right the 
opportunity to promote their own civic culture. We can see that ideas of charity and 
social work, which several rightist civic groups stressed played a key role in their 
activities, were also present in these celebrations. The right presented its own 
involvement in the tercentenary as one that would project virtuous ideas of social 
responsibility, as well as the enforcement of law and order. Many of these themes 
came from the right’s entwinement with religious movements and ideas. 
                                                
139 Löwe, ‘Political Symbols and Rituals’, pp. 460-461.  
140 V. F. Dzhunkovskii, Vospominaniia, Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1998), pp. 154-156; ‘VI vserossiiskii s”ezd 
russkikh liudei’, in Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol. 2, p. 321.  
141 Dzhunkovskii, Vospominaniia, Vol. 2, p. 155.  
142 Ibid., p. 155.  
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Germogen’s passage to Moscow during the tercentenary had the aim of educating 
the peasant population, through spreading a message of Christian virtue.143 In 
contrast, militancy against enemies was a preferred theme for other cassocked men 
associated with the right. Father Ioann Vostorgov’s report on the ceremonials in 
Tserkovnye vedomosti stressed anti-Catholicism and the supremacy of Russian 
Orthodoxy as the true faith. Russian nationality and the triumph, victimhood and 
heroism of the Russian people were all key themes in his report.144 There was 
another side to the rightist presentation; this was the success of the autocracy, and 
Russia’s necessity to wage ceaseless war against cosmopolitans, foreigners and 
intelligentsia who yearned to destroy it. In one example, a reading from the chair of 
the Kholm branch of the URP opined on the threat that Poles – meaning, Roman 
Catholics – posed to the Tsar’s true subjects. Like the Jewish citizens of the empire, 
such opposition could not be tolerated. The anti-national minority instincts of 
rightists had apparently not changed much since 1905.145 
 
Looking beyond the obvious similarities with the regime, including the 
religiosity, celebration of the autocracy and use of Russian chauvinism, we can see 
further congruities between the regime and the right from the tercentenary 
celebrations. By February 1913, when the celebrations were at their height in St. 
Petersburg and across the empire, the right’s committees and plenaries organizing 
their involvement in the ceremonials only stressed congruence with the Romanov 
dynasty. One URP leader even described the ascension of the Romanov dynasty to 
the throne as a moment of national awakening. Criticism of the Tsar’s advisors and 
even Nicholas II was occurring in private circles of the right, but in public the Tsar 
was treated more generously.146 Rightist groups such as the URP seemed uncritically 
to adapt the iconography of the regime, and use even older emblems from an 
imagined ‘golden age’ including past ‘heroic’ Tsars such as Alexander III, and 
                                                
143 ‘VI vserossiiskii s”ezd russkikh liudei’, in Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol 2, p. 322.  
144 Tserkovnye vedomosti, 9 February 1913, 6, appendices, pp. 265-271.  
145 ‘VI vserossiiskii s”ezd russkikh liudei’, in Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol 2, pp. 308, 311; 
Vestnik Soiuza russkogo naroda, 27 May 1913, 143, p. 10. 
146 One analysis of this dissent is Podbolotov, ‘Monarchists Against Their Monarch’. The private 
rather than public nature of much of this criticism should be noted: Nicholas II may have been 
publicly praised but he was not widely toasted in private monarchist circles.   
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biblical figures such as the Virgin Mary. This indicates that a genuinely original 
symbolic language on the part of the right had not been created by 1913, and that 
furthermore, the right would be tolerated at official celebrations, albeit uneasily.147  
 
In disseminating the message of the might and splendour of the Romanov 
monarchy, the propaganda activities of the right celebrated the popular relevance of 
the monarchist autocracy. The public activities of the right entailed nothing less than 
total support for untrammelled autocracy, a vision that did not encompass either the 
Duma or other representative systems.148 5,000 copies of a text called Votsarenie 
doma romanovykh (Reign of the House of the Romanovs) were to be published.149 
Elsewhere, the commemorations involved the creation of mementoes of the event, 
such as the minting of celebratory medals bearing portraits of the imperial family. 
These were distributed in September 1913 to all members of the URP that had 
participated in the tercentenary celebrations, and were available to purchase from the 
central council for 80 kopeks.150 Whilst such gestures no doubt pleased activists, 
whether such activities reflected a wider popular monarchism is uncertain. This is in 
contrast to the February ceremonials in which the UAM and URP enthusiastically 
participated, which were presented in rightist propaganda as holidays ‘for the 
people’ with the aim of representing a majority who had been long oppressed by 
mendacious internal enemies and left-wing political machinations.151 There was 
however a sharp contrast between this enthusiastic public participation and more 
pessimistic private views. This is evident from one telegram from Purishkevich to 
Count A. A. Bobrinskii, dated 4 June 1913, which remarked on the link between the 
celebrations and fear of revolution: 
 
Count, we do not dare to sleep, we should not follow the example of the 
Russian government, which, returning from the Romanov ceremony, we 
                                                
147 ‘VI vserossiiskii s”ezd russkikh liudei’, in Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol. 2, p. 323.  
148 Ibid., p. 316.  
149 Ibid., p. 317.  
150 ‘[Ob”iavlenie glavnogo soveta SRN o vozmozhnosti priobreteniia medali v pamiat’ 300-letiia 
doma romanovykh]’, in Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol 2, p. 332; GARF, F. 116, op. 2, d. 9, l. 78 
ob.  
151 ‘VI vserossiiskii s”ezd russkikh liudei’, in Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol. 2, p. 314.  
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believe, is under a hypnotic picture that all is calm in the countryside. We 
need to understand the psychology of the Russian crowds and the masses of 
the people, which today cry in ecstasy “hurrah!” but tomorrow will approach 
with red flags.152  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the sphere of public ritual and demonstrations, the regime had a clearly 
inconsistent attitude towards the ultra-right. Dzhunkovskii’s account of the 
Romanov tercentenary reflected the attitude of many local officials; this was an 
equivocal view of the ceremonial activities and rituals of the right. This trend also 
emerges from many police reports; though the idea that right-wing activity needed to 
be contained, rather than eradicated completely, is especially telling as to how many 
observers in Russian administration viewed their activities. Away from St. 
Petersburg or Moscow, rightist activity on the imperial periphery was more of a 
threat, especially considering that the Russian Empire was under-governed in the 
late imperial period. This can be seen from Bessarabia and Odessa, where the 
importance of geography, demographics and local rather than national factors played 
a significant role. Such factors should not be underestimated; the activities of right-
wing activists were not static, but adapted to reflect local concerns. Events in 
Bessarabia, Kiev or Odessa show a different ‘right’ to that in St. Petersburg and 
Moscow; the former was often more militant in tone, and their visions of conflict 
were encouraged by the social composition of the cities and towns which they 
inhabited. A ritual demonstration occurring in a heavily Jewish area would use 
different themes, more redolent of Russian Orthodoxy, or especially Russian 
nationhood. Yet other provincial activities appeared to be more pacific.  Even 
though Poltava was a largely non-Russian area, the scenario here mirrored the St. 
Petersburg-based Romanov tercentenary celebrations.  
 
                                                
152 Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnykh aktov (RGADA), F. 1412, op. 2, d. 57, ll. 2-4: V. M. 
Purishkevich (St. Petersburg), to Count A. A. Bobrinskii (St. Petersburg), 4 June 1913; published in 
Kir’ianov (ed.), ‘Perepiska i drugie dokumenty pravykh (1911-1913 gody)’, Voprosy istorii, 11-12 
(1999), p. 127. 
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The creation of right-wing identities in a poly-ethnic and multi-
denominational empire with growing political and minority nationality awareness – 
and by this stage, not only amongst the educated elites – was one of the most 
compelling challenges of Russian modernity. A general feature is the distinction 
between right-wing radicalism and the Tsarist status quo that these activities 
demonstrate. Though several features of right-wing public activity appeared largely 
to copy the thematic appeals of tsarism, the similarity of monarchist emblems 
generated tensions between the regime and the right. The very appearance of the 
right displayed a lack of confidence in the imperial regime to safeguard ‘true 
Russian’ values in the era of crisis. This is reflected by subtle shifts in the visions of 
the people and state presented. Images of Tsar and people played a prominent role in 
the scenarios of both the autocracy and the independent right, but the latter shifted 
emphasis towards the narod, as well as Nicholas II. The inadequately developed 
symbolic and political emblems of the far right, some of which were derivative of 
the regime’s own religious and popular ideals, had, in the long run, a detrimental 
effect on the right’s ability to mobilize. The right, instead, placed much of its energy 
into creating negative emblems, pursuing ‘enemies of the people’, groups which 
included Jews and bureaucrats.153 Unlike certain right-wing tendencies in twentieth-
century Europe, the Russian right did not find genuinely popular symbols and rituals 
with wide social appeal, and ended up caught between the ideas of elitist gentry 
organizations and an emerging, though incomplete, ideology of populist nationalism. 
These shortcomings had the ultimate result that by 1914 and the revolutions of 1917 
the right was much depleted as an independent force, and also divided a potential 
base of support from the autocracy that rightists claimed to support. Such failures 
left in tatters the right’s desire to unite the Russian Empire together as an army of 
many millions, and also undermined the autocracy that it wished to defend. 
                                                
153 O. Figes and B. Kolonitskii, Interpreting the Russian Revolution: The Language and Symbols of 
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Chapter Five  
 
Russia Renewed – Right-Wing Visions of Civic Society 
 
It was not only through violence and conflict that radical rightists sought to 
transform Russian society. This chapter will focus on the understanding and creation 
of right-wing civic society, defined here as autonomous associations, non-political as 
well as political, operating outside of government control and working to develop 
bonds of association between members united around central ideas. I term this civic 
rather than civil society to demonstrate that these were decidedly ‘uncivil’ ideas, and 
show that mass politics in the Russian Empire had illiberal potentials and outcomes.1 
Right-wing associations, like a wide variety of other political and social groups and 
their activists, demonstrated nationalist, exclusionary ideas that contributed to 
destructive social conflicts. Whilst study of civil society has long been a fashionable 
topic, it has usually been interpreted as a liberal phenomenon, and very rarely used 
to analyze right-wing activity.2 However, as Susanne Hohler has recently assessed, 
there was a ‘dark side’ to civil society in late imperial Russia.3 ‘Uncivil movements’ 
and ‘contentious politics’ need to be included in analysis of civil society. Groups on 
the right inculcated bonds of association, trust and shared ideals in their members as 
much as liberal and left organizations; one should aim for an understanding of how 
these processes work by focusing on cases from the ‘dark side’ of civic society’s 
history.4 Like the campaigns to the State Duma, and the symbols and rituals 
                                                
1 I agree with Hillis that the outcomes of civic society were not always positive, and generated 
destructive as well as creative energy, hence the use of this term. See Hillis, Children of Rus’, p. 16.  
2 The literature on this subject is vast. A few contributions that have informed the below analysis are: 
L. Engelstein, ‘The Dream of Civil Society: The Law, the State, and Religious Toleration’, in 
Slavophile Empire: Imperial Russia’s Illiberal Path (Ithaca, NY and London, 2009), pp. 78-98; R. 
Wortman, The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness (Chicago, 1976); L. McReynolds, The 
News Under Russia’s Old Regime: The Development of a Mass Circulation Press (Princeton, 1991); 
W. G. Wagner, Marriage, Property and the Law in Late Imperial Russia (Oxford, 1994). See also the 
essays in Clowes, Kassow and West (eds.), Between Tsar and People; and Crisp and Edmondson 
(eds.), Civil Rights in Imperial Russia; for the impact of civil society in Weimar Germany, see S. 
Berman, ‘Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic’, World Politics, 49 (1997), pp. 
401-429. 
3 Hohler, ‘Radical Right Civil Society’, pp. 93-104. 
4 In using this term, I adopt the terminology used by Mudde and Hohler. See P. Kopecky and C. 
Mudde, ‘Rethinking Civil Society’, Democratization, 10, 3 (2003), pp. 1-14; C. Mudde, ‘Civil 
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previously assessed, the use of civic culture was another technique for popular 
mobilization in the era of mass politics, features that would be demonstrated 
elsewhere in the onset of the revolutions of 1917.5   
 
 Right-wing civic groups spread across the empire after 1905 in provincial 
regions such as Perm, Odessa, Tula and Kiev, as well as in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg.6 Many of these groups were non-political, and nominally separate from 
organizations such as the Union of Archangel Mikhail (UAM) that elected leaders to 
the State Duma. Socially, the right was diversifying. Several associations, such as 
the Double-Headed Eagle (Dvuglavyi orel, DHE) were student groups; others, such 
as the Union of Russian Working Men (Soiuz russkikh rabochikh liudei, URWM) 
aimed to attract workers. These were not only populist gestures, but built into the 
organization and structure of certain groups. The leadership of the URWM decreed 
at any one time that it needed at least three people of ‘working-class’ origin sitting 
on its council, though it was not made clear how ‘working-class’ would be defined.7 
A police report in Kiev from December 1907 estimated that this group had 6,500 
members, whilst the DHE had a more modest 300.8 However, these ‘non-political’ 
associations could still act in tandem with the politicized right. The URWM, among 
other activities, relied on the distribution of publicity materials, which were passed 
onto it from the regional branch of the Union of Russian People (URP). Help was 
also given through the circulation of newspapers and lectures delivered by 
prominent figures; for instance, Boris Iuzefovich, the chair of the Russian Assembly 
in Kiev, gave lectures to delegations from the URWM and also the DHE throughout 
                                                                                                                                    
Society in Post-Communist Europe: Lessons from the Dark Side’, in P. Kopecky and C. Mudde 
(eds.), Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe (London and New York, 
2003), pp. 157-170; S. Chambers and J. Kopstein, ‘Bad Civil Society’, Political Theory, 29, 6 (2001), 
pp. 837-865; R. D. Putnam, ‘Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital’, Journal of 
Democracy, 6, 1 (1995), pp. 65-78.  
5 See Rogger, ‘Russian Fascism’ and ‘Formation of the Russian Right’, in Jewish Policies, pp. 189, 
228.  
6 Analysis of the provincial parties is in Rawson, Russian Rightists, pp. 75-106.  
7 Kir’ianov (ed.), ‘Pravye i konstitutsionnye monarkhisty v Rossii v 1907-1908 gg.’, Voprosy istorii, 
8 (1997), p. 94.  
8 Ibid., p. 94. According to this police report, the former had declined in number to around 550 
members by June 1909. Another report estimated 386 members of another group, also called 
Dvuglavyi orel, in Ekaterinoslav in June 1907: GARF, F. 102, 4-e d-vo, op. 1907, d. 164, l. 297 ob. 
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1907.9 The Khar’kov branch of the Russian Assembly, established in 1902 and 
attended by members of the clergy such as Professor T. I. Butkevich, began to meet 
more frequently during the revolution of 1905.10 The URP also established tearooms 
across the empire, where activists could meet to discuss a variety of issues.11 The 
links between political and non-political groups were often unclear. Though much of 
this activity was ostensibly non-political, the majority of it was in reaction to 
political developments; mainly, this was due to what activists perceived as negative 
changes that had arisen during 1905, including laws of religious toleration, the 
establishment of a parliament and promises of increased rights for minority groups.12 
 
Cultural Campaigns     
 
Right-wing groups, such as the Russian Assembly, had perceived themselves largely 
as cultural organizations before 1905. Whilst such groups developed positive 
elements, structured around a shared veneration of the Uvarov principles of 
Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality, there were also pronounced negative 
components. These included anti-Semitism, harshly chauvinistic sentiments, and 
vehemently anti-democratic ideas, including those circulated in the Russian 
Assembly by members such as A. S. Viazigin and D. P. Golitsyn, which do not fit 
the inclusive liberal ideals of ‘good’ civil society. Later groups, including radical 
right associations established in Kiev and Odessa, followed the pattern set by 
conservative groups, as well as the Assembly, towards the end of the nineteenth 
century. These groups did not consider that they were carrying out political work 
                                                
9 Recounted in Iuzefovich, Politicheskie pis’ma, Vol. 17, p. 335.  
10 A record of this activity is published in Mirnyi trud, 10 (1905), pp. 182-216, ‘Vtoraia godovshchina 
otkrytiia Khar’kovskogo otdela russkogo sobraniia’, P. Khorsov.  
11 See for one account P. Timofeev in Russkoe bogatstvo, 2 (1907), pp. 57-81, ‘V chainoi soiuza 
russkogo naroda’. 
12 A prominent example was the statute promising reforms to the existing laws of religious toleration, 
17 April 1905, which can be found in Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, 3rd series, Vol. 25, 
Pt. 1, no. 26126 (1905), pp. 258-262. For commentary, see Waldron, ‘Religious Toleration in Late 
Imperial Russia’, pp. 103-119. 
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before 1905; indeed, they would not have been allowed to. Instead, the central theme 
was a battle for culture, one returned to after the revolutionary crisis had passed.13   
 
Paradoxically, whilst the right-wing movement made a large impact on the 
streets, and responded enthusiastically to the challenges of mass politics, its overall 
political impact, especially in the First and Second Dumas, was comparatively 
weak.14 This was no coincidence, as rightists were in general more comfortable 
expending their energy on ‘non-political’ forms of group association, such as 
lectures, charity works, temperance drives and sports, and the civic groups 
established reflect this.15 This was driven by fear of the events and conflagrations 
from the revolutionary era. The preoccupation to create a vision that was civically 
rather than politically-minded reflected this dislike of institutional politics; and the 
resulting ideas were often divisive and exclusive.16  
 
 A significant feature of the right was its transition to different support bases. 
This can be seen in the appeal to a wide range of demographics, including women 
and students.17 Generally, conceptions of education were a central theme in the 
activities of civic groups, and the creation of youth wings of the right-wing 
movements (often known as Academists) and conceptions of ‘moral education’ as 
                                                
13 Kir’ianov, Russkoe sobranie, pp. 25-73. Several literary and cultural salons were established in St. 
Petersburg and Moscow at the end of the nineteenth century. See for example the discussion of the 
salon of E. V. Bogdanovich, who joined the URP in 1905, in Stogov, Pravomonarkhicheskie salony, 
pp. 146-174.  
14 Rawson, Russian Rightists, pp. 151-220; Hillis, Children of Rus’, pp. 171-177. 
15 Of course it was not only rightists that realized the social importance of such work. Groups that 
shared interests with the right, including patriotism and social activism, were appearing in late 
imperial Russia, which had a dynamic and lively civic life. See for examples A. Lindenmeyr, Poverty 
is Not a Vice: Charity, Society and the State in Imperial Russia (Princeton, 1996); and Bradley, 
Voluntary Associations.  
16 In other countries, civil society has utilized concepts of division and exclusion, particularly, in 
states that have undergone, or are products of, recent processes of nation building, disintegration or 
transition to new varieties of political systems. However, the limitations of private groups may also 
be apparent in states where public distrust of autonomous associations is at high levels. For further 
examples, see P. Kopecky, ‘Civil Society, Uncivil Society and Contentious Politics in Post-
Communist Europe’, in Kopecky and Mudde (eds.), Uncivil Society? pp. 1-18; M. M. Howard, The 
Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge, 2003).  
17 For discussions of the social basis of the Russian right after 1905 see Kir’ianov, ‘Chislennost’ i 
sostav krainikh pravykh partii v Rossii’, pp. 29-43; Omel’ianchuk, Chernosotennoe dvizhenie, pp. 
178-227.  
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disseminated by right-wing activists reflect concerns elsewhere. Certain members of 
the right-wing movement were creating a more independent and transformative 
vision of Russia’s spiritual and moral renewal within these civic associations. This is 
illustrated by the resulting cultural campaigns, which included involvement in the 
temperance movement, creation of student branches, interest in workers’ education 
and focus on the role of women in society. This approach reveals important 
distinctions between the old and the new right, as well as how conceptions of civic-
mindedness and group identity functioned within right-wing groups, whilst still not 
adhering to the normative forms of ‘good’ civic society. The creation of these civic 
groups, as well as the major political associations such as the URP and UAM, also 
shows the extent of the right’s independence from the state.  
 
Cultural visions and Russia’s decay 
 
Some rightists viewed culture as a potentially positive transformative tool, with the 
creative arts having a major role to play in the ‘freedom’ of the people from 
revolutionary tyranny, instead of conceptions of civil or legal rights.18 Vladimir 
Gringmut wrote in the posthumously published Istoriia narodovlastiia (History of 
Popular Power) that ‘the history of European culture was founded not on basic rights 
of law, but on fundamental European freedoms in the arts and creative works’.19 A 
key problem was that Russia’s culture had not been safeguarded against artistic 
degradation, mainly, threats that had been emanating from Western Europe over the 
previous several decades, a view shared by many activists, including ones from the 
Khar’kov branch of the URP.20 This was reinforced by a view that the nation needed 
to be protected. At certain rightist gatherings, as in a meeting of the Patriotic Unions 
held in Kazan during late November 1909, the Russian nation was conceived as a 
cultural and ethnic rather than a legal and constitutional entity. This was based 
around a vision of protecting the purity of the ‘truly Russian’ subjects of the empire, 
                                                
18 By ‘culture’ is meant the broader norms and values of the rightist parties. This perspective goes 
beyond the features of propaganda and artistic works, into the realms of thought and feeling, 
considering how people were, according to the right, meant to think and act. 
19 V. A. Gringmut, Istoriia narodovlastiia (Moscow, 1908), p. 21.  
20 Mirnyi trud, 10 (1905), p. 183.  
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united around the autocratic Tsar and the Orthodox Church.21 Political changes that 
had occurred during the Great Reforms of the 1860s were looked upon with dismay, 
and instead ‘culture’ was given a prominent role in right-wing conceptions of civic 
society.  
 
 But how were these striking visions precisely shaped and rendered? The 
precise conception of the nature of the autocracy exemplified the continuation of 
mystical trends amongst right-wing cultural groups. In one meeting of the Khar’kov 
branch of the URP on 14 November 1905, the power of the Tsar was described as 
‘unlimited’ (neogranichennyi) as well as absolute and unchanging.22 Pavel Khorsov, 
the pundit and activist, in chronicling this meeting quoted from the official laws of 
the Russian Empire published in 1898, which stressed that the will of the monarch 
could not be compromised or devolved to other sources.23 In attempting to justify the 
autocracy’s basis for power in the face of revolutionary changes, such as the October 
Manifesto, Khorsov was adding little new material to an argument that the autocracy 
had outlined for itself.24 Later groups affiliated with the right, such as the Union of 
Russian Orthodox People in Kazan, would not deviate from this basic conception of 
the Tsar’s power.25 
 
 Branches of the DHE, URP and the Russian Assembly all shared an idea that 
it was the Russian people that had been the most affected by the changes in Russian 
society over the past several decades. Hence, they needed re-education in a patriotic, 
religious and enlightened spirit, which would re-forge Russia’s narod in future 
generations. But in practical terms, how would the decline of the people be arrested? 
Artistic works had a strong role to play here. The ‘great cultural works’ of Russian 
writers, many of them canonical greats from the nineteenth century, such as Mikhail 
Lermontov, Fedor Dostoevsky and Leo Tolstoy needed to be distributed. This was 
                                                
21 Mirnyi trud, 1 (1909), p. 107, ‘Pervyi volzhsko-kamskii oblastnoi patrioticheskii s”ezd v Kazani’, 
21-25 November 1908 (author unknown).  
22 Mirnyi trud, 10 (1905), p 183. 
23 Ibid., p. 183.  
24 Ibid., p. 183.  
25 Mirnyi trud, 1 (1909), p. 91.  
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not merely to inculcate a love of fine literature and reading, but also had a patriotic 
goal: the re-education of the narod in a conception of civically-minded patriotism, 
which would contribute to a renewed conception of Russia’s national greatness. 
These ideas also inspired practical projects. For instance, DHE activists in Kiev 
discussed plans to build a library.26 In another letter, circulated within the Academist 
Union from the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute, addressed to the right-wing 
Duma leader G. G. Zamyslovskii in October 1909, this student group requested 
13,000 rubles for the construction of a one-storey wood and stone building to house 
the Academist’s library collections, which would disseminate pro-monarchist 
literature, and also be used as a space to hold meetings.27 The establishment of 
libraries, meeting rooms and literary salons were central aims of many right-wing 
groups, used to spread the pro-autocratic message, and were also an attempt to build 
a right-wing ‘salon culture’. This view of Russian cultural greatness inspired by 
nineteenth-century cultural work is more common than arguments engaging with 
issues such as civil or legal rights in these particular groups.  
 
 The main conceptions behind the real and imagined restoration of the nation 
were education and patriotism, themes that applied to the Russian Assembly’s work 
in general, as well as the student cells of the right-wing groups. Taking one example 
from the URP’s branch in Khar’kov in 1907, we can see a conception of Russian 
‘popular education’ was a central theme behind the reports and lectures given in the 
house of this group. To give an idea of the tone of these, a report by the orator Ia. A. 
Denisov discussed the dangers posed by the wave of liberalism in Russia, and 
another following it, delivered by I. A. Anosov, was titled ‘the raising of the great 
religious spirit of the Russian people’.28 Other branches of the Assembly stuck 
closely to the Uvarov triad, enthusiastically celebrating Russian autocracy as the 
structure that state and society needed, especially given the threats to ‘mother 
                                                
26 GARF, F. 102, 4-e d-vo, op. 1907, d. 128, l. 7: rules and regulations of the DHE. 
27 GARF, F. 117, op. 1, d. 119, l. 5 ob.: report describing the activities of the Academic Union in St 
Petersburg, 7 October 1909.  
28 Mirnyi trud, 2 (1908), pp. 127-128, ‘Godovoi otchet, “Khar’kovskogo soiuza russkogo naroda” za 
1907 god (vtoroi god sushchestvovaniia)’, Iv. Anosov. This branch claimed to have 556 active 
members at the end of 1907.  
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Russia’ posed since 1905.29 Activists perceived these not only as threats to the 
Russian state, but more pertinently, as threats to the Russian people. This civic-
minded vision of education in Russian and national ideas had a motive of re-
education after the events of 1905, over fears that the Russian people at large were 
being lost to revolutionary ideals, no matter that the number of those actively 
involved in the revolutionary movements was still very small at this stage.30   
 
 A report delivered from A. S. Viazigin to members of the Assembly in 1908 
opined on the threats posed to the Russian people by the events of the ‘liberal’ 
epoch. Following Viazigin’s declarations, there would be further reports from 
assembly members Ia. A. Denisov on ‘liberalism’, and another report from I. A. 
Anosov on ‘patriotism in Russian poems’.31 Trends from Western Europe were 
described as having a detrimental effect on native literature.32 In 1910, Moskovskie 
vedomosti carried an editorial entitled Critical Writings: From the Revolution to 
Erotomania. This article outlined the negative impacts of artistic modernism in 
Russia. These were accusations that recent trends in Russian literature, brought into 
Russia by European writers such as Heinrich Mann, were too realistic and 
depressing. A particular problem was the absence of heroism: 
 
Literature in recent times…perhaps in the last half-century, is an unbroken 
evolution towards a depressive cadence. All literary works will be 
completely inconceivable without heroes. In our time, the time of 
associations and debased democracy, heroes have not only become 
unnecessary but even odious. The claim ‘down with heroes!’ follows, and 
the start of our literary lineage will be the systematic debunking of 
heroism’.33   
 
Threats also came from other areas, and in many of the reports delivered to cultural 
associations, the exclusive and exclusionary rhetoric of many leaders of the right can 
be seen. Unlike more ‘positive’ civic society groups, the meeting houses of rightist 
                                                
29 Mirnyi trud, 3 (1909), pp. 57-58, ‘Tretii god’, Iv. Anosov.  
30 Mirnyi trud, 2 (1908), p. 127.  
31 Mirnyi trud, 3 (1909), pp. 57-58, ‘Tretii god’, Iv. Anosov.  
32 Ibid., p. 57.  
33 Moskovskie vedomosti, 7 May 1910, 103, p. 2; see also Newstad, ‘Components of Pessimism’. 
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associations such as the Russian Assembly usually sought to exclude Jews, national 
minorities, non-Orthodox religions and leftists, often giving reports on the dangers 
that these enemies posed, and creating a group identity united around a shared hatred 
of a common enemy. These were meetings established specifically for ‘Russians 
only’, though there were occasionally exceptions to this, such as the attempted 
establishment of a branch of the URP for Jewish members.34  
 
Threats to the people took many different forms (including Masons, 
Europeans, merchants and speculators), but most of all this ire was directed against 
Russian and world Jewish populations. ‘Jewish masonic cliques’ were behind 1905; 
the revolution itself was purported to be Jewish.35 Such ideas were common in right-
wing circles, but as well as the reported economic and political machinations of the 
Jews in the revolutionary era, examples of anti-Semitism moving in different, and 
more radical, directions after 1905 can be seen. One instance was a report from P. A. 
Krushevan (editor of the anti-Semitic newspaper Bessarabets, which worked to 
inflame tensions in the notorious pogrom in Kishinev during 1903), presented to a 
delegation of Russian Assembly activists in April 1907. This made a series of 
outrageous claims, blaming Jews for a long list of mythical ills, including stealing 
bread from the Russian workers, the economic subjugation of the people, and 
infiltrating Russia’s schools and universities to teach socialist doctrines.36  
 
 Quoting from Western racist authors such as Houston Stewart Chamberlin, 
as well as the Russian Monarchist Party’s (RMP) A. S. Shmakov, Krushevan’s 
report presented an anti-Semitic fantasy constructed along largely religious lines. He 
blamed the ‘character’ of the Jewish people for the continuing ferocity of their 2,000 
year-old fight with the world’s Christian populations. This ‘enemy within’ was 
responsible for Russia’s decay, particularly given their markedly different 
                                                
34 GARF, F. 102.ОО, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. А, t. 3, l. 146: MVD Odesskogo 
gradonachal’nika. Kantseliaria, 1 July 1908. A police report from Odessa in July 1908 commented 
that success for this group was ‘not forthcoming’, though says less about why this was the case. 
Possibly, it was due to lack of funding by other nearby right-wing groups. 
35 Mirnyi trud, 1 (1909), p. 94.  
36 Vestnik Russkogo sobraniia, 6 April 1907, 13, pp. 4-5.  
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psychological characteristics.37 Modern and religious anti-Semitism co-existed in 
Krushevan’s report, which assessed world Jewry as both a racial and religious threat. 
Krushevan’s quoting of Western writers demonstrates how the changing ideology of 
anti-Semitism from religious to racial conceptions was inspired by trends from 
Western Europe; no small irony given how frequently the right stated its distaste for 
West European influences. The crucial point is that the anti-Semitism expressed in 
this report would not admit for the possibility of Jewish reconciliation with other 
members of the body politic, even in the case of conversion from Judaism to 
Orthodoxy.38 Though Krushevan’s conception of anti-Semitism may have been 
particularly radical, not held by all the members of the Russian Assembly who had 
gathered to listen, the group had the shared mutual end of identifying a common 
enemy to members, even if the ‘theoretical’ about turns made to get to this differed 
on occasion.  
 
 In other features too, the radical right’s societies promoted an exclusionary, 
exclusive message, inspired by a view of Russia in the throes of social disorder. V. 
A. Bobrinskii, a rightist delegate to the Third and Fourth Dumas, spoke in 1910 
about class war in response to a previous speech by a kadet delegate, I. K. 
Pokrovskii. Bobrinskii saw that the proletariat, as idolized and mythologized by 
sections of the right, could itself become a danger due to the introduction of 
consumerist values in Russia. The spread of these ideas, linked to the onset of 
urbanization, would lead to the fearful separation of the narod from the gentry, from 
which horizontal splits in state and society would follow. The results of this would 
be devastating: yet more political and social revolution, as was the case in 1905.39 
This was a crucial problem, as in their cultural associations groups including the 
Russian Assembly promoted a vision of society based on rank and differentiation, 
but united under the banner of tsarism; a vision of Russia’s future shared by the 
Tsar, landowners, gentry, workers and peasantry alike. When discussing the Poltava 
                                                
37 Ibid., pp. 4-5.  
38 Ibid., pp. 4-5.  
39 Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Stenograficheskie otchety, Third Duma, session 3 (St. Petersburg, 1910), 
iv, col. 349. 
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celebrations in 1909, the URP leader Aleksei I. Konovnitsyn spoke of his desire to 
see ‘dukes and peasants alike united under one banner’.40  However, unity did not 
mean social equality: rightists such as Konovnitsyn and Bobrinskii promoted a 
hierarchical vision of Russia’s future society, with each group having a role to play 
in a truly ‘Russian’ society. The Tsar as leader, the rulers of Russia and then the 
masses would all be united under Tsarist ideals.   
 
 It is curious that in spite of cross-class attraction, a central fear was the 
spread of hooliganism. On 1 August 1913, the right-wing newspaper Vestnik Soiuza 
russkogo naroda reported how a group of hooligans attacked an officer from the 37th 
Ekaterinburg regiment, named as Kikul, in an unprovoked assault occurring on 
Polevaia Street in the city of Nizhnii-Novgorod.41 The assault was committed by 
local riffraff who had been drinking heavily in the nearby tavern for several hours. 
This illustrated fear of the threat posed by hooligans and wanton mob violence.42 
This attack on an officer being singled out for discussion is particularly telling: 
rightists venerated the institution of the armed forces, and an attack on a member of 
them by ‘the rabble’ made the story especially shocking for readers. Curiously, 
despite rightist autonomy, this shows that some elements shared the central fears of 
the establishment. Not only right-wing radicals, but also figures in polite society 
condemned these social trends.43 Novoe vremia was one pro-regime newspaper that 
also reported on ‘hooligans’ carrying out attacks on innocents.44 
 
 In its practical activities, cultural associations and meetings, the radical right 
did little to disown certain, more preferred ideals. The importance of Russian 
religion to the right can be clearly seen from many reports on the activities of both 
political and non-political groups. The Khar’kov branch of the URP united with 
members of the Russian Assembly from the same region to hold a celebration on 17 
                                                
40 Obraztsov, Torzhestvo russkogo ob”edineniia, p. 46.  
41 Vestnik Soiuza russkogo naroda, 16 August 1913, 151-152, p. 19. 
42 Ibid., p. 19.  
43 The fear of hooliganism was often linked to the revolution of 1905. See J. Neuberger, Hooliganism: 
Crime, Culture and Power in St. Petersburg, 1900-1914 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1994), pp. 88, 
139. 
44 Novoe vremia, 8 March 1914, p. 13. 
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May 1907 in honour of the bishop’s 25 years of service to the Khar’kov region. This 
was attended by many religious figures, such as Bishop Arsenii (a member of the 
URP), a number of priests, as well as leaders of the monarchist movement such as A. 
G. Shcherbatov, of the URP and Union of Russian Men (URM).45 The meetings of 
these groups kept close formal ties to organized religion, as well as the use of 
religious symbolism in such processions. Even the ‘radical’ wings of the right, such 
as the URP, demanded the inclusion of Russian religion as a stimulus for civic 
development. It was integrated into the educational activities of the Russian 
Assembly, primarily as a tool for inspiring the Russian people. Therefore, the 
conception of moral education was largely a religious one: members attending these 
soirees, processions and banquets held by rightist groups would have been saturated 
in the language and symbols of Orthodoxy.46  
 
An overall aim of these meetings was to construct a vision of the modern era 
as a time of chaos, crisis and decay caused by the revolution of 1905 and also long-
term negative developments, such as political reforms and social change. Right-
wingers at these gatherings reacted to such developments by constructing an 
idealized past, based around mythic visions of Russian heroism, achievement and 
grandeur: social projects were created aiming to put such ideas into practice.  
 
Charity and poverty 
 
Whilst one should not wish to lose sight of the negative character of many of these 
right-wing groups, it was also the case that in the same era, conceptions of charity, 
voluntarism and welfare were developing amongst certain right-wing societies.47 Not 
every meeting revolved around visions of destruction and the pursuit of common 
enemies, though these were standard themes. The focus on charity might initially 
appear surprising, but one needs to bear in mind the shared end it had with the 
                                                
45 Mirnyi trud, 2 (1908), p. 129, ‘Godovoi otchet “Khar’kovskogo soiuza russkogo naroda” za 1907 
god. (Vtoroi god sushchestvovaniia)’, Iv. Anosov.  
46 Ibid., p. 131.  
47 Lindenmeyr’s Poverty Is Not a Vice discusses the challenge of poverty to civil society, but makes 
no reference to the efforts of the organized right, pp. 217-224.  
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negative racist and exclusionary visions outlined above: the moral and cultural 
improvement of the Russian body politic.  
 
 Crucial in this idea of charity was the theme that the right was on the side of 
the nation’s poor as the revolutionary crisis worsened; the aid given to poor students 
was cited as an example. RMP member I. A. Kolesnikov arrived in Moscow to open 
a girl’s school established in Gringmut’s name after his death, which aimed to carry 
on his brand of teachings. The school, like several others that the right founded, was 
free and aimed at the poorest students in society, those most in need of education. 
There was, of course, more to this than merely giving poor students a helping hand: 
the political and spiritual legacy of Gringmut and the RMP’s teachings would be 
carried on to the next generation as a result of its construction.48 These projects, as in 
the case of a meeting house built for members of the Russian Assembly unveiled on 
21 October 1909, were aimed at educating youth by inculcating national and 
patriotic feelings, specifically, in the socially needy, and subsequent publications 
described a message of charity.49 As Aleksandr Shcherbatov noted, the aim of this 
education was not only to teach people how to read and write, but to inculcate a 
basic theoretical conception of the way that the world worked, aims that came with 
‘correct’ messages about the proper ideologies to follow.50 
 
 On an individual basis too, activists involved in the monarchist movements 
played a role in charity and volunteer work across the empire. Dar’ia Kudelenko (c. 
1870-after 1917) gave lectures to workers and students, and took part in consumer 
cooperatives in Kiev during 1907; she was also the secretary of the DHE in the 
region.51 Aleksandr Evskii (1842-1913), chair of the Kiev Union of Russian 
Workers (Kievskii soiuz russkikh rabochikh) founded a universal aid society to help 
victims of the Russo-Japanese War, their families and lower-ranking members of the 
                                                
48 This is recounted in Bogatyr’ mysli i dela, pp. 302-305; Grazhdanin, 30 September 1907, 74, p. 10; 
18 November 1907, 88, p. 15. Another school aimed at poor students was established by a group of 
students in Astrakhan’ during 1908, or at least, so it was claimed: GARF, F. 117, op. 2, d. 8, l. 3: 
Russkaia pravda, 1 October 1908. 
49 Dom i gimnaziia russkogo sobraniia (St. Petersburg, 1910), p. 40.  
50 Mirnyi trud, 1 (1909), p. 95.  
51 For a short biography, see CSIE, p. 269.  
   
 191 
armed forces, who had returned from the conflict and were in need of financial 
support.52 Supporters of these mutual aid activities crossed over between a number 
right-wing, conservative and nationalist groups. Evskii was also a member of the 
Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists (Kievskii klub russkikh natsionalistov), in some 
ways a comparatively moderate nationalist group that supported Stolypin and his 
nationalist policies. This had a social base largely composed of elites, and lacked the 
socially demagogic elements associated with the URP, URM or indeed, the Union of 
Russian Workers.53 In another instance from 1908, a report from a member of the 
council of the Russian Assembly, T. I. Butkevich, given to a meeting of the Kazan 
branch, outlined the work of the All-Russian Missionary Union. This group had 
been active during 1908 in helping out the poor in the region, including the 
peasantry, and Butkevich, a member of the clergy, was keen to report on the positive 
impact of its work. The exact extent of the right’s practical involvement with this 
work was unknown, though clearly, many delegates praised and supported the work 
of the group.54  
  
 The heroism of Russia and the Russian people in both previous and current 
eras was a much-worn theme. The meetings of the assemblies, often attended by 
leaders such as Golitsyn and Krushevan, depicted the greatness of the Russian 
narod, who had been betrayed by a ruling clique of intelligentsia and bureaucrats. 
They placed themselves on the side of the peasantry and workers, and claimed much 
of the work they carried out was for their benefit, rather than for the rightist factions. 
A commission organized by a meeting between different branches of the URP in 
1911 enquired into ways in which the condition of the poor peasant (bedniak) could 
be improved. The rights of the peasants, conceived of as moral and spiritual, rather 
than civic, had been denied in the current revolutionary epoch. It was claimed that 
only the autocracy itself, and the organized political right, were attuned to the 
                                                
52 See ibid., pp. 196-197.  
53 Ibid., p. 197. His obituary is printed in Kievlianin, 12 September 1913.   
54 Mirnyi trud, 3 (1909), p. 58.  
   
 192 
interests of the peasantry.55 In a similar light, it is worth noting that several of the 
letters addressed to the URP or UAM stressed poverty as the primary social 
condition of the sender.56 The detail of many of these sources, especially in terms of 
the social impact of the organized charity efforts of rightist groups and councils, is 
unfortunately lacking. What is safer to state is that the populist appeal of the right 
continued well after 1905, and that the overall goal of these activities in aid of the 
nation’s poor was linked to the support of monarchist ideologies, and attempts to 
improve the moral and spiritual condition of the Russian people, in order that they 
might fit into rightist projects. 
 
Temperance 
 
Alcoholism was one example of the interest in illnesses. The radical right, like many 
other observers, was especially perturbed by many Russians continual love of drink. 
Alcoholism was pervasive in the social life of late imperial Russian society, and 
widespread drunkenness played a central role in its dysfunctional nature. Dr. P. S. 
Alekseev, a physician from Riga and a pioneer in studies of alcoholism and its 
effects, went as far as to suggest that ‘the temperance question lies at the foundation 
of all social and political reform’.57 Important establishment groups shared his 
concern, and Church temperance movements were also active in trying to combat 
the root causes of alcoholism. They saw that the main effect was the poverty that 
alcoholism brought upon households, as the nation’s poor spent what little time and 
money they had in the tavern.58  
 
 The radical right shared this interest in alcoholism with many other political 
and social groups in late imperial society, yet their concerns had different roots. 
Groups including the Guardianship of Public Sobriety, the state’s official 
                                                
55 GARF, F. 116, op. 1, d. 17, ll. 29-40 ob.:  doklady komissii vserossiiskogo s”ezda SRN v g. 
Moskve v 1911 g. A further example of right-wing charity and civic activism is outlined below, the 
Union of Russian Women in Voronezh. 
56 Priamoi put’, February-March 1911, p. 890.  
57 P. S. Alekseev quoted in P. Herlihy, The Alcoholic Empire: Vodka and Politics in Late Imperial 
Russia (Oxford, 2002), p. 4. 
58 Ibid., pp. 78-80. 
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temperance organization, perceived a decline in working productivity and broken 
families as among the main negative effects of alcoholism.59 In contrast to this, 
many rightists held that alcoholism represented a corrupting spiritual ill in Russian 
society. Accordingly, right-wingers saw that moral corruption was among the worst 
effects of a ubiquitous social ill. Alcoholism was a ‘perversion’ that would ‘corrupt 
the mass of the people’, according to one editorial in Vestnik Russkogo sobraniia 
from January 1908.60 Negative political as well as social effects would arise as a 
result. As in so much of the right’s activities and propaganda, 1905 played a central 
role in such images; the eventual outcome of Russia’s vodka-soaked decay would be 
yet more political revolution.61 The commentator K. F. Golovin, writing in the UAM 
thick journal Priamoi put’, noted the rapid spread of shops selling wine and spirits, 
which were linked to revolutionary propaganda. Golovin expounded on the dangers 
Russia faced from the onset of alcoholism. It was, in his view, connected to the onset 
of revolution, and particularly, the impact of ‘revolutionary’ parties, such as the 
Kadets.62 In these intransigent visions, the right’s political opponents, such as the 
moderate conservative Octobrists, were themselves presented as drunks: the 
‘pervasive alcoholism’ of the Octobrists was part of their negative influence on 
Russian politics. Drunkenness was a weakness to be associated with political rivals, 
as much as a lack of self-control: the same criticism was also levelled at left-wing 
students.63 In addition, groups of right-wing activists claimed their own sobriety as a 
virtue; a telegram addressed to Petr Stolypin from students of the rightist group the 
Russian Union claimed, ‘of course, we are completely sober’.64  
 
 One leading figure in this anti-alcohol campaign was Ivan Sikorskii, a 
psychologist, theorist of nationalism, social activist, witness at the trial of Mendel 
Beilis in 1911 and a member of the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists. Sikorskii 
                                                
59 Ibid., pp. 14-35. The Guardianship of Public Sobriety was established on 1 January 1895. 
60 Vestnik Russkogo sobraniia, 4 January 1908, 1, pp. 8-10. 
61 Ibid., pp.  8-10; 28 February 1908, 9, pp. 1-5.  
62 Priamoi put’, February 1910, p. 530.  
63 Vestnik Russkogo sobraniia, 28 February 1908, 9, p. 9; Moskovskie vedomosti, 25 September 1908, 
222, p. 1.  
64 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, t. 5, ll. 137-138 ob.: telegram, the ‘Russian 
Union’ in Kursk (anonymous), to P. Stolypin (unknown date). 
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spoke at several rightist functions and assemblies, perceiving that alcoholism was 
inextricably linked to decay in Russian society.65 In his view, it was one of the 
biggest threats to popular health, as he outlined in a pamphlet on the ‘physically and 
psychologically destructive’ effects of alcoholism on the Russian nation in the 
nineteenth century.66 Purishkevich also took an interest in the problem of 
alcoholism. Like Sikorskii, he considered that alcoholism was a social danger that 
was on the increase in Russian society, and that decisive measures needed to be 
taken to combat it. Sikorskii appeared at the First All-Russian Union for the Fight 
with Alcoholism in November 1909, the proceeds of which were held by 
Purishkevich. Sikorskii carefully noted, in particular, its detrimental effects on the 
young, and what he termed the ‘socially irresponsible’ in society. He was chosen as 
one of the nine representatives from the provinces on the organizing council, a role 
that accorded with his earlier researches into the illness. Like many others at the 
congress, Sikorskii conceived of alcoholism not only as a debilitating problem in 
itself, but as a form of nervous illness, which particularly affected the poorest classes 
in society.67 This congress was not only attended by rightists, but also brought 
together many other figures, including liberals and conservatives from the zemstvo.68 
 
 The Russian Assembly was strident in its criticism of state actions that could 
limit the popular impact of temperance groups. It fiercely criticized the state’s 
withdrawal of funding for the much-maligned Guardianship of Public Sobriety. In 
this, the radical right again exhibited divisions between the status quo and 
spontaneous right-wing tendencies.69 The state was simply not taking drastic enough 
measures to reverse the contemporary decline of the Russian people, though from 
the bottle in this case, rather than pornographic novels or the unscrupulous Kadets. It 
was the poorest who were most at threat from the perils of drink. V. V. Malyshev, an 
                                                
65 A biographical entry of Sikorskii appears in CSIE, pp. 482-485.  
66 I. A. Sikorskii, Alkogolizm v Rossii v XIX stoletii i bor’ba s nim (Kiev, 1899).   
67 Ibid.; see also Morrissey, ‘The Economy of Nerves’, pp. 645-675. 
68 The proceedings of the congress have been preserved in the personal chancellery of Purishkevich. 
GARF, F. 117, op. 1, d. 649, ll. 3-13 ob.: Russkii narodnyi soiuz imeni Mikhaila Arkhangela. 
Lichnaia kantseliariia Purishkevicha. Pis’mo organizatsionnoi kommissii 1-go vserossiiskogo s”ezda 
po bor’be s pianstvom…, 13-18 November 1909.  
69 Vestnik Russkogo sobraniia, 28 February 1908, 9, p. 5.  
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activist from Orenburg, wrote a circular addressed ‘to the Russian people’ in May 
1908, which addressed the threat that alcohol posed to Russia’s poor.70 The effects 
were most deleterious on the poor peasants who lacked education or awareness of its 
corrupting effects. What was needed was more, not less, government control. 
Malyshev called for restrictions on personal freedoms to drink, in favour of 
increased state control; in particular, the government needed to more closely monitor 
the sale and distribution of alcohol.71 A 1912 edition of Pochaevskii listok (Pochaev 
Newsletter), the paper of the Pochaev branch of the URP, called for the 
establishment of clinics to combat alcoholism, a necessity given the regime’s 
inaction against the scourge in previous years.72 
 
 Why was there so much emphasis on controlling alcoholism? Activists 
claimed that alcoholism was responsible for all manner of ills in society: a wide-
ranging critique that encompassed everything from Jewish power and control, to 
defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, poor military performance due to drunken 
soldiers and the onset of the widely despised era of parliament and politics.73 
Malyshev wrote that the control of alcoholism would result in ‘the restoration of 
brotherly unity, prosperity, and by economic means, the maintenance of the poorest 
members of the population’. In his view, ‘drunkenness and debauchery’ had resulted 
in the need to save the country from the ‘Jewish stench’. In his criticisms and 
concerns, we can see that the adoption of anti-Semitism was not far away, even on 
apparently completely unrelated topics.74 There was also a strong religious element 
to the anti-alcoholism drive, a move that accorded with the links between the radical 
right and Russian Orthodoxy. Religious figures, including Father Ioann of 
Kronstadt, whom some from right-wing groups such as the URP idolized, had been 
heavily involved in the temperance movements throughout imperial Russia. The 
anti-alcohol drive was seen by many activists, not only from within the right, as a 
                                                
70 GARF, F. 117, op. 1, d. 2, l. 4: Proekt. Russkie liudi!, 28 May 1908.  
71 Ibid., l. 7.  
72 Pochaevskii listok, 61 (1909), pp. 10-11.  
73 Vestnik Souiza russkogo naroda, 13 June 1914, 188, p. 14. This editorial described the need to fight 
drunkenness in the army, due to its detrimental effect on Russia’s military capacity. 
74 GARF, F. 117, op. 1, d. 2, l. 7.  
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spiritual and religious mission, as well as one to liberate the people from the 
physical effects of alcoholism.  
 
One central reason for promoting a message of anti-alcoholism was the threat 
that alcoholism posed to the body politic.75 As in the case of cultural decline, this 
was a vision of an idealized body of people, Orthodox ‘true Russians’, under attack 
from a contemporary threat. In this, the right had something in common with later 
fascist parties in Europe, which saw that a nation undergoing a process of spiritual 
re-birth needed to be inoculated against all possible threats. The emphasis on the 
dangers of alcohol was not only a pet interest of isolated thinkers, but reveals a more 
radical ideology, based on combatting all possible threats to the people. Whilst it 
would be incorrect to portray the anti-alcohol drive as a completely secular mission, 
given the influence of religious practice, the right’s views to protect the people as an 
ethnic and cultural entity were at the forefront of many of these visions to create a 
healthier nation. Therefore, more modern ideologies were being adopted, albeit 
slowly and in a piecemeal fashion, and integrating many traditional ideas and 
emblems. Involvement in temperance movements and anti-alcohol ideology was a 
source of pride for the right, tying into civic patriotism. Priamoi put’ proudly 
declared in May 1912, possibly erroneously, that Moscow University was the first 
institute in the world to set up an academic enquiry into the effects of alcoholism.76 
  
Education and Society   
 
Many rightists had a pronounced interest in youth, with Russia’s students an 
important part of the future resistance to revolution. As early as 1902, a member of 
the central council of the Russian Assembly, A. F. Rittikh, delivered a report to the 
group of his plans to open a school ‘for the education and the enlightenment of 
youth in the Russian national spirit’.77 Right-wing student organizations including 
                                                
75 See for instance Priamoi put’, December 1912, pp. 206-207, which discussed alcoholism as a 
‘popular’ illness.  
76 Priamoi put’, May 1912, pp. 186-187.  
77 Dom i gimnaziia russkogo sobraniia, p. 3.  
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the Dennitsa (Dawn) movement appeared shortly afterwards in 1902; additionally, 
there were several branches of the Russian Assembly exclusive to students, the first 
of which was established in Khar’kov on 9 November 1903.78 However, from 1905 
there was a wave of further development, with the emergence of what came to be 
known as the Academist movement.79 The DHE in Kiev, established June 1907, was 
one of many similar groups that appeared across the empire. Whilst there was 
widespread criticism of student ‘politics’ on the right, mainly due to an association 
of students with left-wing radicalism, many rightists also stressed the importance of 
students to the monarchist movement.80 Lev Tikhomirov wrote, ‘it is completely 
evident, that in the sphere of civic activism we must draw from the forces of youth, 
and with it her training, and her social position, as these are what Russia needs’.81 
Iuzefovich was another commentator who saw that Russia’s youth needed 
revitalization if the nation was to be saved.82 The school was a battleground for 
Russia’s future, but in the view of Purishkevich in a telegram to Count A. A. 
Bobrinskii, ‘the future of Russia, as you can see, will be the most terrible 
catastrophe’.83 Rightists would portray the future of the nation in such stark terms; 
not only was there an impending ‘war’ for the Russian university campus, but there 
was a psychological battle for the hearts and minds of the next generation coming to 
pass. 
 
 
                                                
78 For the Dennitsa movement, see Morrissey, Heralds of Revolution, pp. 79-80; Kir’ianov and 
Dodonov (eds.), ‘Predystoriia pravomonarkhicheskikh partii’, 5 (2001), p. 118.  
79 Morrissey, Heralds of Revolution, pp. 140-146.  
80 For criticism of student movement, see for example Moskovskie vedomosti, 31 July 1908, 177, p. 1; 
6 February 1911, 29, p. 1.  
81 Tikhomirov, Khristianskoe gosudarstvo i vneshniaia politika, p. 642. ‘K voprosu ob 
obshchestvennoi deiatel’nosti uchashcheisia molodezhi: predstaviteliam kruzhkov patrioticheskoi 
molodezhi’ (originally published in Moskovskie vedomosti, 1907). Tikhomirov’s view of the power of 
youth was also driven by fear stemming from the outbreaks of disorder at Moscow University during 
the revolution of 1905. See for instance ‘25 let nazad: iz dnevnika L. Tikhomirova’, Krasnyi arkhiv, 
3(40) (1930), p. 60.  
82 Iuzefovich frequently returned to this theme in his writings. See Iuzefovich, Politicheskie pis’ma, 
Vol. 17, p. 368. 
83 RGADA, F. 1412, op. 2, d. 57, l. 1: V. M. Purishkevich (St. Petersburg), to Count A. A. Bobrinskii 
(St. Petersburg), 28 March 1913. The telegram informed Aleksei Bobrinskii of the publication of a 
book, School the Victory of the Second Revolution, by Purishkevich’s organization the UAM in 1913, 
outlining how the Russian university had degenerated as a result of left-wing radicalism.  
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The culture war for Russian universities 
 
The Academists appeared across many different parts of the Russian Empire during 
and after 1905, primarily in response to the longer-standing presence of left-wing 
student groups. In places as diverse as St. Petersburg, Tula and Kazan, the right 
attempted to mobilize youth, though their presence was particularly strong in the 
southwest of the empire, a largely non-Russian region.84 Academist groups, such as 
the DHE in Kiev, have left voluminous recollections, letters and a wide variety of 
documents revealing their main ideas and principles. Like the mature right-wing 
groups, Academists declared themselves protectors of the three central principles of 
the Uvarov triad: ‘God, Tsar and fatherland’ (Bog, Tsar’ i otechestvo). Furthermore, 
Academists created an educational agenda for raising the consciousness of Russian 
youth towards patriotism. A flyer from the Academist Union distributed around 
Odessa University in April 1907 listed the following points, to be adopted as basic 
principles of Russian education:  
 
1. Necessary ‘religious consciousness’ instilled in pupils; 2. National 
patriotic feeling; 3. A courageous upbringing, and how this relates to social 
and religious ideals; 4. Discipline; 5. The necessity to oppose strikes and 
idleness; 6. National patriotic feeling towards the state; 7. Necessity of 
family life; 8. National spirit, creation of a national history; 9. Defence of 
the ideas of law and order; 10. Opposition to the nihilistic and individualist 
tendencies of our time; 11. Turn towards an upbringing in favour of the 
state; 12. Creation of circles of a religious-moral character.85 
 
                                                
84 For overviews of the social basis, structure and ideology of the Academist movements, see I. V. 
Omel’ianchuk, ‘Monarkhicheskie ‘akademicheskie korporatsii’ v uchebnykh zavedeniiakh Rossii 
(1901-1914 gg.)’, <http://ukrstor.com/ukrstor/omeljancuk-akademobszestva.html> (accessed 
9/4/2014); Chernosotennoe dvizhenie v Rossiiskoi imperii, pp. 128-142; Stepanov, Chernaia sotnia v 
Rossii, 1905-1914 (2nd edition, Moscow, 2005), pp. 324-340.  
85 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, l. 67: Volia i zemstva, 5 April 1907; ll.  
99-99 ob. The DHE in Kiev had an almost identical list of rules and regulations: GARF, F. 102, 4-e 
d-vo, op. 1907, d. 128, l. 5: Chernigovskogo gubernatora, po kantseliarii 6 June 1907; and so did the 
Academist club at St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute, GARF, F. 117, op. 2, d. 8, l. 10: ustav 
obshchestva (Akademicheskii soiuz studentov S. Peterburgsk. Politekhnicheskogo instituta); and ll. 
96, 97-99 ob., 100, 105-108, all copies of the rules and regulations of the group, titled ‘Ustav 
akademicheskogo studencheskogo obshchestva S. Peterburgskogo politekhnicheskogo instituta’; and 
GARF, F. 117, op. 1, d. 183, ll. 3-5 ob. is a near-identical document. 
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Many of these points were long familiar as rightist ideological principles, but were 
there also more radical elements to the Academist plan? For instance, what form 
would this search for ‘consciousness’ take? Certain tactics of the groups appeared 
similar to the principles of the civic associations outlined above. These involved the 
distribution of books, holding of seminars and also the beloved musical literary 
evenings.86 Leaders of the Academists claimed such measures were a corrective to 
the current state of Russian education. The DHE, for instance, claimed that liberal 
educators had led the previous several generations astray: they were responsible for 
Russia’s decline. There was also a degree of sympathy with the current generation of 
youth, who were said to have suffered as a result.87 Whilst the violent nature of 
many of these groups should not be overlooked – a theme to be returned to – one of 
the main visions of the Academists themselves was an ideological war to win back 
the wayward student community.88 Youth needed to be re-educated in conceptions 
of Russia’s national greatness. 
 
 A prominent example, a theme that recurs continuously in Academist 
correspondence, was the interest in science. This was not, however, merely a pursuit 
of the love of education and learning for its own sake, but part of a mission to raise 
awareness of the relationship between science and patriotism, a source of great pride 
given Russia’s achievements in the sphere. The right could appropriate a new set of 
heroes, such as the chemist Dmitrii Mendeleev, creator of the periodic table, with no 
small amount of satisfaction, as these were held to be uniquely ‘Russian’ 
achievements. Furthermore, the ‘culture war’ in the Russian university was 
described as a battle between science and politics.89 Letters from rightist students to 
                                                
86 GARF, F. 102, 4-e d-vo, op. 1907, d. 128, l. 7: rules and regulations of the DHE; GARF, F. 117, 
op. 2, d. 8, l. 98. 
87 GARF, F. 117, op. 2, d. 8, ll. 7-8.  
88 It should be noted that many of these appeals, for instance, in flyers distributed around St. 
Petersburg Polytechnic Institute in 1908, were addressed to the student body as a whole, rather than 
only other Academists: GARF, F. 117, op. 2, d. 8, ll. 1-1 ob.: K studenchestvu S. Peterburgskogo 
politekhnikuma; and ll. 83-83 ob.: K umerennomu i bezpartiinomu studenchestvu. 
89 Of course, this pre-dates the 1905 era, as described in chapter one. See for instance Mirnyi trud, 1 
(1904), section 2, p. 7, P. Khorsov, ‘Prazdnik russkogo samosoznaniia’. A sympathetic discussion of 
the Academists in 1905 is A. S. Budilovich, Nauka i politika (St. Petersburg, 1905); see also S. D. 
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the leadership of the UAM reflected on the desire to preserve Russian science 
against what was perceived as one of the main degenerate tendencies within the 
modern Russian university, the growing threat posed by politics.90 One letter from 
Nikolai Nikol’skii, an Academist studying at Warsaw University, expanded at length 
upon the problems facing Russian education: 
 
Soon, we will no longer be students. I only want to see our educational 
institutions be peaceful, and I do not want to see our schools – temples of 
science – turn into political arenas, and turn away from science and towards 
politics. Furthermore, as a student, I have come to believe that schools must 
stand above all politics, that they must be purely Russian in spirit and 
thought. Academic life must flow freely and without interruption, if one only 
desires to study, and not understand politics – in other words, school must be 
for science, and not party division.91 
 
Like Nikol’skii’s letter, another undated communication from Odessa University 
discussed the need to ‘free science’ within the modern Russian university. The main 
strengths of Russia were its abilities in the hard sciences, and ‘action and liberation’ 
were needed to preserve these.92 The rightist Professor N. S. Mishenko, in a speech 
delivered to members of the URP in Kiev on 24 October 1908, described the need to 
preserve ‘pure science’ against the forces of revolution and anarchism in the Russian 
university. Particularly this was necessary as the science in question connected to 
notions of Russian greatness, achievement and national pride.93 Vladimir 
Purishkevich, in his reports to right-wing groups, also spoke of the need to keep the 
university as a place for the ‘preservation of science’.94  
 
The subject hierarchy was expressed in other ways. Student groups, like the 
main council of the Russian Assembly, preferred what they described as the ‘hard’ 
                                                
90 For a few examples, see student letters to the UAM leadership: GARF, F. 117, op. 1, d. 119, ll. 7-
10; similar examples can be found from student groups at the Alexander III Electro-Technical 
Institute, dated between 1909-1910 in GARF, op. 2, d. 13, ll. 2-6, 7-12, 16; Priamoi put’, 23 October 
1910, pp. 255-256; February-March 1911, pp. 869-871, 890-891; 30 April 1911, pp. 1088-1093; 30 
May 1911, pp. 41-44. These letters came in to the main council of the UAM from across the empire, 
and were mostly addressed to Vladimir Purishkevich.  
91 Priamoi put’, 23 October 1910, p. 255.  
92 GARF, F. 117, op. 1, d. 119, l. 23: obrazhenie k nezavisimoi i bezpartiinoi: chasti studenchestva. 
93 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 244. 
94 Vestnik Russkogo sobraniia, 4 January 1908, 1, p. 5.  
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subjects, including chemistry, physics, biology and mathematics, but also the oldest 
humanities discipline, philosophy.95 The Russian Assembly founded its own 
gymnasium in 1911, geared towards improving ‘the health of the nation’. Its 
activities were designed to demonstrate ostensible sympathy with the people, such as 
in a 50th anniversary celebration of the emancipation of the peasantry, held on 17 
February 1911.96 Patriotism was linked to the celebration of science, which was held 
to be a source of Russian greatness, as represented by the achievements of the 
nation’s finest minds.97 Students reflected these desires, claiming in letters they were 
themselves ‘above politics’ and how as ‘university was only for science’ they 
opposed dangerous political trends ‘but we ourselves present the theme of calm 
currents of academic life, without ceremony, declining to please party interests’.98 
These ‘party interests’ were taken to mean strikes; a group of Academists from 
Moscow University protested against the disruption of a professor’s lectures, 
proclaiming that university was ‘for the motherland, honesty, and science’. 
Subsequently, Academists at St. Petersburg, Odessa and Kiev Universities organized 
anti-strike meetings after 1905.99   
 
Politics was rejected due to its associations with the left. In contrast, right-
wing groups described themselves as attempting to preserve ‘pure science’ and 
‘further the lives of students and of study’ at universities, as seen from the rules and 
regulations of the Union of Academists at the Alexander III Electro-Technical 
Institute in St. Petersburg. They claimed that they were only interested in improving 
the educational level of the student community, and the pursuit of learning on 
university campuses across the empire. St. Petersburg University, like several others, 
had been previously disrupted by widespread strike action.100 The legacy of 1905 
                                                
95 Vestnik Russkogo sobraniia, 28 April 1908, 17, p. 7; GARF, F. 117, op. 2, d. 8, l. 121: Iuzhnye 
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99 Ibid., p. 891; GARF, F. 117, op. 2, d. 8, l. 41, Academist letter; l. 61, Academist letter; l. 76: 
Kolokol, 4 October 1908, no. 781.  
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hung heavily; in their claims that university campuses had been thrown into chaos 
by strikes and protests, right-wing students were not always wide of the mark. 
However, many negative aspects of right-wing ideology manifested themselves in 
the letters and ideas of the Academists. The humanities, in contrast to the sciences, 
were largely perceived negatively, due to their associations with corruption and also 
with Judaism. The law faculties of the Russian universities were held to be full of 
the right’s enemies, including Jews and socialists. In a speech delivered to the Duma 
on 3 March 1907, Purishkevich spoke of a ‘Jewish section’ amongst the 
professoriate, which was driving Russian universities into a state of anarchy; in a 
revealing insight into his anti-Semitic mindset, Purishkevich even opined on the 
infiltration of Jews into Russia’s State Council.101 The social crisis manifested itself 
in other ways too. In his work, The Decline of the Contemporary Russian University, 
Purishkevich spoke of a wave of student suicides that had swept through university 
campuses after the 1905 revolution.102 
 
 Curiously several of the educational trends praised were associated with 
West European education, which some rightists suggested Russia should emulate. In 
a report to the Russian Assembly on 14 December 1907, Vladimir Purishkevich 
praised the German system of higher education, for its clear understanding of the 
need to separate science from politics and its emphasis on patriotism. Kaiser 
Wilhelm II was praised as one of the few European leaders who understood the 
‘correct’ transformative power of higher education, and Academist groups were 
partially based on notions of patriotism and discipline imported from the German 
patriotic student associations, known as the Burschenschaften.103 The right vowed to 
transform Russian youth, in large part due to the desire to create a new generation of 
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patriots, who would mirror the values of Uvarov whilst attempting to preserve the, in 
their mind, world-leading status of Russia as a technological and scientific pioneer.  
 
But there was more to these conceptions than just lessons in the classroom. 
Rightists were also interested in physical culture. The most common form of this 
was gymnastics, which the UAM promoted as a tool with which to transform youth. 
In Akkerman province, rightists established their own gymnasium, focusing on 
fitness activities and recreational pursuits. These were supported by internal 
donations, such as from the UAM leader, Purishkevich. Following on from the 
models established by the Burschenschaften, Baltic German Student corporations, as 
well as older native conservative student organizations such as the Dennitsa 
movement, rightist groups stressed the benefits of these activities, and also of school 
sports. As in the case of the positive interpretation of science, these were promoted 
as healthy alternatives to the corruption and decay of politics, which had resulted in 
the decadence of the student body. However, it was only a specific type of physical 
culture that was emphasized. These groups not only promoted physical fitness, but 
also what were seen as the ‘true Russian’ values of brotherhood, companionship and 
order. In some images, participating students wear military-style uniforms. Other 
photographs depict the students holding the Russian imperial standard whilst 
performing these exercises. Sport, like science, was contrasted with the negative 
influence of politics and the humanities.104 Letters from students also stressed the 
importance of sport, and its potential use as a device to inculcate patriotic ideas, as 
in the case of the St. Petersburg Academic Union, which pledged in its manifesto to 
stand for ‘science, art and sport’.105  
 
                                                
104 Priamoi put’, December-January 1911/1912, pp. 360, 367-368. Unfortunately, the report does not 
specify the amount received from Purishkevich.  
105 GARF, F. 117, op. 1, d. 119, l. 5 ob.: police report describing the activities of the Academic Union 
in St. Petersburg, 7 October 1909. 
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Quite late in the day, the UAM had discovered an idea with potential mass 
appeal. Sport and gymnastic societies had been used to some effect in other 
countries, in connection with ideas of national revival. One of these was nineteenth-
century Germany. In 1848, the German Gymnastic League was founded, an 
organization ‘dedicated to the purity of the Volk’. The membership of a variety of 
gymnastic organizations rose rapidly in Germany in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. As in the Russian case, the rituals of these gymnastic movements stressed 
cult and symbol, and expressed fraternity and brotherhood amongst students. The 
surviving images of the Russian gymnastic group organized by the UAM in 
Akkerman emphasize these values by showing the students involved in fitness 
activities in perfect synchronicity. This was not merely the appearance of order, but 
of people working together in the national will. That inspiration for these groups 
came from abroad again highlights that it was Western ideologies and trends often 
driving these ‘anti-Western’ groups, though with one important distinction. The 
Akkerman gymnasts, in contrast to the Burschenschaften, used the physical 
 
Figure 14 Academists outside the Akkerman gymnasium, Priamoi put’, December-January 
1911/1912, p. 359. 
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reconstruction of Russian youth as the central symbol of their cult, rather than that of 
the nation as a legal or civic entity. The eventual aim was the reconstruction of the 
self in a more virtuous, civically-minded, patriotic form.106  
 
Leading rightists such as G. G. Zamyslovskii, Purishkevich and Markov may 
have voiced their support for the Academists, but in reality how did they intend to 
back them? These rightist student groups received many donations from branches of 
established rightist groups, though it has been alleged by some contemporary reports 
circulating within local administration that the Russian regime financially supported 
them as well.107 Generally, Purishkevich and other figures operating within the main 
leadership council of the UAM were the most willing to lend a hand, at least 
according to the students themselves. Student rightists frequently wrote to 
Purishkevich to express their thanks for his generous financial support. A group of 
several students from the Academic Club of Polytechnic Students in St. Petersburg 
wrote to Purishkevich to thank him for his assistance. Records from Purishkevich’s 
office show that large sums passed through his hands, and were diverted to the 
organization after 1912. The amount came to hundreds of thousands of rubles. 
Purishkevich distributed funds to these associations himself, though it is unclear 
where all this money that Purishkevich received came from.  As he was a man of 
some financial means, it is likely that at least some of this came from his own 
pocket; though it is unclear to what exact extent the regime also funded the 
Academists.108 
 
  
                                                
106 For analysis of the gymnastic societies in Germany from the mid nineteenth century, see Mosse, 
Nationalization, pp. 125-136; for France, see Weber, ‘Gymnastics and Sports’, pp. 74-76. As in the 
Russian Empire, these aimed for national revival as part of their rationale, though achieved a grander 
scale than the Academists’ projects. 
107 In Odessa, reports circulating within the city administration between 1909 and 1910 claimed that 
money was forthcoming from the regime in order to build a school for the URP. Chernovskii (comp.) 
and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, pp. 289-290. 
108 As can be seen from student letters addressed to Purishkevich in GARF, F. 117, op. 1, d. 119, ll. 
39-40, 42. See also GARF, F. 117, op. 1, d. 241, ll. 3-4: denezhnyi otchet predsedatelia soiuza 
purishkevicha po summam proshedshikh cherez ego ruki so vremeni osnovaniia soiuza, 8 November 
1912; GARF, F. 117, op. 2, d. 8, ll. 36, 37, 40, 41, 50, 51; and GARF, F. 117, op. 1, d. 12, l. 14. 
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The numerical strength of the Academists is subject to some dispute. Soviet 
historiography tended to downplay their numerical significance, but their own 
sources give substantial numbers. Academist groups at the Nicholas II 
Technological Institute in Tomsk and at the St. Petersburg-based Lesnyi Institute 
both claimed 400 members in 1908, though of course, such claims should not be 
taken at face value.109 What we can be more certain of is that though right-wing 
student groups may have made up a small percentage of the overall student body, 
they produced a disproportionately large impact on university campuses due to their 
intransigent stance towards Russia’s present. It should not be overlooked how 
rejection of the educational present was both implicit and explicit in much of this 
activity. In criticizing the state’s policies from the last thirty to forty years, these 
                                                
109 For one example, see M. V. Borisenko, ‘Vliianie opyta pervoi rossiiskoi revoliutsii na 
formirovanie obshchestvennogo oblika rossiiskogo studenchestva v mezhrevoliutsionnyi period 
(1907-1917 gg.)’, in Iu. D. Margolis (ed.), Novoe o revoliutsii 1905-1907 gg. v Rossii: mezhvuzovskii 
sbornik (Leningrad, 1989), pp. 168-169. The rightist estimates are from GARF, F. 117, op. 2, d. 8, l. 
29 ob.; and GARF, F. 117, op. 1, d. 199, l. 5 ob.  
 
Figure 15 Academists outside the Akkerman gymnasium, Priamoi put’, December-January 
1911/1912, p. 361. 
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groups placed themselves in a position of intellectual opposition to the current 
Tsarist regime, concerns reflected by rightist leaders elsewhere. When Boris 
Nikol’skii wrote that schools needed to be ‘Russian in spirit’, he also suggested that 
the educational establishments of the contemporary era were a betrayal of Russia’s 
student body.110 Academist claims, as well as Purishkevich’s letters to the Minister 
of Education from 1906-1908 A. N. Shvartz, and to his successor, Lev A. Kasso, 
took on a similar tone. The university was held to be in a state of crisis as a result of 
liberals acting inside the establishment, as well as from revolutionaries.111 
 
Workers’ education 
 
Right-wing activists saw the need to ‘educate’ other sections of the narod, including 
urban workers, as shown from the publicity materials of the Khar’kov branch of the 
URP. The membership of this branch was listed as 3,940 on 1 March 1907.112 
Leaders, including I. V. Kovalevskii, P. I. Butov, M. G. Kovalev and A. S. Viazigin, 
described how ‘the activists of the Union declared the aim of teaching workers as 
one understanding of its activities in regard to its relationship with other monarchist 
organizations, and to delegates’.113 This built on earlier trends in addressing the 
workers’ question.114 The aim was the ‘immediate’ cultivation of mass support, and 
the branch was positive about the public impact of its activities in 1907: 
 
Public opinion has turned, expressed by the fact that the Union’s members 
are drawn from the peasantry and the working class, and we see 
representatives of the highest echelons of the Orthodox Church, true science, 
figures from the military and the civil service, nobility and even zemstvo 
figures, of which a number of zemstvo activists representing the Valkov 
zemstvo from the town of Enisherlov (members of the Valkov branch of the 
                                                
110 The council of the Russian Assembly, led by Nikol’skii, voiced such criticisms in its official laws: 
GARF, F. 588, op. 1, d. 1265, ll. 49-50.  
111 Purishkevich, Materialy po voprosu o razlozhenii sovremennogo russkogo universiteta, pp. V-VII; 
Priamoi put’, May 1912, p. 771; March 1914, pp. 277-278.  
112 Mirnyi trud, 3 (1907), p. 194, Iv. Anosov, ‘Deiatel’nost’ Khar’kovskogo soiuza russkogo naroda. 
Otchet za pervyi god’ sushchestvovaniia’. 
113 Ibid., p. 190. 
114 Ibid., p. 197.  
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Khar’kov Union of Russian People) were elected as members of the State 
Duma from Khar’kov province.115  
 
Other examples show how lectures were considered one important tool for teaching 
the workers, giving them a thorough grounding in the importance of Russian 
Orthodoxy and Russian education. Rightist delegates to the State Duma including 
Vladimir Purishkevich, A. D. L’vov, G. G. Zamyslovskii and V. Kazarinov met with 
leaders of the Society of Russian Firemen on 22 October 1909 to discuss a lecture 
held on 18 October for the Russian Workers’ Economic Union, landowning 
members of the Russian Assembly and right-wing delegates to the Duma. Antonii 
(Khrapovitskii), Archbishop of Volynia and Zhitomir, delivered the lecture in 
L’vov’s apartment at eight in the evening.116  
 
 But did activists, or provincial leaders, reflect the preoccupations of the 
leaders of the central right-wing associations? The correspondence of the leader of 
the Perm branch of the URP, Petr Vasilievich Riabov (1870-1918), provides some 
indicators. Between September 1913 and March 1915, Riabov wrote frequently to 
Aleksandr Dubrovin to voice his desire to carry out educational work.117 Of peasant 
background, Riabov had worked as a sorter in the Perm cannon factory until 1907, 
when he was forced to resign from his post on health grounds. Afterwards, he lived 
near the Motovilikha factory just outside Perm, where he opened a tearoom, and 
became one of the organizers of the Motovilikha branch of the URP. He 
subsequently became permanent chairman until the branch’s disbanding in 1917. In 
December 1909, he opened a URP branch for railway workers in Perm.118 His 
telegrams describe worker and peasant concerns, and his attempts to mobilize right-
wing support in the factory in which he was formerly employed largely focused on 
                                                
115 Ibid., p. 198. 
116 ‘Zasedanie soveta imperatorskogo rossiiskogo pozharnogo obshchestva sovmestno s chlenam 
pravoi fraktsii gos. dumy 22 Oktiabria 1909 g.’, in Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol. 1, pp. 535-536. 
117 GARF, F. 116, op. 1, d. 346, l. 56: P. Riabov (Perm), to A. I. Dubrovin (St. Petersburg), 1 
November 1913. These communications were addressed to what was by then known as the All-
Russian Dubrovinist Union of the URP, rather than merely the URP.  
118 For biographical details of Riabov, see Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol. 1, p. 685; CSIE, p. 475. 
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educational projects. One letter, entitled The Workers’ Question listed the following 
demands:  
 
The education of workers by reliable cadres for the most important tasks of 
state work; development of a religious patriotic spirit amongst circles of 
workers, as opposed to revolutionary propaganda; peaceful struggle with 
strikers in the sphere of self-awareness; construction of arteli for workers; 
support for Russian craftsmen in order to evade the dominance of 
foreigners; construction of technical offices for the sale of work tools and 
factory equipment; a requirement to save weight on railway transport and on 
the steamship wharf; supply union members with free medical work and 
insurance for them in case of misfortune, injury and death; the formation of 
professional teaching in the Motovilikha factory for the children of workers 
of the Perm cannon factory.119  
 
The letter shows how even far-right figures such as Riabov could integrate elements 
of what are usually considered left-wing ideologies, in this instance, social care, as 
well as those more typical of nationalists and conservatives, such as the supposed 
inculcation of a patriotic spirit. Riabov chaired several congresses in Perm for URP 
activists between 1913-1915. In 1913, Riabov gathered URP activists to draft a letter 
to Nicholas II, raising awareness of the branch’s work. 
 
 The Perm governor, in an apparent show of sympathy, allowed a delegation 
of monarchist organizations led by Riabov to converge on the Motovilikha factory 
from 13-16 December 1913. In doing so, he allowed for a discussion forum for the 
‘spiritual enlightenment activity’ of the group. Riabov explained a month before the 
event how it was going to work. After a ‘ceremonial service’ the attentions of the 
delegation turned to discussing a seven-point plan to ‘raise awareness of the 
monarchist position’ and ‘revive understanding of [our] activity’. Riabov’s concerns 
encompassed education, the condition of the peasantry and the working class. The 
basic message of ‘Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality’, and ‘Russia, one and 
indivisible’ reflected monarchist ideologies established after 1905.120 Riabov also 
                                                
119 GARF, F. 116, op. 1, d. 346, ll. 70-71: P. Riabov (Perm), to A. I. Dubrovin (St. Petersburg), 1 
November 1913. 
120 Ibid., ll. 70-71.  
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referred to the need to fight the strikers disrupting work in the factory, yet curiously 
stressing his desire to halt these groups via ‘peaceful’ means, and the need to 
develop a ‘religious patriotic spirit’ amongst the workers.121 
 
 In another telegram to Dubrovin, Riabov expanded on how to ‘educate’ 
workers in the Motovilikha factory. The rightist movement in Perm needed to 
engage with 12,000 local workers, and Riabov voiced his frustration that not enough 
was being done to inculcate patriotic feelings in the local populace, a requirement 
for them to join the monarchist movement. A central idea in his conception of 
education was the purity of science, and need for ‘objective’ rather than political 
learning. But this claim did not by any means represent a noble search for 
uncorrupted, de-politicized knowledge. Whilst Riabov stressed a desire to improve 
the knowledge of workers in the Motovilikha factory, more strenuous examination 
of his ideals reveals the ways in which this knowledge would be harnessed. Riabov 
suggested the founding of study circles for the children of workers, where they could 
study the necessary ‘hard’ technical subjects required for a sounder understanding of 
the practices of modern manufacturing. The problem of ‘uneducated’ workers was, 
in his view, a pressing one, as it was holding back the strength of Russia, as well as 
the success of right-wing organizations on a local level.122  
 
 His other letters to Dubrovin touched on the theme of transforming the 
education of children, suggesting a mixture of science-based learning structured 
around a technical education, with a spiritual element of teaching based around 
‘religious feeling’, and a nebulous concept described as ‘patriotic education’.123 In 
his view, what had led to the crisis in Russian education was that the children of 
workers had not been inculcated with the spirit of Russian Orthodoxy. Another 
problem was poor understanding of modern scientific practices, particularly, 
                                                
121 Ibid., ll. 70-71.  
122 Several similar examples of telegrams from Riabov to Dubrovin, many of which contain similar 
themes to the cited source, appear in ibid., ll. 70-71, 142 ob., 143-144 ob., 145-146, 149-150, 187-
188. These date from between 1913 and 1915.   
123 Ibid., l. 150: a list entitled ‘programme of people’s education: understanding national-patriotic self 
awareness in the development of people’s schools’.  
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knowledge of how to repair and build the weapons needed for state defence.124 
Riabov saw that, in future, Russia would be engaged in unceasing war with foreign 
enemies. The defence of a strong, technologically advanced future Russia would 
require a productive and efficient workforce, which needed a sound understanding of 
how to build and repair destructive armaments worth many thousands of rubles. The 
new generation would need to familiarize itself with such work.125 
 
 Riabov’s interests in science, technological understanding and patriotism as 
necessary frameworks for education were all related principles. The need to defend 
the motherland aggressively would require a greater level of technological progress, 
and improvements in the training and technical skills of the current workforce across 
Russia, united to a patriotic spirit. In the view of Riabov, the current population was 
simply too decadent to achieve this aim. Riabov mentioned how endemic 
drunkenness in Russian life needed to be eradicated if the nation wanted to achieve 
its goals in the future, including successful state defence.126 Riabov’s communiqués 
with Dubrovin show no small grasp of the challenges that Russia would need to 
overcome in order to achieve such aims. However, his personal interests were not 
representative of all rightists, who often stuck to more conventional themes, such as 
devotion to Russian religion, and love of the Tsar.  
 
A role for women 
 
A striking feature of several of these right-wing groups was the pronounced presence 
of women, who were in many cases given prominent roles. In contrast to the all-
male composition of, for instance, the State Council, the leadership of the right was 
not entirely masculine. Certainly, elite women had long played a role in private 
charitable societies and institutions. Empress Elizabeth and other women from the 
aristocracy had founded the Women’s Patriotic Society in 1812 to help those who 
                                                
124  Ibid., l. 145: a sheet titled ‘the workers’ problem: document seven in the programme for the 
founding of professional study in the factories of Motovilikha for worker’s children’.  
125 Ibid., ll. 145-146. 
126 Ibid., ll. 187-188. 
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had suffered as a result of the war against Napoleon, and later charitable groups also 
encouraged the active participation of women.127 For the radical right nearly one 
hundred years later, women were not only given charitable roles such as baking 
cakes at the local bazaar and fete, but were also afforded more distinguished and less 
traditionally gendered roles as activists, organizers and leaders. One prominent 
example was Elena Poluboiarinova (1864-1919), the secretary of the URP after 
1907, and editor of the group’s newspaper, Russkoe znamia, between 1909 and 
1912.128 Another is Lidiia Kologrivova (?-1915), a member of the Russian 
Monarchist Assembly, one of its chief poets, and the daughter of Count Aleksandr 
Ivanovich Ukhtomskii, who participated in the war against Napoleon in 1812.129  
  
 Women were accorded a role in the transformation of the nation sought by 
other civically-minded right-wing groups. Taking the example of student 
associations, the leadership of the Academist unions was keen to recruit female 
students. V. Zh. Kursov, an activist with the Russian Assembly, established a circle 
of female students in Moscow during 1907, with additional support from V. A. 
Gringmut.130 The main council of the group consisted of: E. E. Vostorgova; Sofia 
Aleksandrovna Golitsina; Liubova Dmitrievna Gringmut’; Lidia Aleksandrovna 
Kologrivova; Nadezhda Aleksandrovna Murovtseva; and E. A. Bogolenova. Like 
the men’s sections of the organizations the aim of these groups was to banish politics 
from the Russian university, and preserve it ‘only for science’.131 The groups 
appeared to have primarily cultural aims, with the goal to set up study circles, 
libraries and clubs, all for the preservation of ‘free thought’ in the time of ‘ruinous 
strikes and disorder’ across Russian universities.132 
                                                
127 Lindenmeyr, Poverty is Not a Vice, p. 111.  
128 A short biography appears in CSIE, pp. 403-404. Poluboiarinova, unlike many of her male 
colleagues, appeared to stay loyal to Dubrovin during the later splits in the right-wing groups, and she 
accompanied him in his formation of the ‘Dubrovinist’ wing of the URP in 1912. 
129 Ibid., pp. 255-256. Her obituary appears in Moskovskie vedomosti, 25 March 1915; and 
Istoricheskii vestnik, 5 (1915).  
130 Mirnyi trud, 5 (1909), p. 47, ‘Deiatel’nost’ russkogo zhenskogo kruzhka uchashchikhsia g. 
Moskvy, otchet’ 1907-1908 god’; see also Mirnyi trud, 10 (1912), pp. 20-23. 
131  Mirnyi trud, 5 (1909), p. 49, ‘Deiatel’nost’ russkogo zhenskogo kruzhka uchashchikhsia g. 
Moskvy, otchet’ 1907-1908 god’.  
132 Ibid., p. 50. 
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 But did these groups merely reflect the concerns also seen in the male wings 
of the organizations, or were they adding new elements to a revised conception of 
Russian society? What was the exact role for women? A. G. Chutaevskaia was the 
leader of the Russian Women’s Student Circles in Moscow from 1910-1911. The 
group was dedicated to the preservation of the university ‘for science only’, the love 
of motherland, patriotism and search for the improvement of the nation, which 
exactly mirrored the claims of other right-wing student groups. However, it is 
intriguing to note that women, as well as making up the sole membership of this 
organization, were also leading and driving the group.133 Claiming between 30-50 
active members in Moscow, the scale of this group was much smaller than that of 
the DHE in Kiev in 1907 (estimated to number around 350 or so), though it used 
similar tactics, such as giving reports and seminars. Apparently, the leaders of the 
right-wing groups took an interest in the circle’s progress; Purishkevich was invited 
to travel from St. Petersburg to give a report to the group.134 The numerical presence 
of female Academist cricles was stronger in non-Russian areas, like other right-wing 
groups. In Odessa, one report from 22 October 1911 claimed there were 400 
students at a school for female students organized by the URP.135 
 
 Certain provincial groups demonstrated a degree of civic-mindedness. The 
Union of Russian Women in Voronezh, led by Mariia Nikolaevna Ditrikh, 
undertook a variety of activities, including participation in artistic exhibitions, 
painting and charity work.136 The first annual meeting of this group in 1908 passed a 
resolution that it would open a group for making Russian national costumes. This 
had the dual role of creating styles of Russian national dress, therefore contributing 
to what members saw as patriotic awareness, and also giving work to poor women; 
                                                
133 GARF, F. 117, op. 1, d. 184, l. 1: T. Lebedeniskaia (Moscow), to V. M. Purishkevich (St. 
Petersburg), 19 October 1910.  
134 Ibid., ll. 2-2 ob.: A. G. Chutaevskaia (Moscow), to V. M. Purishkevich (St. Petersburg), 27 
October 1910.  
135 GARF, F. 1467, op. 1, d. 847, l. 6: report from Nikolai Tregubov in Odessa, published 24 July 
1917 in the Provisional Government committee of inquiry into the illegal activities of the old regime.  
136 Ditrikh was also a member of the Russian Assembly. See CSIE, p. 170. This tells us that 
membership of these central organizations was also open to women by 1907-1908. 
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these female groups considered such a charitable social function very important. A 
report from the chair of the Union, M. Bernova, vice-chair N. Popova and secretary 
E. Prokhorova, declared that between 1908 and 1911 it had provided economic 
assistance for poor families. The Union had attempted to spread charitable ideals in 
Voronezh, undertaking such noble activities including baking bread, and distributing 
salt, sausages, tea and eggs for poor families at Easter, and also opening a day care 
centre for children in poverty, called Manger.137 These social roles mirrored other 
organizations such as the URWM in Kiev, as well as the efforts of individual 
activists such as Dar’ia Kudelenko.  
 
 These social roles largely reflected activities in other groups on the right, and 
did not accord a unique status or rationale to female members. Furthermore, female 
emancipation and liberation were not themes of these women’s groups, and feminist 
questions were not even on the agenda in other rightist circles. However, female 
membership was an issue, with leaders such as V. A. Gringmut clearly considering 
the female branches of the Academists an important part of the organizations, 
writing to these groups expressing his support.138 More generally, the presence of 
women in the higher echelons of the right stands in stark contrast to the masculine 
nature of Russian officialdom in the era; the rulers of Russia were all men, as 
indeed, they were in Western Europe. Rightists were often keen to include women, 
as well as peasants, workers and students in their activities, as part of the desire to 
improve the social reach of such groups. Leaders including Gringmut saw that, in 
the ideal to reach across horizontal ties in society, their groups would need to 
include a variety of social demographics, in one sense a forerunner of the people’s 
community, Volksgemeinschaft, later pursued in 1930s Germany. However, in 
contrast to several fascist groups in Europe later on, religion and nationality played a 
more significant role than gender in the identity hierarchy created by rightists. This 
is demonstrated by the exclusionary practices towards Jews and national minorities, 
                                                
137 GARF, F. 117, op. 1, d. 53, l. 34: Vestnik Russkogo sobraniia, 18 November 1911, 29, p. 5. In this 
aim, the rightist women’s groups mirrored the role of women in civic society and charitable 
associations elsewhere in the late imperial period. See Lindenmeyr, Poverty is Not a Vice, pp. 123-
129. 
138 GARF, F. 117, op. 1, d. 53, l. 34.  
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in contrast to the more inclusive role for women. Indeed, generic prejudice in this 
sphere did not appear to be as pronounced as it was in several others, which is not to 
suggest that it was absent. Rightists did not in fact strive for gender equality, but 
rather sought to reach across gender as well as social divides in order to promote a 
vision of unity in society. Consequently, not only traditional gender roles were 
accorded to female members, even if the right-wing groups did not go as far as to 
promote ideologies of feminism, as several revolutionary groups certainly did.139  
 
The dark side 
 
Having considered the social reach of the right, it is time to return once again to the 
issue of why this has been termed the ‘dark side’ of civic society. One reason was 
the appeal to and use of violence. The DHE in Kiev was one of several student 
groups that disrupted lectures, and members carried out attacks on other students. 
The association had taken confidence from the success of the right in the local 
elections, held in Kiev during February 1907. Three of its leaders, Kiselevich, 
Kornaichik and Sevastianovo, were promoting a message designed to ‘discourage 
internal revolution’ at the local school. Kievskii golos (Kievan Voice) sarcastically 
suggested that ‘only the best and most pure of Russia’s youth’ were joining the 
group, which in reality was creating new tensions amongst the local population.140 
The rector of Odessa University, I. M. Zanchevskii, wrote to Petr Stolypin about the 
growing problem of the antagonism of Jewish students on the campus by groups of 
URP activists. The harassment of many students who merely wished to study and 
learn was one feature of the Academist groups, in spite of their oft-stated claims to 
appear above politics, and to display pious and respectful behavior.141 When the 
                                                
139 The presence of women in twentieth-century fascist movements in a variety of European countries 
is considered in K. Passmore, (ed.), Women, Gender and Fascism in Europe, 1919-1945 (New 
Brunswick, NJ, 2003). See particular K. Passmore, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-10.  
140 GARF, F. 102, 4-e d-vo, op. 1907, d. 128, l. 1: Kievskii golos, 2 February 1907.  
141 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, t. 1, ll. 15-15 ob.: I. M. Zanchevskii 
(Odessa), to P. A. Stolypin (St. Petersburg), 11 September 1906. Examples of Academist violence 
appear elsewhere. See for instance GARF, F. 1467, op. 1, d. 849, l. 18: police telegram from 8 
February 1907 in Odessa (republished in the Protocols of the Emergency Commission of the 
Provisional Government, 16 September 1917).  
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Council of the Students’ Committee at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute was 
accused of being full of Jews (using the pejorative zhid’) by the leadership of the 
UAM, it was no surprise that UAM students then pledged to wage war against 
leftist, Jewish students.142 
 
 In spite of these examples of violence, rightist students portrayed themselves 
as strike breakers and champions of law and order, against the disruptive tendencies 
of the strike movement that had prohibited learning. In the village of Novo-
Aleksandriia, a group of Academists wrote to the UAM central council, stating ‘the 
last strike was a scandalously illegal one, and we, opposed to the strikes, were 
unable to support and enter into open war with their adherents’.143 This illustrates 
another feature: the establishment of Academist groups corresponded with a desire 
to fight strikes and disorders across university campuses. This was also apparent 
from student circles established in Khar’kov back in 1903.144 The White Double-
Headed Eagle, another organization operating within Odessa during October 1907, 
was reported in the liberal paper Birzhevye vedomosti as openly committing anti-
student violence.145 The targeting of the student community appeared to be a tactic 
for rightist druzhiny linked to the URP, with further reports describing incidents on 
the Odessa campus when rightists clashed with leftist students.146 Attacks on 
students, particularly Jewish ones, from small groups of rightist students in Odessa 
tended to increase the authority suspicion of these self-stated ‘patriots’.147  
 
 Another ‘dark’ feature was the exclusionary practices of these civic societies, 
which cannot be over-estimated. These groups had an exclusive nature, membership 
normally being limited to Russians, and therefore, Jews and national minorities were 
                                                
142 GARF, F. 117, op. 2, d. 8, l. 84 a.: Veche, 5 October 1908.  
143 GARF, F. 117, op. 2, d. 15, ll. 4-6: letter to the main council of the UAM from Novo-Aleksandriia, 
21 February 1910; GARF, F. 117, op. 2, d. 8, ll. 7-7 ob., 61, 89.   
144 Iu. I. Kir’ianov (ed.), ‘Publikatsii: perepiska i drugie dokumenty pravykh (1911-1913)’, Voprosy 
istorii, 10 (1999), p. 107; Kir’ianov and Dodonov (eds.), ‘Predystoriia pravomonarkhicheskikh 
partii’, 5 (2001), p. 118. 
145 GARF, F. 102, 4-e d-vo, op. 1907, d. 164, l. 64: Birzhevye vedomosti, 3 October 1907.  
146 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. A, l. 209: Utro svobodne, 23 April 1907.  
147 Ibid. 
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banned from joining, as in the case of the Kiev sports club ‘Eagle’. Other nationalist 
groups, such as the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists, also adopted such 
practices.148 Elsewhere, projects of charity and education did not only aim to 
improve the immediate material situation of those that needed help, but had other, 
more subversive functions. A day centre for the Circles of Russian Women in 
Voronezh provided not only a social service, but also a forum for the discussion of 
rightist values.149 When a school for the poor was established, a device for 
inculcating the values of Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality was also created. 
 
Conclusion    
 
Between the revolution of 1905 and the years immediately preceding the outbreak of 
the First World War, rightists made some headway appealing to different social 
groups, and creating a cross-class civic vision united by the connecting thread of an 
idealized patriotic society, but with its roots located in Russia’s history. Across the 
empire, workers, students, peasants and women joined the monarchist cause, 
showing that the patriotic ideals of the central monarchist councils had some popular 
resonance, although the exact scale of the movement is difficult to precisely 
determine from available sources. Yet there were clear limits to this vision of unity 
across society. The divisive and exclusionary ideologies adopted, far from being a 
source of strength, in fact became a weakness for several right-wing groups. These 
limited their potential social intake, and additionally, repelled educated and well-to-
do Russians, again highlighting the growing class dimension to the new right’s 
following. For many conservatives, right-wing radicals were seen as hooligans and 
they rejected their demagogical leanings. Fears of the pogrom crowd are apparent in 
the memoirs of a Duma deputy from the Nationalist Party, Vasilii Shul’gin. 
Describing crowds of patriotic demonstrators in the 1905 pogroms, he notes their 
‘wild roars’ and asks ‘what could be more frightening than a mob?’150  
                                                
148 Hohler, ‘Radical Right Civil Society’, pp. 101-102.  
149 GARF, F. 117, op. 1, d. 53, l. 34.  
150 V. V. Shul’gin, Days of the Russian Revolution: Memoirs From the Right, 1905-1917 (edited and 
translated by B. F. Adams, Gulf Breeze, 1990), p. 25.  
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 However, even given the small scale of several right-wing civic groups, they 
should not be excluded from an examination of civic society in late imperial Russia. 
Firstly, there were overlaps between these radical rightist groups, and more mature, 
developed and sophisticated organizations, such as, for instance, the Society of 
Friends of Natural History, which shared with many Academist groups the 
importance of science as a form of social capital.151 Secondly, we see the true 
complexity of the right when studying examples such as the DHE or URWM, and 
the creation of a civic vision for Russian society. The response to different social 
groups changed depending on whether national minorities, women, students or Jews 
were the demographic in question.152 This casts new light on the radical right’s 
position in society as well as in politics, caused in part by this unusual intersection 
between extreme and conservative visions, and the related impact of identity 
politics. Furthermore, these civic groups, in portraying a divisive and dark view of 
society were not unique to their time, but reflect exclusionary practices in other 
European and global organizations, similar examples of which endure across the 
world to this day. In late imperial Russia, the absence of strong and responsive 
central government only encouraged the appearance of non-democratic, ‘dark’ civic 
groups.153 
                                                
151 See for example Bradley, Voluntary Associations, pp. 128-168.  
152 Hohler, ‘Radical Right Civil Society’, pp. 101-103. 
153 Berman, ‘Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic’, pp. 401-429. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Towards Catastrophe – Internal Crises and Division 
 
As the revolutionary tide ebbed after 1905, the radical right groups suffered a 
gradual decline in membership numbers. These numbers reveal that although at one 
stage a large-scale presence, rightists never achieved the level of support that they 
desired.1 In one respect, the answer to why this was the case is obvious. After 1905-
1906, revolutionary violence was on the wane; without a revolutionary movement, 
counter-revolutionaries were not needed. By the middle of 1907, Stolypin had 
quelled left-wing extremism in brutal fashion, and there appeared to be more terror 
coming from extremists on the right, though the evidence showing this is 
‘impressionistic and inconclusive’.2 This reinforced the regime’s view that the 
autonomous right was a threat, in spite of its shared convictions with tsarism. Even 
so, this factor reveals less of the right’s internal weaknesses, which gradually robbed 
the movement of its initial dynamism. There had been serious attempts by the right 
to develop conceptions of workers’ rights, forge links with the peasantry and spread 
ideas of social improvement after 1905. Since these views did not always fall on 
entirely stony ground, why then was the right diminished as a political and social 
movement by the outbreak of war in 1914?3  
 
                                                
1 This is shown by police reports compiled by Kir’ianov, Pravye partii v Rossii, 1911-1917, pp. 69-
103. The numbers of right-wing groups across the empire deteriorated markedly between the two 
periods compared, the first being from the end of 1907 to the start of 1908, and the second period 
from the end of 1915 to the start of 1916. Taking Odessa as an example: from 1907-1908, the 
membership of the URP in the region was estimated at 3,000, with all other combined right-wing 
groups at 2,670. The data from 1915-1916 shows a drop in numbers to 1,050 and 400 respectively. 
The figures are on p. 82.  
2 Ascher, The Revolution of 1905: Authority Restored, p. 326; Waldron, Between Two Revolutions, 
Ch. 3.  
3 Kir’ianov’s monograph on the right-wing parties has examined the First World War period (1914-
1917) in considering the ‘reasons for crisis and failure’. In this author’s view, right-wing weakness 
was apparent well before this time. With substantial evidence to show various problems, such an 
analysis can be attempted for an earlier period: Kir’ianov, Pravye partii v Rossii, 1911-1917, pp. 388-
424.  
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 There were alternative reasons for the right’s decline: factionalism and 
corruption, the divisive and yet potentially powerful mobilizing idea of nationalism, 
and the Beilis affair and its fall out. These factors were all connected; together, they 
form an argument that factionalism and ideological disagreements combined to 
contribute to the right’s self-destruction, a process largely driven from within. This 
does not mean that the right was without its successes after 1907, the year that the 
movement appeared to peak in terms of numbers, members and overall influence. As 
we have seen, there were many examples of right-wing clubs with influential social 
capital operating across the empire, and the presence of rightists in the re-configured 
Third Duma, structured to be more ‘Russian in spirit’ according to Petr Stolypin, 
increased rapidly after 1907.4 However, the recruitment of rightists into the political 
arena paralleled the declining influence of the right’s extra-parliamentary activity. 
Its stature as an independent social movement was not aided by the recruitment of 
major right-wingers to positions in parliament and politics. 
 
Schisms in the Right 
 
A central cause of rightist weakness was political infighting, which crippled the 
ability of several major groups to operate effectively on a day-to-day basis. The first 
major crisis in right-wing power came at the start of 1908, when the largest right-
wing group, the Union of Russian People (URP), suffered a split significant on its 
own terms and indicative of problems occurring in several groups across the empire. 
One of the root causes of this split was corruption. Embezzlement of government 
funds and subsidies was widespread amongst the right, and a recent analysis has 
focused in detail on the financial corruption of the URP, both in St. Petersburg and 
Odessa, as well as in several other areas across the empire. Such financial problems 
did not, it should be noted, end all productive links between right-wing 
organizations, but contributed to a series of tensions within the movement that were 
                                                
4 See for instance Ivanov, Poslednie zashchitniki monarkhii; and Edelman, Gentry Politics, p. 30. 
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never entirely overcome, mainly centered on the ‘Dubrovinist’ wing of the URP. 
After four years of internecine strife amongst local groups, a nationwide split 
followed in early 1912, when the URP once again broke apart to form two rival 
organizations.5  
 
The Union of Russian People and the Union of the Archangel Mikhail 
 
By late 1907 the URP, under A. I. Dubrovin’s leadership, had grown in size to 
become a very large-scale political movement, with membership in the tens of 
thousands, but all was not well under an apparent veneer of success.6 There were 
widespread accusations within the URP that Dubrovin had embezzled a large 
amount of funds, mainly those given to the organization by surreptitious government 
sources, intended for supporting newspapers, druzhiny and councils.7 A. I. Prusakov, 
a member of the URP in 1906, claimed Dubrovin took a cut of the substantial 
government subsidy directed towards druzhiny in St. Petersburg for himself.8 What 
is clear is that within the URP after 1905, criticism began to grow over allegations of 
his financial wrongdoing, and his stance of total intransigence towards the Duma: a 
toxic combination of corruption and tactical squabbles leading to unrest.9 Though 
the URP had staged electoral campaigns to the First and Second Dumas, the 
disappointing return of rightist deputies had led many within the movement to 
question the wisdom of espousing anti-constitutional ideas whilst playing the 
constitutional game.10 One significant source of opposition was Vladimir 
Purishkevich, a flamboyant figure from a minor gentry family in Bessarabia who 
                                                
5 Langer, ‘Corruption and the Counterrevolution’, covers St. Petersburg, pp. 116-126, and Odessa, pp. 
242-262.  
6 The exact figures are open to dispute. Stepanov in his Chernaia sotnia v Rossii claims around 
400,000: pp. 104-105, 108-109. However, for reasons I have laid out in chapter two, this estimate 
could be unreliable.  
7 For examples, see Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, pp. 43-45, 49, 
50-53, 55, 75-77. 
8 Ibid., p. 45.  
9 GARF, F. 116, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 19-19 ob.  
10 Ibid., l. 11.  
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had joined the URP in 1905. His personality clashed with that of Dubrovin from an 
early stage.  His infighting with Dubrovin reached such a point that he was expelled 
from the URP’s central council at the start of 1908. From the end of 1907 until the 
start of 1908, Purishkevich and his closest associates discussed the creation of a new 
group, and on 11 March, the Union of the Archangel Mikhail (UAM) was officially 
established, with its main council located in St. Petersburg.11 
 
 Ideologically, this group was almost identical to the URP, believing in the 
supremacy of the autocracy, Russian religion and an intense form of nationalism. 
But the tactics of the group were different to the earlier and larger organization.12 
Purishkevich, unlike Dubrovin, did not preclude the possibility of working with the 
Duma system (whilst still voicing his opposition to it), and his enthusiastic 
campaigning for election bore reward when he became a deputy to the Second, Third 
and Fourth State Dumas from Bessarabia, which he represented between 1907 and 
1917.13 This was undoubtedly helped by the Tsar’s dissolution of the Second Duma 
to create a more compliant buffer of ‘conservative’ feeling. In other areas of policy 
too, Purishkevich’s group displayed increased autonomy from the main council of 
the URP. Though Purishkevich, like Dubrovin, lamented the period of 
constitutionalism and revolution, he was increasingly attempting to find political 
solutions to political problems. However, it should be recognized that this does not 
                                                
11 Biographical details for the group can be found in ‘Soiuz imeni Mikhaila Arkhangela’, in V. V. 
Shelokhaev (ed.), Politicheskie partii Rossii: konets XIX-pervaia tret XX veka. Entsiklopediia 
(Moscow, 1996), p. 491; and its leader in CSIE, pp. 423-432; RKE, pp. 388-392. A comprehensive 
and sympathetic recent biography of Purishkevich is A. A. Ivanov, Vladimir Purishkevich: opyt 
biografii pravogo politika (1870-1920) (St. Petersburg, 2011).  
12 The rules and regulations of the group, which it should be noted closely mirror those of the URP, 
are published in GARF, F. 117, op. 2, d. 36, ll. 1-9 ob.; see also Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol. 1, 
pp. 369-374.  
13 For a thorough portrait of Purishkevich’s activity in the Duma, see I. K. Kir’ianov, Rossiiskie 
parlamentarii nachala XX veka: novye politiki v novom politicheskom prostranstve (Perm, 2006), pp. 
159-181.  
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mean the UAM was a less radical organization: druzhiny were established under its 
own auspices.14  
  
Purishkevich’s stage in the Duma allowed for opportunities both of self-
promotion and the broadcasting of the rightist cause, that the clandestine activities of 
Dubrovin’s URP, such as the attempted assassination attempts, could not. His 
lengthy and virulent speeches in the Duma, castigating all manner of ills in Russian 
society, including Jews, socialists and other parliamentarians, led to him gaining 
notoriety across the empire. On one occasion, after throwing a glass of water at 
Pavel Miliukov, he was thrown out of the chamber, to much applause from liberal 
deputies.15 However his elevated profile appeared to help his organization, and after 
Purishkevich had left the URP in 1908, significant numbers of monarchists 
gravitated towards the UAM, which had a measure of success in creating its own 
social movements, particularly in the realm of student support. Furthermore, 
Purishkevich was active in the field of publishing and propaganda. The total print-
run of the myriad of books published by the UAM, such as the 13-volume Book of 
Russian Sorrows (Kniga russkoi skorbi), designed to chronicle the many victims of 
the revolutionary movement, was estimated to come to nearly 1.3 million copies.16 
Purishkevich ‘…appeared as a most active publisher, it was thanks to his efforts that 
there was a turn towards the ability to publish en masse…of the rightist political and 
societal organizations’.17 Purishkevich’s publication activities, like the different 
endeavours of Riabov, had the eventual goal of educating the population in a civic, 
anti-revolutionary, ‘Russian’ spirit. Purishkevich’s success in this sphere may have 
been greater than that of many of his contemporaries on the right, and such activities 
doubtless helped to raise his own profile. But the split between the URP and UAM 
                                                
14 B. A. Pelikan, whom we will encounter below, formed a druzhina for UAM members in Odessa 
during 1908, mentioned in Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 274.  
15 The incident is mentioned in Ascher, Revolution of 1905, Vol. 2, p. 307. 
16  Kir’ianov, Rossiiskie parlamentarii, pp. 160-161.  
17 Ibid., p. 160. More evidence of this publication activity is in a list of UAM books, in Priamoi put’, 
30 April 1910, pp. 79-80; and evidence of disbursements from the authorities in support of these 
ventures can be found in Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, pp. 138-
139.  
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proved damaging to the right-wing movement more widely, as it divided its potential 
base of social support, and the lasting enmity between central figures such as 
Dubrovin and Purishkevich was never resolved.18  
 
 After 1908, the two main right-wing groups, the younger UAM, with its 
commitment to parliamentary struggle, publishing and exploring new avenues of 
social support, and the older URP, which adopted a more combative approach to 
what many activists saw as a necessarily fierce anti-revolutionary war, became 
increasingly separate. The two leaders did not directly communicate with one 
another. Purishkevich’s stage in the Duma gave him a more visible platform than his 
rival, and by 1910, Dubrovin had become something of a bête noire for many in the 
movement, as Purishkevich’s attitude towards him had no small influence within 
right-wing ranks. However, Dubrovin still had many supporters, including amongst 
members (and also, former members) of the URP. An open letter to the main council 
of the URP on 19 June 1910, sent by an activist, Olga Morozova, strongly praised 
the ‘wise and direct leadership’ of A. I. Dubrovin, and his strong, semi-dictatorial 
style of leadership of the URP, a necessity due to the severity of the revolutionary 
threat faced. She claimed the ‘backstage intrigue’ by his rivals would lead only to 
the weakening of the monarchist movement, and Dubrovin’s secrecy in regard to his 
own affairs was a merely a sign of his personal nobility, an unwillingness to ‘air his 
dirty laundry in public’. Even at this advanced stage, Dubrovin exerted influence 
over some activists within the movement. By 1910, a ‘Dubrovinite’ faction had 
emerged, removed from other groups on the right, but with a measure of influence 
over many activists.19 
 
                                                
18 There were also criticisms of Purishkevich from a conservative angle. Vladimir Meshcherskii, who 
had no small influence within the press, described the Duma orator as ‘an extremely talented actor’, 
considering him to be little more than a self-publicist. Grazhdanin, 10 June 1911, 26, p. 12. 
19 GARF, F. 102.OO, op. 316, (1910 g.), d. 244, ll. 22-23 ob., 25-26: otkrytoe pis’mo glavnomu 
sovetu SRN (otoslannoe v glavnyi sovet), Olga Morozova, 19 June 1910.  
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 However, other leading monarchists were harshly critical of Dubrovin and 
his corruption. Ioann Vostorgov, an associate of Gringmut, also left the URP in 1908 
to join the UAM. Much bickering continued between the two warring factions 
afterwards, and one police report even describes an assassination attempt in October 
1910 on Dubrovin by recalcitrant former members of the URP who opposed his rule. 
This was discussed in the main council of the group, and reported in Russkoe 
znamia. Such incidences point towards the symbolic significance of violence as a 
central part of the political culture of the extreme right.20 However, one newspaper, 
Sovremennoe slovo, reported that by autumn 1910 these factional fights had ‘ceased 
to attract the interest of the general public’ and were leading to the wider ‘decline in 
the influence of the monarchist movement.’ Following this, Dubrovin left the central 
council of the URP for some months, resulting in a further crisis of leadership.21 
 
 The warnings of the damage that infighting would do to the right-wing 
movement apparently went unheeded by Dubrovin, Purishkevich and their principal 
associates. To further compound the factionalism that was widespread in the central 
councils of the URP after 1908, the group, still led by Dubrovin, split once again in 
November 1911. This further schism was driven by criticisms of his ‘dictatorial’ 
attitudes from within the group, in particular, disapproval of his tendency to expel 
members he did not like. Additionally, his refusal to allow the URP to undergo a 
total audit of funds raised further suspicions of his corruption. Criticism was also 
driven by his uncompromising stance towards the UAM; he would not admit to any 
level of reconciliation with his enemy, Purishkevich.22 The split came after members 
of the URP’s main council, still led by Dubrovin at this time, realized a drop in the 
numbers of new members. Leading members of the URP decided to take firm action. 
At a session convened to deal with the problem, after several ballots, members voted 
                                                
20 Ibid., ll. 29-29 ob.: MVD, DP, po osobomu otdelu. Sekretno. Nachal’nik S. Peterburgskogo 
okhrannogo otdeleniia, October 1910; ll. 30-30 ob., shows an apparently identical source.  
21 Ibid., l. 27: Sovremennoe slovo, 17 September 1910.  
22 GARF, F. 116, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 26-28 ob.    
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to replace Dubrovin with E. I. Konovnitsyn as the leader of the group.23 Dubrovin 
responded to his expulsion in 1912 by convening his own group, and decided to cut 
all of his remaining ties with the URP, a decision influenced by his irritation at 
continuous criticisms of his rule. Dubrovin left the group, along with his associate 
Elena Poluboiarinova, to form yet another right-wing organization. This was the 
grandiloquently titled All-Russian Dubrovinist Union of Russian People 
(Vserossiiskii Dubrovinskii soiuz russkogo naroda, or ARDURP), which was active 
from 1912 until 1917.24 Meanwhile, the URP continued to exist under the same 
name, now led by N. E. Markov and Count E. I. Konovnitsyn, after the secession of 
the Dubrovinists. It should be noted that the rules and regulations of the Dubrovinist 
faction of the URP, and its central ideological tenets, did not differ from those of the 
main council of the URP or of the UAM. Dubrovin’s faction was strongly 
committed to Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality, as well as anti-Semitism and 
harsh xenophobia, and like the original URP, designated itself a ‘union’ rather than a 
‘party’.25   
 
 This new split in the right was prompted in part by Dubrovin’s corruption, 
but to focus solely on this is to place insufficient emphasis on important tactical 
disagreements emerging within the rightist movement. By the end of 1907, some of 
the more perceptive figures inside the movement were realizing that if the faction 
were to adapt, diversify and achieve wider success, then it would have to bring to an 
end its activities of clandestine violence. In particular, it would need to stop planning 
(and occasionally, undertaking) assassinations, which were unsurprisingly damaging 
the credibility of the group as a buttress for the autocracy. There is an obvious 
paradox about a group that ostensibly styled itself as ‘pro-autocracy’ and then 
decided that the best course of action to defend that same governmental structure 
                                                
23 Ibid., l. 28 ob.  
24 Chernovskii (comp.) and Viktorov (ed.), Soiuz russkogo naroda, p. 39; this split is also chronicled 
in Langer, ‘Corruption and the Counterrevolution’, pp. 122-126.  
25 The rules and regulations of the group are listed in GARF, F. 116, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 31-37.  
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was to carry out an assassination attempt on a chief policy-maker, such as Sergei 
Witte, or duma deputies such as Mikhail Herzenstein and Grigori Iollos.  
 
The URP in Odessa 
 
The reverberations from the split in the central right-wing councils at the start of 
1908 were felt around the empire. In Odessa, the URP branch, at that point led by 
Count A. I. Konovnitsyn, was subject to internal turmoil driven by political 
infighting. Like the central branch led by Dubrovin in St. Petersburg, much of this 
resentment amongst members was caused by accusations of widespread corruption 
within the organization. One claim was that Konovnitsyn had embezzled funds that 
the government channeled towards the Odessa branch of the URP from 1906 
onward.26 Konovnitsyn’s control of the worker’s arteli in the region, and his 
disbursements to URP members amongst the druzhiny, allowed for plenty of 
opportunities for him to take a cut of the subsidies. By the end of 1907, accusations 
of corruption had spread throughout the organization. His leadership of the URP 
was, unsurprisingly, increasingly challenged by his own associates. Among these 
were the influential B. A. Pelikan, vice-chair of the URP, and Nikolai N. Rodzevich, 
the chair of the closely affiliated organization the Union of Russian Men (URM) in 
Odessa. As in the case of Dubrovin, Konovnitsyn had a tendency to expel members 
that complained about missing disbursements and insufficient funding weakening 
the structure of the group.27 This created a wide pool of disgruntled former members 
of the URP in the area, and also led to dissatisfaction within the ranks. Pelikan, 
increasingly angry at missing disbursements leading to the financial weakness of the 
group, quit as editor of Za tsaria i rodinu. He led many members of the Odessa 
URP, and supporters from a related group called the White Guard, in secession from 
                                                
26 GARF, F. 1467, op. 1, d. 847, ll. 23 ob.-24 
27 In a telegram to fellow URP member K. A. Durante, Konovnitsyn described his feud with 
Dubrovin, and also Boris Nikol’skii, stressing that he wanted to see the expulsion of the ‘hooligan 
elements’ from the group, in order that the leadership of the monarchist unions from the end of 1912 
could be placed back into the hands of the ‘good’ section of the URP and the UAM. GARF, F. 102, 
op. 265, d. 556, l. 30: A. I. Konovnitsyn (St. Petersburg), to K. A. Durante (Odessa), 4 January 1912. 
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the main council in March 1908. They formed a UAM branch in Odessa, in 
opposition to the URP in the same city.28  
 
 This dispute became exceptionally heated, and the repercussions led to smear 
campaigns, backstabbing and even physical fighting. Pelikan launched a campaign 
against Konovnitsyn in the right-wing press, the aim of which was to force 
Konovnitsyn from the main council of the URP. Things came to a head in March 
1908, when a gun battle broke out between the two warring factions in a URP 
tearoom, leading to a dozen arrests.29 A propaganda war then ensued, as the rival 
newspapers of the two groups, the UAM’s Iuzhnyi bogatyr’ (Southern Hero) and 
Konovnitsyn’s Za tsaria i rodinu continued to trade blows during 1908, each 
accusing the other of the worst kinds of depravity.30 Konovnitsyn sent a telegram to 
A. N. Grigor’ev’s successor as mayor of Odessa, I. N. Tolmachev, who was more 
receptive to rightists than his predecessor, with a request that he disband Pelikan’s 
group. Tolmachev did not cede to this, or to a further request to chair a mediating 
session between the two warring factions, but he did take the firm action of writing 
to Pelikan to request him to disband the druzhiny of the UAM.31  
 
  Pelikan was uncooperative at first, but after receiving another direct request, 
this time from the leader of the UAM in St. Petersburg, Vladimir Purishkevich, he 
did disband the combat arm of the UAM in 1908.32 The consequences of this 
infighting were grave for the monarchist movement in Odessa. Konovnitsyn had 
recruited many workers to the URP cause, particularly due to his control over the 
arteli in the port area, where right-wing recruitment had been strong during 1906 
                                                
28 The corruption of the URP in Odessa is recounted in Langer, ‘Corruption and the 
Counterrevolution’, pp. 242-246.  
29 GARF, F. 102.ОО, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. А, t. 3, l. 123.  
30 Ibid., ll. 157-158: I. N. Tolmachev to the Odessa department of police, 25 July 1908. 
31 Ibid., ll. 125-125 ob.: I. N. Tolmachev to the Odessa department of police, 18 April 1908. Further 
reports on this factionalism amongst the Odessa URP can be found in Tolmachev’s reports, as well as 
police circulars addressed to him, passed within the department of police during 1908 in: ibid., ll. 
126-126 ob.; l. 147; ll. 172 ob.-173.  
32 Ibid., ll. 126-126 ob.  
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and 1907. His approach had led to the creation of new right-wing workers’ groups, 
such as the Russian Society of Steamship Workers. These groups, often closely 
affiliated with the URP, had managed to build up a strong level of organization 
during 1906 and 1907.33 As the majority of the disbursements given to the URP by 
the government were channeled to worker’s arteli by Konovnitsyn, the split in the 
right served to divert these much-needed resources, as well as to have the effect of 
playing the rival factions off against each other. As I. N. Tolmachev noted, another 
outcome was that these splits helped to destroy whatever credibility the leaders of 
the right had, not just within their own groups, but also with other sympathizers in 
the region, including in the Odessa city administration.34 The URM, still led by 
Rodzevich, continued to publish hostile reports of the URP in their paper, and the 
propaganda war helped to discredit the movement. As Tolmachev foresaw, this 
made members lose sight of whatever ‘higher’ aims that they had, as the movement 
became gradually more riven with infighting.35  
 
 This was, however, not the end of the story for the URP in Odessa. In 
November 1909, a group from within the main council of the URP requested a full 
audit of the group’s finances, and that Konovnitsyn be removed due to his corruption 
and hampering of the popular potential of the URP. The split, as reported in Novoe 
vremia, occurred when a group of three members wrote an open letter to the main 
council of the URP, requesting that Konovnitsyn step down, and nominated a local 
right-wing activist, I. I. Zaichenko, to step up to replace him. Konovnitsyn, far from 
giving up his position, declared the move illegal and expelled the dissident group, 
who subsequently left to form a new group under Zaichenko, the Southern 
Monarchist Union (SMU).36 Unsurprisingly, animosity ran high afterwards, and the 
SMU continually aimed barbs at the leader of the URP from their affiliated paper, 
                                                
33 Konovnitsyn claimed as much in a later telegram: GARF, F. 102, op. 265, d. 565, ll. 995-996: A. I. 
Konovnitsyn (St. Petersburg), to I. V. Sosnovskii (Odessa), 2 April 1912. 
34 GARF, F. 102.ОО, op. 316, (1905 g.), d. 999, ch. 39, l. А, t. 3, ll. 157-158: I. N. Tolmachev to the 
Odessa department of police, 25 July 1908.  
35 Ibid., l. 158.  
36 Ibid., l. 242: Novoe vremia, 14 February 1910, no. 12187.  
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the UAM’s Iuzhnyi bogatyr’. One of these in February 1910 accused Konovnitsyn of 
pocketing the funds intended for the URP’s paper Za tsaria i rodinu. Activists from 
the SMU even issued death threats against their ex-leader.37 The group claimed that 
Konovnitsyn’s dictatorial leadership was ruining the potential of the monarchist 
movement in Odessa to achieve a truly mass scale. His desire to enrich himself was 
at odds with the real aims of monarchism, which needed to re-establish the 
autocratic and religious principles of the movement, and not play to the whims and 
caprice of corrupt leaders.38  
 
 But this war of words did not go unanswered from Konovnitsyn’s side. Za 
tsaria i rodinu, still controlled by Konovnitsyn, responded in 1910 by suggesting 
that the SMU were not and could not be ‘true patriots’ due to their factionalism. 
Rebutting their accusations, Konovnitsyn claimed that an audit carried out 
independently by I. N. Tolmachev in 1908 had found the finances of the group were 
all in order. He also claimed his commitment to social reform, citing his opening of 
a school for poor children in Odessa, one of several charitable works on his part, and 
that he had successfully directed a mass monarchist movement in Odessa as shown 
by his work in appealing to the worker’s arteli in the port area from 1906.39 The 
movement was, he claimed, not in decline, but only just beginning. The succession 
of Zaichenko and the SMU from the main council of the URP was against the 
constitution of the group, the spirit of the monarchist movement, and demonstrated 
Zaichenko’s own grasping nature and love of power. This infighting and 
factionalism was reported in the monarchist press throughout the year.40  
 
 These schisms in the right severely weakened the popular impact of the URP 
in Odessa, which underwent a sharp decline in membership numbers after 1907.41 
                                                
37 Ibid., l. 243: Russkoe slovo, 11 February 1910.  
38 Ibid., l. 243. 
39 Ibid., ll. 244-244 ob.: Za tsaria i rodinu, February 1910. 
40 Ibid.  
41 See Kir’ainov, Pravye partii v Rossii, 1911-1917, pp. 69-102. 
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The authorities in Odessa increasingly opposed the monarchist movement, one result 
of the vicious infighting that had broken out within it. Furthermore, the groups were 
compromised by lingering suspicions of violence, such as the anti-Jewish pogroms 
that had been associated with the right between 1906-1908, before the UAM’s 
druzhiny was wound up on the orders of Tolmachev. Moreover, those who had 
previously sympathized with the monarchist movements, including voices within 
authority, were now put off by the widespread corruption and factionalism of the 
URP and its breakaway organizations. Importantly, the corruption in these two 
examples was not unique, but indicative of trends elsewhere. The Bessarabia branch 
of the URP, which underwent its own set of internal problems after the death of its 
leader Pavel Krushevan in 1909, also suffered from corruption and factionalism. 
After Krushevan’s passing, I. I. Dudnichenko, a leading member of the group in 
Kishinev, sent a telegram to the main council of the ARDURP in October 1912 to 
complain that he ‘could not stay silent when people use the monarchist badge as a 
device to enrich their personal well-being’. Certainly, his leader Dubrovin would 
have recognized his claims.42   
 
 Corruption, whilst certainly not helping the activities of the right, is an 
inadequate explanation on its own to explain right-wing weakness. Corruption 
served to exacerbate existing tensions and engender further problems, and helped to 
accelerate the decline of the movement. But other significant problems prohibited 
the wider social, political and cultural influence of the right-wing associations. 
Corruption forms part of rather than the entire explanation, as the groups that left the 
URP after 1906, including the UAM, went away to pursue their own activities, 
sometimes with quite different aims and goals in mind. The weaknesses of the URP 
central council and its recalcitrant members cannot fully explain the shortcomings of 
these different groups. There were wider problems, ones that illuminate the political 
                                                
42 GARF, F. 116, op. 1, d. 57, l. 6: I. I. Dudnichenko (Kishinev), to the main council of the URP, A. I. 
Dubrovin (St. Petersburg), 10 January 1912.  
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culture of the far right. Significant ideological and tactical disputes dogged the right 
after 1907, one of which was the divisive approach to the national question.  
 
People and Nation 
 
In addition to the practical problems sketched, there were also many ideological 
disputes occurring within the various factions of the movement, often revolving 
around the three central elements of the Uvarov triad, not least the role of autocracy 
and Russian religion. Here, one of the most significant sources of tension within 
rightist groups will be highlighted, which is the problem of nationalism, and more 
specifically, how the ideas of both people and nation were understood within the 
rightist factions and the complexities this engendered. 43 This question was a crucial 
one for the right, as the stress on national issues was a central part of their appeal. 
When considering the issue of nationality in the Russian Empire, central questions 
arise immediately, as illustrated by the terminology. What did rightists mean by 
people (narod)? What did they mean by Russian (russkii, or rossiiskii)? What did 
they mean by nation (natsiia) or nationality (narodnost’)? These crucial issues 
would have profound implications for the ability of rightists to mobilize supporters 
in a multi-denominational, multi-ethnic empire, where in 1897, only 43.3 per cent of 
the population were ‘Great Russians’.44  
 
                                                
43 Some major studies of Russian nationalism are Weeks, Nation and State; G. Hosking, Russia: 
People and Empire, 1552-1917 (Cambridge, MA, 1997); Thaden, Conservative Nationalism; Lieven, 
Empire; Hillis, Children of Rus’; H.-D. Löwe, ‘Russian Nationalism and Tsarist Nationalities Policies 
in Semi-Constitutional Russia, 1905-1914’, in R. B. McKean (ed.), New Perspectives in Modern 
Russian History (Harrogate, 1990), pp. 250-277.  
44 Theodore Weeks defines Russkii as opposed to Rossiiskii as a more ‘intimate’ word ‘used to 
describe the language, culture, and even religious faith (i.e., Eastern Orthodoxy) shared by Russians’. 
T. Weeks, ‘National Minorities in the Russian Empire, 1897-1917’, in Geifman (ed.), Russia Under 
the Last Tsar, p. 113. The statistic is cited from p. 118.   
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 Nationalism has shaped the course of modern history more than any other 
force, and the Russian Empire was no exception to this.45 It was not only the right-
wing parties and their related civic groups that were pre-occupied with the issue. 
Conceptions of Russian nationhood had haunted the policy-makers of the Russian 
Empire long before the late imperial period, and were one of the primary challenges 
in governing its vast empire. An enormous territorial space, with dauntingly long 
borders, the regimes of successive Tsars were all in broad agreement about the 
necessity of bolstering the power of the state, but there was no consensus about an 
underlying conceptual understanding of what the state actually was. For instance, the 
European myth under Peter the Great identified the autocrat with the power of the 
secular state. In stark contrast, the national myth under Alexander III ‘strove to 
display an ethnic and spiritual bond between the Russian Tsar and the Russian 
people’, the latter conception of which held more appeal for the rightist groups.46 In 
addition to the far right, the Nationalist Party and the Kiev Club of Russian 
Nationalists were also perplexed by such matters. Professor P. I. Kovalevskii was 
one Nationalist Party member who thought that the force of nationalism could be 
used as an above-class ideology creating a very wide social basis for the party. He 
saw that the Nationalists could be a truly ‘democratic’ group, speaking in the 
interests of all classes. His resulting appeal, therefore, included the need to ‘arouse 
national feeling among the dark masses’.47 However, when Kovalevskii urged the 
need for the group to transform its ideology in 1912, it was still drawing on a very 
limited social basis. Kovalevskii’s desire for increased popular involvement was 
reflected in the right-wing groups.48 However, as will be seen, there were divisions 
                                                
45 One classic study is E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1870: Programme, Myth, 
Reality (Cambridge, 2005). The divide between ‘state’ and ‘nation’ in this period makes it difficult to 
apply Hobsbawm’s central thesis to the case of the Russian Empire. 
46 Wortman, Scenarios of Power, Vol. 2, pp. 6-7, 13-14.  
47 P. I. Kovalevskii, Osnovy russkogo natsionalizma (St. Petersburg, 1912), p. 16; Russkii 
natsionalizm i natsional’noe vospitanie v Rossii (St. Petersburg, 2006), p. 105; Edelman, Gentry 
Politics, pp. 146-148. 
 48 On the Nationalists, see Weeks, Nation and State, pp. 30-40. For a detailed outline of the central 
ideological tenets of the Nationalist Party (or All-Russian National Union), see Kotsiubinskii, Russkii 
natsionalizm, pp. 76-115. 
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between rightists and conservatives, often over the position of national minorities in 
the empire.49 But even to extreme rightists, how radical were changes in the actual 
content of such nationalist appeals?  
 
The rightist view: exclusive and exclusionary 
 
A central feature of the right-wing view was its exclusive and exclusionary nature. 
Like fears over degeneration stemming from sources such as alcoholism or 
pornographic novels, minority nationalities were perceived as threats to the body 
politic. The rightist factions considered that Russia was a religious and cultural 
entity, the central focus of which was the narod. Russian Orthodoxy was a key 
element of this construction: the narod was composed only from Orthodox ‘true 
Russians’.50 Exclusionary practices were a guiding principle of the Russian 
Assembly, which established in its rules and regulations in 1901 a law that only 
Orthodox men would be admitted to the group. In one early meeting, a member 
declared that ‘to become Russian men, we must first become Orthodox, only those 
who derive from Orthodoxy will support Russian nationality’.51 One of the striking 
features of the manifestos, editorials, rules, regulations and many other 
pronouncements of the Russian Assembly, URM, URP and UAM is the frequency 
of which the term narod is used, rather than empire or nation, in describing the 
entity that the right-wing groups wished to protect.52  
 
 This is not to say that groups, including the URP, were unaware of the 
importance of issues of nation and empire, rather to state that they conceived of 
                                                
49 See Loukianov, ‘“Russian for Russians’ or “Russia for Russian Subjects”?’ pp. 77-92. 
50 Narod does not translate easily into English. Authors in the nineteenth century sometimes used it to 
refer to the Russian peasantry. Some commentators and statesmen when using it meant more than just 
‘people’ (its literal translation). It was also associated with nationality and nationhood, and 
particularly the ‘simple folk’ of society – the masses to whom the Russian right appealed.  
51 GARF, F. 588, op. 1, d. 1243, ll. 6–6 ob.: Zapis’ zasedaniia soveta Russkogo sobraniia; this note 
records a standard Assembly view.  
52 This was the view held by the URP, which can be found in a manifesto from 1906 titled ‘Soiuz 
russkogo naroda’, in Shelokhaev (ed.), Programmy, pp. 444, 447.  
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these problems as ‘tribal questions’ (plemennye voprosy) in which Russian Orthodox 
people were considered separately from the rest of the population.53 Gringmut 
described such a view in a pamphlet published after his death, The History of 
Popular Power.54 Similarly, the rules and regulations of the main council of the 
UAM in 1908, as outlined in its newspaper Kolokol (Bell) described a rising ‘feeling 
of national self-awareness in the majority of the people’ and described Russians as 
under threat from subversives within the empire.55 These were often taken to mean 
national minorities, including the Poles, Jews and Finns. The ARDURP copied these 
ideas. In early 1912, a pronouncement from Dubrovin, the chair of the main council, 
claimed the narod was the centre of the Russian body politic, requiring special 
protection by right-wing groups, making explicit reference to ‘Russian nationality’.56 
  
The national question was powerful, but also divisive; many who believed in 
Russian nationalism could not agree on a shared conception of it in order to create a 
party united on such a platform. In considering the issue, Dubrovin thought the 
ARDURP to be at odds with nationalist groups, as well as his fierce rivals on the 
left. Dubrovin claimed the most dangerous individuals ‘we must consider to be not 
only the revolutionaries and the Kadets, but also the Octobrists and the nationalists’. 
By the latter, Dubrovin was referring to the Nationalist Party, which had supported 
Stolypin over the Western borderlands bill that was blocked in the State Council in 
1911.57 Lev Tikhomirov also criticized this group. ‘The National Union is claiming a 
national role, but in reality the people have no demand for it. It has not introduced 
anything into its program, and has no connection with Russian nationality’.58 At a 
meeting of the main council of the Russian Assembly on 27 March 1906, chaired by 
Nikolai Rodzevich (also a member of the rightist URM) it was declared by one 
                                                
53 Ibid., p. 447. 
54 V. A. Gringmut, Istoriia narodovlastiia (Moscow, 1908).  
55 UAM program as republished in Kolokol, no. 642, 1908, St. Petersburg, in Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye 
partii, Vol. 1, p. 370.   
56 GARF, F. 116, op. 1, d. 1, l. 19. 
57 Ibid.  
58 L. A. Tikhomirov, K reforme obnovlennoi Rossii (stat’i 1909, 1910, 1911) (Moscow, 2012), p. 51.  
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member that the Assembly stood in opposition to constitutional monarchists. This 
meant the Octobrists and their offshoots such as the Union of 17 October – in this 
instance, the Party of Legal Order (PLO) established in St. Petersburg in October 
1905. The major point of contention was that the PLO’s propaganda in elections to 
the State Duma held during 1906 had taken the somewhat ambiguous position that 
the autocracy was to exist unchanged, and yet be bound by a constitution. The 
Russian Assembly saw this as an unacceptable, false compromise, ‘…the invitation 
of indivisible autocracy is only a ruse, which was behind the PLO and the 
constitutional parties’.59  
 
 But where did the source of disagreement lie on the national question? A 
significant point in the pronouncements of Dubrovin is the use of the term russkii, 
Russian by ethnicity, rather than rossiiskii, or Russian by nationality. This was not 
merely semantics, but points to an important distinction from moderate conservative 
groups.60 Dubrovin was referring to the Russian people, rather than the Russian 
Empire. The use of ‘people’ supported the view that to be ‘Russian’ was a cultural, 
religious and intimate rather than national quality. This qualitatively transforms the 
meaning of the term, and also its implications, as identity became linked to ethnicity. 
Nationality could not simply be acquired: one was born with it.61 Not only 
Dubrovin’s group took this stance; N. L. Mordivinov, a member of the Russian 
Assembly, declared in a meeting between the central council of the group that ‘true 
Russian Orthodox men’ were russkii rather than rossiiskii.62 Yet others on the right 
had slightly different conceptions. As we have seen, the narod was a central point of 
importance to the right-wing parties – the group imagined as russkii.63 Some right-
                                                
59 GARF, F. 588, op. 1, d. 1243, ll. 33-34 ob. This statement is particular telling, as the final aim 
behind both this case and the principle of national self-realization was the same for the far right: 
defending state power.  
60 It was on the conception of the potential Russian nation on which few conservative groups agreed. 
The Nationalist Party did not have close accord with the right-wing factions on this matter, in 
addition to their disagreements on the direction that ‘constitutional’ Russia was to take.  
61 For a discussion of this distinction, see Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, pp. xix-xxviii. 
62 GARF, F. 588, op. 1, d. 1243, ll. 6–6 ob.: Zapis’ zasedaniia soveta Russkogo sobraniia. 
63 See also the discussion in chapter two under ‘the rise in populist nationalism’.  
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wingers, among them Lev Tikhomirov, did refer to the nation, but like Dubrovin and 
the ARDURP, he conceived of Russian Orthodox people as a separate group, 
needing to be inoculated against the corrupting effects of other peoples within the 
empire. For Tikhomirov, the basis of this difference was cultural and religious, as 
well as ethnic. In his essay What is Nationalism? which appeared in Moskovskie 
vedomosti in 1910, Tikhomirov outlined his conception of the national issue: 
 
…it is evident that this concept and principle can be reduced to the simple 
fact, that we must become ourselves. Nations, people, as in the case of all 
individuals, have a unique character, which is to say, metaphorically 
speaking, personality. This character is based on the characteristics of 
different tribes, and the individual circumstances of the historical 
development of a people…64 
 
For other rightists, religion was central to this imagined separateness. N. D. 
Oblekhuov, a commentator writing in Purishkevich’s journal, equated being Russian 
with a belief in Russian Orthodoxy.65 It was also clear from the publicity materials 
of the central council of the UAM from 1908 onwards that Russian was taken to 
mean Orthodox.66 Right-wing activists expressed their concerns about political 
subversion primarily in relation to the non-Orthodox subjects of the empire. The 
Catholic Poles were one (though far from the only) source of consternation, and 
these rebels from the Western regions of the empire were imaged to be subversives. 
In a letter from L. Ivanov to V. M. Purishkevich in 1913, the Polish deputies to the 
State Duma were described as ‘the first and most desperate enemies of the Russian 
people’.67 In the writings of G. G. Zamyslovskii, the non-Russian peoples of the 
empire were associated with liberalism, revolution and subversion of the autocracy, 
                                                
64 L. A. Tikhomirov, Apologiia very i monarkhii (Moscow, 1999), p. 212. The italics have been 
preserved from the original.   
65 Priamoi put’, 30 September 1910, pp. 151-153.  
66 Kir’ianov (ed), Pravye partii, Vol. 1, p. 370.  
67 GARF, F. 102, op. 265, d. 920, l. 446: L. Ivanov (Warsaw), to V. M. Purishkevich (St. Petersburg), 
2 March 1913. We should not consider that rightists were alone on this issue. Other conservatives, 
such as Vladimir Meshcherskii, agreed national minorities posed a grave threat. In one editorial, 
Meshcherskii claimed that the revolutionary threat came, most of all, from Finland. Grazhdanin, 4 
September 1911, 34, p. 16. 
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and religious differences were central to this.68 A similar logic lay behind the idea 
that the revolution of 1905 was Jewish-inspired. 69 The regime’s proposed creation 
of a separate province in Kholm was looked upon with no little suspicion for these 
reasons; the region contained large numbers of Roman Catholic Poles, who would 
destabilize state power in the region.70 A view developed that Russian nationhood 
involved several non-acquirable characteristics; therefore, it was the preserve of a 
certain group of people. However, in contrast to later rightist groups in Europe, this 
view was often based on culture and religion, rather than exclusively ethnicity.  
 
Generally, right-wing groups stuck to ‘Great Russian’ nationalism of a 
nineteenth century variety.71 Many rightists considered that the way to integrate 
subject or ‘enemy’ nationalities was to apply administrative and cultural 
Russification, much in the same way that the regime itself had done throughout the 
latter half of the nineteenth century.72 This shows the largely derivative nature of the 
ideas of the Russian right when it came to the national question. Ideas of nationalism 
that involved politics or ethnicity were often weakly developed. Instead, many 
rightists saw religious and cultural differences as the primary focus of the national 
question. The resulting views were often primitive, and relied primarily on the 
exclusion of non-Russians, as well as ideas of integrating the distant ‘truly Russian’ 
masses.  
  
In contrast, some members of the Nationalist Party developed appeals to 
nation building. One figure was P. A. Kovalevskii. Such slogans could use political 
and ethnic ideas, as well as appeals to Russian religion. A speech from B. A. 
Vasil’chikov to a meeting of the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists on 21 February 
1910 revealed an appeal to the narod, where he stated ‘we call for Russian men to 
                                                
68 G. Iurskii [G. G. Zamyslovskii], Pravye v tret’ei gosudarstvennoi dume (Khar’kov, 1912), p. 12. 
69 This view was widespread in right-wing circles, for instance, in the work of A. S. Shmakov, a later 
witness at the Beilis trial in September 1913. A. S. Shmakov, Svoboda i evrei (Moscow, 1906). 
70 Vestnik Evropy, 4 (1912), p. 422; Weeks, Nation and State, pp. 172-192. 
71 See Weeks, Nation and State, pp. 3-18.  
72 Ibid. 
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unite in our club under the banner of nationalism’. He claimed that the club called 
for cultural and political work, such as an increase in Russian language tutorials for 
other peoples of the empire.73 Through tuition in a shared language, culture, and 
identity, Vasil’chikov held that many subjects of the empire could be converted to 
the cause of Russian nationalism.74 Such views were more sophisticated than the 
doctrines of certain right-wing groups, and behind these were the differing statuses 
of respective ethnic and minority nationalities. Nationalists also saw the empire as a 
‘family of peoples’, which like the official effort to organize the Bessarabia 
celebrations, allowed for a possible reconciliation of different peoples under the 
imperial framework. The aim was very far from equality – ‘Great Russians’ held the 
prominent role – but each group would be afforded a role. Nationalists, like the 
right-wing parties, the regime and a great many Russians, perceived that Ukraine 
and Belorussia were not separate from Russia. However, the Jewish question was a 
thornier issue for the Nationalists, who were split on whether Jews could be 
assimilated or converted.75 One development was indicative of this conflicted mood. 
At a 1909 conference in the southwest of the empire, attended by a wide variety of 
nationalists and URP members that resulted in the creation of the Nationalist Party, 
there was debate over whether Jews could join the nationalist group to be created. 
The resolutions following the conference decreed that Jews would be barred from 
joining the organization, a view shared by many moderate and radical nationalists 
alike.76  
 
However, differences between the two movements became more pronounced 
over time. One case showing this was the debate over the Western zemstvo bill, 
when rightist opposition to Stolypin’s policies coalesced between 1910 and 1911.77 
The bill promised fundamental reform of the Western borderland regions in the 
                                                
73 Sbornik kluba russkikh natsionalistov, Vol. 2 (Kiev, 1910), pp. 113-114.  
74 Ibid., p. 114.  
75 Sbornik kluba russkikh natsionalistov, Vol. 1 (Kiev, 1909), p. 35.  
76 Okrainy Rossii, 2-19 September 1909, pp. 521-522; Hillis, Children of Rus’, pp. 228-230. 
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empire. It was the Nationalist Party on which Stolypin leaned in order to get the bill 
passed through the State Duma in 1911.78 Indeed, this bill was originally proposed to 
Stolypin by the Nationalist Party member D. I. Pikhno, whose idea of a bill to 
establish zemstva in the Western regions of the empire gave Stolypin an opportunity 
to use nationalism as a potential basis of support for his administration. In the 
charged atmosphere after 1909-1910, this was an appealing prospect for him. The 
bill was initially supported by a number of groups including the Nationalist Party, as 
well as several delegates from the right, but further qualifications to the bill, debated 
in the State Duma, proved controversial for the latter tendency. In sharp contrast to 
the Nationalist Party, rightists opposed any possible qualifications to the bill, 
believing they would strengthen the interests of non-Russian peoples in the empire, 
and the devolution of powers from a centralized state.79 Several rightists fiercely 
criticized the bill in the Duma; N. E. Markov declared that the bill could only be 
supported if it strengthened the Russian people and the Russian state.80 Purishkevich 
added that he too saw such a bill as potentially weakening the hold of the Russian 
state on subject nationalities.81 Both were united in a view that establishing 
legislative powers in regions of the empire with largely non-Russian populations 
would devolve power from the central administration in St. Petersburg. In spite of 
these criticisms, the bill passed on a reading through the State Duma in the spring of 
1910, albeit only by a narrow margin. 
 
The bill met with a different fate in the State Council. The commission that 
examined the bill in March 1911 removed most of the amendments that had been 
added to the bill in the Duma. In the full session, the bill was defeated. It had met 
with strong opposition, directed against what was considered by many to be little 
more than a piece of unscrupulous politics. Stolypin had already been under pressure 
                                                
78 Edelman, Gentry Politics, p. 101; Weeks, Nation and State, pp. 145-148. 
79 Waldron, Between Two Revolutions, p. 172. 
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from the Octobrists, shown by opposition to Article 87 in the State Council, and this 
failure helped to further diminish his already shaky support in the State Duma and 
State Council.82 More significantly, there was a widespread view on the right that 
the bill would potentially strengthen the power of minority nationalities in the 
Russian Empire, where there were large numbers of Polish Catholics, and it met 
with inveterate criticism. It also inspired machinations from other conservatives, not 
least Petr Durnovo in the State Council.83 As well as revealing the right’s position in 
relation to the nationality question, this episode also shows that the right was not, 
even by 1910-1911, completely marginalized from mainstream political discourse. 
This was not the only area where the right had an influence. The United Nobility, a 
congress composed of nobles whose assemblies started to meet in 1908, exerted 
behind the scenes pressure by leaning on high-level ministers and also on the Tsar 
himself in order to place further pressure on Stolypin’s reform plans.  
 
The Nationalists, the right and race 
 
Modern racist ideas were developing on the right before the First World War, as 
seen from Krushevan and Shmakov, but significant figures, not technically members 
of the right-wing parties, also demonstrated such views. Often, these were 
developing in what have been termed more ‘moderate’ national associations, such as 
the Nationalist Party and the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists.84 Yet the matter is 
complex: more extreme ideas were in development in different types of conservative 
groups.85 Ivan Sikorskii, a member of the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists, drew 
                                                
82 Gosudarstvennyi Sovet, Stenograficheskie otchety, Session six, meeting 36 (St. Petersburg, 1910), 
cols. 1781-1795. 
83 Weeks, Nation and State, pp. 148-151; Waldron, Between Two Revolutions, pp. 170-175.  
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ideologies can be fleeting. See for example Repnikov, Konservativnye kontseptsii pereustroistva 
Rossii, pp. 310-315; Luk’ianov, Rossiiskii konservatizm i reforma, pp. 135-137. A work that 
examines the history of physical anthropology in Russia in a much wider context, taking into account 
such leading literary lights as A. S. Pushkin, as well as aspects of nationalist discourse in the late 
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on contemporary ideas of anthropology and race with both West European and 
native influences in his lectures delivered between 1912 and 1913. Western authors 
such as Houston Stewart Chamberlin were attracting increasing interest in debates 
exploiting the concept of race – particularly, an emerging interest in biology and 
aesthetic differences as categories for racial separation.86 Sikorskii, whilst a member 
of the Nationalist Party rather than the URP, did contribute to rightist activities in 
other areas, such as the temperance movement, and was called upon as a witness 
during the initial stages of the Beilis affair in May 1911.87 
 
Sikorskii shared a wider suspicion of minority nationalities, and unlike many 
on the right, conceived that aesthetic and biological differences between races were 
more significant than religious ones. In a lecture delivered to the Kiev Club of 
Russian Nationalists, later published in 1915 as What is the Nation and Other Forms 
of Ethnic Life? Sikorskii declared that ‘in our days the biggest mistake we have 
made is mixing races with nations’.88 ‘The unity and relationships between different 
groups’, he continued ‘establishes itself most clearly in the life of the race, the aim 
of which is a successful organization of labour, and in particular, the task of 
preserving the lives of races and making their progress complete – both physical and 
spiritual’.89 Sikorskii claimed that the peoples of Russia were both modern and 
European (describing them as ‘true Aryans’), and that Ukrainians and Belorussians 
were not separate from them, due to their shared ethnicity.90 In contrast, he 
considered the ‘ancient tribe’ of the Jews to be distinct, due to their unique 
‘character’. Like many others on the right, he considered the Jewish question 
                                                                                                                                    
imperial period, is M. Mogil’ner, Homo imperii: istoriia fizicheskoi antropologii v Rossii (St. 
Petersburg, 2008). This has recently been published in English as M. Mogilner, Homo Imperii: A 
History of Physical Anthropology in Russia (Lincoln and London, 2013).  
86 I. Sikorskii, ‘Chto takoe natsiia i drugie formy narodnoi zhizni?’ Ab Imperio, 3 (2003), p. 242. This 
re-publication includes footnotes and commentary by I. Gerasimov, M. Mogil’ner, and A. Semenov. 
87 R. Weinberg, Blood Libel in Late Imperial Russia: The Ritual Murder Trial of Mendel Beilis 
(Indiana, 2013), pp. 99-101.  
88 Sikorskii, ‘Chto takoe natsiia i drugie formy narodnoi zhizni?’ p. 242. 
89 Ibid., p. 247.  
90 Ibid., p. 259.  
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separately, but he made specific reference to their racial difference, using the term 
race as well as tribe in his report.91  
 
Unlike most other racialists, Sikorskii was a trained psychiatrist, with a 
general interest in theories of degeneration and psychological decline, as seen in his 
opposition to the problem of alcoholism. To a greater degree than several other 
nationalist commentators, he attempted to give his observations on nationalism and 
racial difference a degree of scientific respectability, whilst making claims that 
referred to the importance of the spirit of each nation.92 On the Russian people, he 
wrote ‘their popular spirit – is the most biologically rich, based on centuries of 
biological and historical life, which is one of the main reasons that it is hidden from 
present view’.93 His views are a mixture of nineteenth-century Romantic thought (in 
Germany, where it originated, the spirit of a nation [Geist] was central to this 
Romantic revival), and more modern concepts that drew on scientific ideas and 
techniques transforming Russian nationalist discourse immediately before the First 
World War.94 
 
The idea of race was prevalent elsewhere. The main ideologue of the 
Nationalist Party, and one of the main columnists for Novoe vremia, Mikhail 
Men’shikov, also developed ideas of race and biological difference. This 
demonstrates how Russian nationalist thought was moving in new and unusual 
directions in the earliest years of the twentieth century, inspired by Western 
European trends and ideas. Like Sikorskii, the Jewish citizens of the empire were a 
particular problem for Men’shikov, and he held this particular ‘tribe’ to be distinct 
                                                
91 Ibid., pp. 262-263.  
92 For extensive commentary on Sikorskii’s ideology, see Mogil’ner, Homo imperii, pp. 237-278; for 
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Renovating Russia: The Human Sciences and the Fate of Liberal Modernity (Ithaca, NY, 2008), pp. 
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not only from Russians, but from all other national groups in the empire. In an 
article published in Novoe vremia on 1 February 1909, he wrote that ‘the Jews are all 
individuals, but they have no individuality’.95 They were described as a tribe of 
‘other people’ who derived from the Semitic lands, and hence their ‘different blood’ 
from the Russian people would manifest itself in a variety of cultural and behavioral 
differences.96 Like Sikorskii, a main thrust of his argument was that the Jewish race 
could not mix with native Russian populations, not only due to profound differences 
of culture and language, but also due to their biological seperateness. He continued, 
‘we, Aryans, even with our feelings of fear and disgust at these other parasitic tribes, 
cannot comprehend the internal element, as can a Jew himself. Here, we must 
understand that it is imperative to separate ourselves from this danger’.97  
 
It is telling that many of these doctrines that utilized ‘modern’ racism or anti-
Semitism were in development outside of the specific party confines of the right-
wing groups, as there was undoubtedly an overlap between other nationalist groups 
and the rightist factions on issues of race. A. S. Shmakov was one ardent anti-Semite 
on the right (a member of the RMP and URP) who specifically engaged with racist 
doctrine, expounding on the merits of the ideas of Houston Stewart Chamberlin, and 
describing the Jews as a pestilence on the Russian land, following this with the claim 
that ‘race is the main factor in the problems of state and society’.98 He was joined in 
having such ideas by rightists including Pavel Krushevan, G. V. Butmi and Pavel 
Bulatsel.99 However, for both Nationalists and the ‘extreme’ right, ethnically based 
racist ideologies that drew on biology and Darwin as their intellectual background, 
                                                
95 M. O. Men’shikov, Pis’ma k russkoi natsii (Moscow, 1999), p. 110.  
96 Ibid., p. 108.  
97 Ibid., p. 114.  
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though present, were usually marginal ideas in their discourse.100 Older ideas of 
religious infiltration, and the threat to poor Orthodox Russians from Jewish 
merchants and speculators, were more common. Men’shikov’s essay cited above 
was not merely a report about biological racist doctrine, but also contained the more 
common stereotypes of the Jews as the masters of international finance capitalism 
and monetary exploitation.101 
 
The most important point to realize is that these pejorative visions, in all their 
varieties, mutually reinforced one another despite the qualitative differences. 
Considering racist anti-Semitism as the ‘other’ in the ranks of the various types of 
Russian anti-Semitism, whilst a useful tool for scholarly analysis, does not always 
take us closer to the reality of how these doctrines actually influenced people. Not 
only was the distinction between ethnic, religious and cultural racism often unclear, 
more generally, it is a climate where traditional religious anti-Semitism was not only 
common, but often encouraged and legitimized, that allowed for the rise of different 
types of anti-Semitic ideology. Prejudices that had existed for centuries created 
fertile ground for the rise of new, yet linked, ideologies. What is most telling is the 
interaction between these different tendencies; they often occurred alongside each 
other, with commentators such as Men’shikov and Shmakov holding a potpourri of 
views simultaneously, rather than sticking rigidly to one type or the other. When 
considering the generic irrationality of racist thought and practice, this is hardly the 
most surprising outcome.  
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The Beilis Affair 
 
The most notorious example of this interdependence was the Mendel Beilis affair. 
The controversial episode of a factory worker accused of the murder of a Christian 
child, Andrei Iushinskii, shook Russian society and gained international notoriety.102 
The affair started on 20 March 1911, with the discovery of the corpse of thirteen-
year old Iushinksii in a cave on the outskirts of Kiev, and lasted for over two years, 
continuing through to the acquittal of Beilis on 29 October 1913. The discovery of 
the body was the starting point for a wave of lurid accusations against Beilis and 
many other Jews in the empire, with extreme right-wingers concocting a myth of a 
‘ritual murder’, a vision based on an ancient, religious mythology of a Jewish 
proclivity to target Christian children and commit a ‘blood libel’.103 The extreme 
right, in particular the URP and DHE in Kiev, the latter headed by a student at the 
nearby Kiev University, V. S. Golubev, took a prominent role in promoting the 
affair, firstly in bringing it to public attention, and then subsequently fuelling the 
interest of the imperial regime.104  
 
The details of the affair itself have been repeatedly examined: it is not the 
aim here to present a chronology.105 It has been agreed that the affair was in effect 
an anti-Semitic show trial, manufactured to demonstrate the ‘guilt’ of Beilis, and that 
the ‘facts’ reported by the prosecution team in the Kiev district court, based on the 
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blood ritual myth propagated by the far right, were fictitious.106 This interpretation is 
entirely satisfactory: the following analysis will instead consider how the affair 
sheds light on the nature of the right in this period. It will examine right-wing 
conceptions of religious and modern anti-Semitism; and also, how the controversial 
incidents contributed to the wider perception of the radical right. In particular, it will 
stress how the affair highlighted the fragility of the right-wing vision.107  
 
The Beilis affair: a right-wing myth 
 
On the discovery of Iushinskii’s body, pressure was put on local police to find a 
culprit for the murder. The ritual murder accusations first became public on 27 
March 1911, when Victor Pavlovich interrupted the calm of Iushinskii’s funeral by 
spreading leaflets depicting his murder as part of the blood libel ritual. The case 
quickly piqued the interest of local far right groups. Two associations, the youth 
organization the DHE, and the Kiev branch of the URP, were the most intimately 
connected with much of the resulting anti-Semitic propaganda – and Pavlovich was 
a member of both groups. The DHE’s paper, Dvuglavyi orel (the Double-Headed 
Eagle, edited by Dar’ia Kudelenko) as well as other right-wing tribunes such as 
Zemshchina and Vestnik Soiuza russkogo naroda carried grisly depictions of the 
blood ritual, and depicted Christian Russians as under attack from a Jewish ‘enemy 
within’. On 11 April 1911 a Dvuglavyi orel editorial claimed that ‘there is no doubt 
whatsoever that we have here a case of ritual murder conducted by the kikes’.108 
Zemshchina protested ‘surely we do not yet live in a kike republic, but a Russian 
monarchy’.109 In an age of a developing public press, the distribution of these 
graphic images was having an effect on the reading public. One powerful image was 
martyrdom myths: a strong theme on the right, and observers became familiar with 
                                                
106 See for example Rogger, Jewish Policies, pp. 40-55. 
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rightist attempts to present Iushinskii as a martyred victim of Russian Jewry. One 
Kievan described an image in Dvuglavyi orel as ‘a snapshot of a corpse surrounded 
by mourners, encircled with the inscription: to the memory of the eternal martyrs at 
the hands of the Jews’.110  
 
The presentation of the ritual murder claim was an opportunity for hardcore 
anti-Semites to project their own warped view of the state of Russian society and the 
role of the Jews in the history of the nation to the wider public. The radical right 
created an outlandish and gruesome interpretation of the murder to fit into their anti-
Semitic worldview. The police in Kiev were placed under pressure to prosecute, 
especially by the right-wing press, which pushed forward the ritual murder claims on 
both a local and national level. V. A. Golubev hounded the local prosecutor’s office 
in order to find a Jew fit to pin the ritual murder accusations on. The case received 
support from prominent right-wingers, including V. M. Purishkevich and G. G.  
Zamyslovskii, who pushed the regime to take up the ritual murder case, and in mid-
1911, Mendel Beilis, a local brick worker, was accused of ritual murder.  
 
The affair demonstrated a meeting between religious and modern anti-
Semitisms on the far right. Propaganda, as carried in Vestnik Soiuza russkogo 
naroda, and the views of Purishkevich, Zamyslovskii and Golubev, constructed an 
anti-Jewish prejudice based largely on religious lines. The ‘blood libel’ was an 
ancient myth that stretched back to medieval times, though by this stage it had more 
or less died out in Western Europe. As Robert Weinberg has described, it had 
originated in twelfth-century England, when rumours spread that Jews had murdered 
Christian children to subvert the Passion of Christ. The Fourth Lateran Council 
(1215) was crucial in propagating the ‘blood libel’ or ritual murder myth. A vital 
moment in this was when ‘the Western Latin Christian Church affirmed the doctrine 
of transubstantiation, the belief that the water and wine used in the sacrament of the 
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Eucharist contained the body and blood of Christ’. This facilitated the propagation 
of a mythical ritual involving blood, as guilty Christians felt that the consuming of 
wine and wafers at weekly communion was a form of ritual cannibalism, and this 
deviant behavior was projected onto Jews.111  
 
The right used both ancient and modern anti-Semitic ideas in the affair. The 
long-established religious myth of the Jews as ‘Christ killers’ was added to more 
recent ideas, which presented Jews as involved with socialism (the primary example 
being Marx himself), and the revolutionary movement more generally. This anti-
Semitism stemmed from a deep-seated rejection of constitutional and civil rights for 
ethnic and religious minorities, including rights of religious toleration.112 Both types 
of anti-Semitism mutually reinforced one another.113 The affair also demonstrates 
that the most radical and demagogical wing of the right, including the URP and the 
DHE, were obsessed with conspiracy theories. The rightist press was full of 
descriptions of outlandish ‘plots’ to subvert and to take over Russia. A wide variety 
of ‘conspiracies’ could also emanate from other enemy groups, including masons, 
socialists, students, Poles, Armenians and Finns; in short, a whole gamut of 
subversives undermining the power of the Russian Empire.114  
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The Beilis ritual murder campaign quickly gained adherents in the first half 
of 1911. Significant figures within the regime, such as the Minister of Justice from 
1906 to 1915, Ivan G. Shcheglovitov, have been suspected of bringing it to the 
attention of Nicholas II.115 The right’s role is clearer. Activists including Golubev 
brought it to public prominence and fuelled wild rumours of anti-Russian outrages 
committed by Jews, myths that some bought into. Once the case was transferred to 
the Kiev judicial office, the rightist press, such as Vestnik Soiuza russkogo naroda, 
carried extensive coverage of the trial, sometimes in lurid detail.116 A maniacal view 
of all Jews as Christ-killers was presented, and this interpretation was adopted by the 
prosecution team, in particular, by the ardent anti-Semites A. S. Shmakov and G. G. 
Zamyslovskii. That a distinctly dubious case had even reached the comparatively 
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late stage of undergoing legal process shows that right-wing attitudes, even at their 
most extreme, were not wholly on the periphery of Russian society, but had some 
influence. Notably, Golubev’s contention that Jewish ritual murder was the only 
possible explanation for the death of Iushinskii had support at the trial in September 
1913.117  
 
However, the Beilis affair was a much-contested matter. Even to those who 
sympathized, such views were potentially dangerous given the violence that could 
stem from them. Though rightist papers such as Dvuglavyi orel pleaded for calm 
after the ritual myth was first published,118 during and after 1911, there was an 
upturn in reports of anti-Jewish violence in Kiev.119 In wake of the Beilis affair, 
there was a desire from certain DHE activists to incite a new wave of pogroms, with 
Golubev one particular agitator. The publicizing of the affair shows a clear 
correlation with fresh incidences of public disorder; reports from Kiev province in 
1912 show isolated outbreaks of anti-Semitic violence.120 But these sources also 
point towards the limits of the right-wing vision, and in particular, the subsequent 
attempts to incite a new wave of anti-Semitic violence. Though there were isolated 
incidents, the outbreak of mass violence against all the Jews in Kiev from 1911, as 
hoped for by Golubev and others, never materialized.121 Was this a popular rejection 
of the anti-Semitic claims of the affair’s exponents? One can speculate that the 
overwhelming majority of Kievans, as had been the case in the 1905 pogrom,122 had 
no intention of getting themselves involved in anti-Jewish violence, whether they 
held such prejudices or not. Another source of opposition came from within Kiev’s 
governance. A. F. Girs, the governor of the province and certainly no liberal, far 
from granting the wishes of Golubev and other rightists to take retributive measures 
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against Kiev’s Jews, demanded they stop publishing graphic newspapers, warning 
that the resulting de-stabilization of the region would not be tolerated.123 
 
Controversy amongst nationalists 
 
Criticism also came from elsewere; one letter from a Kievan criticized the right-
wing press coverage during 1912. Of a Dvuglavyi orel editorial it asked ‘are we in 
the twentieth century?’124 Liberal publications universally condemned the affair, and 
several nationalists spoke out against it.125 D. I. Pikhno, the owner and editor of 
Kievlianin, criticized the Beilis affair, as did one of the newspaper’s main 
contributors, Vasilii Shul’gin. Shul’gin penned an extensive defence of Beilis’ 
innocence, appearing in Kievlianin on 27 September 1913, the third day of the Beilis 
trial.126 Shul’gin, a Nationalist Duma deputy, was himself an anti-Semite, and his 
articles in Kievlianin often presented invective against Jews. He did, however, 
denounce the claims of ritual murder, declaring that they had no basis in reality. 
Shul’gin’s principal reason for his opposition to the affair was that, as a lawyer by 
training, he found the lack of respect for the rule of law and the conspiratorial views 
presented in Dvuglavyi orel farcical. Opposition to anti-Semitism as an ideology 
played a lesser role, if it did at all. Shul’gin was confident that the judicial procedure 
would demolish all the accusations in due course.127 His editorial denounced the 
ritual interpretation of the murder as pure superstition. ‘One doesn’t have to be a 
lawyer, but only need to have some common sense, to understand that the Beilis 
indictment is mere prattle, which any defence attorney could break down without 
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even trying’.128 Shul’gin continued ‘weren’t any…educated in the law or connected 
to a judicial department?’129 However, right-wing papers throughout October 
continued with the murder ritual charge.130 In Shul’gin’s own Nationalist Party, the 
ritual murder accusations had some support. A telegram sent during the trial to the 
vice-prosecutor Georgii G. Chaplinskii from several members of the Kiev Club of 
Russian Nationalists, including A. I. Savenko, Mossakovskii, Dvorzhitskii and 
Chikhachev, re-iterated the view that Beilis was ‘tortured by Jewish-fanatics’.131 
Rightists responded to Shul’gin’s denunciations of the affair with invective: 
 
On September 28 1913, in issue no. 267 of the Kievlianin, I published a 
critical analysis of the work of the Kiev prosecutor’s office of the Beilis case. 
One can imagine the reaction from the right. The editor received a flood of 
most vile abuse, including not a few charges that the Kievlianin had been 
bought by Jews.132  
 
Shul’gin further complained that his stance against the case led to him receiving 
threats from many on the right, though mainly the DHE and their supporters.133 The 
potential for violence during the heated trial attracted particular controversy. One 
article in the Dubrovinite newspaper Vestnik Soiuza russkogo naroda, published as 
the trial was underway, reported on a meeting between several monarchist 
organizations. These included ones that had previously backed the ritual murder 
claims, such as the Russian Assembly, the URP and the UAM. The editorial called 
for all of their members to remain calm during the trial:  
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…in view of the continual broadcasting of left-wing views in the 
newspapers, as well as from individuals hostile to monarchism, connecting 
the events of the Beilis case with upcoming events such as pogroms, and 
turning attention to them, what monarchists are essentially showing is that 
they have not learned the lessons of the pogroms, as apparently the authority 
powers will not tolerate mob law. The committee of monarchist 
organizations, in view of the celebrations of the Romanov tercentenary, 
zealously asks all monarchist organizations to take all necessary measures 
that may stop their members becoming involved in violence and 
pogroms…134  
 
The article displays concern over possible counter recriminations, and indeed, a lack 
of faith in the members of the monarchist groups to show restraint, believing 
activists from the URP, DHE and others might retaliate in fury at a potential 
‘innocent’ verdict.135 The jury in the Kiev court reached the verdict on 29 October 
1913. The jurors were mostly peasants, and the case for the prosecution had hoped 
that ignorance and suspicion of Judaism amongst the local population would lead to 
a conviction. However, the surprising result was that Beilis was acquitted, after a 
vote from the twelve-man jury tied at six each for guilty and not guilty meant he was 
able to walk free under Russian law. Whilst finding Beilis innocent, the jury’s 
summation that Iushinskii’s death ‘looked like a ritual murder’ (by seven votes to 
five) led to extremists on the right presenting the case as a success. A shrill article in 
Dvuglavyi orel added, ‘the torturers of Christian children exult, but their criminality 
has been proven with extensive clarity in court’.136 Lev Tikhomirov, writing in 
Moskovskie vedomosti, demanded legal redress:  
 
…the Kiev court found Beilis not guilty of the ritual murder, but at the same 
time, recognized that the killing was itself proof of a ritual murder. Such 
recognition makes it yet more alarming if the government does not take 
immediate serious action towards final clarification on the issue of the 
existence of ritual murder.137  
                                                
134 Vestnik Soiuza russkogo naroda, 162-193, 1913, p. 3; see also Kir’ianov (ed.), Pravye partii, Vol. 
2, p. 356. 
135 Klier, ‘Zhid’: Biography of a Russian Epithet’, pp. 1-15. 
136 Dvuglavyi orel, 30 October 1913, 44, p. 1, in Weinberg, Blood Libel, p. 165.  
137 Moskovskie vedomosti, 30 October 1913, 250, p. 1. 
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That the court came close to convicting Beilis satisfied the extremists of the URP 
and DHE, even given his eventual acquittal. Although the case had been defeated, 
this was not a convincing verdict. Therefore, it is no surprise that voices from the 
right, including Tikhomirov, were still not convinced of Beilis’ innocence due to the 
contradictory verdicts. Vasilii Shul’gin, who had spoken out against the entire 
process, was later arrested in 1913 on the charge of disseminating false evidence 
during the trial, but was later acquitted by Nicholas II, who never took more than a 
cursory interest in the affair. Though in one sense, the right had won a tactical battle 
in bringing the Beilis case to a local court and creating national and international 
interest in the resulting ‘affair’, from another perspective it was not at all a victory. 
Apart from the acquittal result, it met with domestic and international condemnation. 
Moreover, regime support for the affair showed how the right was reliant on 
sympathizers elsewhere, and had lost some of its spontaneity as a movement by 
1911-1913.138 
 
Conclusion 
 
By 1914, the right was beset by a series of divisions: practical, ideological and 
political. There were serious problems regarding factionalism crippling the right 
from 1907 onwards, but other more subversive challenges were also damaging right-
wing credibility. The myths of the right, in the field of anti-Semitism where they had 
many adherents, alienated elitist nationalists such as Shul’gin who otherwise shared 
certain basic convictions, such as a belief in the Uvarov triad. As some perceptive 
conservative observers saw, the Beilis affair was damaging Russian prestige and 
credibility in making international headlines and achieving negative press coverage. 
The London-based newspaper The Times condemned the affair as the essence of 
                                                
138 Weinberg, Blood Libel, pp. 109-110.  
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reaction.139 Lucien Woolf, a British journalist, published a newspaper In Darkest 
Russia that took a special interest in popular and political anti-Semitism in the final 
years of the Russian Empire. It included regular updates on the Beilis affair, 
including voices from the nationalist wing that spoke out against it, such as Pikhno 
and Shul’gin. Another was Prince V. P. Meshcherskii, who commented ‘I look upon 
it as a page from the annals of a lunatic asylum’.140 Nationalists such as D. I. Pikhno 
who shared the URP’s commitment to a vision of ‘Great Russian’ superiority and 
opposition to ‘Jewish power’ saw the organization, and in particular its Dubrovinist 
faction, as little more than a bunch of street ruffians.  The above analysis shows that 
there was a schism between right-wing groups and other nationalists, which would 
have the consequence of prohibiting any drive to create a cross-party conservative or 
right-wing political group united from these disparate elements. In the end, due to 
deep ideological divisions, no such group was created on this platform.141 
 
 The breaking of the right also robbed tsarism of a potentially useful buffer of 
support. This did not necessarily need to be the case. Right-wingers used elements of 
traditional monarchism, including visions of a strong, centralized state – the primacy 
of the Russian autocracy. Many rightists also portrayed a Russia united by the 
supremacy of Russian Orthodox religion. Desiring the assimilation of national 
minorities was also not at odds with the past practice of the imperial regime. 
However, nationalism was changing in this period. Some conceptions of the 
greatness of the Russian narod involved ethnic exclusion, and others, a tacit 
rejection of the Tsarist status quo. Whilst both counter-revolutionary and reactionary 
ideologies on the right mutually reinforced one another, the tension between the two 
is of crucial importance in understanding why the right did not make more of a 
popular impact. In using elements of both modern and reactionary ideas, several 
                                                
139 The Times, 11 November 1913, 40336, p. 8; 12 November 1913, 40337, p. 9. International 
notoriety and condemnation had followed pogrom episodes during the previous decade. See Johnson, 
‘Uses and Abuses’, pp. 162-166. 
140 In Darkest Russia, 22 October 1913, p. 17. 
141 See Loukianov, ‘Russia for Russians’, p. 88. 
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right-wing groups positioned themselves in a difficult position. Clearly, they were 
separate from the autocracy, but did not present distinct, independent or convincing 
solutions to the crisis of Russian power that many different elements of society 
recognized as the central problem of the old regime. The extreme nature of the 
right’s response to the revolutionary crisis had two important implications. Firstly, 
the exclusionary nature of the extreme right undermined the potential for greater 
right-wing support; the widespread press coverage of the Beilis affair, along with the 
supposed threats posed by national minorities, created a perception that rightists 
were solely negative, not providing positive or constructive solutions to the 
problems of Russia’s present. Secondly, the autocracy’s support base was 
fragmented by the inability of moderate and extreme rightists to work together, and 
provide a stable, larger conservative group that could provide support for the 
embattled Romanov monarchy.  
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Conclusion 
 
At the outset of the First World War one hundred years ago, the Russian right had 
been severely diminished as a social movement from its peak in 1905-1907. Though 
it still commanded adherents in Russian society, its ability to appeal to peasants and 
workers, which was what organizations such as the Union of Russian Men (URM) 
and the Union of Russian People (URP) had originally aimed for in 1905, was 
limited. Organizational disarray, ideological disputes and the unique political and 
social context of the Russian Empire did not give the right enough fertile ground 
upon which to make the necessary breakthroughs. There was little overlap between 
extreme rightists and other defenders of the state, denying the right its imagined role 
as a vital buffer of support for the autocracy.1 However, some right-wingers were 
proven accurate in predicting a future revolution and further crisis. Whilst not from 
‘the right’ as described here, it was an arch-conservative from inside the regime, Petr 
Durnovo, one who had seen an emerging autonomous right as a potential buttress of 
support for tsarism in 1905, who proved most sage in his predictions. At the outset 
of the war, Durnovo wrote in his famous memorandum that Germany and Russia did 
not have conflicting interests and needed to act as allies, and that ‘in the event of a 
defeat, the possibility of which in a struggle with a foe like Germany cannot be 
overlooked, social revolution in its most extreme form is inevitable’.2  
 
Like so many other political and social groups in Europe, the war changed 
much after 1914; here, only the most general contours of right-wing activity can be 
sketched. The fortunes of the right did not improve in this period, and the outbreak 
of war and its ensuing events further split the supporters of the autocracy. Whether 
to enthusiastically back the autocracy, or to go further in realizing its deficiencies 
                                                
1 One example of this criticism was from the Nationalist deputy to the Fourth Duma, A. I. Savenko, 
who also specifically referred to the rightists as a ‘separate fraction’. GARF, F. 102, op. 265, d. 987, 
l. 8: A. I. Savenko (St. Petersburg), to N. K. Savenko (Kiev), 28 April 1914.    
2 ‘Durnovo’s memorandum’, in F. A. Golder (ed.), Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917 
(Gloucester, MA, 1964), p. 21; for incisive commentary on Durnovo’s career, see Lieven, Russia’s 
Rulers, pp. 207-223. 
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than before, was one particular point of contention. Some of the most prominent 
monarchists such as Nikolai Markov exhibited pro-German sentiments, not least as 
Germany was still a monarchy at this stage. The loyalties of monarchists were split 
between what some saw as their own wavering autocracy, which had not done 
enough to secure right-wing interests, and backing the war effort, which had shown 
the patriotism of the Russian people. Vladimir Purishkevich saw the outbreak of pro-
Russian sentiment in 1914 as a popular expression of support for the regime, and 
enthusiastically threw himself into supporting the monarchist cause. This rightist 
Duma deputy cancelled almost all of his political activities after 1914, to organize 
relief and charity work in support of the war effort, which he enthusiastically backed 
until 1917.3  
 
More widely, there was a triumphant mood in Russia at the outset of the war, 
reflected by right-wing newspapers such as Dubrovin’s Vestnik Soiuza russkogo 
naroda, a sentiment reminiscent of conservative visions of imperial grandeur and a 
swift, decisive military victory in the war against Japan a decade earlier. For these 
newspapers, unequivocal support for the war effort was the only possible option.4 
This triumphalism was challenged by the stark realities of Russia’s military 
campaigns in the initial phases of the war, which were largely disastrous, 
exemplified by among other defeats the rout at Tannenberg, which resulted in the 
destruction of the Russian Second Army in August 1914. War brought chaos and a 
challenge to perceptions of an easy victory, though some right-wingers continued to 
support the military campaign whilst hoping against hope for a Russian victory. 
Tikhomirov wrote in his diary in August 1915 ‘in truth, demoralization has occurred 
on both sides. The Germans are also giving in, and there is even an expression now 
that soldiers “fight a loser’s chess game”, where Germans and Russians are equally 
                                                
3 J. Langer, ‘Fighting the Future: The Doomed Anti-revolutionary Crusade of Vladimir 
Purishkevich’, Revolutionary Russia, 19, 1 (2006), pp. 43-44.  
4 Vestnik Soiuza russkogo naroda, 23 August 1914, 195, p. 12; 21 December 1914, 203, p. 12. 
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striving to surrender to one another’.5 Indeed, Russia’s improving performances in 
the field during 1916 and 1917 fed such aspirations for eventual victory, and not 
only amongst rightists.  
 
In the imperial court, the autocracy’s leading figures were attracting 
increasing criticism. The military had long been a sacred cause for the right, but the 
imperial regime was more open to criticism. A particularly hated figure was Grigorii 
Rasputin, rumoured to hold the favour of the Tsarina, and the stories of his unseemly 
activities in the imperial court were seen by important rightists, who themselves 
wished for the favour of the imperial regime, as bringing shame on the motherland. 6 
Fantasies of treason and pro-German influence at the imperial court were on the rise 
throughout the war, not only from the far right, but from liberal Duma deputies too.7 
This fevered atmosphere, and Rasputin’s activity in spreading rumours of his own 
influence, inspired a plot to kill off this increasingly hated figure, with one rightist 
playing a central role in the eventual assassination of the imperial favourite. On 16 
December 1916, the plot to kill Rasputin was carried out by Purishkevich, Felix 
Iusupov and S. S. Lazovert. By this stage, rightists were increasingly critical of the 
government’s conduct in the war, even in the Fourth Duma, a largely pliant political 
system. Purishkevich and Markov launched speeches critical of all aspects of the 
military campaign, showing that the autocracy itself was increasingly under fire 
from right-wingers who posed as the defenders of the people against an increasingly 
hapless regime and its chaotic conduct of the war effort.8  
 
The revolutions of 1917 represented the final defeat of the organized post-
1905 right, bringing a swift end to the main organizations that had been tottering for 
several years. After 1917, many rightists retreated from organized political activity, 
                                                
5 L. A. Tikhomirov, Dnevnik, 1915-1917 gg. (Moscow, 2008), p. 113.  
6 Figes and Kolonitskii, Interpreting the Russian Revolution, pp. 15-19.  
7 For discussion of the fear of German spies within the Russian Empire, see W. C. Fuller Jr., The Foe 
Within: Fantasies of Treason and the End of the Russian Empire (Ithaca, NY, 2006). 
8 See for example two published speeches delivered in the Fourth State Duma in 1916 from Markov, 
in N. E. Markov, Voiny temnykh sil (Moscow, 2008), pp. 408-421 and pp. 422-436.  
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with some going into exile, and others retreating from public life entirely. Many of 
the figures from the old regime were captured and interrogated by the Provisional 
Government Commission of Enquiry in 1917, one of which was Markov. Others, 
such as Purishkevich, initially escaped this fate, and conspired against the Bolshevik 
regime, but after later capture and punishment (in his case, serving a four-month 
sentence of hard labour) toned down their political activity.9 However, the 
emergence of the White Armies in the civil war provided some ex-rightists, 
including Purishkevich, with a natural home. One of the most prominent right-
wingers in the White movement was Markov, leader of the southern section of the 
monarchical Loyal Union (Soiuz vernykh). The activities of former far-rightists in 
the White Armies show previous obsessions; one of these was anti-Semitism, as 
exhibited by distribution of copies of the notorious tract The Protocols of the Elders 
of Zion amongst the White Armies, a book that blamed the Jews for the decline of 
Western civilization.10 However, suffering from divided ideologies, unclear goals, 
strategic difficulties and political impotence, this movement did not provide the 
organizational framework necessary for a monarchist restoration of Russia; in this 
way, paralleling the right-wing movement that had preceded it. Instead, many right-
wingers went into exile – Paris was one particular destination – or toned down all of 
their political activities whilst staying in Russia.11 One prominent figure, Lev 
Tikhomirov, died in Moscow in 1923, left untouched by the Bolsheviks. One can 
only speculate why he met with this relatively serene fate; perhaps by this stage, 
devoid of his movement and without any social support, he was considered to be no 
more than a harmless crank by leading figures in Russia’s Bolshevik regime, not 
worth pursuing seriously.  
 
                                                
9 See Langer, ‘Fighting the Future’, pp. 50-51.  
10 One author has suggested that by giving refuge to figures that would later migrate to the White 
Armies in the civil war after 1917, who would then go into exile and serve as an inspiration for later 
fascist movements, the Russian right in an indirect way influenced Nazism. See Kellogg, Russian 
Roots of Nazism, pp. 30-46. On the influence of the protocols after 1917, see R. Sh. Ganelin, ‘Beloe 
dvizhenie i “protokoly sionskikh mudretsov”’, in Natsional’naia pravaia prezhde i teper’. Istoriko-
sotsiologicheskie ocherki, Pt. 1: Rossiia i russkoe zarubezh’e (St. Petersburg, 1992), pp. 124-130. 
11 J. J. Stephan, The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925-1945 (New York, 1968).  
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However, to focus only on these individual fates is to lose sight of the wider 
context. Russian rightists were part of a general crisis of European conservatism in 
the early twentieth century, and in this they were significant. As we have seen, the 
story of the Russian right is a European as well as a Russian one, with West 
European influences playing a central role in shaping individual ideologies, as well 
as the direction of the movement more generally, which was ironically formed in 
response to ‘Western’ tendencies. The impact of European racialist ideas, and the 
influence of German nationalist student groups such as the Burschenschaften on the 
Academists are but two examples of this.12 What light can study of the pre-
revolutionary Russian right shed on contemporary European movements? The 
similarities with other nationalist groups in the fin-de-siècle period elsewhere in 
Europe are quite pronounced. Analogous tendencies appear in a variety of countries, 
among which were British conservative groups, but perhaps more striking were 
similarities with German nationalist groups before 1914, such as the Pan-German 
Union, which criticized the bureaucracy and pledged unswerving defence of the 
emperor.13 Charles Maurras of the Action Française, like the leaders of the URP and 
the Union of the Archangel Mikhail (UAM), desired to create a movement based 
around an official state religion, uniting the people with the state, and constructing a 
sense of a national community. Like the URP, this group owed more to cross-class 
unity, rather than traditional left and right distinctions.14 
 
Perhaps the most tempting initial comparison to make is with the fascist 
movements of the 1920s and 1930s.15 Certainly the right represented a departure 
                                                
12 Luk’ianov, Rossiiskii konservatizm i reforma, pp. 243-257.   
13 See G. Eley, Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change After 
Bismarck (New Haven, CT, 1980); R. Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study 
of the Pan-German League, 1886-1914 (Boston, MA, 1984); and the essays in L. E. Jones and J. 
Retallack (eds.), Between Reform, Reaction and Resistance: Studies in the History of German 
Conservatism from 1789 to 1945 (Oxford, 1993). 
14 See for example E. Weber, Action Française: Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth Century France 
(Stanford, CA, 1962); S. Kalman, The Extreme Right in Interwar France: The Faisceau and the 
Croix de Feu (Hampshire, 2008). 
15 Rogger, ‘Was there a Russian Fascism?’ pp. 398-415. 
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from traditional conservative positions, and in this they mirrored fascist movements 
in Germany and Italy. However, unlike later fascists, the pre-1914 rightist rise to 
pre-eminence was hampered by an equivocal response from the regime. The splitting 
of the support for the autocracy, which was accused of not understanding the right’s 
true role, was a source of major regret for some. Most right-wingers did not live long 
enough to see the rise to power of fascist regimes in Europe, but in 1928, Nikolai 
Markov wrote:  
 
The Union of Russian People in 1906-1907, consisting of three to four 
thousand local councils, represented a great nucleus for the formation of a 
government organization for popular monarchism. If the Russian government 
at the time had been able to understand what Mussolini later realized in Italy, 
and instead of stubbornly opposing the Tsar and leaders of the monarchist 
associations, supported and implemented them as appropriate, salvaging the 
idea of the need for supreme power to rely on the best parts of the population 
organized in strong unions, Russia’s history would have been quite 
different.16  
 
In their commitment to existing institutional structures, rightists, unlike fascists, did 
not desire truly revolutionary changes to the superstructure of society. Yet Markov 
accurately noted how the smashing of any hopes for the creation of a coalition of 
pro-autocracy forces aided the downfall of the regime, as well as the right: 
 
Rebellion against the royal authorities – in the name of royal power – was 
impossible. We had to abandon the offensive, the public construction of such 
activity (otherwise – fascism) and retreat deep underground in order to save 
the shrines and the banners of the autocracy. This mournful retreat of the 
Union of Russian People lost many supporters and most of their leaders, and 
from a mighty, efficient and formidable force of the enemies of the people, 
gradually turned into the autocracy’s propaganda organization for the 
ideological struggle against the dark forces.17 
 
                                                
16 Markov, Voiny temnykh sil, p. 124. 
17 Ibid., p. 125. For more on this theme, see the various essays in ‘Ot chernosotenstva k fashizmu’, in 
Natsional’naia pravaia prezhde i teper’, pp. 111-171. 
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The inability to provide effective support for the autocracy raises the question as to 
where to place the right among the regime’s defenders. Rightists have been seen as 
proto-fascists by some commentators,18 but a more appropriate comparison is 
between the extreme right in countries that had similar pre-conditions to the Russian 
Empire, such as Romania and Spain in the twentieth century. Unlike in the modern, 
industrialized societies of Northern Italy and especially Germany, emerging far right 
groups in these two countries arose in response to demographic conditions closer to 
those in much of the Russian Empire in the early twentieth century. All three were 
largely agrarian, rural societies undergoing processes of modernization and 
urbanization that were to a large extent incomplete during the rise of a nascent right-
wing movement. Once in power in Spain, the Franco regime utilized principles 
similar in important respects to many apparent in the pravye factions: protecting the 
power of the corporate state; the centrality of an official religion to civic and public 
life (albeit Roman Catholicism, rather than Russian Orthodoxy); veneration of 
‘traditional’ institutions such as the army, Church and government; protecting the 
agrarian economy; beatification of an authoritarian political superstructure; and the 
denial of emerging ‘liberal’ institutions. But a central difference was the role of the 
leader – in the case of Franco’s Spain, the dictator himself.19 Unlike in post-civil war 
Spain, the Russian right could celebrate no primus inter pares of their own: only the 
Tsar could hold such a role.20  
 
 An even more striking parallel emerges with the Romanian far right in the 
1930s. The most famous of these groups was the fissiparous tendency led by the 
charismatic Corneliu Codreanu, founded on 24 July 1927. The movement started out 
as the League of the Archangel Mikhail, before the formation of the Iron Guard in 
1930 as the paramilitary wing, and the name under which the entire movement came 
                                                
18 See, typically, S. B. Liubosh, Russkii fashist V. M. Purishkevich (Leningrad, 1925), p. 29.  
19 R. Carr, Modern Spain, 1875-1980 (Oxford, 1980), pp. 155-172. 
20 This does not mean that subtle changes were not occurring, as we saw with the example of 
Gringmut.  
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to be known in later years.21 The ideological and practical similarities between 
rightist tendencies in Russia and Romania, as in the case of Spain, show some 
distinct congruities. One analyst has described the supporters of this Romanian 
movement as ‘pseudo-intellectual riff-raff unable or unwilling to make a decent 
living, who sought refuge in a mystic nationalism, the only reality of which was a 
ferocious anti-Semitism’.22 The latter two statements could easily be applied to 
many of the followers of the URM, URP or UAM. The visions of the right’s 
supporters in both countries had many parallels. Romanian nationalists relied on 
romantic conceptions of land and state from a bygone era, and the emblem of the 
Archangel Mikhail, like the group’s name, was identical to one of the most 
prominent Russian far-right groups assessed above. The symbolic similarities are 
therefore obvious. Another congruent feature was the obvious debt of both 
movements to religion. Like the URP, the League in Romania relied on overt 
religiosity in terms of its symbolism, and also its central ideological tenets; these 
were heroic, puritan, ascetic and above all Christian revivals.23 Both movements 
expressed harsh anti-Semitism and anti-minority nationalism.  
 
But the most important correlation is with the post-Soviet Russian 
Federation, where the idea of social crisis and revolution that inspired the radical 
right in the earliest years of the twentieth century has not gone away, but been 
transformed. Similar ideas have fed the right as it emerged after communism. In the 
early 1990s, several groups appeared as part of a nationalist revival in protection of 
‘Russian traditions’, which shared the names of groups examined in this thesis. One 
was the URP, another, the Russian Assembly and a newspaper called Russkoe 
znamia appeared.24 Certainly, one must be careful when making direct parallels 
between the pre-1917 right and these ‘new’ extreme nationalist groups. The social 
                                                
21 For background, see Livezeanu, Cultural Politics; E. Weber, ‘The Men of the Archangel’, Journal 
of Contemporary History, 1, 1 (1966), pp. 101-126; ‘Romania’, in Rogger and Weber (eds.), The 
European Right, pp. 501-574. 
22 A. Cretianu, The Lost Opportunity (London, 1957), p. 20.  
23 Payne, A History of Fascism, pp. 277-289.  
24 Laqueur, Black Hundred, pp. 261-270.  
  
 
 
 
 
266 
conditions in the 1990s were entirely different. The Russian Federation is not the 
Russian Empire, although problems over what the ‘nation’ means remain. A 
seventy-five year period of communism has come and gone. However, the idea of a 
social crisis, national instability and threats to Russian religion and nation play a key 
role in the extreme right of today, as they did with the movements of yesteryear.25  
 
Certainly the ‘enemy’ targets may have changed, and new sources of ‘social 
chaos’ added. It should not be overlooked how extreme, fringe right-wing 
movements, which often attract media attention entirely disproportionate to their 
size, may reflect developments and moods elsewhere in society. In Western Europe, 
popular concerns over immigration have seen the rise of voluble radical right 
movements in virtually every country. A different case, currently attracting much 
attention in the West, is the promulgation in Russia of laws restricting ‘gay 
propaganda’, and the resulting tensions over homosexuality and homophobia that 
have stimulated the activities of right-wing extremists – a global and European as 
well as a Russian phenomenon. In 2009, a group composed of members of ultra-
nationalist and Orthodox Christian groups, one of which adopted the nomenclature 
of the 1905 period and called itself a ‘black hundred’ group, denounced 
homosexuality in a rally held in the centre of Moscow.26 The use of modern 
technology in these activities and addresses sits alongside ancient prejudices. It has 
been reported how rightist groups have been using social media as a tool with which 
                                                
25 Some of the most extreme of these far right movements, such as Russian National Unity and 
Arctogaia, are being classified as neo-fascist. See A. Umland, ‘The Post-Soviet Russian Extreme 
Right’, Problems of Post-Communism, 44, 4 (1997), pp. 53-61; and ‘Conceptual and Contextual 
Problems in the Interpretation of Contemporary Russian Ultranationalism’, Russian Politics and Law, 
46, 4 (2008), pp. 6-30; see also R. Griffin, W. Loh and A. Umland (eds.), Fascism Past and Present, 
West and East: An International Debate on Concepts and Cases in the Comparative Study of the 
Extreme Right (Stuttgart, 2006). 
26 Associated Press, ‘Moscow Riot Police Violently Break up Gay Pride Rally’, The Guardian, 16 
May 2009, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/16/moscow-police-gay-rights> (accessed 
26/4/2014).  
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to ‘ambush’ homosexuals, part of an upsurge in vigilantism.27 Concepts of 
conservative nationalism that share the common ground of national restoration, pro-
Orthodoxy and Russian chauvinism with the extreme right have been revived 
elsewhere; a distinct echo from an earlier period. These compete with right-wing 
groups by diverting or releasing public energies in providing non-toxic fronts for 
similar impulses. Yet otherwise disconnected activities can serve to inspire further 
efforts from fringe far-right groups, by vetoing their desires and legitimizing their 
prejudices. The activity of extreme nationalists in both Russia and Ukraine in 
Russian intervention in Crimea during 2014 shows how the use of nationalism by 
regimes and governments can lead to increased activity from autonomous, radical 
political and social groups. 
 
As long as it is possible to stimulate an idea of an impending social crisis, 
regardless of the actual source of tensions, radical right activity will not completely 
disappear. Rightist activity relies on a constellation of factors in harnessing an idea 
of crisis and presenting it to followers. The myth of an idealized, usable past and its 
corruption in the present period is a malleable idea that can be shaped to rapidly 
changing social, political and economic circumstances. In Europe today, we can see 
similar events occuring in rightist revolts that draw on working-class support, 
channeling popular disaffection and anger against ‘ruling classes’ of liberals and 
bureaucrats. Yet the contingency of these processes is merely stimulated in Russia, 
by its turbulent history as well as its present crises. Interest in Russia’s conservative 
and right-wing heritage, a trend alive and well in Russia today, will continue into the 
future as debates on Russia’s history and identity continue to be one of the 
inescapable dilemmas of the progress of that nation. 
 
                                                
27 A. Luhn, ‘Russian Anti-Gay Law Prompts Rise in Homophobic Violence’, The Guardian, 1 
September 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/01/russia-rise-homophobic-
violence> (accessed 26/4/2014). 
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Appendix A. Significant individuals 
 
Dubrovin, Aleksandr I. (1855-1921): leader of the Union of Russian People (1905-
1912), chair of the All-Russian Dubrovinist Union of Russian People (1912-1917). 
Golitsyn, Dmitrii P. (1860-1928): a co-founder of the Russian Assembly (1901), 
member of the State Council.  
Grigor’ev, Apollon G. (?-?): mayor of Odessa (1905-1907).  
Gringmut, Vladimir A. (1851-1907):  editor of Moskovskie vedomosti (1896-1907), 
leader of the Russian Monarchist Party (1905-1907). 
Iuzefovich, Boris M. (1842-1911): the leader of the Russian Assembly in Kiev, 
editor of the newspaper Pravovogo i poriadka, a member of the URP in Kiev, son of 
publicist and statesman Mikhail V. Iuzefovich. 
Konovnitsyn, Aleksei I. (1855-1919): leader of the Union of Russian People in 
Odessa (1906-1911). 
Krushevan, Pavel (Pavolachi) A. (1860-1909): editor of Bessarabets, member of the 
Russian Assembly, leader of the URP in Bessarabia (1905-1909). 
Markov, Nikolai E. (1866-1945): member of the Union of Russian People, leader of 
the Union of the Archangel Mikhail and later a leader of the Union of Russian 
People after the 1912 split. 
Men’shikov, Mikhail O. (1859-1918): Nationalist Party member, contributor to 
Novoe vremia newspaper. 
Nikol’skii, Boris V. (1870-1919): member of the Russian Assembly, member of the 
Union of Russian People from 1905. 
Poluboiarinova, Elena (1864-1919): associate of A. I. Dubrovin, secretary of 
Russkoe znamia (1909-1912), treasurer of the Union of Russian People from 1907. 
Purishkevich, Vladimir M. (1870-1920): member of the Russian Assembly and the 
Union of Russian People; later leader of the Union of the Archangel Mikhail (1908-
1917); delegate to the Third and Fourth State Dumas. 
Riabov, Petr V. (1870-after 1917): leader of the Perm branch of the Union of 
Russian People (1907-1917), previously a sorter in the Motovilikha cannon factory. 
  
 
 
 
 
269 
Sharapov, Sergei F. (1855-1911): editor of Russkii trud and Russkoe delo; also one 
of the founding members and a leader of the Union of Russian Men.  
Shcherbatov, Aleksandr G. (1850-1915): one of the organizers and chairs of the 
Union of Russian Men (1905-1909). 
Sheremetev, Pavel S. (1871-1943): a leader of the Beseda circle, leader of the Union 
of Russian Men from 1905.  
Shmakov, Aleksei S. (1852-1916): author of numerous anti-Semitic tracts, including 
Mezhdunarodnoe tainoe pravitel’stvo and Svoboda i evrei. 
Shul’gin, Vasilii V. (1878-1976): co-editor of Kievlianin, Nationalist Party deputy to 
the Third and Fourth State Dumas. 
Sikorskii, Ivan A. (1842-1919): psychologist, ideologue of the Nationalist Party, 
called as a witness in the Beilis affair in 1911. 
Tikhanovich-Savitskii, Nestor N. (1866-after July 1917): leader of the Astrakhan’ 
People’s Monarchist Party. 
Tikhomirov, Lev A. (1852-1923): member of the Russian Assembly and the Union 
of Russian People; editor of Moskovskie vedomosti (1919-1912). 
Tolmachev, Ivan N. (1861-1931): mayor of Odessa (1907-1911). 
Viazigin, Aleksandr S. (1867-1919): co-founder of the Russian Assembly (1901). 
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Appendix B. Glossary  
 
Chernaia sotnia – black hundred 
Druzhina – combat organization, also known as the ‘fighting brotherhoods’ 
Narod – literally ‘people’, sometimes used to mean Russian peasant or ‘simple folk’ 
Narodnost’ – Russian nationality 
Obshchina – peasant commune 
Osobyi otdel – special section of the department of police 
Otechestvo – fatherland 
Panikhida – memorial service 
Panskie vecherniki – musical literary evenings 
Pravoslavie – Russian Orthodoxy  
Pravye – rightist/right-wing 
Rodina – motherland 
Rossiiskii – Russian by nationality or the Russian Empire 
Russkii – Russian by ethnicity or culture 
Samoderzhavie – the autocracy 
Samosoznaniia – self-awareness or self-awakening 
Soslovie – estate system 
Smutnoe vremia – the time of troubles, as rightists often referred to the post-1905 era 
Zemskii sobor – assembly of the land
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